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Abstract
This comparative study of Ecuador and Bolivia analyses the political dynamics of 
economic reforms in the last two decades. The question guiding this work is: under which 
conditions are presidents able to introduce the reforms they propose? and the focus is put 
on the political processes behind the tax reforms that were implemented and those that 
failed. The theoretical framework employs an institutionalist approach and focuses on how 
variations in institutional structures have shaped policy-making processes. Since most 
authors limit their analysis to institutional aspects, the thesis aims to make a contribution to 
this approach by analysing the influence of particular institutional aspects on the 
introduction of reforms. Other variables, such as the influence of private sector groups or 
popular protest, are included in the analysis to explore to what extent they challenge or 
complement the argument. The tax reforms of the last two decades are used as a case study 
to account for dynamics of economic policy-making in the two countries more generally. 
The study resulted in three main findings. Firstly, the institutional analysis proposed 
provides a coherent explanation as to why Bolivia was able to implement wide-ranging tax 
reforms during the 1980s and 1990s while presidents in Ecuador usually failed to introduce 
similar changes. Bolivia’s particular form of presidentialism -  featuring a parliamentary 
element of electing the president in Congress in the second round of elections -  has 
produced coalition governments after 1985, which allowed presidents to introduce wide- 
ranging tax reforms. In Ecuador, on the other hand, tax reforms often failed due to the lack 
of institutional incentives for overcoming the political deadlock of a fragmented Congress. 
A second finding contributes to the economic crisis approach as hyperinflation proved to 
have an impact on the policy-making process (Bolivia after 1985), which has not 
necessarily been the case when countries experienced other types of economic crises (e.g. 
Ecuador in 1999). Thirdly, the change in the pattern of policy-making within Bolivia is 
examined. It is argued that the extra-institutional processes Bolivia experienced during the 
recent years have been caused by the same institutional mechanism that had brought 
political stability during the 1980s and 1990s as coalition politics was dependent on 
patronage payments and the political parties lost more and more support. This thesis, in 
short, fills a gap by connecting institutional analysis to actual economic reforms; it 
establishes a link between political structures and their effect on policy-making as regards 
the case of tax reform.
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1 Introduction
“Economists may have dominated the academic discussion 
o f taxation, but political criteria appear to have dominated 
tax policy-making in the real world. ” 
B. Guy Peters1
During the last two decades almost all Latin American countries have undergone a U-turn 
in their development strategy and have increasingly implemented market-oriented 
economic policies. In Duncan Green’s words this phenomenon can be described as a "silent 
revolution" (Green, 1995). While this paradigm-shift has taken place region wide, there are, 
however, great variations in timing, scope and content of so-called structural adjustment 
and stabilisation policies. Chile, for instance, has introduced wide-ranging economic 
reforms2 throughout the last two decades and now has one of the most open economies of 
the region. Brazil, in contrast, has been a late reformer as it implemented heterodox 
programmes during the 1980s and only turned towards more orthodox economic policies in 
the mid-1990s. Why did some countries implement wide-ranging market-oriented reforms, 
while others did not? Why did countries introduce economic reforms for certain periods 
and not at other times?
Parallel to economic liberalisation Latin American countries have experienced a process of 
democratisation and it was once commonly assumed that these two processes would be 
naturally reinforcing each other and would eventually lead to consolidated democracies and 
market-oriented economies. Events of recent years have challenged this assumption. 
Economic liberalisation is increasingly criticised, in some cases reversed and political 
instability has put democratic viability into question. The recent events in Bolivia and 
Ecuador and the early termination of Lucio Gutierrez’s and Carlos Mesa’s presidential 
terms provide striking examples.
1 Peters, 1991:55.
2 When using the term “reform” I will follow Grindle’s definition: “a deliberate effort on the part of the 
government to redress perceived errors in prior and existing policy and institutional arrangements” (Grindle, 
1991:4). This should not be considered to imply a judgment on the quality of the policies.
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1.1 R e se a r c h  Q uestio n
In this comparative study of Ecuador and Bolivia the political dynamics of economic 
reforms is being analysed. The question guiding this work is: under which conditions are 
presidents able to introduce the reforms they propose? Comparing the patterns of economic 
reforms of Ecuador and Bolivia for most of the last two decades, the differences seem 
rather striking: Bolivia undertook a “shock” adjustment with its Nueva Politico Economica 
(New Economic Policy -  NPE) in 1985 and has introduced wide-ranging policies in the 
subsequent years and throughout the 1990s. During the same period the country has also 
experienced a period of great political stability. Ecuador on the other hand took a gradual 
approach to implementing reforms ever since its return to democracy (1979). Grindle 
(1993) termed this pattern as "muddling through", while Edwards (1995:7) classified 
Ecuador even as a "non-reformer”. Considering these patterns -  how can the differences 
between Ecuador and Bolivia be accounted for? While there is a stark contrast between 
their policy-making processes in the 1980s and 1990s, the countries have become more 
similar during the last couple of years as Bolivian presidents struggled to have their 
economic reforms approved and as the country lapsed into political instability, as expressed 
in the overthrow of Sanchez de Lozada in October 2003 and the resignation of President 
Mesa in June 2005. What has caused these changes within Bolivia?
These questions provide the background for the research undertaken and an explanation for 
these processes will be sought.
1.2 T h e o r e t ic a l  A ppr o a c h  a n d  A r g u m e n t
The theoretical framework employed in this study has a neo-institutionalist approach as its 
base. The main argument therefore focuses on how the different political structures of the 
two countries have shaped the processes through which policy decisions have been made 
and implemented.
Empirical Institutionalism. A stream of new institutionalism, which B. Guy Peters 
(1999:78ff) termed “empirical institutionalism”, has focused on analysing how the structure 
of governments leads to differences in policy processes and the choices made by 
governments. Most of all, this literature compares the functioning of presidential systems to 
that of parliamentary systems. A debate about the relative advantages or disadvantages of 
either system was triggered by Juan Linz’s article Presidentialism or Parliamentary
14
Democracy: Does It Make a Difference?.3 He essentially argued that a democratic regime is 
more likely to be consolidated when it has a parliamentary system and that presidentialism 
causes problems of governance (Linz, 1994). More often than not the discussion that has 
evolved focused on the dichotomy between a parliamentary and a presidential system; on 
broad regime type rather than on specific variations between presidential regimes or 
differences of institutional features. A lot of research along this line has involved large 
statistical studies -  like a recent work by Przeworski et al. (2000) -  rather than smaller case 
studies. The main question behind most analyses was whether it is parliamentary or 
presidential regimes that lead to stability and democratic consolidation. A consensus 
quickly emerged: the majority of scholars agreed on the superiority of parliamentarism, or, 
as Jorge Lanzaro put it, on the “satanisation of presidentialism” (Lanzaro, 2001b: 18).
Some analysts, however, have questioned the primacy accorded to parliamentary regimes 
and have focused on the specific design of presidential regimes and the differences between 
them. Mainwaring and Shugart (1997a) convincingly questioned the pro-parliamentary 
analysts, for example, by referring to a crucial flaw in the analysis: selection bias. Since 
most presidential regimes can be found in Latin America and most parliamentary ones in 
Europe or the former British colonies, it is difficult to determine to what extent the 
instability and failure of governance in Latin America has been caused by the regime type 
or due to economic and other factors. It is difficult to say whether the European-style 
parliamentary systems would have fared much better facing the economic crises occurring 
in Latin America during the 1980s and 1990s. Mainwaring and Shugart (1997a) examined 
the variations between presidential regimes in different countries and how specific 
institutional designs affect political processes and democratic stability. Central to their 
analysis were presidents’ constitutional powers and the nature of the parties and the party 
system. They argued that there is no "universally best form o f government” (Mainwaring 
and Shugart, 1997:3) and that a presidential regime may potentially be the more adequate 
form of government for some countries. The question of how to produce effective 
governance, rather than being about presidentialism or parliamentarism, is what kind of 
balance there is between a president’s constitutional and partisan powers. In their detailed
3 A paper version of his arguments appeared in 1987; a summary was published in 1990 in the Journal o f 
Democracy (No. 1, 51-69); and the ultimate version came out in 1994, which was faithful to the original but 
extended by comments on the preceding discussion of his arguments (Linz, 1994).
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analysis Shugart and Carey (1992) also questioned the superiority of parliamentarism and 
identified potential strengths and merits of presidential regimes. They pointed out different 
forms of creating a balance between presidents and assemblies, which in their view, is a 
crucial condition for effective governance. More concretely, they argued that “efficient 
presidentialism” goes together with weak presidencies. Weak presidential regimes, in turn, 
are characterised by a combination of limited constitutional powers of presidents and a 
prominent role of assemblies in the legislative process. Shugart and Carey argued that this 
combination reduces conflicts between the executive and the legislature and leads in 
consequence to an efficient political regime.
The analysis of those scholars based within “empirical institutionalism” has usually been 
limited to constitutional structures of types of governments and has been disconnected from 
what political systems actually do, i.e. they have often left aside the aspect of policy­
making. As George Philip pointed out: “The literature has, too often, offered up either 
institutions without policy change (via Douglass North) or policy without institutional 
variances (via the public choice theorists). " (Philip, 1998:97). A number of authors, 
however, differ from this approach and did actually connect the analysis of institutional 
aspects to that of policies. Weaver and Rockman (1993), for example, analysed how a set of 
different institutional aspects has an impact on the capacity of governments to function 
effectively. In a series of case studies on different policy areas their institutional framework 
was applied to the US presidential and a number of parliamentary systems. A shortcoming 
of this work is, however, its one-sided perspective. By comparing a single presidential 
regime to various parliamentary ones to show that not all parliamentary regimes function in 
the same way, the dimension of differences between presidential regimes is left out. A 
study of presidentialist regimes and the effect of institutional aspects on the policy-making 
process was carried out by Haggard and McCubbins (2001) as they addressed policy areas 
such as budgeting, privatisation and electricity regulation. This study follows the 
aforementioned authors in focusing on institutional detail rather than broad regime type and 
the interrelatedness of institutional features and economic policies. The thesis aims to make 
a contribution to this approach by analysing how variations in institutional structures 
influence the possibility of presidents to introduce economic reforms. Other theoretical 
approaches commonly used for explaining economic policy-making processes -  focusing 
on the influence of interest groups or external actors -  are challenged in this study. It is
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argued that the importance of interest group pressure or external influence is overstated and 
that particular institutional aspects better explain patterns of economic reforms. The 
argument why these alternative approaches are insufficient for explaining the different 
patterns of tax policy-making is made in the conclusion of the thesis (see Chapter 8.2). The 
approach used here differs from other institutional frameworks such as rational choice 
institutionalism. The rational choice branch of institutionalism tries to offer a neat and 
elegant theory by considering formal rules only, and thereby fails to adequately reflect the 
complex dynamics of Latin American politics. When using a small number of cases and 
looking at political processes in detail, any endeavour to use a mono-causal explanation 
becomes futile. Though the resulting explanations might be less neat than those of rational 
choice institutionalism, they are most probably closer to reality (see also Weyland, 2002b). 
Therefore, while institutional aspects will be central, other variables -  such as the influence 
of private sector groups, popular protest or the use of patronage payments -  are included in 
the analysis to find out to what extent they challenge or complement the argument set out 
here.
Literature on Ecuador and Bolivia. Very few authors deal specifically with the countries 
studied and relate an institutionalist perspective to govemability. Ecuador. In the case of 
Ecuador, Grindle and Thoumi (1993) analysed the adjustment policies introduced by 
Ecuadorian governments between 1982 and 1990. They distinguished between introducing 
reforms and the technocratic style employed, and sustaining reforms at which stage the 
authors considered the opposition of economic interest groups and political parties. Grindle 
and Thoumi revealed a pattern of “muddling through” consisting of a successful 
introduction of policy reforms which were subsequently watered down or reversed due to 
political and economic pressure. While the concept of muddling through describes 
Ecuadorian patterns well, the analysis does not account for the fact that reforms frequently 
did not pass due to presidents’ lack of support in Congress. In her analysis of Ecuador’s 
presidential system, Conaghan (1994a) argued that Ecuadorian presidents usually lack 
partisan support for their policies in Congress due to the institutional arrangements and the 
multi-party system. Given that presidents were unable to form majorities, attempting to 
bypass the Congress when introducing policies became an often chosen strategy. 
Developing some of these ideas further, Conaghan (1995) set out in detail the processes of 
party proliferation, electoral volatility, and how parties are marginalised from policy-
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making. Describing the party system she stressed the following characteristics: executive- 
legislative conflicts were related to the existence of an extreme multi-party system; policy 
decisions were dominated by technocrats chosen by presidents and parties were largely 
excluded from the process; finally, the Ecuadorian voters’ party preferences were very 
volatile and differed considerably from one election to the next. Conaghan’s work is crucial 
for an understanding of Ecuador’s political system, yet her focus on technocrats is unable to 
explain why policy proposals -  as elaborated by technocrats -  often failed to be introduced.
The authors Salgado and Santos (1998) provided a detailed analysis of Ecuador’s fiscal 
system and the reforms introduced in this area. While the work claimed that failure to raise 
revenues leads to political tensions and difficulties in governing, it lacks a perspective on 
the political dynamics of the policy-making process and does not explain why fiscal 
policies failed. In their study on presidentialism and parties in Ecuador between 1979 and 
1997 Burbano and Rowland (1998) focused on executive-legislative interactions. They 
tried to explain Ecuador’s institutional and govemability crisis by referring to the variables 
of the presidential system and institutional arrangements concerning the executive and the 
legislature, the party system, and political culture. Finally, Mejia-Acosta’s work (2002) 
represents not only a recent but also very comprehensive analysis of Ecuador’s political 
system. Considering the time period 1978 to 1998, he provided a lot of empirical detail on 
the functioning of the electoral system, the party system and executive-legislative relations. 
He concluded that the govemability problem of the country was caused by an interaction 
between the institutional arrangements and the strategies adopted by the political actors. 
While the last two studies provide detailed information about institutional aspects 
concerning party interactions and their relations to the presidents, neither of them makes a 
connection to policies introduced by the different governments.
Bolivia, The work of Gamarra has been crucial in the analysis of Bolivia’s form of 
presidentialism, the party system and coalition politics. He developed the term “hybrid 
presidentialism” (1992) to define the country’s political system and showed how it may be 
a model for other Latin American regimes in its ability to solve problems of dual legitimacy. 
Pointing to the relation between the method of electing the president and policy-making, he 
maintained that the system’s ability to produce coalitions -  also facilitated by the leadership 
skills of those involved -  was vital for the introduction of economic reforms since 1985
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(Gamarra, 1994). Yet Gamarra also continually stressed the drawbacks of coalition politics 
and the party system: parties in Bolivia were not so much driven by ideologies but rather by 
their desire to access patronage. According to Gamarra, the circulation of public sector 
positions had come to play a crucial role in the formation of coalitions (see particularly 
Gamarra & Malloy, 1995). He continued to be concerned with both the advantages and the 
disadvantages of the Bolivian system: he argued that hybrid presidentialism managed to 
pursue democratisation while at the same time introducing wide-ranging economic reforms. 
He also emphasised that coalitions worked while sufficient resources existed; now that 
patronage demands had grown, coalitions were destabilised (Gamarra, 1997). While in the 
majority of his work Gamarra focused on an analysis of political structures and referred to 
policies only broadly, he considered economic reforms in detail in a study of 1998. The 
analysis is mainly limited to the government of Sanchez de Lozada (1993-97), however 
(Gamarra, 1998). In a recent work (Gamarra, 2003) he analysed the influence of historical 
factors on the party system and took into account the current political crisis of Bolivia. His 
explanation maintained that parties have lost links and have proved unable to represent civil 
society, in consequence to which social movements and organisations have become 
political actors and successfully influenced political decisions in certain areas.
Mayorga’s work bears some similarity to that of Gamarra. Using the concept of 
“parliamentarised presidentialism” Mayorga (1997) outlined the parliamentary features of 
Bolivia’s form of presidentialism such as the election of presidents by Congress in case of a 
second round as defined by Article 90 of the Constitution. The politics of coalition resulting 
from this institutional mechanism was crucial to democratic consolidation, Mayorga 
maintained. Describing the four inter-party governments since 1985 Mayorga (2001) 
extended his arguments, claiming that Bolivia’s experience showed how the difficulties 
caused by divided government marking most Latin American regimes could be solved. 
While also evaluating the process of democratic consolidation in a recent study (Mayorga, 
2002), he went on to complement his analysis by examining the regressive process by 
which political parties and their leaders were increasingly discredited and “antisystemic” 
social actors began to influence Bolivian politics (Mayorga, 2002). Domingo (2001) 
developed the analysis of the disadvantages of coalition politics further. Providing an 
analysis of the party system, the effects of electoral reforms and the dynamics of coalition 
politics, she argued that coalition politics was possible due to the underlying politics of
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patronage, the autocratic style of the executive and technocrats to impose policies from 
above, and finally due to the consensus on neoliberal reforms among those in decision­
making positions. While coalitions had helped govemability, Domingo concluded, they had 
led to a serious problem of representation as parties failed to fulfil their role as mediators 
between state and society.
While Gamarra, Mayorga and Domingo mainly considered institutional aspects, the work 
of Morales, the current President of Bolivia’s Central Bank, emphasised the policy side. 
Morales has written extensively on the political economy of economic reforms and issues 
of economic stabilisation with a main focus on the New Economic Policy (NEP) introduced 
in 1985 (Morales, 1991; 1994; 1996; 2001). While he refers to some political aspects of 
adjustment, an economic analysis is at the centre of his work. Among those who do connect 
an institutional analysis to economic policies is a recent study of Grindle (2003) in which 
she gave a broad overview of policies introduced between 1985 and 2002. Her main 
interest lies in the role of the MNR as the majority of significant reforms were introduced 
while this party was in power.
As in the wider field of empirical institutionalism, the above mentioned authors focused 
mainly on institutional aspects in isolation; they paid little attention to actual policy 
changes. The contribution of this thesis is therefore to look at how the introduction of 
economic reforms was influenced by particular institutional arrangements. A large number 
of the existing studies on these countries also relates to a different time-frame than the one 
taken here. In the case of Bolivia, for example, a significant amount of research was done 
on the introduction of the New Economic Policy but less so on other time periods. The 
thesis extends this time-frame by including governments and their economic policies of the 
last two decades.
Research on these countries generally uses either Ecuador or Bolivia as a case study. 
Malloy’s El problema de la gobemabilidad en Bolivia, Peru y  Ecuador (1992) represents 
one of the few comparative studies. Referring to the governments of Belaunde in Peru 
(1980-85), Febres Cordero in Ecuador (1984-88) and Paz Estenssoro in Bolivia (1985-89) 
he concluded that the leadership skills of the latter must have played a crucial role given 
that only in Bolivia economic reforms were successfully introduced despite similar 
institutional legacies and implementation strategies in all three countries. Though Malloy
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called this study comparative he mainly outlined the experience of Bolivia and failed to 
explain why and how exactly the Ecuadorian and Peruvian presidents were unsuccessful 
(see Malloy, 1991). Truly cross-country comparative is, however, Conaghan and Malloy’s 
Unsettling Statecraft: Democracy and Neoliberalism in the Central Andes (1994). In this 
rare intra-Andean study, the authors compared the democratic transitions and neoliberal 
economic reforms during the 1980s in Ecuador, Peru and Bolivia. Conaghan and Malloy 
looked at the role of economic interest groups and the political management of individual 
policy-makers to account for the different patterns of economic reforms in the three 
countries. Given its comparative perspective and its analysis of the political dynamics of 
economic policy-making, this study probably comes closest to the one undertaken here. The 
approach and explanatory framework employed in this thesis differs, however: while 
Conaghan and Malloy consider the business sector as a crucial actor to account for policy 
choices, this view is questioned here (see Chapter 8.2). In the empirical analysis it will 
become clear that the influence of the private sector is often overstated and that it is rather 
specific institutional arrangements that can explain policy-making processes. Another 
difference is that the time-frame of this study are the last two decades while Unsettling 
Statecraft looked at the 1980s only.
In summary, this thesis will go beyond the existing studies mentioned by evaluating the 
effects of particular institutions on policy-making processes, by applying a time-frame of 
the last two decades, and by providing a comparative perspective.
1.3 Se l e c t io n  o f  T a x  R e fo r m  as C ase  Study
Tax reform has been chosen as the main case study for various reasons. Having briefly 
analysed economic policies across the whole spectrum of so-called Washington Consensus 
reforms, it became obvious that the area of tax reform provides a representative case for the 
economic reform process in Ecuador and Bolivia. It is assumed that -  while focusing on 
one particular area of economic reform -  the analysis will provide insights into the political 
dynamics of policy-making more generally.
Studying tax reform from a political science perspective seems worthwhile as tax policies 
are usually analysed on a purely technical basis; it has traditionally been the realm of 
economists. More recently, however, some political scientists have taken interest in the
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field of tax reform, with B. Guy Peters (1991) and Sven Steinmo (1998) most prominent 
among those. Both of them argued that the way governments raise the money they need for 
governing is an essentially political question. In addition, no matter how carefully designed 
by economists, the fate of tax reform proposals usually depends on political processes. 
While Steinmo and Peters focused on industrialised countries in their work, hardly any 
literature -  taking a political science perspective -  exists of tax reform in developing 
countries. Kent Eaton (2002) provided an important exception with his comparative study 
on tax reform in Argentina and the Philippines in which he focused on the influence of the 
legislature on tax policy-making. As regards Latin America, he argued, fiscal policy is 
important for the way it represents a break from the past development model of import- 
substituting industrialisation. In the pre-liberalisation period, Latin American economies 
were often marked by high budget deficits and fiscal instability; tax systems were complex, 
relied heavily on excise taxes and taxes were generally widely evaded. This failure to raise 
sufficient revenue domestically was mainly covered by external loans or money creation. 
The design and functioning (or rather lack thereof) of the tax systems throughout most of 
Latin America, thus had a major influence in the debt crisis the region was to experience in 
the 1980s and 1990s. Given that recourse to foreign borrowing as a means to balancing 
fiscal deficits was basically ruled out, most countries of the region started implementing tax 
reforms at some point during the 1980s or 1990s. Timing, scope, and content of the reforms 
to the tax systems, however, varied widely.4
With respect to the cases of Ecuador and Bolivia, no studies on the tax reforms of the last 
two decades exist. This thesis aims at making a contribution by analysing this area of 
economic policies. Tax reform has thus been chosen as the case study for the following 
reasons: a) it appears representative for patterns of economic policy-making in Ecuador and 
Bolivia more generally; b) tax reform is an area rather neglected by political scientists; c) 
fiscal policies have played an important role -  both economically and politically -  before 
and after the shift to market-oriented economies; d) no literature on the experiences of tax 
reform exists on Ecuador and Bolivia for the time period of the last twenty years.
4 For an overview of tax reforms in Latin America see, for example: Shome (1992; 1999); Perry and Herrera 
(1994); Bird (1992); Bird and Oldman (1990); Bird and Peny (1994); IBRD (1991); Gillis (1989).
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In the analysis of tax reforms the focus here is put on internal taxes, especially the Value- 
added Tax (VAT), income and excise taxes; changes of other internal taxes are taken into 
account when they played a role in the discussion of a particular reform. The focus on 
internal taxes was chosen in order to scale down the number of cases to be analysed but 
also because policy changes as regards other taxes have their own dynamics. External taxes, 
or tariffs, for example, have been subject to change given agreements within the Andean 
Pact and have thus been less a matter of domestic politics than internal taxation. Taxation 
of the hydrocarbons sector is the other main field displaying its own dynamics. While left 
aside here, this area would be well worth analysing in some future research. Administrative 
changes, including those regarding the status and structure of the Internal Revenue Services, 
are taken into account yet are of secondary importance to internal taxes for the purposes of 
this study.
1.4 T a x  R e fo r m  in  L a tin  A m eric a
To put the tax reform experiences of Ecuador and Bolivia into context, the overall trends 
occurring in Latin America during the 1980s and 1990s shall be outlined here. Following 
the debt crisis of 1982 most countries of the region saw their capital inflows sharply 
reduced and in consequence needed to either cut spending or increase tax revenues. 
Reforms to the tax system were introduced in most of Latin America during this period. 
Though they differed regarding their timing and scope, they followed a general trend. The 
most important changes included a greater simplification of the tax system, the reduction of 
tariffs, the increased importance of Value-added Tax (VAT), a decline in the progressivity 
of income taxes, and attempts to improve the efficiency of tax administration.
Decline in Tariffs. One of the major elements of the so-called Washington Consensus 
reforms introduced in the region since the 1980s was trade liberalisation. While the 
previous economic model of import substitution industrialisation had relied heavily on 
taxes on foreign trade, governments throughout the region started to significantly reduce 
and gradually abandon import tariffs. At the same time taxes on exports all but disappeared 
in Latin America. As a result of these changes revenues went down: for example, in 
Argentina taxes on international trade collected 1.8 per cent of GDP in 1985-89 and only 
0.8 per cent in 1995-98, in Colombia it went from 2.2 to 1.0 per cent during the same time 
period (Tanzi, 2003:338). Trade duties in Latin America had generated around 20 per cent
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of total tax revenues in the mid-1970s and halved to around 10 per cent by 1998 (Mahon, 
2004:7). Both Bolivia and Ecuador complied with this trend as tariff revenues in Bolivia 
fell from representing around 40 per cent of total tax revenues in 1980 to around 10 per 
cent during 1991-95 (on average); in Ecuador this share declined from around 33 per cent 
to 24 per cent in the same time period (Lora, 1997:6). Since tariffs had previously thus 
provided significant revenues in the region, these had to be sought elsewhere and the 
importance of taxes on consumption increased.
Value-added Tax. Along with the decline in tariffs came the introduction or expansion of 
VAT, which replaced turnover or sales taxes in most countries of the region during the last 
twenty years. While some countries, such as Argentina, Brazil, Colombia and Nicaragua 
introduced multiple rates, the majority of countries introduced a single rate of VAT. 
Standard rates have also gone up over time -  as the importance of VAT increased tax 
systems centred more and more around taxes on consumption. Chile, Paraguay and Peru 
represent an exception to this trend as VAT rates were either lowered or remained the same 
(Shome, 1999:13). As of July 2000 the unweighted average of VAT rates in Latin America 
was 15.17 per cent (Tanzi, 2003:340). Bolivia, therefore, with its rate of 14.92 per cent5 
comes very close to the average, while Ecuador’s 12 per cent rate is significantly below it. 
Due to this increase in the rates -  and probably also because tax administrations became 
more efficient -  revenues from the VAT grew significantly. As Mahon reported, while 
taxes on goods and services accounted for around 25 per cent of total tax revenues in the 
mid-1970s it went up to 43 per cent by 1998 (Mahon, 2004:6-7). Argentina, for example, 
tripled its VAT income and together with Brazil and Chile now collects similar revenue 
levels to those of OECD countries from this tax (Tanzi, 2003:342). Revenues, however, 
vary widely as Panama’s VAT, for example, collected 1.9 per cent of GDP while Brazil’s 
collected 9.5 (in 1996) (Shome, 1999:13). Bolivia’s VAT revenues of 4.5 per cent of GDP 
lie in the middle of this range, while Ecuador collected 3.3 per cent of GDP with only 
Mexico and Panama generating less than this (in 1996; Shome, 1999:14).6 To take into 
account the different rates applied in different countries when considering VAT-GDP ratios, 
the concept of VAT productivity is often used. It is defined as VAT revenue as a
5 The legislated tax-inclusive rate is 13 per cent. The VAT is incorporated in the price of the product, so the 
effective VAT rate is 14.92 per cent of the price excluding the tax itself.
6 It has to be taken into account, however, that Bolivia had an effective VAT rate of 14.92 at that time, while 
Ecuador’s was 10 per cent.
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percentage of GDP divided by the VAT rate. Taking this aspect into account VAT 
productivity in 1995 was rather low in Colombia, Nicaragua, Mexico and Argentina 
(around 0.2 per cent), Honduras, Costa Rica, El Salvador, and Chile have a high 
productivity (around 0.5), and Ecuador and Bolivia were in the middle (0.35 and 0.4 
respectively) (Lora, 1997:6).
Income Taxes. As tax systems shifted more and more emphasis to indirect taxes, the role 
of income taxes declined, thereby reducing progressivity. As Tanzi (2003:345) showed 
income tax rates have fallen during the last two decades: the top personal income tax rate in 
Latin America went from an average of 49.6 per cent in 1985-86 to 27.8 per cent in 1999- 
2000; meanwhile the rate of the corporate income tax went from 43.3 per cent in 1986 to 
28.6 per cent in 1999-2000. The personal income tax rate dropped almost by half and in 
2000 only Chile and Mexico had a rate higher than 40 per cent, with all other countries 
charging 30 per cent or less (Tanzi, 2003:345). Corporate income taxes were also lowered 
though not to the same extent as personal income taxes. Parallel to this decline in rates, the 
personal exemption levels went up so that less and less people fall into the tax brackets and 
therefore do not pay any income tax. While the regional average of the personal exemption 
level was 0.47 as share of per capita GDP in 1986, it increased to 1.36 in 1997 (Shome, 
1999:7). According to the same data Bolivia’s personal exemption level fell during this 
time period, while Ecuador’s increased. In 2001 revenues from income taxes represented 
less than 5 per cent of GDP compared to 12.5 per cent in OECD countries (Singh et al., 
2005:31). A few countries, however, managed to increase their share of income tax 
revenues during the last two decades, as did Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, and Peru (Tanzi, 
2003:346) yet the general trend was that revenues from taxes on income, profits and capital 
gains slightly declined (Mahon, 2004:7).
Other taxes. While the changes regarding the taxes mentioned above represent the major 
trends in taxation in Latin America during the last twenty years, other taxes have also been 
introduced or experimented with in various countries of the region. A Gross Assets Tax was 
established in Mexico, Argentina, Costa Rica, Guatemala, and Venezuela. Usually charged 
at 1 to 2 per cent of the gross assets of enterprises, it serves as a way to ensure that 
companies pay at least a minimum tax and prevents them from fully avoiding tax 
contributions (Tanzi, 2003:347-8). Bolivia’s tax system never featured this tax and in
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Ecuador a gross assets tax was charged as a one-off tax of 1 per cent in 1999 only. There 
was a general trend towards lower taxation of capital as fewer and fewer countries 
employed taxes on assets or net worth during the 1990s than compared to the 1980s. A 
Financial Transactions Tax (FTT) was introduced in several countries in order to raise 
revenues. A tax on financial transactions was or in some cases still is levied in Argentina 
(introduced in 1983, 1988 and 2001), Bolivia (2004), Brazil (1994 and 1997), Colombia 
(1998), Ecuador (1999), Peru (1989), and Venezuela (1994 and 1998). Often this tax was 
resorted to when the country experienced an economic crisis (e.g. Ecuador in 1999 or 
Venezuela in 1994 and 1999). Generally, a financial transactions tax was chosen to 
generate revenues in a relatively short time period and because it was politically much less 
controversial than other taxes (an aspect which played an important role when introduced in 
Bolivia in 2004). As regards revenues the more recent experiences of this tax were more 
positive than in the cases where it was introduced earlier. Particularly Brazil, Colombia and 
Ecuador gained significant revenues from their FTT. In Ecuador, for example, the 1 per 
cent tax on financial transactions produced revenues of 3.5 per cent of GDP in 1999 
(Coelho et al., 2001:12). A third example of experiments in the tax systems are the various 
forms of simplified tax regimes widely introduced in Latin America. To find adequate 
forms of charging the informal sectors, a large number of countries developed simplified 
forms of taxation for small taxpayers. Furthest in this development are Argentina, Brazil, 
Bolivia and Peru, which created a single tax rate to be paid by the informal sectors instead 
of the major taxes such as VAT, income taxes, and social security taxes (Tanzi, 2003:350).
Tax administration. Finally, significant efforts were made throughout the region to 
improve the effectiveness of tax administrations.7 Often this involved: a restructuring of 
administrative units, changes were made regarding their personnel, tax agency -  taxpayer 
relations were modified, administrative processes were increasingly computerised and 
certain tax administration activities were privatised (usually by giving banks a greater role 
in tax collection). In Ecuador, the reform of tax administration starting in 1997 led to a 
significant increase in revenues as VAT collections, for example, rose from 3.5 per cent of 
GDP (on average) in 1993-97 to 6.8 per cent in 2000 (IMF, 2003:64; see also Chapter 6.5).
7 For a good overview of tax administration reforms during the 1980s see Bird and Casanegra (1992).
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Revenues. Tax revenues have increased significantly during the last twenty years in most 
countries of the region. As Table 1.2 shows revenues have gone up particularly in 
Argentina, Bolivia, and Brazil. In Argentina, for example, the tax-GDP rate went from 10 
per cent in 1985 to 17.6 per cent in 1999 and in Brazil from 6.4 to 15.0 per cent in the same 
years. In most other countries revenues also increased with the exceptions of Chile were 
they remained stagnant at a high level, in Costa Rica they slightly declined during the 
1990s, and remained stagnant in Mexico, Uruguay and Peru. Bolivia went from having 
rather low levels of tax collection to having one of the highest rates in the region: from 7.9 
per cent of GDP in 1985 to 18.1 per cent in 1999. Ecuador, by contrast, increased its 
revenues from 6.4 in 1985 to 9.8 in 1999 only (Tanzi, 2003:332), though they increased 
significantly after that partly due to the improved tax administration. Depending on the tax- 
GDP ratio Shome (1999) divided Latin America into high tax, medium tax, and low tax 
groups (see Table l.l).8
Table 1.1: High-, Medium-, and Low-Tax Countries, Latin America
High-Tax
( > 20% of GDP)
Medium-Tax
(11-20% of GDP)
Low-Tax
(< 10% of GDP)
Brazil Argentina Ecuador
Chile Bolivia Guatemala
Costa Rica Colombia Paraguay
Nicaragua Mexico Peru
Uruguay Panama Venezuela
Source: Shome, 1999:14. Own elaboration.
8 Categorised according to data from 1992 and 1996. Note that this categorisation is based on general 
government revenue. If this was higher than 20 per cent of GDP, countries are in the high-tax group; in the 
low-tax group if general government revenue (and central government revenue in the case of countries highly 
dependent on petroleum revenue) was 10 per cent or less; and in the medium-tax group if revenue was 
between 11 and 20 per cent (Shome, 1999:15).
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Table 1.2 Total Tax Revenues of the Central Governments (as percentage of GDP)
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Argentina 9.1 12.0 10.1 9.1 8.4 10.0 9.5 9.4 7.2 9.6 12.4 14.2 16.5 17.9 17.7 17.3 16.0 17.3 17.6 17.6
Bolivia 8.5 9.2 4.9 2.9 2.1 7.9 7.9 8.1 8.4 7.9 8.2 8.7 10.7 11.4 12.4 12.4 12.3 14.5 16.3 18.1
Brazil 7.7 7.6 7.5 8.0 6.6 6.4 6.5 6.0 6.0 5.7 10.2 10.0 9.4 10.6 13.2 12.6 11.8 12.6 14.5 15.0
Chile 17.4 19.2 18.3 17.7 19.6 19.1 18.4 18.1 15.5 15.1 14.5 16.7 17.3 18.0 17.5 17.0 18.2 17.6 17.8 16.9
Colombia 7.6 7.2 7.3 6.7 6.8 8.6 9.0 9.5 9.4 9.3 9.3 10.7 11.2 11.6 11.8 11.4 11.5 12.2 10.5 10.8
Costa Rica 11.2 12.0 12.5 15.6 15.3 15.2 13.8 14.5 14.4 14.4 14.0 11.4 12.0 12.1 11.7 12.5 12.7 12.6 12.8 12.5
Dom. Republic 10.3 9.7 8.0 8.5 9.0 9.7 11.3 11.4 11.8 12.5 10.5 11.8 13.8 14.8 14.0 13.8 13.1 14.7 15.0 14.4
Ecuador 7.1 6.6 5.6 5.4 5.9 6.4 8.1 7.9 7.5 8.0 7.6 7.6 7.2 7.4 7.7 8.0 7.2 9.3 9.9 9.8
El Salvador 11.1 11.4 10.6 10.6 11.6 11.6 13.1 10.9 9.3 7.6 9.1 9.5 9.6 10.3 10.9 12.0 11.3 11.1 10.3 10.5
Guatemala 8.6 7.6 7.2 6.3 5.3 6.1 7.0 8.1 8.7 7.8 6.8 7.3 8.2 7.8 6.7 8.0 8.8 9.4 9.6 10.0
Haiti 7.2 10.1 10.9 11.6 11.7 12.5 10.2 10.4 10.6 10.4 8.7 9.5 6.1 5.5 2.6 6.4 7.5 9.2 8.9 9.1
Honduras 14.2 12.7 12.7 11.8 13.5 14.0 13.5 14.0 11.7 11.8 14.1 14.5 15.4 14.8 14.3 15.7 14.4 14.1 17.0 17.7
Mexico 15.8 11.4 10.6 11.1 11.0 10.9 11.5 10.8 12.2 12.1 11.5 12.0 12.4 11.4 11.3 9.2 9.0 9.8 10.5 11.2
Nicaragua 22.2 19.5 21.5 25.9 30.6 27.7 27.8 24.8 19.2 21.7 13.5 17.7 19.2 18.7 19.3 20.6 20.7 23.0 24.1 23.0
Panama 13.9 14.3 13.7 14.4 13.8 13.8 14.5 14.7 9.6 8.2 11.7 12.5 12.5 12.1 11.8 12.5 12.1 12.5 12.1 12.6
Paraguay 8.4 7.5 8.2 6.4 6.6 6.9 6.8 7.0 6.9 8.8 9.5 9.4 9.3 9.4 10.7 12.2 11.5 11.8 11.6 10.8
Peru 15.8 13.2 13.0 10.7 11.6 13.4 11.3 8.4 7.7 6.1 7.7 8.9 10.0 10.1 11.2 11.6 12.1 12.1 12.1 11.4
Uruguay 15.5 16.1 13.6 14.0 12.5 13.6 14.7 15.0 15.4 14.3 14.4 14.3 14.9 14.7 13.1 14.6 14.9 15.8 16.1 15.4
Venezuela 5.9 9.9 9.2 9.6 9.9 11.0 12.9 8.6 7.7 4.5 3.7 4.4 5.5 7.2 8.7 8.2 7.9 9.8 10.3 10.3
Source: ECLAC, quoted in Tanzi, 2003:332.
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Looking at the developments of tax revenues, there is a clear contrast between Bolivia’s 
and Ecuador’s performance: while Bolivia roughly doubled its revenues since the mid- 
1980s, Ecuador’s revenues increased only slightly. It seems therefore that Bolivia did 
not only manage to introduce tax policies successfully (see Chapters 4 and 5) but that 
these tax reforms did result in significant increases in tax revenues. Ecuador’s way of 
introducing changes to the tax system in a rather gradual and often inconsistent way led 
to a stagnation of revenues. Though this seems a positive development for Bolivia, 
increased tax revenues bring greater responsibility on the part of the state on how to 
spend the money collected. Of the two sides of fiscal policy Bolivia seems to have 
relied mainly on raising revenues rather than on cutting spending. As pointed out in 
Section 3.1, Bolivia failed to make progress concerning public spending as public sector 
employment increased during the 1990s (see also Chapter 8.4). It seems that this 
imbalance between increased levels of taxation and a lack of reduced spending on the 
side of the government has led to state-society tensions, which contributed to the 
political instability the country experienced during the last few years. As several 
interview partners pointed out there is an immense frustration in the Bolivian population 
about the lack of quality services the state provides in return for their tax payments 
(Doria Medina, Gray Molina, interviews, 25.5.+7.5.2004). In short, the increased 
revenues have not been accompanied by an improvement in the quality of services 
provided by the state. This aspect also helps to explain why the government’s attempted 
tax reform of February 2003 was foiled by popular protest and why the pattern of a 
successful introduction of tax policies came to an end.
1.5 W h y  E c u a d o r  a n d  B o l iv ia ?
More often than not it is the larger Latin American countries that are used as case 
studies, intensive research has been done on political economy decisions of Argentina, 
Brazil, Chile or Mexico. Research on the experiences of the smaller democracies is 
considerably less frequently undertaken and very little literature on Ecuador and Bolivia 
exists. This study makes a contribution to the literature by focusing on Ecuador and 
Bolivia, thus providing some evidence for the reform process of the smaller Latin 
American countries. A cross-country comparative approach has been chosen as it allows 
to establish a relationship between political phenomena. As Sartori (1994c: 15) pointed 
out, comparisons “control (verify or falsify) whether generalizations hold across the 
cases to which they apply”.
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The two cases were selected using the most-similar-method of comparative analysis: as 
many factors as possible are held constant so that the critical variables accounting for 
the differences in economic policy-making processes can be isolated. Despite important 
differences, Ecuador’s and Bolivia’s economic situations can be considered as broadly 
similar when contrasted to other countries of the region. Both countries are classified as 
Lower-Middle Income Countries by the World Bank and within the region they are 
among the poorest: while Ecuador was ranked as number 10 and 11 as regards GDP per 
capita within South America between 1986 and 2001, Bolivia took place number 12.9 
Both countries are heavily indebted, while Bolivia had a total debt service/exports ratio 
of 37.0 per cent on average between 1980 and 2002, Ecuador had 33.1 per cent on 
average during the same time period (WDI, 2005). Ecuador and Bolivia are both highly 
vulnerable to external economic conditions, not only because of the limited size of their 
economies but also due to their high dependence on export earnings of primary 
commodities. The two countries faced broadly similar external economic conditions in 
the aftermath of the Mexican default of 1982 when credits dried up and Ecuador and 
Bolivia were experiencing huge budget deficits (as did many other Latin American 
countries). There are certainly also significant differences -  not least the fact that 
Ecuador is an oil economy. Yet in an overall assessment the similarities outweigh these. 
As concerns institutional arrangements, both countries can be broadly classified as 
presidential10 and have a multi-party system. This allows for an analysis of more 
specific institutions that may be held accountable for affecting economic policy-making. 
The two Andean countries also share geographical, historical and cultural 
commonalities. Additionally, the countries share a lack of geopolitical power. In that 
respect neither of the two countries seems to be more vulnerable to external influence 
than the other. As regards the last few years the two countries share a history of 
overthrowing (or early retirement of) its leaders: Ecuador (Bucaram -  1997; Mahuad -  
2000; Gutierrez -  2005) and Bolivia (Sanchez de Lozada -  2003; Mesa -  2005). Both 
countries are currently marked by highly strained state-society relations and frequent 
outbursts of popular protest.
The time frame of this study is within the last two decades. More precisely, the period 
from 1984 to 2003 will be covered in the case of Ecuador, starting with the government
9 Out of 12 countries (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, 
Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela). IMF, 2005.
10 Bolivia does not represent a purely presidential regime but rather one that can be defined as 
“parliamentarised presidentialism” (see Chapter 2.1).
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of Febres Cordero during which a first significant tax reform was undertaken in the 
country’s post-democracy period, and ending with the government of Noboa. The 
government period of subsequent presidents (Gutierrez and Palacio) are not included as 
no significant changes to the tax system were introduced. The analysis of Bolivia 
considers the years 1985 to 2004 taking into account all governments since Paz 
Estenssoro (1985-89). The period of Mesa’s presidency (2003-05) is included as his 
government attempted to introduce major tax changes in 2004.
1.6 M e t h o d o l o g y 11
The primary material used and gathered for this thesis comes from various sources.
Interviews. For this work, a total of 67 interviews (see Appendix B for a list) were 
conducted. The interviewees were involved at the policy-making level for certain 
periods during the last twenty years and most of them were chosen due to their 
involvement in the tax reforms analysed in this thesis. The interviewees included two 
former presidents, 13 finance ministers, six Central Bank presidents, eight members of 
parliament, three directors of the Internal Revenue Service, nine other ministers and 
vice-ministers. Other interviewees included directors and presidents of Ecuador’s and 
Bolivia’s main private sector organisations, second rank personnel of the same 
organisations as well as of the Ministry of Finance and the Internal Revenue Services, 
the Tax Superintendent of Bolivia, chairpersons of the legislative commissions dealing 
with tax reforms, representatives of prominent think tanks, tax lawyers, and academics. 
The interviews were semi-structured and in-depth. They were conducted as attributable, 
were tape recorded and subsequently transcribed.
Documents. To complement this material several types of documents were used. 
Newspapers proved to be an important source as they provided results of voting on tax 
reforms in the Congress, behind-the-scenes information, speeches, and evidence of 
dynamics of the coalitions. The Bolivian newspaper El Diario and the Ecuadorian El 
Comercio of the last two decades were consulted systematically at Colindale, the 
newspaper branch of the British Library. For articles of the last two to three years a 
wider range of newspapers was consulted via the internet. The minutes of the 
legislature’s discussion on some of the tax reforms were researched in the Ecuadorian 
and Bolivian libraries of Congress. Several internal documents were provided by the 
Ministries of Finance and the Internal Revenue Services. Databases of the two Central
11 For a more extensive outline of this methodology section see Appendix A.
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Banks, the Internal Revenue Services as well as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
and World Bank were consulted for statistical data.
1.7 M a in  F in d in g s
The pattern observed when analysing the tax reforms undertaken in Ecuador and Bolivia 
during the last two decades shows that there has been quite a difference between the two 
countries in the way they introduced tax reforms. While Bolivia managed to introduce 
wide-ranging reforms quite consistently during the 1980s and 1990s, projects in 
Ecuador often failed or were greatly modified. Since around the year 2000 the pattern in 
Bolivia changed as introducing reforms became more difficult for presidents and the 
general political climate turned more unstable culminating in the overthrow of President 
Sanchez de Lozada in October 2003 and the early end of Mesa’s presidency in 2005. 
How can these patterns be explained?
While the findings of the research are outlined in detail in the concluding chapter, a 
short overview of these findings is anticipated here. The institutional explanation 
proposed proved to have explanatory power as it provided a coherent explanation as to 
why Bolivia was able to implement wide-ranging tax reforms during the 1980s and 
1990s while presidents in Ecuador usually failed to introduce similar changes. Bolivia’s 
particular form of presidentialism -  featuring a parliamentary element of electing the 
president in Congress in the second round of elections -  produced a pattern of coalition- 
building after 1985, which in turn allowed presidents to introduce wide-ranging tax 
reforms. In Ecuador, on the other hand, tax reforms often failed due to the lack of 
institutional incentives for overcoming the political deadlock of a fragmented Congress. 
While the hypothesised influence of institutional aspects on the economic policy 
process has thus been supported by the empirical evidence gathered, also other aspects 
were found to complement this approach and help explain the patterns that occurred in 
Ecuador and Bolivia.
A second finding contributes to the theoretical approach which argues that economic 
crises can account for economic reforms undertaken (see Chapter 8.3). The empirical 
evidence gathered showed that the crisis aspect in its broad version did not make a 
successful introduction of reforms more likely. The case of Ecuador’s economic crisis 
of 1999 and the difficulties of Mahuad’s government in introducing tax reforms in this 
situation are a good example. What did prove an important factor, however, was the 
existence of hyperinflation in Bolivia in 1985 which paved the way for drastic economic
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reforms in its aftermath. The wide-ranging tax reform Bolivia introduced in 1986 was 
partly possible due to the ruling coalition that existed at congressional level but also due 
to the fact that people were willing to accept such reforms given the traumatic 
experience of hyperinflation. Hyperinflation is thus an important variable and helps 
explain the different patterns of tax reforms of Ecuador and Bolivia. It shows that an 
economic crisis in the form of a hyperinflation has an impact on the policy-making 
process which is not necessarily the case when countries experience other types of 
economic crises.
While the patterns of policy-making in Ecuador and Bolivia had been strikingly 
different from each other during the 1980s and 1990s, this pattern changed during the 
last couple of years. In February 2003 President Sanchez de Lozada tried to introduce 
an income tax but failed to do so facing massive popular protest. Later during the year 
he was forced to resign and was succeeded by Carlos Mesa who struggled to introduce 
any reform while being in power and largely failed when attempting to have a tax bill 
approved in March 2004. How can this change of pattern be explained and what 
happened to coalition politics which had allowed previous governments to introduce 
reforms? And how can the extra-institutional overthrow of the tax reform in February 
2003 be accounted for? While coalition politics on the one hand had the effect of 
providing Bolivia with a period of political stability lasting for almost twenty years and 
also allowed governments to introduce their economic reforms, it had a second effect 
which has slowly undermined the viability of the coalitions. These coalitions were 
dependent on the distribution of patronage, a feature which would become more and 
more dominating over the years. While Bolivia was a radical reformer as regards so- 
called Washington Consensus policies during the last two decades, it did not manage to 
reduce or significantly reform its public sector. The patronage logic of coalition politics 
prevented presidents from doing so. It seems, therefore, that “old politics” has been 
necessary for the introduction of “new economics” (Panizza, 2000). In the eyes of the 
public the traditional parties involved in the coalitions became more and more 
discredited as they seemed interested in little more than the side payments they received. 
The established parties received fewer and fewer votes, coalitions became more 
unstable and popular protest gained more and more momentum given the increasing 
frustration of Bolivians with the political establishment. Protest movements developed 
into a political force able to influence the policy-making process as protests reversed
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water privatisation in January 2000 or prevented the above mentioned income tax from 
being introduced in February 2003.
Coalition politics, in short, thus had a dual effect: it facilitated the introduction of 
economic reforms and led to political stability yet at the same time was a catalyst for 
political instability in the long run given its dependency on patronage payments. The 
extra-institutional processes Bolivia experienced during the recent years, then, were 
caused by the same institutional mechanism that had caused political stability during the 
1980s and 1990s.
1.8 C h a p t e r  S t r u c t u r e
Following this introduction, the second chapter compares the political structures of 
Ecuador and Bolivia as regards their particular form of presidentialism. The 
constitutional powers of executive and legislature are considered as well as electoral 
procedures, aspects of the party systems and coalition formation. Particular reference is 
made to the institutional provisions regarding the introduction of tax reforms. Chapter 3 
outlines the economic situations of the two countries thus setting the background for the 
comparison. An overview of the Washington Consensus reforms undertaken in the two 
countries since their return to democracy is given. This analysis shows what has 
happened in other areas of economic reform and thus contextualises the tax reforms 
used as a case study. It also provides evidence that tax reforms have been representative 
for other economic reforms undertaken in Ecuador and Bolivia. Chapters 4-7 contain a 
detailed case study of the tax reforms introduced in Ecuador and Bolivia since the 1980s. 
The Bolivian tax reforms introduced while coalition politics was still in place are 
analysed in Chapter 4 (Governments of Paz Estenssoro, Paz Zamora, and Sanchez de 
Lozada). In Chapter 5 the policy process during the period of Banzer, Sanchez de 
Lozada (his second government) and Mesa is considered, a time period where coalition 
politics gradually collapsed and during which Bolivia experienced a time of high 
political instability. Chapter 6 looks at the tax reforms that occurred or were attempted 
in Ecuador during the governments of Presidents Febres Cordero, Boija, Duran Ballen 
and Bucaram, while Chapter 7 focuses on those undertaken by Mahuad and Noboa. All 
the chapters and cases considered share a similar structure. Firstly the presidential 
elections are described, as is the process of forming a coalition (if applicable) including 
its patronage aspects, and the parties’ representation in Congress. Having established 
the political background, the main policy reforms introduced by each government are 
briefly outlined. For every case of tax reform its main elements are given and the
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process of how it came to be introduced, how it failed, or how it was modified is 
investigated. A particular focus is put on the dynamics of executive -  legislative 
relations and how Congress influenced the fate of reforms. However, to make the work 
more viable other variables are equally taken into account: the opposition and lobbying 
activities of economic interest groups, trade unions or social movements and the 
influence of external actors. By taking these different factors into account the whole 
story of these tax reforms shall be reconstructed to determine the decisive elements in 
each case. Every individual tax reform studied ends by examining the factors that 
explain why the reform either succeeded or failed. Chapter 8 finishes with a comparison 
of the processes of tax policy-making in Ecuador and Bolivia and conclusions from the 
preceding chapters are drawn.
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2 The Political System of Bolivia and Ecuador
This chapter will compare the political systems of Ecuador and Bolivia, with reference 
to the current literature on presidential regimes in Latin America. After providing a 
definition of presidentialism the regime type of Ecuador and Bolivia will be identified. 
Subsequently the discussion focuses on the constitutional powers of president and 
congress, electoral processes, the countries’ party systems and coalition formation. 
Finally, hypotheses to be tested in the case study of tax reforms are developed.
2.1 C a t e g o r is a t io n  o f  R e g im e  T y pe
Definition of presidentialism. Within the literature on presidentialist regimes several 
definitions have been offered: Lijphart (1984) stressed the aspects of the president’s 
election for a fixed term and direct (or indirect) popular election as essential 
characteristics. Linz (1994) took on these standard features yet added a focus on the 
legislature as a defining feature. He stressed that in a presidential system both president 
and legislature are democratically legitimised, both are elected for fixed terms, and he 
emphasised the separate survival of president and legislature. Other scholars essentially 
crafted their definitions by drawing on these two (see, for example, Mainwaring, 1990; 
Mainwaring and Shugart, 1997b; Stepan and Skach, 1994). Some authors, however, 
went further and narrowed the definition down by making reference to the powers of a 
president. Sartori (1994b) included the president’s right to appoint the cabinet and 
Shugart and Carey (1992) expanded this definition by a fourth element (apart from 
popular election, fixed terms, appointment of cabinet): they considered lawmaking 
authority granted by the constitution as another essential element of presidentialism. 
When analysing the regime types of Ecuador and Bolivia in the following the more 
specific definition of the aforementioned authors will be drawn upon.
Bolivia. Among those who explicitly attempted to categorise the Bolivian political 
regime, few considered it as presidential without at least making some qualifications 
(for authors who defined it as presidential see, for example, Jost, 1998:508). However, 
defining Bolivia’s regime as presidential, or purely presidential, clearly contradicts the 
formerly established definition: although it fulfils the principle of fixed terms it partially 
violates that of popular election. In the Bolivian system a popular election is held to 
select a president in a first round; if neither of the candidates receives more than 50 per 
cent of the votes, however, the president is chosen by the legislature from among the
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first two (until 1994 from the first three) candidates of the first round.12 Theoretically, 
therefore, the regime could be presidential at times: namely whenever a candidate 
receives a majority of votes in the first round. Considering the elections since Bolivia’s 
return to democracy, however, the president has always been chosen in the second 
round only (and for the time being it seems unlikely that any candidate could gain the 
majority of votes in the first round). Thus, the president has ultimately not been elected 
by popular vote but by the legislature, a procedure common to parliamentary systems.
Secondly, several times the Congress has not elected the plurality winner of the first 
round. In 1985 the legislature favoured the second-placed Paz Estenssoro (MNR -  
Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario) over General Banzer (ADN -  Action 
Democratica Nacionalista) who had come first and in 1989 the legislature even elected 
Paz Zamora (MIR -  Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionario) who had only received 
the third highest number of votes. These two cases show that the Bolivian legislature 
does make use of its constitutionally given right to choose the president in the second 
round. It does not act as a rubber-stamp to endorse the results of the first-round popular 
election, but has proven to be the decisive body in selecting a president. Given this 
practice Bolivia can be considered to feature a parliamentary principle in its political 
system: the election of the chief executive by the assembly. In the presidential elections 
since 1993, however, the Congress has endorsed the plurality winners of the first round: 
Sanchez de Lozada in 1993 as well as 2002 and Banzer in 1997. Since the constitutional 
reform of 1994 the choice of Congress has been limited to the first two vote-getters. It is 
likely that the change in the electoral procedures of the congressional round has 
influenced this new pattern of endorsing the plurality winner.
In short, given this evidence of presidential elections since 1985, Bolivia violates the 
principle of popular election common to other presidential regimes, as it is the 
legislature who makes the ultimate decision on the presidency. Though Bolivia can thus 
be considered as non-presidential as regards the origin of the chief executive, neither 
can the system be defined as being parliamentary: despite the dependency on the 
assembly for being elected, once in power the president’s survival is independent of the 
assembly. Unlike in parliamentary systems, the Bolivian Constitution does not allow for 
a congressional vote of no-confidence. Given that the Bolivian regime is in accordance 
with only one of the principles of presidentialism (that of a fixed term of both president
12 See Art. 90 of the Constitution of 1967 and Art. 90:1 of the amended text of 1995. All references to the 
Bolivian Constitution taken from: Political Database of the Americas (PDBA), 2005a; 2003; 2005b.
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and assembly) and violates the second (popular election), and since it does not provide 
for a vote of no-confidence essential for parliamentary systems, it can be considered as 
a mixed system. It is more in accordance with presidentialism than with 
parliamentarism since the election procedures are not purely parliamentary, as the first 
round has the format of a popular election, and as the post-election system seems purely 
presidential.
Gamarra (1997:363-364) defined the Bolivian political system as “hybrid 
presidentialism”. While the term “hybrid” implies two different aspects it is only one 
that is named and there is no clear allusion to the fact that the Bolivian regime includes 
parliamentary features and provides for a prominent role of the legislature. Using the 
term “hybrid” to characterise Bolivia’s political system may also be questioned for its 
double meaning (as the word hybrid is often used in a pejorative sense). Among the 
other scholars considering the Bolivian system as mixed are Shugart and Carey who 
used the term “assembly-independent regime”, defined by them as a regime in which 
“the origin o f executive power is not separate from assembly power, but the survival o f  
the two branches remains independent. ” (1992:78). While agreeing with this definition, 
the term “assembly-independent” seems an unfortunate choice. It is a confusing term, as 
the crucial distinction between the Bolivian regime and other presidential regimes in 
Latin America is that the election of the president is not independent of the assembly 
but indeed dependent. It seems that Shugart and Carey (1992:161) by using this term 
intended to imply that it is the “assembly” that decides on the origin of presidents and 
that they are “independent” of the assembly afterwards. The term, however, does not 
appear to live up to its intended ideal: naming a regime “assembly-independent” evokes 
the impression that the chief executive is generally independent of the assembly. 
Among the few who have ventured to name the Bolivian political system is also 
Mayorga. He argued that the actual political regime of Bolivia can be described as 
“parliamentarised presidentialism”. It is a system that is characterised by inter-party 
coalitions and by the congressional election of the president (Mayorga, 2001:105). 
Mayorga’s categorisation seems apposite for two reasons: firstly, it expresses the mixed 
character of the Bolivian system and explicitly names its components. At the same time, 
however, it implies the predominance of presidential features over parliamentary ones. 
It makes clear that the Bolivian system is a modified presidential regime, in which the 
Parliament plays an important role. It seems thus well-chosen to use the noun 
“presidentialism” with an attributive adjective: parliamentarised presidentialism.
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Secondly, this term avoids both the lack of clarity and ambiguity of the categorisation 
“assembly-independent” as used by Shugart and Carey, and the pejorativeness and lack 
of preciseness of the term “hybrid”.
Ecuador. Defining Ecuador’s regime type at first sight appears to be an easier task than 
in the case of Bolivia. Firstly, in Ecuador presidents are elected by popular vote: the 
Constitution13 requires that if neither of the candidates receives the majority of votes in 
a first round14, a majority runoff between the first two contenders takes place. Secondly, 
both president and assembly are elected for fixed terms: the president remains in power 
for four years as do the members of Congress.15 Thus, it seems the Ecuadorian regime 
fulfils the criteria of a purely presidential regime and a number of scholars have 
consequently named it as presidential without making any qualification (see, for 
example, Dent, 2000; Grindle, 1993).16 However, considering the third aspect of our 
earlier established definition of presidentialism, control over government composition, 
one finds that the Ecuadorian legislature used to have the power to dismiss ministers. 
Under the Constitution valid between 1979 and 1998 Congress had the right to 
interpellate and censure ministers of state (Art. 59:f), consequently, the principle of the 
sole control over government formation presidents hold in purely presidential regimes 
was violated. Given the provision for censure, which is granted to few Latin American 
legislatures only, Shugart and Carey (1992:41) have classified Ecuador’s regime as
i  n
“presidential-parliamentary”. The main distinguishing feature of this regime type is 
that both president and legislature have the right to dismiss ministers. With a new 
Constitution coming into effect in Ecuador in 1998, the Congress was deprived of its
13 After the end of military rule, Ecuador implemented a new Constitution in 1979, which was reformed 
twice (in 1984 and 1996). In 1998 a new and currently valid Constitution has been adopted. When 
mentioning articles of the Constitution in the following I refer to the one from 1979 as reformed in 1984 
when discussing the pre-1998 period. All references to the Ecuadorian Constitution taken from; PDBA, 
2005c; 2005d; 2005e.
14 Since 1998 candidates need to reach 40% only (plus a difference of at least 10% to the second-placed 
candidate) to be elected in the first round. It was hoped that this reform would provide an incentive for 
coalition-building as chances were now higher that a decision would fall in the first round. In the 1998 
and 2002 elections, however, this rule has not made any difference.
15 This, however, is only the case since 1998, until then assembly members elected on the national list and 
on the provincial list were elected for four or two years, respectively.
16 Interestingly, quite a number of scholars writing about Ecuador’s democracy do not discuss the regime 
type at all (see, for example, Biles, 1998; Conaghan, 1994a; Conaghan and Malloy, 1994).
17 Since Shugart and Carey do not explicitly discuss the case of Ecuador, however, there is some 
ambiguity in their classification: elsewhere they put Ecuador half-way between a presidential and a 
presidential-parliamentary system (Shugart and Carey, 1992:160).
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right to censure ministers, cabinet formation is thus exclusively in the hands of the 
president.
In conclusion, Ecuador can be considered as having had a modified presidential regime 
until 1998 given the provision of a “potent” vote of censure granted to Congress. The 
system violated the third principle of presidentialism: the president’s sole control over 
government composition. Since the change of Constitution in 1998, however, the 
political system of Ecuador is in absolute accordance with the earlier given definition of 
presidential regimes as the right of the legislature to dismiss ministers was abolished.
2.2  C o n s t it u t io n a l  P o w e r s  o f  P r e s id e n t  a n d  C o n g r e ss
Having established the regime type of both countries, an analysis of the constitutional 
powers bestowed on the president and congress will define the systems of these two 
countries in more detail and facilitate a better understanding. The relationship between 
powers of the executive and the legislature is crucial to explain patterns of political 
processes. According to Shugart and Carey (1992) it is the balance of presidential- 
congressional powers which influences democratic stability and governance. The 
following sections focus on provisions regarding veto and decree powers, which 
represent the crucial aspects defining congressional-presidential relations. Other powers, 
such as emergency powers, control over government formation and rules on referenda 
will also be taken into consideration.
Veto powers. A veto constitutes one of the determining features of presidential power 
over legislation as providing presidents with veto power means that they have the right 
to block any law approved by the legislature. It is essentially a reactive power, which 
Mainwaring and Shugart (1997b:41) defined as allowing the president “to defend the 
status quo against attempts by the legislative majority to change it”. The veto is 
ubiquitous in the presidential regimes of Latin America; there are few constitutions that 
do not grant this power to the president. However, there are great variations between 
different forms of vetoes and the actual extent of power that is transferred by it.
One way to assess the nature of a president’s veto is to consider the possibilities the 
congress has to counteract it. In both Ecuador and Bolivia the stakes for the legislature 
to overturn vetoes are high: a two-thirds majority is required to override it. The 
president can thus be considered as having a “strong” veto since a high degree of 
opposition and unity among the oppositional forces has to be given in congress to 
overturn it. However, the nature of veto power in Ecuador and Bolivia does in fact
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differ greatly. Distinguishing between total vetoes and partial vetoes will make these 
differences clear. While a total veto allows presidents to block a proposed bill as such, 
they have the power to pick elements they agree with and veto parts they disapprove of 
if the Constitution provides for a partial veto. A partial veto -  which only few Latin 
American constitutions grant to the executive -  thus shifts the balance of power 
between president and legislature clearly towards a predominant president. In Ecuador 
presidents have both a total and a partial veto at their disposal and can thus be 
considered as being in a more powerful position than their Bolivian counterparts (Art. 
153). This powerful position of Ecuadorian presidents is even enhanced: in the case of a 
total veto, the Congress has no right at all to overturn it (while they can override a 
partial veto when gathering two thirds of the votes). However, there are some 
qualifications to these veto powers, which in turn, allows the legislature to act as a 
check on presidential power. Here one has to distinguish between the Constitution in 
effect since 1998 and the previous one of 1979, reformed in 1984 and 1996: in the 
Constitution of 1979 as reformed in 1984 the president is specifically denied to veto the 
budget and was thus deprived of blocking a crucial part of legislation (Art. 70). 
Secondly, should a president make use of a total veto, while not having the right to 
override it, the Congress had the possibility to call for a referendum on the vetoed bill 
(Art. 69). Presidents consequently had to decide carefully whether to use a partial veto 
and thus allow the legislature a potential override, or to use a total veto, which in turn, 
might have resulted in a referendum. Depending on the current popularity of the 
president a referendum of the voters might not always seem a desirable prospect for a 
president.18
The Constitution of 1998 brought important changes to Ecuador’s political system: it no 
longer mentions that the president cannot veto the budget (Art. 130; 258). Secondly, the 
new Constitution altered the provisions regarding total veto powers: Congress has been 
divested of its right to call for a referendum in case the president uses a total veto on 
some legislative proposal. The only option at the disposal of Congress to ratify the 
originally intended law is a two-thirds override, however, after one year only (Art. 153). 
These two changes concerning budget legislation and total vetoes have essentially
18 As an example how a referendum may negatively affect a president one might consider the referendum 
held in Ecuador in June 1986. Though not following a presidential veto, but even called by the President 
himself, it makes clear that a referendum might be something presidents prefer to avoid. Febres Cordero 
had called for a plebiscite on allowing independents to be elected to public office. The referendum was 
defeated by a two to one margin and contributed considerably to the deterioration of Febres Cordero’s 
personal standing (see, for example, Corkill and Cubitt, 1988; Isaacs, 1993).
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created a “stronger” presidency and have taken away some of the powers the 
Ecuadorian legislature previously held. In Bolivia, by contrast, the Constitution does not 
provide for a partial veto, the president is restricted to the option of vetoing a complete 
bill (Art. 76).19 The referendum is a new institutional feature in Bolivia’s political 
system: a law passed by Congress in July 2004 gave the right to convene a referendum 
to the executive, the legislature (needs approval of two-thirds majority), and the
90population (requiring support of 6 per cent of registered voters).
In sum, the Ecuadorian political system bestows presidents with “strong” veto powers 
as they can oppose legislative proposals by using a total or a partial veto. Until 1998, 
however, the Ecuadorian Congress had some means to counteract at its disposal: in the 
case of a total veto it could resort to calling for a referendum, while being able to 
override a partial veto with a two-thirds majority. Under the new Constitution of 1998 
Congress has been deprived of its right to call for a referendum, thus presidential veto 
power has been further increased. In Bolivia, in contrast, the Constitution allows for 
considerably less concentration of power in the executive: Bolivian presidents can 
merely resort to using a total veto, which may be overturned by a two-thirds majority in 
Congress.
Decree powers. In contrast to the veto powers, which give a form of passive power to 
the president, decrees are proactive allowing the president “to establish a new status 
quo” (Mainwaring and Shugart, 1997b:41). Rather than reacting to a legislative 
proposal of the congress, a decree power puts presidents in a position to legislate 
without involving the legislature. In the field of Latin American politics ruling by 
“decree” is an almost ubiquitous term. As Mainwaring and Shugart (1997b) have 
pointed out, however, in many Latin American presidential regimes this seemingly 
existing decree power is based on a semantic misunderstanding. In Latin America the 
term decreto is used not only for a president’s right to issue new legislation but also for 
rule-making authority, which relates to existing legislation only. The term decree will 
here be understood in a narrower way so that presidential powers can be analysed more 
distinctively. The definition provided by Shugart and Carey who consider decree laws
19 All references to the Bolivian Constitution are from the 1967 Constitution reformed in 1995 (PDBA, 
2003). In case there have been changes to the original Constitution of 1967, these are mentioned.
20 Excluded from referenda are questions of internal or external security, fiscal matters and the political 
division of the country (Ley 2769, 6.7.2004).
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as “those laws which the president can initiate and which maintain the force o f law 
unless specifically rescinded (vetoed) by congress" (1992:143) will be adopted.
Bolivia. Having thus defined decree laws, one finds that Bolivian presidents have the 
right to use regulatory decrees only, there are no provisions for legislative decree 
powers in the Constitution. At times, however, presidents managed to introduce wide- 
ranging changes despite being limited to the tool of regulatory decrees: this was the case 
of the famous Decree 21060 by which President Paz Estenssoro introduced his New 
Economic Policy on 29 August, 1985. It was a reform programme aimed at liberalising 
the economy and reducing the state’s role in economic development. The drafters of the 
reform had managed to formulate the decree in a way that all changes made referred to 
already existing legislation and thus the 21060 kept within the framework of a 
regulatory decree (Urioste, interview, 11.5.2004).
Ecuador. Ecuador’s Constitution (since 1984), on the other hand, bestows the president 
with a right that Krsticevic (1992:139) called “indirect” decree power. Ecuadorian 
presidents are entitled to legislate by decree: however, solely as regards economic 
measures (including tax reforms). This is not a decree power in the absolute sense of 
coming into force in the moment of its announcement, because the Constitution allows 
the Congress to veto a decreed bill. Yet, if the legislature does not discuss it within 
fifteen days (30 days since the Constitution of 1998 came into force), it automatically 
becomes a law. Although the Congress is thus given some countervailing powers, it can 
still be considered as a decree power and concurs with the earlier given definition. The 
president also had the right to issue several decrees at the same time, thus making it 
impossible for the legislature to deal with all of them within fifteen days. During the 
presidency of Febres Cordero (1984-88) in Ecuador, for example, he sent fifteen 
economic laws to Congress at one point, some of which had more than 200 articles. 
Obviously, most of them came into force without even having been looked at by 
Congress (Corkill and Cubitt, 1988; Roldos, 1986). This possibility was ended by the 
Constitution of 1996 (Art. 88; Art. 155 Constitution of 1998) as it prohibited presidents 
(except during a state of emergency) from sending new decree legislation in case 
another project was still being considered by the legislature. In addition to this decree 
power, the Ecuadorian Constitution allows presidents to call for a referendum on any 
kind of legislative matter. This provides them with yet another potential instrument to 
rule without consulting the Congress (see Mainwaring and Shugart, 1997b:46). In 
conclusion, while the Bolivian system does not grant any decree power to its presidents,
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their Ecuadorian counterparts are in a more powerful position as they may introduce 
legislation by decree.
Other constitutional provisions. In terms of constitutional powers over legislation, 
veto and decree powers represent the main aspects defining the relationship between 
president and congress. Other constitutional features, however, also have an influence 
on congressional-presidential relations. These are briefly outlined below.
Emergency powers. The right to assume emergency powers and to suspend certain 
provisions such as civil liberties for a specified period of time is a common feature of 
Latin American presidential regimes. Both the Ecuadorian and the Bolivian 
constitutions allow the president to resort to this measure in case of a foreign invasion 
or internal disturbance. In both countries the legislature has the right to revoke a state of 
emergency declared by the president. Paz Estenssoro (1985-89) of Bolivia made ample 
use of these emergency powers: by declaring a state of emergency he managed to limit 
the protests against his New Economic Policy (see Chapter 4.2).
Vote o f  censure. Another crucial element influencing the balance of powers between 
president and the legislature is control over government formation. While in both 
countries the president names and dismisses the cabinet ministers (Bolivia, Art. 99; 
Ecuador, Art. 78:e, 1984; Art. 171:10, 1998) the regimes have long differed 
substantially in their provisions for giving the Congress a voice. Bolivia does not grant 
any decisive power to the legislature: though the legislature may pass a vote of censure 
on cabinet ministers by a two-thirds majority it does not compel the president to 
actually dismiss the minister. Thus, not only are the stakes high to pass a vote of 
censure, it also may have no consequence at all and hence merely bestows the Bolivian 
Congress with the right for a symbolic rebuke of cabinet ministers. In Ecuador, as 
mentioned earlier, until 1998 the legislature had the right of votes of censure. This right 
was used extensively by the legislature: between 1979 and 1996 ministers were 
threatened with a vote of censure on 190 occasions (Sanchez Parga, 1998:84); 37 
interpellations were ultimately carried out and 18 ministers were effectively censured 
(Burbano and Rowland, 1998:105). While 18 impeachments might appear a relatively 
modest number one has to keep in mind that ministers often resigned in anticipation of a 
vote of censure when facing a threat of being interpellated by Congress. The main target 
group of interpellations were the finance ministers, who were accused of everything 
from human rights violations or sugar price increases to administrative irregularities
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(Conaghan, 1994a:343). The institutional aspect of a vote of censure has led to a high 
turnover of finance ministers and in consequence has resulted in great instability in this 
position so crucial for the development of economic policies. Between 1979 and 1998 
finance ministers’ average term in office was 11.25 months (see Appendix C).
Considering the case of the tax reform undertaken in 1989 under finance minister Jorge 
Gallardo it seems striking that this period was the longest a finance minister held this 
position during the last 25 years. Gallardo remained Minister of Finance for 29 months. 
It can be assumed that this continuity (and the apparent support he must have enjoyed) 
contributed to a successful attempt at reforming the tax system (see Chapter 6.2). The 
Congress can consequently be considered as having been in possession of an important 
countervailing power opposite the president given their right to censure ministers. Since 
1998, however, this congressional power has been restricted: while the currently valid 
Constitution still allows the legislature to censure ministers, it transfers the ultimate 
decision about the minister’s dismissal to the president thus essentially making the vote 
of censure as “toothless” as Bolivia’s (Art. 130). A member of the Ecuadorian Congress 
has commented that "since the authority to dismiss functionaries has been taken away 
from Congress, these processes are pure bla, bla”.21 It needs pointing out, however, 
that the volatility in the Ministry of Finance has continued even after the vote of censure 
had been abolished in 1998. This is in part related to the fact that since then there have 
been four different governments (Mahuad, Noboa, Gutierrez, Palacio) while there 
would have been only two had Mahuad and Gutierrez been able to end their terms. On 
the other hand this volatility has been related to the fact that in the unstable political 
environment of the last years presidents seem to have frequently chosen to dismiss some 
of their ministers to soothe public discontent with their governments. As former finance 
minister, Alfredo Arfzaga, commented: “In this environment o f permanent conflict the 
ministers are the fuses that are blown to allow maintaining the government’s stability. ” 
(Arizaga, interview, 31.3.2004)22
In sum, with the introduction of a new Constitution in Ecuador in 1998, the 
congressional-presidential balance of power has been considerably changed in favour of 
the president. By depriving the legislature of its potent vote of censure that it formerly 
held, more power has been concentrated in the executive.
21 Le6n Rold6s in “Congreso aprobo 21 leyes y  vetos del Ejecutivo” (Hoy, 3.6.2002). All quotes from 
newspapers are my translation.
22 All quotes from interviews are my translation. When adding a word or phrase to a quote I will mark it 
with my initials, SL. See list of interviews in Appendix B.
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2.3  A s se ssin g  C o n s t it u t io n a l  P o w e r s
Table 2.1: Constitutional Powers of President and Congress
President’s Powers Congressional Powers
Bolivia
Total veto 
No decree power 
Emergency powers 
Names and dismisses ministers
Elects president1
Override by two-thirds majority
Revocation of state of emergency
Ecuador Total veto 
Partial veto
Decree power for economic reforms 
Emergency powers 
Names/ dismisses cabinet ministers 
May call referenda
Until 1998: no override, but may 
request a referendum
Since 1998: two-thirds override after 
one year, no referendum
Override by two-thirds majority
Veto within 15 days
Revocation of state of emergency
Vote of censure on cabinet ministers 
(until 1998)2
Source: based on Constitution Politico de Bolivia, 1967 + con reformas de 1994; Constitution Politico 
de la Republica de Ecuador, 1984, 1996, 1998.
1 The Congress elects the president in case no candidate receives more than 50% of the votes in the first 
round. Since 1997 Congress chooses from the first two vote-getters, previously from the first three.
2 Until 1998 the Constitution gave Congress a decisive vote of censure: censured ministers were forced to 
resign (Art. 59:f, 1984). The current Constitution, however, has considerably weakened this power, as 
now the ultimate decision about the fate of the censured minister falls to the president (Art. 130, 1998).
Tables 2.1 and 2.2 show that considering presidential and congressional powers together 
rather than presidential powers only (as do, for example, Mainwaring and Shugart, 
1997a) allows for a more comprehensive assessment of the political systems of Bolivia 
and Ecuador. Looking at the presidential side of powers only, one misses out potential 
countervailing powers of the legislature, which in effect might balance the presidential- 
congressional relations. Taking into account powers of Congress, some qualifications 
have to be made in the assessment of Bolivia having a “weak” presidency and Ecuador 
a “weak” Congress, essentially suggested by Mainwaring and Shugart (1997b). In 
Ecuador under the Constitution in effect until 1998 the legislature was bestowed a 
countervailing power for every presidential right. It could call for a referendum in 
response to a total veto, override a partial veto by a two-thirds majority, veto legislation 
decreed by the president, revoke states of emergencies and most significantly Congress 
could censure ministers. However, the stakes for many of these countervailing powers 
were rather high: for example, a referendum was rarely called for by the legislature and
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gathering a two-thirds majority in a highly fragmented Congress is a difficult 
endeavour. Hence, even though the Ecuadorian legislature was granted powers to 
overturn presidential initiatives, some of them were difficult to put into practice. The 
most powerful device of the legislature was the vote of censure. With the introduction 
of a new Constitution in Ecuador in 1998, the balance of power between president and 
Congress shifted markedly towards an even more dominant president: most 
significantly, Congress was deprived of its right to effectively censure ministers and of 
its option to call for a referendum in case of a presidential total veto. Ecuador’s 
Constitution thus provides its president with extensive powers, such as decree and 
emergency powers, total and partial vetoes, the sole control over government formation 
and the possibility to call for a referendum. By comparison, Bolivia’s presidents are in a 
weaker position as they are neither provided with decree power nor with a partial veto. 
Still, Bolivian presidents have control over cabinet formation and are provided with a 
total veto difficult for the legislature to overturn. The Bolivian Congress, in turn, is in a 
powerful position as it elects the president and potentially has a larger role to play in the 
legislative process given the absence of presidential decree and partial veto power.
Table 2.2: Presidential Powers and Countervailing Powers of Congress
Bolivia Ecuador
President Congress President Congress
+ Total veto
+ Emergency powers 
+ Cabinet formation
+ Elects president 
+ Two-thirds override
+ Revocation
+ Total veto 
+ Partial veto 
+ Decree powers 
+ Emergency powers 
+ Cabinet formation 
+ Referendum
+ Referendum*
+ Two-thirds override 
+ Veto 
+ Revocation 
+ Vote of censure*
Source: Own elaboration. Based on Constitution Politico de Bolivia, 1967 + with reforms of 1994; 
Constitution Politico de la Republica de Ecuador, 1984, 1996, 1998. * Until 1998.
In sum, Ecuador’s presidents are granted rather extensive legislative powers which in 
Latin America is is also the case in Chile, Brazil and Colombia. Bolivia’s weak 
presidential powers are comparable to those in Costa Rica, Nicaragua and Paraguay 
(Stein et. al., 2005:48).
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2.4 L e g is l a t iv e  P r o c e ss
In the following the process of introducing legislation in Ecuador and Bolivia will be 
outlined. Particular reference will be made to provisions for tax legislation.
Ecuador. In Ecuador’s unicameral system bills have to be approved by the legislature 
in a simple majority vote and both executive and legislature have the right to present 
law proposals.23 As regards the area of taxation, however, the power of the legislature 
was significantly restricted with the introduction of a new Constitution in 1998, which 
deprived the legislature of the power to initiate tax reforms and granted it solely to the 
president (Art. 147, Constitution 1998). The legislature has thus been limited to reacting 
to the president’s proposals in this matter. After the executive has sent the bill to 
Congress the usual process is as follows: the project is distributed among the deputies 
and sent to the legislative commission responsible for taxation which analyses the 
project and sends a report to the legislature. In a first debate observations are made and 
the bill is then returned to the commission, which prepares a second report on the basis 
of the comments given. In a second and final debate, the bill is discussed in the 
legislature article by article, which are approved, modified or rejected. While this 
procedure appears to allow the legislative commissions some room for manoeuvre, their 
influence on policy-making seems to have been rather marginal as became clear in 
several interviews with presidents and members of the commission responsible for 
taxation (see, for example, Minuche, Bustamante, interviews, 20.4.2004, 25.3.2004).
When sending a tax proposal to Congress, presidents have the option to either send it as 
an ordinary law, or to send it as an economic law marked as urgent (see section on 
decree power above). This gives very little time -  15 days until 1998 and 30 since 
then -  to the legislature for discussing the law. When failing to comment on the bill 
presented, it would come into force by default. Practically all tax reforms initiated by 
the executive during the last two decades have been sent to the legislature in this way, 
as the alternative -  to send it the ordinary way -  would have meant a bill would 
probably take years to be approved (Ruales, interview, 23.3.2004). As mentioned earlier 
prior to the 1996 Constitution presidents were allowed to send an unlimited number of 
urgent economic laws. As regards tax reform, this provision allowed President Febres 
Cordero to increase the VAT from 6 to 10 per cent in 1986 as the tax bill was one 
among many of these bills marked as urgent and which Congress could not process
23 Ecuador’s Congress currently has 100 members (71 between 1979-1992, 77 in 1992-96, 82 in 1996-98, 
125 1998-2003).
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within a period of 15 days. Given, however, that this possibility was abused by Febres 
Cordero, his successors did not take recourse to this procedure to the same extent and it 
was formally abolished in 1996.
The Ecuadorian Constitution granted the right to decide on a piece of legislation not 
only to the Congress but also to its proxy body, the Plenario de las Comisiones 
Legislativas24 (Article 65 of the 1979 Constitution -  modified in 1984 -  and Article 88 
of the 1996 Constitution). The Plenario consists of the members of the legislative 
commissions (four commissions with 28 members in total between 1984 and 1994; five 
commissions with 35 members since 1995) and convenes during the periods of the year 
when the full Congress is on vacation. While arrangements like the Plenario to provide 
continuation of legislative work are a common feature of Latin American presidential 
systems, it is highly unusual that this body had the right to decide on bills. It seems that 
in all other Latin American countries an extraordinary session of the full Congress has 
to be convened if a law is to be approved outside the congressional periods. In no case 
can anyone but the Congress decide on legislation. Granting this power to the Plenario 
is therefore a unique feature of the Ecuadorian system. In 1998, however, this procedure 
was abolished as the new Constitution established that all laws have to be discussed in 
Congress. Another rather striking fact is that only since 1996 was the composition of the 
Plenario required to be proportional to the composition of the Congress.25 It could thus 
occur that the representation of parties in these two legislative spaces differed. Most 
markedly a distortion existed in the first half of President Boija’s government, between 
1988 and 1990, when his ruling party fell short of holding a majority in the Congress 
but did hold a comfortable majority in the Plenario. As will be outlined later, Boija 
managed to take advantage of this situation by sending his proposed tax reform to the 
legislature at a time when the Congress was on vacations and the bill could thus easily 
pass in the Plenario (see Chapter 6.2).
Once the executive’s reform proposals have been either approved, rejected or modified 
by either the Congress or its proxy the Plenario, Ecuadorian presidents have the option 
of putting either a total or a partial veto (see section above). Though many tax initiatives 
of the executives were turned down by the legislature, presidents hardly ever took
24 Plenary of Legislative Commissions. Hereafter Plenario will be used.
25 In Article 31 of the Organic Law of the Legislative Function (Ley Organica de la Funcion Legislativa\ 
organic laws state a country’s constitution) the following section was added in 1996: “The Plenario of the 
Legislative Commissions has to be composed in proportional relation to the representation which the 
different political parties and the disaffiliated have achieved.’’
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recourse to this option, probably to avoid further conflict with Congress. The only 
exceptions occurred in 1999 under Mahuad and in 2001 when President Noboa vetoed 
the decision of the Congress to turn down his bill regarding an increase of the VAT rate 
(see Chapter 7.1,2). Considering the constitutional provisions to introduce laws, tax 
laws in particular, presidents in Ecuador seem to be equipped with rather favourable 
powers: it is only the executive who has the right to propose tax reforms since 1998; 
they can be sent marked as urgent thus leaving very little time to the legislature for 
deliberation; and finally presidents have wide-ranging veto powers at their disposal they 
could use in case Congress would turn down their initiatives. What is unusual about the 
Ecuadorian system is that until 1998 it allowed a body other than the Congress to decide 
on legislation, as was the case of the Plenario, which was not required to be 
proportional to the composition of Congress.
Bolivia. Given that Bolivia has a bicameral system any piece of legislation has to be 
approved by both chambers of the Congress.26 Initiating tax reforms is not limited to the 
executive but both chambers of the Congress can also present projects. Bills are usually 
discussed in the Chamber of Deputies first where the discussion -  in a similar way as in 
Ecuador -  proceeds in two rounds between which the legislative commission 
responsible (Economic Commission) integrates proposals for modification that arose in 
the legislature. The commission is required to write a report within a period of 15 days 
after the first discussion. Just as in Ecuador, this legislative commission does not have a 
decisive influence on tax policy-making and usually reacts to the initiatives of the 
executive (Inch, interview, 13.5.2004). In the second discussion a decision is taken in 
the Chamber of Deputies and the bill is then passed on to the Senate. While the Senate 
has the power to stop the introduction of laws, in practice it has made rare use of this 
possibility and has generally followed the decision taken by the lower chamber. A 
simple majority in each chamber is needed to approve laws. In response to the 
legislature’s verdict on the tax bill, the president has the possibility to veto the decision 
(see section on veto power above). This veto can only take the form of completely 
vetoing the approved law rather than vetoing parts of the bill (as the Ecuadorian 
Constitution allows). The legislature needs to gather two-thirds of the votes to overturn 
the presidential veto. In sum, in Bolivia the powers granted to executive and legislature 
to introduce tax legislation are more balanced than in Ecuador: both have the right to
26 The Camara de Diputados (Chamber of Deputies) currently has 130 members (117 between 1984- 
1997) and the Camara de Senadores (Chamber of Senators) 27 members.
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initiate reforms, the time taken to discuss the reforms is left to the Congress, and finally 
the president only has a total veto at his disposal to overturn decisions taken by the 
legislature.
2.5 P a r t y  Sy st e m
After having defined the political regimes of Ecuador and Bolivia and having examined 
the constitutional powers of presidents and congress, the party systems of both countries 
will be considered.
Table 2.3: Number of Parties in Congress, Bolivia + Ecuador
Number of parties in Congress
Bolivia Ecuador
1985-89 10 1984-86 13
1986-88 13
1989-93 5a 1988-90 11
1990-92 11
1993-97 9 1992-94 12
1994-96 13
1997-2002 7 1996-98 11
1998-2003 13b
2002- 8 2003- 18b
Average 7.8 12.7
8 New legislation of 1986 made the system of seat allocation less proportional. As pointed out by 
Domingo (2001:150) the law was ambiguously phrased and in the 1989 elections the Corte National 
Electoral (National Electoral Court, CNE) took the liberty to interpret it in a way that favoured the large 
parties. This way only five parties entered the Congress. According to Domingo another two would have 
achieved presentation had the law been interpreted differently. Romero Ballivian, of the electoral court, 
considered that the decision was a result of the politicisation of the electoral court at that time (Romero 
Ballivian, interview, 28.4.2004). Due to these proceedings, the way members of the electoral court are 
elected was changed in 1991 and the electoral system was reformed mainly through legislation introduced 
in 1996.
b Prior to the 1998 elections parties were not allowed to form alliances and had to present their own 
candidates. Since then, however, a high number of deputies in Congress competed in the elections on a 
joint list rather than under a single party label. This has led to a dispersion of parties represented in 
Congress (Pachano, interview, 18.3.2004). In “1998-2003” and “2003-“ I have counted all parties 
represented individually or via a joint list. E.g. in the case of the 2003 elections there have been 14 parties 
holding seats under their party label plus eleven joint lists of two parties holding one or more seats. I have 
counted the 12 parties plus those parties, which have gained representation via a joint list but not 
individually (of which there were six).
Source: Own elaboration. Based on data from TSE (2004), Observatorio Electoral (2005), CNE (2005b).
Bolivia. Bolivia’s party system can be categorised as a fragmented multi-party system. 
Between 1979 and 1997 a total of 28 parties participated in presidential elections and 
the average number of effective parties between 1979 and 1993 has been 4.0, 4.7 in
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1993 (Mainwaring and Scully, 1995:30) and 5.5 in 1999 (Chasquetti, 2001:354).27 
Despite this fragmentation, however, there is some consistency as the candidates elected 
to the presidency have always come from the parties ADN, MIR or MNR. These three 
parties have also constantly taken the first three places in all presidential elections 
between 1985 and 1997. Gamarra and Malloy (1995:420) have consequently named 
Bolivia’s party system a “three-party-dominant multiparty system ”. The popularity o f 
the three parties has gradually and steadily declined, however, as they received less and 
less votes from one election to the other. While the ADN, MNR and MIR had received 
more than two-thirds of the votes in the elections of 1985 and 1989, they lost more and 
more of their supporters, by 2002 falling below 50 per cent o f the votes (see Table 2.4). 
Other parties which had participated in the coalitions also saw their representation 
greatly diminished (as did the UCS), or completely disappear (as was the case of 
CONDEPA).
Table 2.4: Total ADN, MNR, MIR, 1985-2002
Total ADN, MNR, MIR 
(as % of s e a ts  in Lower Chamber )
Source: Own elaboration. Data from Observatorio Electoral, 2005; CNE, 2005b.
As regards the parties represented in Congress, the number has been considerably lower 
than has been the case in Ecuador: while an average of 7.8 parties has been represented 
in each legislature since 1985 in Bolivia, the number for Ecuador since 1984 has been
12.7 (see Table 2.3).
27 All authors have based their calculations on Laakso’s and Taagepera’s (1979) framework for 
determining the number o f “effective” parties, which takes into account their relative size.
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The degree of ideological polarisation expresses the extent to which votes are dispersed 
between parties on the left or right spectrum. An interesting fact about the Bolivian 
party system is that has become less polarised since the 1985 elections. The three main 
parties dominating Bolivian politics between 1985 and 2003 (MNR, ADN, and MIR) 
took clearly different positions on the left-right scale to begin with. From 1985 onwards 
and with the start of the introduction of market-oriented policies, however, these parties’ 
ideological differences declined. With the emergence of parties like the Movimiento al 
Socialismo (MAS) in the political arena, however, the degree of polarisation has 
increased again.
Ecuador. While Bolivia’s effective number of parties seems high already, the 
Ecuadorian party system is even more fragmented: in the five presidential elections 
taking place between 1978 and 1992 the mean number of effective parties was 5.8, 6.6 
in the election of 1992 (Mainwaring and Scully, 1995:30) and 5.43 in 1999 (Chasquetti, 
2001:354). Another indicator of the degree of fragmentation is that at least twelve 
parties have obtained representation in Congress in the elections between 1984 and 
1998, a number that has even increased since then (see Table 2.3). Whereas in Bolivia 
the presidency has rotated between three parties, in Ecuador every election since 1979 
has brought a president from a different party to power.28 Conaghan (1994a) described 
Ecuador’s party system as one being characterised by “floating” voters as well as 
“floating” politicians. By this she referred to the high volatility in the behaviour of 
voters as well as the politicians’ frequent change of party. A survey of 1991 showed that 
32 per cent of all elected members of Congress had changed their party affiliation at 
least once between 1978 and 1988 (cited in Conaghan, 1995:448-9). More recent 
numbers confirm this trend: as Table 2.5 shows during 1992 and 1997 between 17 and 
27 per cent of the members had broken away from the party that they had stood for on 
their election within a year after legislative elections brought into being a new Congress. 
It is worth noting that no disaffiliations took place during the first two years of the Boija 
government (1988-90), the time when Ecuador’s most significant tax reform was 
introduced (see Chapter 6.2).
28 There have been eleven presidents from eight different parties since 1979 three presidents, however, 
have not been elected: 1979 -  Roldos, CFP; 1981 -  Hurtado, DP, Vice-President named President after 
the death of Rold6s; 1984 -  Febres Cordero, PSC; 1988 -  Boija, ID; 1992 -  Ballen, PUR; 1996 -  
Bucaram, PRE; 1997 -  Alarcon, FRA, President of Congress named President; 1998 -  Mahuad, DP; 2000 
-  Noboa, Independent, Vice-president named President; 2003 -  Gutierrez, PSP; 2005 -  Palacio, 
Independent, Vice-president named President.
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Table 2.5: Party Disaffiliations by Members of Parliament, Ecuador
Installation of Congress Date Disaffiliations
August 1988 August 1990 None
August 1990 August 1991 10%
August 1992 August 1993 18%
August 1994 August 1995 17%
August 1996 February 1997 21%
November 1997 27%
Source: Own elaboration. Data from Burbano and Rowland, 1998:34,36.
Another prominent aspect of Ecuador’s party system is its highly “personalist” nature. 
Coppedge went as far as saying that "instead o f party politics there is a politics o f  
personality" (1998b: 197). This “politics of personality” has been embodied by the 
politician Velasco Ibarra who dominated Ecuadorian politics during a period of almost 
forty years, between 1933 and 1972 (see, for example, de la Torre, 2000). His style of 
promoting personal loyalty rather than loyalty to a party has marked the political system 
deeply up to the present day. As Coppedge (1998b:555) has shown, Ecuador was the 
only Latin American country where the personalist vote constantly exceeded 10 per 
cent.29
Parties seem to be mainly instruments for gaining office, which can be amply illustrated 
by two incidents: In 1992 Ballen, who had been a long-standing member of the Partido 
Social Cristiano (PSC) and twice its presidential candidate, simply left his old party
■»A
after it had denied him the presidential nomination this time. He founded a new party, 
the Partido Union Republicana (PUR), in order to be able to compete for the 
presidential office, and subsequently won. Another example for the lack of esteem for 
political parties by politicians or presidents themselves is the attempt of Febres Cordero 
to change the Constitution. In 1986 he called for a plebiscite on a constitutional reform, 
which would allow independent candidates to be elected. While then rejected, in another 
referendum -  this time carried out by President Duran Ballen -  the same proposal was 
accepted and since 1996 candidates are no longer required to be affiliated to a party. 
According to political analyst Simon Pachano this change caused a considerable
29 Coppedge used data covering the elections between 1966 and 1994. For his methodology see 
Coppedge, 1998b.
30 For more information on the PSC and other parties see Appendix F.
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weakening of the traditional political parties as their election results declined in 
consequence (Pachano, interview, 18.3.2004).
Parties in Ecuador are also strongly characterised by their regional divide between the 
sierra and the costa; most parties receive strong electoral support only in one of these 
two regions. The PSC, for example, is predominantly based in the costa, while the 
Izquierda Democratica (ID) has its base in the sierra. Within Latin America Ecuador 
has one of the least nationalised party systems, meaning that parties win widely varying 
voter support across the country’s provinces, a feature that it shares with Peru, 
Argentina, Venezuela, and Brazil (Jones, 2005:25). As Ecuador’s parties are mainly 
personalist in nature its degree of ideological polarisation is consequently low. As 
former mayor of Quito, Rodrigo Paz, pointed out: “There are no ideologies, ideas 
diminish and personal aspirations prevail ” (quoted in Conaghan, 1995:456). In 
comparison to Bolivia, however, Ecuador’s party system is much more ideologically 
diverse (Coppedge, 1998b:561).
In both Ecuador and Bolivia links between parties and society have historically been 
weak (Mainwaring and Scully, 1995:13). Party legitimacy is among the lowest of the 
region: as a Latinobarometro poll of 2003 has shown party legitimacy reached 12 per 
cent only in Ecuador and 19 in Bolivia, compared to 47 per cent reached at the upper 
end of the scale in Uruguay. Less than one fifth of the Ecuadorian population thinks that 
parties are indispensable compared to 30 per cent in Bolivia and 59 in Uruguay. While 6 
per cent have confidence in their parties in Ecuador, 8 per cent do so in Bolivia and 34 
per cent in Uruguay (quoted in Jones, 2005:79).
2 .6  E l e c t o r a l  P r o c e d u r e s
It is often argued that the nature of the party system and the degree of fragmentation is 
to a great extent determined by electoral procedures. Shugart and Carey (1992) 
demonstrated that electoral rules and electoral cycles play an important role in shaping 
the character of a party system. They claimed that majority elections of the president 
and non-concurrent elections generate fragmented multi-party systems. Another 
important aspect is the procedure for allocating seats, such as proportional 
representation. Mainwaring (1990) argued that multi-party systems emerge where 
elections are not concurrent -  meaning that the first round of the presidential election is 
not held together with elections for the legislature -  and where proportional 
representation is used. If, by contrast, elections do coincide, a two-party system tends to
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emerge even when a system of proportional representation is applied. Considering
Ecuador and Bolivia, however, these cases do not seem to support Mainwaring’s
hypothesis as both countries have concurrent elections yet still both countries have a
multi-party system. It is interesting to note, however, that in Ecuador the party system
has been more fragmented in mid-term elections than at those times when presidential
1 1
and congressional elections coincide (Shugart and Carey, 1992:224). As regards the 
second aspect of Mainwaring’s hypothesis, both Bolivia and Ecuador allocate seats in 
Congress on the basis of proportional representation.
Bolivia. In Bolivia a system of closed-list proportional representation was in place until 
1997. Without being required to fulfil any quota, all parties were eligible to obtain seats 
according to largest remainders, which favoured smaller parties. The Bolivian party 
system has traditionally been highly fragmented and particularly in the period of 
transition to democracy the proliferation of parties reached rather high levels. Parties 
were often called “taxi parties” given that the number of its members would fit into a 
taxi. Legislation was put into place to limit this proliferation: from 1979 onwards parties 
which received less than 50,000 votes during an election were required to pay its share 
in the costs of printing the ballot papers. Should they be unable to raise the money, they 
would lose their right to exist as a political party. In practice this mechanism did 
function as a form of threshold as in several cases parties were unable to pay and in 
consequence ceased to exist (Romero Ballivian, interview, 28.4.2004). With new 
legislation introduced in 1996 this mechanism was replaced by a threshold, which 
required parties to receive 3 per cent of the votes in order to qualify for representation in 
the legislature (in addition, when failing to achieve 3 per cent once, the party is banned 
from ever standing for election again). While this provision alone would have had the 
effect of reducing the number of congressional parties, another change in the electoral 
rules, however, had a countervailing effect. Until the elections in 1997 all 130 members 
of Congress were elected in a closed list system and seats distributed according to 
proportional representation. From 1997, however, a mixed system was introduced in 
which 68 members of Congress -  the so-called uninominales -  are elected in a first- 
past-the-post system in 68 constituencies, while the remaining 62 seats continue to be 
allocated by proportional representation {Ley 1704, 2.8.1996). Previously, party leaders 
controlled party lists as they selected and allocated places to candidates, which made
31 Due to the fact that provincial deputies had two-year terms until 1998, elections took place biannually 
thus alternating between joint presidential and congressional elections and pure elections for congress.
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politicians dependent on their approval. The system of closed list proportional 
representation has generally been considered to have strengthened the influence of party 
leaders and discipline within parties. This was also confirmed for the case of Bolivia in 
a World Bank report of 2000 (World Bank, 2000a:47). Under the new system, party 
leaders maintained this leverage over only about half of the deputies and had no power 
over the appointment of candidates standing for election in the remaining 68 districts. 
Party discipline was consequently undermined as directly elected Members of 
Parliament had more incentives to be loyal to their constituency (to increase their 
chances for re-election) than to their party leaders.
"It had a completely counterproductive effect because it has destroyed the discipline o f  
the parties. These ‘uninominaV Members o f Parliament do not feel like representatives 
o f the nation but like attorneys o f their region. ” (Urioste, interview, 11.5.2004)
The resulting lack of discipline mentioned by Bolivian constitutionalist Urioste, seems 
to be mirrored in the fact that presidents Banzer (1997-2002) and Sanchez de Lozada 
(2002-3) had far greater difficulty keeping their coalitions together from 1997 onwards 
than had previously been the case.
Given that the directly elected candidates are allocated seats in Congress independent of 
their party overcoming the 3 per cent threshold or not, the number of parties represented 
in the legislature can potentially be higher than would be the case in a pure proportional 
representation system applying a 3 per cent threshold. This occurred in the elections of 
2002 where only six parties achieved 3 per cent, yet also the Partido Socialista (PS), 
winning 0.7 per cent in total, gained one directly elected seat, and the MIP {Movimiento 
Indlgena Pachakuti) even had six of its members directly elected to the legislature 
(having received 2.2 per cent in total). In summary, while the 3 per cent threshold that 
was introduced in 1996 aimed at reducing the degree of fragmentation in the Congress, 
the simultaneously applied “mixed” system of electing deputies had the opposite effect 
as it allowed parties to gain representation without winning 3 per cent. In consequence, 
the new legislation has only slightly lowered the number of parties represented, as there 
were nine parties in the pre-reform elections of 1993, seven in 1997 and eight in 2002 
(see Table 2.3).
Ecuador. In Ecuador seats are allocated by proportional representation according to the 
system of simple quota and largest remainders. No threshold has ever existed. The high 
number of parties in the legislature was mentioned earlier; it is likely that the system of 
proportional representation has contributed to this effect. In 1978 a Ley de Partidos was
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introduced, which aimed at limiting the number of parties competing in elections. The 
most significant requirement put down by this law is that parties have to receive at least 
5 per cent of the votes in two successive congressional elections in order to be eligible 
to stand in subsequent elections. Theoretically, this could have a profound impact on the 
party system and actually reduce the number of parties considerably. However, in 
practice the law did not work out as intended and failed to reduce the number of parties 
significantly. Parties were often allowed to register again and to continue standing in 
subsequent elections despite having failed to fulfil the 5 per cent requirement. To give 
some examples, the Frente Amplio de Izquierda (FADI) competed in elections and 
obtained seats in Congress in each of the five congressional elections between 1979 and 
1990 despite continually failing to receive 5 per cent. According to the Ley de Partidos 
the Partido Conservador Ecuatoriano (PCE) should have been forbidden to contest in 
the elections of 1990 since they did not receive the required share of votes in the two 
preceding elections; the Frente Radical A If arista (FRA) should equally have been 
disqualified after the elections of 1990. The former president of the Tribunal Supremo 
Electoral (Supreme Electoral Tribunal, TSE), Patricio Vivanco, confirmed the failure of 
enforcing this rule and even said that the rule “has never been respected”. He assumed 
that in case the law had been applied, possibly Ecuador would now only have three 
parties as the others would have disappeared (Vivanco, interview, 1.4.2004). Up until 
1997 Ecuador used a closed-list system, hence voters were not able to indicate the 
candidate they preferred from the party list, the chances for candidates to be elected was 
dependent on their number on the list, and the ranking and selection of candidates was 
in turn decided by the party leader. In the mid-1990 the system was changed and in the 
elections to the Constituent Assembly in 1997 for the first time open lists were used and 
seats were allocated according to the votes candidates received independent of the 
percentage gained by their party. Already in 2000, however, the system was changed 
again, closed lists came back and seats were distributed via the D’Hondt system of 
proportional representation. In March 2004 the Tribunal Constitucional (Constitutional 
Tribunal, TC) declared the D’Hondt system as unconstitutional.32 The Congress did not 
manage to agree on a formula and left the decision for the upcoming regional elections 
(17 October, 2004) to the TSE. The TSE opted for the Imperiali quota (a formula that
32 Several interview partners held the opinion that the PSC took advantage of its majority in the TC to 
invalidate this system that favours minority parties (Morillo Battle, Vivanco, interviews, 7.4.2004; 
1.4.2004).
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favours the larger parties). The formula was then used for the 2004 elections; since then 
no decision has been taken and Ecuador remains without an electoral formula.
Both countries use majority elections to determine the president, requiring candidates to 
receive a majority of votes in the first round of elections (40 per cent only in Ecuador 
since 1998). Given the unlikelihood of any candidate receiving more than 50 per cent 
(or 40) of the votes in the first round, the majority format is setting very high stakes. It 
is clear to all participants in the election that the president will generally be chosen in 
the second round. Consequently, the incentives to form electoral coalitions (which were 
prohibited in Ecuador until 1996) for the first round are rather low and parties are 
clearly induced to present their own presidential candidate when participating in 
congressional elections. After having outlined the effects of electoral rules on the party 
system, two other aspects of election procedures -  mid-term elections and re-election -  
will be considered as they influence executive-legislative relations and thus also 
governance.
Mid-term elections. While Bolivia had four-year congressional periods (five-year since 
1997) since 1985, Ecuador held biannual elections between 1984 and 1998 (four-year 
periods since then). Provincial deputies in Ecuador had two-year terms until 1998 and 
elections took place biannually thus alternating between joint presidential and 
congressional elections and pure elections for Congress. This led to a situation where 
the composition of the legislature was completely altered every two years, and the size 
of the ruling party33 generally diminished radically as economic reforms undertaken 
usually proved unpopular. For example, during the presidency of Boija (1988-92) the 
representation of his ruling party, the ID, was reduced from 42.3 per cent of the seats in 
Congress to 19.4 per cent in the mid-term elections in 1990. Similarly Ballen’s PUR 
counted on only 3.9 per cent of the seats in 1994, after 15.6 per cent in the first two 
years of his term in 1992-94 (TSE, 2005). Political analyst Simon Pachano considered 
the mid-term elections to be “fatal” for the continuation of policies:
“The renewal o f the Congress and the national deputies in the middle o f the term 
represented a renewal o f around 85% o f all deputies. That is to say practically a total 
change o f the Congress and a total change o f the composition o f the Congress... This 
renewal, together with the prohibition o f alliances, was obviously fatal fo r  the 
continuation o f policies. And because o f this practically all governments take a U-turn 
in their second year and abandon their economic programme. " (Pachano, interview, 
18.3.2004)
331 will refer to the party of the president as “ruling party”, irrelevant of the degree to which this party 
does actually “rule”...
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With the constitutional reform of 1998 mid-term elections have been abolished.
Re-election of presidents and legislators. Presidents in Ecuador were only allowed to 
serve one four-year term during their lifetime. Since the constitutional reform of 1998, 
however, the rule on re-election has been weakened: presidents may be re-elected 
though not for two consecutive terms (Art. 98;165).34 In Bolivia, where presidents are 
elected for a term of five years since 1997 (previously four), the currently valid 
Constitution of 1967 proscribes immediate re-election (Art. 87:1; 89:2). The arguments 
in favour of these restrictions are a check on presidential power, a prevention of self- 
perpetuation in office and of making the president concentrate on the national interest 
rather than on being re-elected (see Linz, 1994; Shugart and Carey, 1992). Linz 
suggested that the experience of lifelong non-democratic rulers played a decisive role in 
generating rules banning re-election. Considering that in Ecuador Jose Maria Velasco 
Ibarra dominated politics for about 40 years, between 1934 and 1972, this seems a 
convincing explanation. However, although providing a potential check on presidential 
power, restrictions on re-election can have disadvantages: in case of successful and 
popular presidents voters are deprived of returning them to power; and, if on the 
contrary voters are dissatisfied with their leaders, they do not have the possibility to 
hold them accountable (see Shugart and Carey, 1992). These arguments might have 
played a role in Ecuador’s decision to weaken the restrictions on re-election.
As regards Members of Parliament, in Bolivia there are no limits on their re-election, 
while the Ecuadorian Constitution banned them from being re-elected immediately. 
They were allowed, however, to stand again after one term. In a popular consultation of 
1994 it was decided to change this rule and from the 1996 election onwards, deputies 
have been allowed to stand for re-election in consecutive terms. The former rules 
basically meant that the legislature was completely renewed every two years. According 
to Mejia-Acosta (2002:164) in the time period when the rule was valid (1979-96) 368 
deputies were elected only once, 47 twice, 11 three times, and one had been elected four 
times. This shows the extent to which the legislature was renewed in the biannual 
elections. Pachano commented on the detrimental effects of this rule on the efficiency of 
the Congress:
34 The effect of this constitutional change could be observed in the presidential elections of 2002: some 
former officeholders -  Rodrigo Boija (1988-92) and Osvaldo Hurtado (1981-84) -  presented themselves 
as candidates.
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'7 think that the ban on re-election together with other regulations o f the Ecuadorian 
electoral system produced a lot o f instability in the Congress, produced fragmentation 
and a lack o f continuity in managing the Congress and a great improvisation in terms o f  
political leaders. By allowing the re-election there was a certain professionalisation o f  
the deputies. ” (Pachano, interview, 18.3.2004)
2 .7  O n  C o a l it io n s
When analysing effects on govemability, the institutionalist literature has mainly 
focused on variables such as the effective number of parties or the extent of presidential 
powers -  the presence or absence of coalitions has rarely been taken into account. 
Probably it has not featured highly on the agenda, as the question of the capacity for 
coalition-building is often seen as an exclusive feature of parliamentary regimes. As 
Lijphart (1994:97) argued
"presidentialism is inimical to the kind o f consociational promises and pacts that may 
be necessary in the process o f democratisation and during periods o f crisis, whereas the 
collegial nature o f parliamentary executives makes them conducive to such pacts ”.
Other authors likewise claimed that there are few incentives for coalition-building or co­
operation in presidential regimes (see, for example, Valenzuela, 1994:93). Several other 
authors developed a narrowed-down version of this argument: not presidentialism as 
such but the “difficult” combination of presidentialism and a multi-party system would 
lead to political instability and would lack incentives for the formation of coalitions 
(Mainwaring, 1993:200; see also Shugart and Carey, 1992:32-33).
Throughout the last decades coalition theory has been a thriving field of research in 
political science and a large body of literature on coalitions occurring in parliamentary 
regimes -  mainly those of Western Europe -  has developed. A short review of the 
literature shall follow here. Riker’s work (1962) is generally considered as the one that 
started the field of coalition theory. Using a game-theoretic approach and assuming that 
parties are solely interested in holding office, he claimed that winning coalitions of 
minimum size (just about exceeding a majority) would form. This “minimum size 
principle” was later criticised as it was not able to explain the occurrence of minority 
governments or surplus majority coalitions (exceeding the majority by a wide margin). 
Following on from Riker’s work coalition theory divided into two different streams: one 
continued with his game-theoretic approach which mainly uses European coalition 
bargaining as a means to develop game theory further (Laver & Schofield, 1990:9); the 
second line of research has been the ‘European politics’ tradition, which is grounded in 
empirical theory and focuses on cross-national case studies. These two different
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1 sapproaches have developed into two largely separate fields of research. One of those 
who developed Riker’s approach further was Dodd (1976) who contended that in 
fractionalised party systems winning coalitions were unlikely. While winning coalitions 
would occur in moderately fragmented party systems minority governments or surplus 
coalitions would be formed in systems with a higher degree of fragmentation.
Luebbert (1986) was concerned with variables leading to minority governments and 
found that they occurred both in unpolarised political systems with well-developed 
consensus-building mechanisms and in polarised systems where the lack of consensus- 
building mechanisms prevents the formation of majority governments. Luebbert’s main 
contribution was to take intra-party politics into account and not simply regard parties 
as unitary actors when analysing coalition-building. Like Luebbert, Strom (1990; 1997) 
looked into the factors leading to minority governments and argued that parties would 
avoid joining a coalition government if it would decrease its prospects of winning the 
elections in the future. He considered that holding office would generally damage a 
party’s popularity more than when it was part of the opposition. Strom thus made 
voters’ reactions an important aspect and thereby challenged the idea that coalition 
formation was dependent only on intra-parliamentary constellations.
In 1983 Bogdanor’s Coalition Government in Western Europe provided an important 
summary of the discussion so far and contained a collection of essays analysing 
coalition politics in various Western European countries. Bogdanor, whose other work 
has focused mainly on questions concerning electoral reform of the Westminster Model, 
linked this volume on coalitions to the debate regarding the introduction of proportional 
representation taking place in Britain at the time. In the book coalitions are approached 
from three angles: one looking at how constitutional aspects impact on the formation of 
governments, another asking how government institutions such as the cabinet, 
legislature or the traditional parties were affected by the coalitions, and finally analysing 
what difference coalitions made regarding policies introduced and how this differed 
from single-party governments. The essays contained in the book provide “thick 
descriptions” of the government formation process in Western European countries and
35 Research undertaken in the ‘European politics’ tradition has been published in journals such as the 
European Journal o f Political Research, West European Politics, or Electoral Studies. For authors in the 
game-theoretic tradition see, for example, Axelrod (1970), De Swaan (1973), Laver & Shepsle (1990; 
1996), Schofield (1993), Crombez (1996).
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represented an important contribution to the empirical -  as opposed to the game 
theoretic -  tradition of coalition theory.
In his introductory chapter, Bogdanor distinguished between three different types of 
coalition: governmental, parliamentary and electoral. While electoral coalitions depend 
on the electoral system of each country, parliamentary coalitions are defined as those 
where a party ruling as minority government co-operates with other parties, to pass 
legislation, for example. Bogdanor was mainly concerned with governmental coalitions, 
which he again sub-divides into three categories: a Government of National Unity 
would be formed by the main parties when facing a national emergency like war or an 
economic crisis. Secondly, a coalition government could be one in which the co­
operating parties later on merge into one party. Thirdly, and most importantly for the 
author’s purposes, there are power-sharing coalitions in which two or more parties, 
individually failing to secure a majority, join to form a majority government.
“Power-sharing coalitions differ from Governments o f National Unity since they do not 
embrace -or indeed attempt to embrace -  all o f the parties in the political spectrum in 
order to implement a ‘national ’ programme. On the contrary, they seek to implement a 
programme agreed between the coalition partners but probably opposed by those 
parties which do not belong to the coalition. This type o f coalition realigns the 
parliamentary opposition, but does not eliminate it. Power-sharing coalitions also differ 
from coalitions o f the second type -  those which are a prelude to fusion -  since there is 
no intention on the part o f the coalition partners to surrender their separate identity. 
The parties comprising the coalition do not join together in an electoral pact, but 
continue to compete electorally with their coalition partners. ” (Bogdanor, 1983:12).
As Bogdanor pointed out these power-sharing coalitions tend to occur in systems of 
proportional representation where no party gains a majority and when the formation of 
majority governments -  rather than minority ones -  is facilitated by constitutional 
traditions. An important distinction for this thesis, between parliamentary and 
presidential regimes, is hinted at. The crucial difference between these two regime types 
is that in parliamentarism the formation of a coalition is usually required. Since the 
chief executives are elected by the parliament they need the positive vote of a majority 
in parliament to get into power. At the same time terms of offices are not fixed and chief 
executives depend on the support of the majority of the parliament for their survival. 
Presidentialist systems, by contrast, are defined by separate origin and separate survival 
(Mainwaring & Shugart, 1997:15; see also Section 2.1). Presidents do not require a 
majority vote of the parliament to gain office, which makes coalition-building optional 
rather than a necessity.
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Yet there are exceptions to this rule in both regime types. In another work Bogdanor 
(1984) looked at the role of monarchs in constitutional monarchies of north-west 
Europe and their role in the government formation process. What is of interest here is 
his discussion of the concept of “negative parliamentarism”, which means that 
governments do not need to be approved by the parliament. They are formed in different 
ways; in Denmark, for example, a round of negotiations between the Queen and party 
leaders takes place until a government is found which would not be met with a vote of 
no confidence in parliament. This system allows the existence of minority governments, 
which have been the norm rather than the exception in Denmark since 1945 (Bogdanor, 
1984:59). Though it may be difficult to draw parallels between the case of Denmark 
with its co-operative political culture and other countries, it shows to what extent the 
formation of majority coalitions depends on constitutional rules regarding the election 
of the head of state in the parliament. Since this is not generally required in presidential 
systems, so it follows, majority coalitions do not occur with the same frequency as in 
parliamentary systems. This in turn highlights the crucial role of Bolivia’s executive 
electoral formula, which could here be termed as “positive presidentialism”. As in 
parliamentarism presidents in Bolivia require a positive vote of confidence to take office 
which therefore necessitates them to form majority coalitions to support their election 
beforehand.
While coalition-building processes are generally different from each other in 
parliamentary and presidential regimes, it does not follow that presidentialist systems 
per se are unable to produce coalitions. A number of scholars started to question the 
assumption that presidentialist regimes are not conducive to coalition-building (see 
Deheza, 1997, 1998; Altman, 2000; Amorim Neto, 1998, Forthcoming; Lanzaro, 2001a; 
Chasquetti, 2001). Most of this research has involved large statistical studies such as 
Cheibub et al. (2004), which has shown that presidential systems produce significant 
numbers of coalitions. While it seems now established that certain institutional aspects 
rather than presidentialism as such inhibit coalition formation, to date no conclusive 
theory exists about the conditions under which coalitions are formed, although a few 
hypotheses have been brought forward. Chasquetti (2001), for example, argued that 
only extreme multi-party systems would be problematic, but that moderate multi-party 
systems had the capacity to generate government coalitions; and Negretto (2003) 
maintained that coalitions are more likely when presidents lack decree powers and are 
subject to congressional control. These authors have started to make a contribution to
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coalition theory by focusing on presidential regimes, a field that will hopefully receive 
increased attention in the future.
Coalition-building in Ecuador and Bolivia. As outlined in Chapter 1.2., several 
Bolivian scholars -  predominantly Gamarra and Mayorga -  have established a link 
between constitutional provisions concerning the election of presidents in congress and 
the formation of inter-party coalitions. A large number of interviewees in Ecuador have 
stated that the second round majority run-off elections for the president had a 
detrimental effect on govemability, as it created a situation whereby presidential parties 
have only a small representation in Congress (see Chapter 8.1). It seems therefore that 
the variation in the executive electoral formula influences a regime’s capacity to 
generate coalitions. Regarding Ecuador, other institutional aspects present further 
disincentives to inter-party cooperation: the biannual midterm elections to Congress in 
place until 1998 meant that parties were in an almost permanent election campaign, a 
situation during which parties are usually unwilling to tie themselves to a president. 
Midterm elections also meant that the composition of Congress changed every two 
years, thereby practically ruling out the possibility to build coalitions for a full 
presidential term. As pointed out in Section 2.5, Ecuadorian legislators do not display a 
high degree of party discipline, as comparatively large numbers disaffiliate from their
‘X f iparties; this situation of party-switching also impedes the creation of stable coalitions.
Looking at coalition formation in Ecuador and Bolivia during the last two decades, 
Ecuador had only few cases of inter-party coalitions, and all but one were minority 
coalitions. During the government of Febres Cordero, it was the opposition that was 
able to form a coalition, the Bloque Progresista. The most explicit example of a 
government coalition has been the one crafted by President Borja. On coming to 
power in 1988 he built a majority coalition between his own party (ID -  Izquierda 
Democratica) and the DP (Democracia Popular). At the end of 1989, however, the DP 
left the government. Coalitions in Ecuador have been rather a rarity and if formed at all, 
they have been fragile and short-lived. Presidents usually tried to build ad-hoc coalitions 
for every reform they planned to introduce. As argued by Mejia (2000; 2002) though 
Ecuadorian presidents failed to form stable coalitions, they often managed to form
36 The question of why coalitions were possible in Bolivia and not in Ecuador will be discussed more 
extensively in Chapter 8.2.
371 will follow the definition provided by Cheibub et al. (2004), who distinguished between government 
coalitions which involve a set of legislators belonging to parties that hold cabinet posts, and legislative 
coalitions in which legislators from different parties vote together. For the purposes here, I am interested 
in the existence of government coalitions which are also legislative coalitions.
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alliances around certain legislative initiatives, which were achieved by "some informal 
mechanisms (like sponsoring independent deputies or sponsoring party defections)” 
(2000:15). Members of these alliances would typically not admit their support of the 
government publicly (2000:13).
Bolivia, however, challenges the aforementioned claim that presidentialist systems with 
a multi-party system are unable to produce coalitions. Ever since the Pacto por la 
Democracia (Pact for Democracy) between Paz Estenssoro’s MNR and Banzer’s ADN 
in 1985, coalitions were formed at the government level and a stable pattern of 
coalition-building emerged: between 1989-1993 ADN and MIR formed the Acuerdo 
Patriotico (Patriotic Accord); in the following four years president Sanchez de Lozada’s 
party governed in coalition with both the Union Civica Solidaridad (UCS) and the 
Movimiento Bolivia Libre (MBL); in 1997 Banzer’s ruling party ADN entered a 
coalition with three other parties, UCS, MIR and CONDEPA (Conciencia de Patria)] 
and the last coalition -  though rather fragile -  consisted of the ruling MNR, MIR and 
later on also NFR between 2002-03.38
In sum, the literature on coalition formation has almost exclusively focused on 
parliamentary regimes in Western Europe, though some work has now been started on 
coalitions in presidential systems. The literature on presidential regimes has so far 
largely ignored the aspect of coalition formation and its influence on govemability. As 
will be seen in this thesis, however, the capacity of a system to produce coalitions has 
frequently made a crucial difference to presidents’ abilities to introduce policies.
2.8 R e l a t i n g  P o l i t i c a l  S t r u c t u r e s  a n d  E c o n o m ic  R e f o r m s  
This chapter has outlined the political systems of Ecuador and Bolivia, their respective 
regime types, constitutional powers, legislative processes, electoral procedures, the 
party systems and coalition formation were analysed. The study will now relate this 
politico-institutional analysis to economic policy-making in Ecuador and Bolivia during 
the last two decades.
The debate on economic reform processes in Latin America has often focused on 
regime type and on the question whether authoritarian or democratic regime types are 
better suited to implement economic reforms. This discussion bears some similarity to 
the presidential-parliamentary debate as it also focuses on broad regime types, on
38 For more information on these coalitions see Chapters 4 and 5.
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democracy as such rather than a specific form of democracy. Ecuador and Bolivia have 
experienced different patterns of governance and economic policy-making processes. 
Given that they are of the same regime type, this broad concept is unable to account for 
their differences. Consequently, it can be argued the analysis should take into account 
the specific elements of political systems. Ecuador and Bolivia have implemented 
economic reforms to varying degrees during the 1980s and 1990s. Bolivia was one of 
the earliest cases to implement market-oriented reforms in Latin America, it carried out 
wide-ranging structural reforms from 1985. Ecuador, on the other hand, has followed a 
much more gradual approach and structural reforms were often piecemeal ever since the 
first attempt at stabilisation in 1982. Clearly it is a combination of factors that has led to 
these variations. While taking other variables into account the specific question to be 
investigated in this study is: to what extent have institutional aspects of the political 
systems of Ecuador and Bolivia influenced economic policy-making? In the following I 
will outline several hypotheses that will be examined in the study. They have developed 
out of the preceding analyses of the political systems of Ecuador and Bolivia.
Hypotheses.
Constitutional powers. When considering constitutional powers of presidents and 
congress in Ecuador and Bolivia, we have seen that Bolivia can be considered as having 
a rather “weak” executive in terms of presidents’ constitutional legislative powers, 
while Ecuadorian presidents are granted rather extensive powers. Did the differences 
between powers granted to the president and the legislature influence the successful 
implementation of economic reforms? Did “weak” presidencies in Bolivia and “strong” 
presidencies in Ecuador lead to differences in economic policy-making? Given that 
Bolivia during the 1980s and 1990s generally introduced economic reforms much 
earlier, more comprehensively and consistently than Ecuador it seems that extensive 
powers did not facilitate the introduction of reforms. For the analysis of tax reforms to 
follow, it is thus assumed that
=> the degree of constitutional powers is of limited importance for presidents’ abilities 
to introduce reforms “successfully”.39
On coalition-building. While Bolivia has developed a pattern of coalition-building ever 
since the Pacto por la Democracia between Paz Estenssoro’s MNR and Banzer’s ADN
39 When using the term “successful”, I do not intend to imply any judgement or endorsement of the 
policies themselves. Successful here simply refers the ability to introduce and maintain economic reforms 
as proposed by the executive.
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in 1985 and up until 2003, the Ecuadorian governments have been able to form very 
fragile and short-lived coalitions only, if at all. How have these patterns affected 
economic policy-making? The following hypotheses will be analysed:
=> Ecuador’s multi-party system has been inimical to governing effectively and to 
implementing economic reforms due to the system’s lack of ability to produce effective 
coalitions.
=> Bolivia’s multi-party system has allowed presidents to successfully implement 
economic policies in the 1980s and 1990s due to its capacity to generate stable 
governing coalitions. The country’s particular form of “parliamentarised 
presidentialism”, in which presidents are elected by Congress in the second round 
election, has provided an institutional incentive for coalition-building.
Breakdown o f  coalition politics. While Bolivia has experienced a period of political 
stability for almost two decades from 1985 onwards and while presidents have been 
able to introduce the reforms basically as proposed by them, this pattern has come to an 
end in recent years. Starting from around 2000 street protest gained more and more 
momentum and governing via coalitions became increasingly difficult. The end of this 
period of stability was most markedly expressed by the forced resignation of Sanchez de 
Lozada in October 2003, which had followed weeks of state-society conflicts during 
which around 60 people died. The presidential successor, Carlos Mesa (2003-05), 
governed by breaking away from the old pattern of forming coalitions, trying to 
distance himself from the discredited traditional parties. Since he thus did not count on 
any allies in the legislature introducing economic policies was generally difficult for 
Mesa. In June 2005 he resigned in an attempt to facilitate a way out of the deadlock in 
state-society relations. He was succeeded by Eduardo Rodriguez, head of the Supreme 
Court, after the presidents of both the lower and the upper chamber had waived their 
right to take power. Given this contrast between the experiences of the last years and the 
post-1985 period, an explanation for the breakdown of coalition politics and the 
resurgence of extra-institutional politics will be attempted in a third step. The question 
to be addressed is: why did the same institutional arrangements that allowed for the 
introduction of economic reforms and democratic stability during the 1980s and 1990s 
lead to political instability and presidential failure to introduce economic reforms (or to 
stay in power) in recent years?
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3 Patterns of Economic Reforms
It is a common view that Bolivia was a radical reformer during the 1980s and 1990s, a 
“showcase" (Mayorga, 1997:143) implementing policies of economic liberalisation 
basically overnight, while Ecuador is usually considered as one of the main laggards of 
the region, a country “muddling towards adjustment" (Grindle, 1993). However, this 
assessment is often made on the basis of a broad and general overview of the economic 
reform processes of the two countries only. It is probable that the processes differ 
depending on the type of policy, and it is likely that the various economic reforms -  
such as trade liberalisation, tax reform, public sector reform etc. -  have been 
implemented to different degrees in both countries. It may be possible that in some 
policy areas, Ecuador even started the reform process earlier, or implemented more 
comprehensive reforms than Bolivia. In order to get a more differentiated view on the 
patterns of economic policy-making it is necessary to move away from a broad analysis 
and from individual studies of the two countries.
The previous chapter offered an analysis of the extent to which the political structures of 
Ecuador and Bolivia differ, in their presidential systems, constitutional powers, electoral 
rules and party systems. Following from these politico-institutional aspects, this chapter 
will analyse the so-called Washington Consensus reforms introduced in the two 
countries during the last two decades. This will put tax policy-making into context by 
showing what else happened in Ecuador and Bolivia regarding economic reforms. The 
analysis makes clear that tax reform is representative for the dynamics of other policy 
areas. Before looking at these different economic reforms a short discussion of the 
Washington Consensus concept shall follow.
The origin of the Washington Consensus can be traced back to a conference organised 
by the Institute for International Economics in Washington in 1989. Representatives of 
the multilateral organisations and of Washington-based think tanks as well as Latin 
American policy-makers had come together to evaluate the economic reforms 
introduced in the region during the 1980s. As a result of the conference John 
Williamson produced a list of ten policy reforms: fiscal discipline, public expenditure 
priorities in education and health, tax reform, financial liberalisation, competitive 
exchange rates, trade liberalisation; openness to foreign direct investment, privatisation, 
deregulation, and protection of property rights (Williamson 1990 a+b). Compiling this
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list was an act he considered as documenting the policy process that was already 
happening in Latin America anyway and of which Washington was largely unaware 
(Williamson, 1997:48). If this was his intention the subsequent discussion certainly 
frequently did not understand the list as policy documentation but rather as a policy 
manifesto. In 2002 Moises Naim stated that the Washington Consensus had become “a 
damaged brand name ” (FT, 28/10/2002). Criticism of the concept took mainly two 
directions as was summarised by Frances Stewart (1997:62):
“The debate about the Washington consensus (WC) is a debate about process -  who 
makes policy, the legitimacy o f the process and the right to freedom o f thought. It is also 
a debate about content -  whether the contents o f the WC are right in themselves for  
ever, for all countries, for all times, sufficient or necessary conditions o f development, 
and so on. ”
The fact that “Washington” was part of the term chosen by Williamson led to the 
criticism that these policies were chosen by Washington-based organisations and 
imposed on Latin American countries. Because Washington Consensus policies could 
often be found in the conditionality attached to the loans given to Latin American 
countries by the IMF and the World Bank also fuelled this discussion. When Joseph 
Stiglitz developed a “Post-Washington Consensus” in 1998 he reflected this debate and 
claimed that policies can only be sustainable when countries choose and take ownership 
of them and that a revised consensus could therefore not be based on Washington 
(Stiglitz, 1998:33). The second major area of contention was the individual policies 
proposed. During the 1990s it became increasingly clear that the Washington Consensus 
did not deliver the expected results. Especially when comparing the economic results 
achieved in Latin America to those of East Asian countries, the Washington Consensus 
“recipe” seemed to be called into question. In response to the growing criticism several 
authors have developed a revised version of the Washington Consensus. Naim (1994) 
was the first to point out that Latin America was entering a second stage of reforms and 
that the policy agenda should turn to the previously neglected area of public sector 
institution building.40 This second phase of reforms was later extended to include 
distributive measures, as income inequality had been on the rise since the onset of the 
first generation reforms (i.e. Washington Consensus). The second generation reforms 
were generally seen as complementing the Washington Consensus not replacing it.
40 See also Naim (2000), Burki and Perry (1998), Rodrik (2002).
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Williamson (1997; 2000; Williamson & Kuczynski 2003) himself admitted that there 
had been some flaws in the original Washington Consensus and he pointed out 
especially the recommendation concerning financial liberalisation and the exchange rate. 
In the revised agenda he took on Naim’s concern for institution building and called for 
more focus on the education sector by improving spending on primary and secondary 
levels (Williamson, 1997:56-57). In the course of the ongoing discussion all kinds of 
revised versions of the Washington Consensus were discussed and the agenda became 
more and more confused. In part this can be interpreted as an acknowledgement that the 
straightforward policy agenda of the original Washington Consensus has not worked 
and that the international community is currently far from reaching a consensus on the 
policies required at this point.
For the purposes of this chapter I am borrowing from Williamson’s original list of ten 
reform areas. The intention is not to endorse this agenda but simply to use it as a 
framework for evaluating to what extent reforms have been introduced in Ecuador and 
Bolivia since the 1980s. Though some advances have been made, second generation 
reforms largely remain to be introduced as there is a need for reforming public sector 
institutions and as high income inequality exists in both countries.41 Using the 
Washington Consensus as a framework and adjusting it to mirror the reforms that have 
been introduced in Ecuador and Bolivia the areas considered are: 1) Public Expenditure 
Priorities; 2) Tax Reform; Fiscal Discipline42; 3) Trade Liberalisation; 4) Financial 
Liberalisation; 5) Exchange Rate; 6) Foreign Direct Investment; 7) Privatisation; 8) 
Social Security. In a final section other areas playing a crucial role in the economies of 
Bolivia and Ecuador are considered: Foreign Debt; Hydrocarbons; Foreign Aid; Coca. 
Rather than comparing the introduction of reforms in these areas, they are included here 
to give an overview of crucial elements of both Ecuador’s and Bolivia’s economies.
3.1 P u b l ic  E x p e n d it u r e  P r io r it ie s
Bolivia. Before switching to a market-oriented model in the mid-1980s Bolivia had 
followed a model of state capitalism, with the state playing a leading role both in 
investment and employment. Especially during the period of Banzer’s government
41 As regards taxation, an exception is that both countries have taken measures to institutionalise their 
internal revenue services in recent years.
42 Fiscal discipline is included mainly to inform about the fiscal balance. Since taxation and government 
expenditure are the two instruments of fiscal policy, the related policies are outlined in these sections. 
Fiscal balance is therefore not considered as a separate policy area.
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(1971-78) the role of the state was expanded, it invested heavily in social and economic 
infrastructure. Prior to 1985, with the exception of Cuba, Bolivia had the highest share 
of its economically active population employed by the public sector in the region 
(Morales, 1994:138). During the government of General Banzer the number of public 
sector employees grew enormously: while in 1970 there were about 66,000 employees,
177,000 people were employed in the public sector in 1978 (World Bank, 2000a: 1) and 
245,379 in 1985 (Morales, 1996:42). As most other countries of the region, Bolivia had 
also implemented price controls and a comprehensive system of subsidisation during 
that time.
Subsidies. Facing a situation of increasing fiscal deficits and no access to capital 
inflows in the post-1982 period, some first attempts at reducing subsidies were made 
during the years before 1985 as President Siles Zuazo (1982-85) increased prices for 
basic foodstuffs and petroleum several times during his government. These measures, 
however, had little impact on the still very high degree of subsidisation which, for 
example, allowed Bolivian citizens in 1984 to pay transport fares which were about 
one-tenth of the price in a competitive market (Cariaga, 1990:46). In 1985, then, the 
famous Decree 21060 eliminated state subsidies (of foodstuffs, petrol, and public 
transport) practically over night. In consequence, petrol prices, for example, rose from 
US$0.3 cent per litre to 0.30 (Lynch, 1994a: 105). Food stores run by the government 
and offering highly subsidised products were closed. Some relics of the subsidisation 
scheme were, however, still in place in 2002: for example, bottled liquid petroleum gas 
-  used by most Bolivian households for cooking and heating -  continues to be 
subsidised. Attempts at completely abolishing this subsidy were made but then 
postponed by the government due to strong opposition.
Public sector employment The New Economic Policy (NEP) aimed at reducing the 
number of public employees in order to cut public expenditures. One of the main 
measures was the closing of unproductive state mines in 1985, which led to the 
dismissal of around 20,000 miners (Lynch, 1994a: 106).43 Since the early 1990s 
employment in state-owned enterprises was further reduced (naturally so since some of 
them were sold), yet presidents still failed to reduce the number of employees at 
government level. According to some estimates around 20,000 new employees were
43 Until 1985, when world market prices collapsed, tin had been Bolivia’s major export product. In the 
aftermath of this collapse, however, almost all tin mines started to make huge losses. Above all Comibol, 
the state mining corporation, became hugely unprofitable and added around US$720m to the public 
deficit between 1981 and 1985 (EIU, Bolivia, 1994-95:18).
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hired during the first two years of the Paz Zamora (1989-93) government (Gamarra, 
1994:115). Public sector employment had peaked at 245,600 in 1985 and was 
downsized to 200,918 by 1996 (see Figure 3.1). The reduction was only due to a cut by 
around 50,000 people -  from 62,500 to 12,078 -  employed in the public enterprises, 
however. As regards general government level the number of employees gradually 
increased and exceeded 200,000 by 1997; similarly between 1987 and 1997 central 
government employment rose by 50,000 positions, from 129,300 to 180,470. In recent 
years the trend has continued.
Figure 3.1: Public Sector Employment, Bolivia
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*  Note: No data available for the years 1988 -  1993.
** Total Public Sector: includes general government and public enterprises; General Government: 
includes consolidated central government and all units o f the subnational authority; Central 
Government: includes all units representing the territorial jurisdiction o f the central authority throughout 
a country, together with all other ministries and administrative departments, including autonomous 
agencies.
Source: Own elaboration. Data for 1980 to 1987 from CLAD (2004); 1994 to 1997 from IMF 
(2000a:23); 1998 to 2003 from World Bank (2004b: 19)).
In Bolivia salary expenditures on the combined public sector represented 6.8 per cent of 
GDP in 1990, then climbed to 8.3 in 1995 and in 2001 were 8.8 per cent (World Bank, 
1999:10; 2004b:3). These developments are in clear contradiction to the objective of 
Bolivia’s NEP to reduce public spending and represent a contrast to the country’s 
otherwise radical pursuit o f Washington Consensus reforms. It seems likely that the 
existence of patronage politics caused this pattern: it was easier for the government to 
dismiss employees in state industry than to dismiss those in public administration, as 
these positions were necessary for political bargaining with other parties in coalition-
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making. According to Gamarra (1994:122): “a central dynamic o f  politics has always 
been to circulate the commodity o f  government positions (cargos, puestos, y pegas) 
among the dependent middle class which does not control hard sources o f  wealth on its 
own. ”
Health and education. During the first two years of Bolivia’s new economic model, 
social expenditure (as percentage of GDP) was reduced considerably. Large cuts were 
made in the education sector: there was a decline from 3.3 per cent o f GDP in 1985 to 
2.3 per cent in 1986 (Morales, 1994:140). Yet, as Figure 3.2 shows, by 1995 spending 
had climbed again to 4.1 per cent of GDP, and gradually increased reaching 5.7 per cent 
in 2002. In parallel, funding for the health sector equally increased: while it had been 
2.5 per cent in 1995, it was 3.6 per cent of GDP in 2003.
Figure 3.2: Public Expenditures on Education and Health (% of GDP), Bolivia*
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Williamson (1990a+b) defined the Washington Consensus on public sector expenditures 
as reducing public spending and shifting priority from public administration, the 
military and subsidies to greater priority of the social sector. Bolivia fulfilled these aims 
as subsidies have been abolished and spending on health and education has increased. 
However, no significant inroads have been made to reduce public sector employment.
Ecuador. Compared to other countries of the region Ecuador was a late industrialiser. 
During the first decades after World War II the state did not play any significant role in 
the national economy as coastal-based agricultural exports such as cocoa and bananas
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were under the sole control of private entrepreneurs. The situation began to change 
radically when oil was discovered and exporting began in 1972. During the 1970s 
military governments made substantial changes to the Ecuadorian economic model: the 
number of state-owned enterprises increased dramatically -  by means of a 
nationalisation process of industries such as steel, the takeover of the national airline 
and other firms, and the gradual nationalisation of the petroleum industry. Secondly, 
costly subsidy schemes, mainly targeted at consumer durables, were implemented 
during this period. From the early 1970s, prices for petrol and electricity were among 
the lowest world-wide (Grindle, 1993:130) and by 1978 the government spent almost 50 
per cent of its budget on financing subsidies on oil, credits, and basic foodstuffs (Corkill 
and Cubitt, 1988:33). In addition, the size of the public administration increased 
substantially during the 1970s, between 1972 and 1977 alone 40,000 new public 
employees were taken into service (Isaacs, 1993:57).
Subsidies. With the onset of introducing market-oriented reforms in Ecuador in the 
1980s, governments started to gradually remove those subsidisation schemes. The 
government of Hurtado (1981-84) was the first to reduce subsidies and to raise petrol 
prices by 120 per cent. All following governments undertook similar steps to lower their 
spending on subsidies though often they had to reverse or modify these measures given 
the extent of opposition they faced (for example, Hurtado in 1982, Bucaram and 
Alarcon in 1997; Mahuad in 1998). Domestic fuel prices, which had been gradually 
increased since the early 1980s, finally came close to those of the world market by April 
1992 (EIU, Ecuador, 1992-93:19)44. As regards energy subsidies until 1999 they 
covered approximately 70 per cent of the consumer electrical bill (Nazmi, 2001:729). 
Cooking gas has remained to be state-subsidised and proved extremely difficult for 
presidents to eliminate given the level of societal resistance. In late December 2000, for 
example, the government of Noboa announced a 100 per cent increase in the price of 
cooking gas. Due to massive protests mainly by indigenous movements, the president 
made some concessions and reduced the price increase to 60 per cent only (Beckerman 
and Cortes, 2002:106ff). Economic analyst Alberto Acosta maintained:
"The society’s attention has centred on the gas in an almost religious way. It is like the 
last memory o f the petrol bonanza. The people say this is our gas, at least the gas we 
will buy cheap. " (Acosta, interview, 23.3.2004)
44 The Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), Country Profile: Ecuador. 1992-93:19. Throughout the text 
referred to as EIU, Ecuador/Bolivia (country only named in chapters where countries are compared), 
No./Year (if only year is given = Country Profile; if month/number and year = Country Report).
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In 2002 Ecuador spent around US$110 million on the cooking gas subsidy (Crespo, 
2002:5). Since the early 1980s Ecuador has introduced almost annual price increases 
thus gradually reducing subsidisation.
Public sector employment In particular during the 1970s the levels of public sector 
employment grew significantly as the large 
increase in petroleum revenues triggered a 
surge in government spending. According to 
some estimates public sector employment 
doubled between 1972 and 1980 (see Table 
3.3). Numbers continued to grow during the 
following two decades and stood at a level 
of 357,000 employees in 1997. Some of this 
growth, however, is natural as population 
growth is generally accompanied by an increase of employment in certain public sectors 
such as education and health. In central government, some progress has been made in 
reducing the number of public employees during the 1990s: this number declined from
184,000 in 1994 to 129,000 by 2000. This downward trend of the 1990s has been 
reversed in recent years as central government employment rose by 7.3 per cent 
between 2002 and 2004 (World Bank, 2004a: 19).45 
Considering the government’s 
expenditure on wages and salaries, it 
becomes obvious that Ecuador has not 
followed a clear pattern, however: 
during the government of Febres 
Cordero salary expenses of the 
combined public sector tripled from 3.3 per cent of GDP in 1984 to 9.2 per cent in 1987 
as he undertook large public sector hirings. In the following years this level was reduced 
again and remained at 7.0 to 7.9 per cent between 1988 and 1997 (Salgado and Santos, 
1998:75,77). Again, in the last few years the amount spent on wages has been on the 
rise as the wage bill for central government employees in 2004 was projected to be 18 
per cent higher than in 2002 (World Bank, 2004a:20). In short, Ecuador has made some 
progress in reducing the number of central government employees and expenditures on
45 Note that data on public sector employment numbers is extremely limited. Within Ecuador no 
institution has been gathering this information.
Table 3.4: Public Employment, Ecuador I I
Year Civilian Central G overnm ent
1994 184,000
2000 129,000
Source: World Bank, 2005.
Table 3.3: Public Employment,
Ecuador I
Year Total Public Employment
1972 96,709
1980 203,635
1986 323,000
1997 357,000
Source: Araujo, 1998:6 (for 1972, 1980);
Salgado and Santos 1998:24 (for 1986, 1997)
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personnel during the 1990s. However, Ecuador has not followed a consistent line: 
spending and employment levels were hugely increased during the mid-1980s and have 
again been on the rise during the last years.
Figure 3.5: Public Social Expenditures (% of GDP), Ecuador
1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2001 2002  2003
Health ■  Education
Source: Own elaboration. Data from Vos and Ponce, 2004:45.
Health and education. During the second half of the 1970s health and education 
spending was boosted; spending on the education sector reached 4.3 per cent o f GDP in 
1980, but thereafter gradually declined to 2.8 per cent in 1990, 2.6 per cent in 2003 (see 
Table 3.5). Notably, the Ecuadorian Constitution contains the requirement that at least 
30 per cent of central government income is to be spent on education and the 
eradication of illiteracy (Art. 7 1).46 The Ecuadorian government has never met this 
target though: government spending on the education sector ranged between 16.7 and
24.8 per cent during the years 1986 to 1995 (Van Dijck, 1998:52); in 2004 it was 12 per 
cent (EIU, Ecuador, 2005:19). The health sector received rather low funding: the level 
o f expenditures ranged 0.9 per cent in 1995 to 1.3 per cent in 2003. These levels are 
among the lowest o f the region. Salgado and Santos reported that in 1995 the monthly 
spending on health per person equalled the price o f three soft drinks (Salgado and 
Santos, 1998:15).
Considering these developments it becomes evident that Ecuador’s public spending 
priorities have not been restructured in accordance with the Washington Consensus
46 Constitution Politica de la Republica de Ecuador, 1984. The subsequent Constitution o f 1996 contains 
the same clause in Art. 96, as does the current one (1998; Art.71).
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approach: although subsidies have been reduced gradually and cuts have been made in 
public administration, these measures apparently have not been accompanied by an 
increase in public spending on health and education.
Table 3.6: Public Expenditure Priorities: Bolivia + Ecuador
1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Bolivia • Subsidies on consumer goods abolished 
=> Health and education expenditure increased
Increase in number of public sector employees
Ecuador
: . • : :
=> Subsidies on consumer goods gradually reduced, annual cuts
Increase in number of public sector employees; decrease in the 1990s 
Health and education expenditures not increased
Source: Own elaboration.
3 .2  T a x  R e f o r m
Bolivia. Prior to the beginning of the economic reform process Bolivia had a tax system 
in place o f which the main elements were export and import taxes. In 1973 a sales tax of 
5 per cent was introduced but since more and more exemptions were added to it over the 
years and enforcement was low, it provided very little revenue. The Personal Income 
Tax was levied at a progressive rate, with the highest rate being 50 per cent; an 
“Enterprise Tax” was charged at a 30 per cent flat rate (20 per cent for state companies). 
The tax system additionally featured several hundred different taxes many o f them 
earmarked to benefit particular groups and organisations, trade unions or universities 
(Bird, 1992; Mann, 1990; Cabezas, 1990).
"Prior to the Law 843 (1986, SL), the country’s tax system was creating one tax, 
another tax, a little tax here, another little tax there -  which eventually turned 
unmanageable both fo r  the administration and the taxpayer as you did not even know 
all the taxes you were supposed to pay. ” (Velasco, interview, 27.5.2004)
Due to the complexity of the system tax evasion was high even for South American 
standards and tax revenues were rather low. In 1976 a fiscal mission (sponsored by the 
Harvard Law School) led by Richard Musgrave visited Bolivia to evaluate the Bolivian 
tax system. In their report they pointed to the high dependence on taxes on foreign trade 
which created a high instability and Musgrave made a number o f recommendations on 
how to improve domestic tax revenues. These proposals were not taken up by the 
Bolivian government, however, and during the years to follow the tax base eroded 
dramatically: while in 1980 total tax revenues had been 9.69 per cent o f GDP, by 1984
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it merely was 1.8 per cent (see Table 3.7). During the period o f hyperinflation in 1984- 
85, the tax base all but collapsed as taxpayers would pay their taxes as late as possible 
thus reducing the value o f the taxes paid when finally received by the government. By 
m id-1985 tax revenues covered only 15 per cent o f government spending (Lynch, 
1994a: 103).
Table 3.7: Tax Revenues (% of GDP), Bolivia47 
1980s48
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
9.69 9.11 4.69 3.09 1.84 2.32 5.14 7.11 7.27 6.44
Source: Cariaga, 1997:33,117.
1990s
16 - 
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Source: ' 
Servicio de -| q
Impuestos
Internos
(SIN) Own 0 4 T 0*  M  m ~ M  * '
elaboration.
4  - ............. - , .................
2 - 
nu
90 91 92 93 94 95 96 I 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04
TOTAL 6.9 7.5 9.2 10.3 11.3 11.7 11.7 12.2 13.2 12.4 14 13.5 13.6 13.4 15.9
Internal Taxes 4.4 4.8 5.6 6.4 6.8 : 7.4 7.08 6.96 7.4 7.39 7.79 7.9 8.06 8.54 10.6
Hydrocarbons (IEHD)* 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.2 1.4 1.2 11.36 1.27 1.39 1.4 2.67 2.45 2.35 1.8 1.72
Customs duty 1.4 1.7 2.5 2.7 3.1 3.2 3.26 3.94 4.42 3.58 3.51 3.13 3.24 3.07 3.51
TOTAL Internal Taxes Hydrocarbons (IEHD)* >< C ustom s duty
*  Since the privatisation o f YBFB refineries, the collection of taxes via the concept o f  IEHD are included.
In May 1986 the government o f Paz Estenssoro completely overhauled the tax system 
and replaced hundreds of taxes by less than ten, mainly charged on wealth and
47 Please note that there is a significant inconsistency between the total revenues (as % o f GDP) given for 
Bolivia in this table and for Ecuador in Table 3.8 and the figures given in Table 1.2 based on data 
provided by Tanzi (2003). It has not been possible to determine what caused the differences and given the 
scarcity o f  data on taxation in Ecuador and Bolivia finding matching figures is next to impossible. The 
trends indicated in all tables used here are the same, however.
48 According to the Internal Revenue Service (SIN) tax/GDP figures o f  the 1980s are rather unreliable and 
the SIN itself does not have this data.
79
consumption. A 10% VAT with hardly any exemptions was the central element, which 
would not only ensure a broad tax base but also enormously facilitate the procedure of 
tax collection. Income taxes in the traditional sense were abolished and a 10 per cent 
withholding tax on all income was introduced. These reforms showed considerable 
effect: internal tax revenues increased from 2.32 per cent of GDP in 1985 to 7.11 per 
cent in 1987 (see Table 3.7). After this complete redesign of the Bolivian tax system in 
1986, the system was again modified in 1992, when VAT was increased from 10 to 13 
per cent. In 1995 a uniform Corporate Income Tax o f 25 per cent was introduced; an 
attempt to implement a Personal Income Tax in 2003 failed; and in 2004 a Financial 
Transactions Tax was introduced. Tax revenues exceeded ten per cent in 1993, and in 
2003 represented 13 per cent of GDP (see Table 3.7).
Figure 3.8: Tax Revenues (% of GDP), Ecuador 1985-2001*
12 
10 
8
Source: Own 
elaboration. 
Data from 
BCE.
Total
Income Tax 1.4 1.6 1.6 1.3 1.9 1.4 1.4 1.5 1.3 1.4 1.9 1.6 1.7 1.5 2.7 2.9
VAT + E xcise  Tax 2.3  3.4 3.6 3.4 3.6 3.7 3.9 3 .7 3.6 3.4 3.9 4.1 3.8 5.6 6.8
C ustom s Duty 3.1 3 .5 3.1 2.7 2.5  I 2.3 2.1 1.5 1.5 1.6 1.5 1.1 1.9 2 .5  1.9 1.7
Others 0.8  0 .9  0.9 1 1 0 .6  0 .6  0.5 0 .5  0 .6  1 0 .3  0.6 0 .4  0 .7  0.3 0 .3
• Total Income Tax VAT + Excise Tax x  Custom s Duty )K Others
*  D oes not include contributions o f  petroleum sector.
Ecuador. When in 1989 a tax reform was introduced, it was the first time in decades 
that a major overhaul of the system was undertaken. The tax structure in place had been 
marked by policies introduced during the 1960s and 1970s: the government of 
Arosemana (1961-1963) introduced a Corporate Income Tax, which was complemented 
by a Personal Income Tax in 1963 under the military junta government (1963-66). The 
Ecuadorian tax system had featured a huge number o f small taxes the revenues o f which 
went directly to various public institutions. The military junta made some progress in
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simplifying the tax system as it abolished hundreds of taxes (Schodt, 1987:83). A 
further change was made in 1970 under Ibarra (1968-72) who introduced a uniform 
Sales Tax. With the onset o f the oil bonanza the traditional tax base suffered 
considerable erosion during the 1970s. When the oil boom came to an end and oil prices 
went down in the early 1980s tax revenues were lower than they had been in the early 
1970s. Throughout the decades prior to the 1980s Ecuador’s tax system relied mainly 
on direct taxes, as was the case in the whole of Latin America.
Table 3.9: Tax Reforms: Bolivia + Ecuador
.985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Bolivia • Tax reform: - hundreds of taxes abolished;
- 10% VAT + Complementary Tax introduced
• VAT increase to 13%
• Introduction of Corporate Income Tax
• Financial Transactions 
Tax introduced
Ecuador • Tax reform: - simplification of tax system; - income tax of 25%; 
VAT 10%
• 1% Financial Transactions Tax
=> abolished
• Income taxes abolished
:=> reinstated
• VAT: 12% => 14% 12%
Source: Own elaboration.
A tax reform of 1989 represented the first major restructuring o f the system -  which 
was still marked by a large number of different taxes, a long list o f exemptions, and 
often rather high rates (for example, the maximum rate of income tax was 60 per cent) -  
in decades. Income tax (both personal and corporate) was cut to a maximum o f 25 per 
cent and a VAT o f 10 per cent replaced the turnover tax.49 People earning less then 2.5 
times the January minimum wage were exempt from income tax (EIU, Ecuador, N o.l, 
1990). The tax reform also included provisions to facilitate collection by simplifying the 
bureaucratic procedures, establishing additional collection points and, substantially 
increasing penalties for tax evaders. With this reform indirect taxes such as the Value- 
added Tax became crucial. By 1998 direct taxes contributed 33 per cent to Ecuador’s
49 The VAT is levied at every stage o f production and is included in the price o f the product (so when 
buying the product one sees a single price and does not pay the tax separately); the Sales Tax (or turnover 
tax) is levied only once and the percentage o f the sales tax is added to the price o f the product (it is thus 
more visible than the VAT).
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tax revenues and indirect taxes 67 per cent (Salgado and Santos, 1998:17). Tax revenues 
(excluding revenues from the petroleum sector) represented between 7 and 9 per cent of 
GDP during the 1990s and were 10.8 per cent in 2001 (see Table 3.8).
Fiscal Discipline
Bolivia. Throughout the 1970s the public deficit had been growing in Bolivia and 
reached unsustainable levels at the beginning of the 1980s. The combination of very 
low government income and high levels of public expenditures on state enterprises and 
subsidies, led to a deterioration of public finances. Given that Bolivia, as basically the 
rest o f South America, faced a cut-off from international loans in the aftermath of 
Mexico’s 1982 debt crisis, the budget deficit had to be financed in a different way. The 
Bolivian government of that time mainly took recourse to the printing press. Essentially 
this led to the situation of hyperinflation peaking at 11,749.6 per cent in 1985 (see 
Appendix D). With the help of structural policies introduced in 1985 the fiscal deficit 
fell to 2.5 per cent (of GDP) in 1986, before rising again to 7.3 per cent (of GDP) in
1987 (see Figure 3.10). 50
Figure 3.10: Non-financial Public Sector Balance (% of GDP), Bolivia + Ecuador
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Source: Own elaboration. Data for Bolivia from EIU, 1995-96:30 (for 1985-92); 1998-99:32 (for 1993- 
94); 2001:42 (for 1995-98); 2004:39 (for 1999-2003). For Ecuador: World Bank, 2004a: ii.
50 This increase in 1987 was mainly caused by external shocks: as mentioned in 1985 world market tin 
prices declined substantially; additionally, Argentina (from whom Bolivia received 40% o f its export 
earnings) did not settle all payments for natural gas imports (Cariaga, 1990:45).
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Due to continued structural reforms, such as further tax reform or the increased 
withdrawal of the state in production, the non-financial public sector deficit was 
gradually reduced and reached a level of 1.8 per cent in 1995. In subsequent years the 
deficit rose again, however, and in 2002 the deficit was as high as 8.7 per cent of GDP. 
The large deficits of recent years have been mainly caused by the pension reform: 
excluding spending on pensions, Bolivia’s fiscal balance would have been either 
balanced or positive between 1997 and 2000 (Grandi and Jemio, 2001:65). Clearly, 
therefore, the system introduced has overstrained Bolivia’s public finances (see also 
Section 3.8).
Ecuador. With a few exceptions Ecuador’s fiscal deficits have been at rather 
manageable levels and the balance was even positive several times. The deficit of 9.0 
per cent in 1987 was caused by a combination of external and internal factors: in 1986 
the oil price fell from US$25 to 12 per barrel, resulting in a loss of export revenues 
equalling 8 per cent of GDP (De Janvry et al., 1991:48); a severe earthquake in March 
1987 led to costs of around US$926 million caused by export losses and damage repairs 
(Corkill and Cubitt, 1988:94); as regards internal factors, Febres Cordero had 
undertaken a U-turn in his approach to fiscal policy towards the end of his term as he 
raised the level of wages for government officials, initiated comprehensive public works 
programmes and increased electricity subsidies (Grindle, 1993). In the late 1990s the 
fiscal deficit reached unusually high -  for Ecuador -  levels of 5.1 per cent of GDP in 
1998 and 4.6 in 1999. High levels of public sector spending contributed to this situation 
-  damages caused by El Nino in 1998 required around US$300 million in infrastructure 
investments (Carriere, 2001:144) and the state’s bail out of banks costing around US$1 
billion in 1998-99 (Lucas, 2000:9). In 2000 the newly installed President Noboa 
implemented a comprehensive economic reform package called Ley para la 
Transformation Economica (Economic Transformation Law, Ley 2000-4, 13.3.2000) 
which included a strict framework for fiscal policy: a limit of 2.5 per cent of GDP was 
put on deficits in the non-financial public sector accounts. In 2005, when Palacio took 
power after the overthrow of Gutierrez, this law was abolished.
3.3  T r a d e  L ib e r a l is a t io n
Bolivia. Until 1985 Bolivia represented no exception in the region as it was a highly 
protected country: import tariffs were high and diversified, quantitative import 
restrictions on many products were in place to protect the domestic industry. In August 
1985 almost all these import restrictions were removed and products were allowed to
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enter the country freely. Imports were charged with a 10 per cent tariff plus a further 10 
per cent of the previous tariff rate of this product. This system turned out to be too 
complicated, however, and by July 1986 the government had changed the tariff policy 
and imposed a uniform single tariff of 20 per cent on all imports. In 1988 tariffs 
applying to the imports of capital goods were reduced to an average of 10 per cent and 
in the same year tariffs on non-capital goods were cut to 17 per cent. In subsequent 
years tariffs were gradually reduced even further and in August 1990 were at a level of 
5 per cent on capital goods and 10 per cent on other imports. By 1991 94.6 per cent of 
all tariffs were in the range of 5-10 per cent and 5.4 per cent were in the range of 0-5 per 
cent (Van Dijck, 1998:38). With this level of tariffs Bolivia had become one of the most 
open economies of the region.51 Apart from these domestic policy initiatives of trade 
liberalisation, Bolivia further undertook to open its economy within the framework of 
the Andean Pact.52 For most of the 1980s there had been a trade surplus due to the 
contraction of imports mainly caused by the lack of foreign credits in the aftermath of 
the debt crisis. With increased tariff liberalisation, however, Bolivia started to import 
more and more products. Thus, despite a growth in export numbers, the combination of 
higher spending on imports and declining terms of trade led to sharp trade deficits 
throughout the 1990s. During the 1990s Bolivia had an average trade deficit of US$409 
million per year; in 2000 it was US$583.6 million (see Figure 3.11).
Ecuador. While Bolivia changed from a highly protected trade regime to an open 
economy within a very short time period, trade liberalisation was introduced much more 
gradually in Ecuador. Reforms started from 1984 onwards as President Febres Cordero 
undertook some measures to dismantle the complex system featuring a wide range of 
variable tariffs and a generally relatively high level of tariffs. Under his administration 
import quotas on around 600 products were abolished and a number of tariffs were 
reduced. Yet at the end of Febres Cordero’s presidency in 1988, tariffs on manufactured 
products, for example, could still be as high as 335 per cent, and the average level of 
import tariffs was 36 per cent (Lynch, 1994b:89). The succeeding government of Borja 
(1988-92) undertook more substantial trade liberalisation measures: quantitative import 
restrictions -  which in 1990 still applied to about 25 per cent of import products -  were
51 According to Rajapatirana’s (1997:183) evaluation of the degree of openness of the economy, Bolivia, 
by 1992, was the most open economy within South America.
52 The Andean Group, founded in 1969, consists of Bolivia, Colombia, Peru, Ecuador and Venezuela 
(Chile withdrew in 1976). It aims to promote increased regional economic integration and to support 
industrial and technological development. In 1994 a Common External Tariff (CET) was introduced.
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reduced by more than half in 1991 (De Janvry et al., 1994:30). Levels of import tariffs 
were also reduced significantly; now ranging between 2 and 80 per cent. During the 
government of Duran Ballen free trade agreements were signed with Bolivia and 
Colombia in September 1992, with Venezuela in January 1993 and in 1994 a common 
external tariff (CET) was introduced for all members of the Andean Community. While 
intra-regional trade was completely liberalised by this agreement, the CET was set at a 
level of 5 to 20 per cent for external products, with the exception o f cars, which were 
charged with a 35 per cent tariff. Ecuador was granted an exception and kept a 
transitory maximum tariff o f 10 per cent above the Andean Pact’s CET.
■ Ecuador
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While the country thus appears to have been on a gradual path towards opening the 
economy throughout the 1990s, there have been setbacks in the process. In 1998, for 
example, the government of Alarcon introduced a 4 per cent surcharge on imports, 
which was increased to 10 per cent in the following year. They were eliminated again in 
March 2001. In addition, there are still a number of areas o f Ecuador’s trade system that 
have not yet been liberalised. For example, around 1,300 products need to be authorised 
prior to import and some restrictions on importing cars, clothing and tyres are still in 
place (EIU, Ecuador, 2001:41). In 2004 Ecuador (together with Peru and Colombia) 
entered negotiations with the USA concerning a new free-trade agreement. Ever since 
the country gained revenues from oil exports in 1972, Ecuador used to have positive
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trade balances. It was in 1987 when a first trade deficit was recorded: the trade balance 
stood at US$-229 million mainly caused due to the lack o f oil revenues in the aftermath 
o f the earthquake and the low level of world prices for oil. From 1988 Ecuador 
accounted trade surpluses again though numbers varied enormously. During the 
economic crisis of 1998-99 the trade balance experienced a drastic turnaround: in 1999 
imports had contracted by 50 per cent due to the decline in aggregate demand, the 
extreme depreciation o f the sucre (ECS), as well as the lack of credits. At the same time 
oil revenues had increased significantly and, as a result o f these two trends, there was a 
trade surplus of US$1.4 billion in 1999 (see Table 3.11).
Table 3.12: Trade Liberalisation Policies: Bolivia + Ecuador
1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
• almost all import restrictions removed;
- 10% tariff on imports + 10% of previous tariff
• single tariff of 20% on imports;
=> tariffs further reduced -  by 1990: 5% on capital goods,
10% on other imports
Ecuador => 1984-88: reduction of tariffs; cancellation of import quotas on 600 products
• average of import tariffs 36%; max. rate 335%
• quantitative import restrictions halved;
- tariff range reduced to 2-80%
• 4% surcharge on imports;
=> increased to 10%; 
abolished
Source: Own elaboration.
3 .4  F in a n c ia l  L ib e r a l is a t io n
Bolivia. The economic reform package of the NEP contained several measures aimed at 
the financial sector. One of them allowed interest rates for transactions o f Bolivian 
pesos and foreign currency to be set freely by the financial markets. In consequence, 
interest rates fell substantially after having been at very high levels during the period o f 
hyperinflation. While deposits denominated in US-dollars had been prohibited since 
1982, this policy was reversed in 1985 and banks were again allowed to accept foreign 
currency deposits. The effect was that by 1989 84 per cent o f all deposits were dollar- 
denominated (Morales, 1991:24).53 As a result o f the new policy on dollar-denominated 
deposits Central Bank reserves increased significantly as flight capital was repatriated:
53 In addition to allowing dollar-denominated deposits, enquiries related to the origins o f  deposits were 
prohibited. This seems to have been effective in keeping great amounts o f  narco-dollars in the country.
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deposits increased from US$24 million in December 1985 to US$490 million by the end 
of 1989 (Morales, 1991:36). This, in turn, allowed the Bolivian government to finance 
the stabilisation programme and to mitigate the effects of shortfalls in export earnings 
until funds from multilateral creditors were again available as from June 1986 (Cariaga, 
1990:48). In 1993 a new round of reforms of the financial system began, which was to 
improve banking supervision and gradually lower real interest rates. Yet these reforms 
did not prevent a banking crisis from occurring soon afterwards. In the aftermath of the 
1994 Mexican peso crisis Bolivia had to cope with a radical drop in deposits and several 
banks faced extremely difficult situations. Between 1994 and 1996 6 out of 17 banks 
were in precarious conditions, two of them had to be liquidated (see Morales, 2001).
Partly in response to the banking crisis, further financial sector reforms were introduced 
in 1998. A new body was set up to supervise and regulate the whole financial system.54 
In addition, new regulations concerning reserve holdings were implemented: banks 
were now required to hold 2 per cent of eligible deposits in cash and an additional 10 
per cent in a special fund.55 This policy aimed at reducing the costs of financial 
intermediation and enhancing stability in the banking sector: when needed banks could 
apply to the liquidity fund for short-term loans, thus enabling them to overcome 
temporary cash flow difficulties. Taking a further step towards financial sector 
liberalisation the government of Banzer fully opened the country to foreign bank 
operations in 1998. These policy reforms undertaken in the 1990s contributed to 
reducing the level of interest rates: while for boliviano-denominated deposits they fell 
from 21.7 per cent in 1995 to 12.3 in 1999, interest rates for dollar-deposits declined 
from 11.3 to 8.8 per cent in the same period (EIU, Bolivia, 2001:44). The comparatively 
high interest rates prevailing in Bolivia, combined with the decision to allow dollar- 
denominated deposits in 1985, led to a large increase in deposits. While around US$700 
million were deposited at Bolivian banks at the end of 1990, this figure had risen to 
US$3.8 billion in 2000 (EIU, Bolivia, 2000:31; 2001:31). Despite all economic reforms 
undertaken, however, the lack of confidence in the local currency has persisted: 97.9 per 
cent of all deposits were dollar-denominated at the end of 1999 (EIU, Bolivia, 2001:31).
54 Confip (Comite de Normas Financieras Prudenciales) consists of representatives of the Ministry of 
Finance, the Central Bank and the sectoral superintendencies.
55 The fund is named: Requerimiento de Activos Liquidos (RAL). The local part of this fund is 
administered by the Central Bank, while a foreign fond manager administers the foreign paper, which 
makes up around 90 per cent of the RAL. For more details see EIU, Bolivia, 2000.
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Ecuador. In the 1980s Ecuador started a gradual liberalisation of its financial sector, 
with the first reforms implemented by Febres Cordero in August 1986 allowing banks to 
freely set interest rates. In consequence savings and investment levels increased. This 
process was offset, however, by external shocks -  a fall in oil prices in 1986 and the 
earthquake of 1987. In 1988 real interest rates on deposits turned negative and savings 
levels diminished. This gap narrowed throughout the following years until in 1992 most 
real interest rates were close to being positive (EIU, Ecuador, 1992-93:28,30). A 
significant reform of the financial sector was the Financial Institutions Law of 1994: it 
allowed dollar-denominated accounts, lowered the reserve requirements, abolished 
directed-credit schemes and permitted offshore accounts (Beckerman, 2002:45). While 
the legislation brought increased financial liberalisation, no reforms were carried out to 
strengthen the area of bank supervision, the deficiencies of which became especially 
evident from 1995 onwards as the level of bad debts that banks had accumulated was 
revealed and as a high number of illegal deposit-taking cases was discovered.
In the aftermath of El Nino, which triggered economic stagnation and production losses, 
the amount of bad debts rose dramatically in 1998. As the financial sector was 
increasingly deprived of liquid assets and there was little access to foreign credit, more 
and more Ecuadorian banks were in a precarious position. Despite the intervention of 
the state granting emergency credits to 29 banks in December 1995 and thereafter (see 
EIU, Ecuador, 1997-98), a number of banks collapsed in the following years and by 
2001 only 26 banks out of previously 42 remained (EIU, Ecuador, 2001:40). According 
to estimates by Salgado this bailing-out process incurred costs of around one-third of 
1998’s GDP (cited in CELA, 2000:14). Ecuador’s banking crisis seems a prominent 
example of how liberalising the financial sector without having sound frameworks of 
supervision and regulation in place can be hugely damaging for a country’s economy. In 
2000 an attempt to stabilise the shaken financial sector was made by introducing the Ley 
para la Transformacion Economica. It contained new regulations for the financial 
sector, including a limit on interest rates and the introduction of the Basle standards of 
capital adequacy.56 The implementation of these has been delayed, however, due to a 
lack of resources.
56 The Basle Accord of 1988 provides a basis for international co-ordination among banking authorities, 
contains guidelines on effective supervisory systems and determines standards of international 
convergence of capital ratios. See Johnson, 2000. The Basle Committee has revised the previous accord 
and Basle II was finalised in 2004 and is planned to be implemented by 2008.
Table 3.13: Financial Liberalisation Policies: Bolivia + Ecuador
---  .........  . ..... ......... .......... . ........ — .....
1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
"
• Interest rates freed;
- dollar-denominated deposits allowed
=> 1994-97 -  Banking crisis
• Bank Supervision Reform: removal of 
remaining obstacles on foreign bank 
operations
Ecuador • Interest rates freed
• Dollar-denominated deposits allowed; 
reserve requirements lowered
=> Banking crisis
• Limit on interest rates
Source: Own elaboration.
3.5 E x c h a n g e  R a t e  P o l ic y
Prior to the introduction of market-oriented reforms, many Latin American countries 
had fixed and multiple exchange rates in place, which were often considered as 
contributing to generating capital flight and deterring foreign direct investment (McCoy, 
2000).
Bolivia. While the US dollar was worth 20 pesos throughout most of the 1970s, the 
Bolivian currency was devalued for the first time to Ps24.51:US$l in 1979 (EIU, 
Bolivia, 1994-95:8). In subsequent years the exchange rate was modified repeatedly and 
under the Siles Zuazo government the currency was devalued seven times between 
November 1982 and May 1985 (Dunkerley, 1992). Despite these adjustments the gap 
between the official and the parallel rate was still enormous: in May 1985, for example, 
the official rate was Ps67,000:US$l following a devaluation, while the parallel rate 
stood at Ps250,000:US$l (Dunkerley, 1992:191). When Paz Estenssoro came to power 
in 1985 he announced the creation of “a single, real rate o f  exchange” (cited in Lynch, 
1994a: 104). This promise was translated into action by a drastic devaluation o f the 
currency in August 1985, which substantially narrowed the disparity between official 
and parallel rate. From now on the Bolivian currency was allowed to float against the 
dollar and the exchange rate was determined by the Central Bank through daily 
currency auctions: the Central Bank decided on the quantity o f dollars to be auctioned, 
set a floor price and then sold them to the highest bidders. The official exchange rate is 
set by the average of all bids placed for the currency. This system resulted in setting a
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much more realistic exchange rate and by 1987 the official and the parallel exchange 
rate differed by 1 per cent only, while there had been a gap of 1,367 per cent between 
them at the time Paz Estenssoro became President (Lynch, 1994a: 108). A new currency, 
the boliviano (BOB) was introduced to replace the peso on 1 January, 1987. Exchange 
rate policy was an important tool as the radical devaluation in 1985 abruptly ended 
hyperinflation and as the subsequent relative stability of the currency has since then 
contributed significantly to greater economic stability.
Ecuador. In the decade between 1971 and 1981 the exchange rate remained unchanged 
at 25 sucre to the dollar, while during the same time period consumer prices increased 
fourfold. The resulting permanently overvalued exchange rate created an anti-export 
bias as imports were relatively cheap while exports were uncompetitive in foreign 
markets. In 1982, during the government of Hurtado, the currency was devalued for the 
first time in a decade and from 1983 onwards a system of regular “mini-devaluations” 
was established. Two years after coming to power, in August 1986, Febres Cordero 
allowed the currency to float freely against other currencies, which had the effect of a 
rise in the sucre from 110 to 150 to the dollar within a couple of days (Lynch, 
1994b:91). Febres Cordero soon abandoned this market-determined exchange rate, 
however. In March 1988 a “controlled free rate” for private sector goods trade was 
introduced, only to be abolished again five months later by his successor Boija who 
returned to an exchange rate system consisting of an official, an intervention and a free 
market rate.57 Simultaneously, the exchange controls eliminated two years earlier were
reintroduced in August 1988; lifted again on exports in 1989 and on imports in 1992.58
During the 1990s the exchange rate system continued to be modified repeatedly and 
“Ecuador attempted almost every possible permutation for its exchange-rate system ” 
(EIU, Ecuador, 2000:44). At the end of 1994 the government of Duran Ballen 
introduced a crawling-peg exchange-rate system with an exchange rate band of ECS50. 
This enabled the Banco Central del Ecuador (Central Bank, BCE) to devalue the 
currency within certain limits. The crawling-peg system remained in place until 1999
57 The intervention rate applied to all trade transactions, foreign debt service and foreign investment profit 
remittances, while the official rate applied to Central Bank accounting.
58 Exporters had to sell foreign currency earnings to the Central Bank at 5% below the intervention rate to 
change into sucre, while importers were sold foreign currency at 5% above the intervention rate, which 
resulted in a 10% transaction fee charged by the Central Bank. The Boija administration, in an attempt to 
promote export competitiveness, abolished the 5% payment of exporters in 1989 and exchange controls 
on imports were lifted in September 1992 under the presidency of Duran Ballen.
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when Ecuador allowed the currency to fluctuate depending on market conditions. Due 
to the combination of a financial crisis, a huge fiscal deficit and a loss o f confidence in 
the sucre, the currency depreciated enormously: while at the end of 1998 the exchange 
rate stood at ECS6,825 to the dollar, it declined to a rate o f ECS20,243 to the dollar at 
year-end 1999 (EIU, Ecuador, 2001:51). Facing a continued fall o f the currency the 
government of Mahuad opted to take a radical measure: in January 2000 the Ecuadorian 
economy was dollarised. The exchange rate was set at ECS25,000 per dollar and the 
national currency was replaced by dollars from April onwards. Exchange rate policies 
have terminated with the dollarisation of the economy.
Table 3.14: Exchange Rate Policies: Bolivia + Ecuador
Bol.v.a
1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
• floating exchange rate
official and parallel rate almost identical
Ecuador • floating exchange rate
• return to fixed exchange rate;
• crawling-peg exchange rate system 
• floating exchange rate 
• dollarisation
Source: Own elaboration.
3 .6  F o r e ig n  D ir e c t  I n v e s t m e n t
Bolivia. Despite the comprehensive economic reforms undertaken during the 
presidency of Paz Estenssoro, no policies concerning foreign direct investment (FDI) 
were introduced between 1985 and 1989. Given the changed political and economic 
environment, the stabilised currency and the tax reforms o f this time period, however, 
incentives for attracting foreign investment had been created. Yet with an amount of 27 
million in 1990 foreign investment was still at a rather irrelevant level (see Figure 3.15). 
To some extent the slow uptake is based on factors which were impossible to change in 
the short run: the underdevelopment of the infrastructure and the very limited size of 
Bolivia’s domestic market contributed to providing little incentives for foreign investors. 
Under the government of Paz Zamora (1989-93) new legislation introduced in January 
1990 allowed foreign investment in the mining and hydrocarbons sectors and a number 
of legal guarantees -  such as free import o f goods and services, free exchange 
convertibility, and equal status to domestic firms before the law -  were accorded to 
foreign investors. The new law succeeded in its aim o f attracting more FDI: in the
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mining sector, for example, the number of foreign companies rose from 4 in 1991, to 
over 50 in 1996 (EIU, Bolivia, 1998-99:23). Between 1990 and 1994 investment levels 
increased from US$27.2 to 130.2 million (see Figure 3.15). The capitalisation process 
(see next section) made FDI surge from 1995 onwards yet with the end of this process, 
FDI levels started to decline again. In a further move, the so-called Ley Corazon was 
passed in 1999: the previously confined area of a 50 kilometre radius from Bolivia’s 
borders was opened for foreign companies to own property in order to encourage the 
construction of power plants exporting electricity.
Figure 3.15: Foreign Direct Investment, net inflows (current US$m), Bolivia + 
Ecuador
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Source: Own elaboration. Data from World Development Indicators (April 2005).
Ecuador. With the establishment of the petroleum sector in the early 1970s, Ecuador 
became attractive to foreign investment: in 1971 there were 36 foreign companies active 
in oil exploration; between 1972 and 1974 FDI reached 5 per cent of GDP (EIU, 
Ecuador, 1992-93:20; Larrea, 1998:187). From the mid-1970s, however, this process of 
investment liberalisation was reversed and the petroleum sector was gradually 
nationalised leading to the departure of more and more foreign companies. By 1981 
only five o f the previously 36 companies were still operating in Ecuador (EIU, Ecuador, 
1992-93:20). During the 1980s few policy efforts were made to attract foreign direct 
investment; first steps were undertaken by the government o f Borja (1988-92) who, 
however, took a rather mixed approach: while foreign investment especially in oil 
exploration was desired, negotiations were often led in inconsistent ways. In 1991, for
92
example, a large-scale oil exploration programme proposed by the US oil company 
Conoco failed due to administrative delays (EIU, Ecuador, 1992-93:22). This indecisive 
approach resulted in rather low levels o f FDI, which amounted to an average of US$150 
million annually between 1988 and 1991 (see Figure 3.15).
More wide-ranging changes to investment legislation were carried out under Duran 
Ballen (1992-96): in January 1993 investment in previously banned areas was allowed 
and limits on profit remittances (except for the mining sector) were abolished. As a 
result FDI increased significantly: while US$178 million had been invested in 1992, in 
the year the new legislation was introduced it rose to US$474 million (Figure 3.15). 
Despite these substantial measures, some sectors still remained protected (i.e. the mass 
media, defence, fishing, border areas and domestic air transport) until new legislation 
passed in 1997 removed these remaining obstacles to foreign investment in all but the 
areas of defence and telecommunications {Ley 46, 19.12.1997; CORPEI, 2004). At the 
same time it was decided to give foreign investment equal treatment to domestic 
investment. A recent project, which attracted great amounts o f foreign investment, was 
the construction o f a new oil pipeline (Oleoducto de Crudos Pesados, OCP). The 
contract for this project was signed in February 2001 and the responsibility for building 
and maintaining the OCP was given to a consortium o f five foreign companies. It is the 
petroleum sector which has predominantly attracted foreign investment; other areas of 
Ecuador’s economy have often failed to attract FDI. According to an EIU report 
(2000:42):
“Political and economic instability and a lack o f  progress on economic reform have 
deterred FDI inflows to most sectors o f  the economy, other than to the extractive and 
energy industries. ”
Table 3.16: Foreign Direct Investment: Bolivia + Ecuador
• liberalisation of previously restricted areas;
- limits on profit remittances abolished
• most remaining protected areas 
liberalised; - equal treatment of domestic 
+ foreign investment
1990 1995 2000_______ 2095
• foreign investment allowed in mining and hydrocarbons sector;
- equal treatment of domestic and foreign investment;
- bilateral agreement to promote US investment
• border areas opened to FDI
Source: Own elaboration.
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3 .7  P r i v a t i s a t i o n 59
Bolivia. It may appear contradictory that the same person who had led the Bolivian 
Revolution of 1952 and introduced a state-led development strategy during his first term 
as President (1952-56), implemented a radical neoliberal economic programme when 
returning to power in 1985. However, there is some consistency in Paz Estenssoro’s 
economic policy-making, as a main objective of the NEP was to restore the authority of 
the state and to aim at a dominant role of the state in planning and investing in strategic 
sectors such as mining. Consequently, it seems hardly surprising that no attempts to 
transfer enterprises from public to private ownership were being made under his 
government. Some national enterprises, however, were transferred to regional 
development corporations and municipalities -  a process interpreted by Morales 
(1994:141) as an "intermediate step toward privatisation ”. Under the subsequent 
administration of President Paz Zamora (1989-93), privatisation featured rather low on 
the policy agenda as well. In a "lukewarm attempt to privatise” (Cominetti and 
Hofman, 1998:73) Paz Zamora implemented a privatisation law in 1991 which was to 
facilitate the transfer of some small enterprises to the private sector; the large and 
strategic sectors would remain in the hands of the state. Only very few state-owned 
enterprises were privatised by 1994, however. Under the presidency of Sanchez de 
Lozada (1993-97) was a clear strategy about restructuring the state-owned industry 
implemented. Instead of opting for "straightforward privatisation" (Van Dijck, 
1998:36), Bolivia decided to “capitalise” its public enterprises and in February 1994 the 
Capitalisation Law was passed by the Bolivian Congress. Under this scheme private 
investors were allowed to bid for a 50 per cent stake in a state-owned company and 
subsequently take over its management. Instead of paying for their share of the 
enterprise, investors made a pledge to invest a certain amount in the company within a 
specified time period. The state, for its part, allocated the remaining half of the shares to 
the public to set up a pension system. All Bolivians over the age of 21 (by December 
1995) were made shareholders of the capitalised enterprises, resources were deposited 
into a pension fund, and pension payments were to be paid out to people reaching the 
age of 65 {Ley 1544, 21.3.1994). The Bolivian strategy provided an alternative to using 
privatisation for simply reducing public sector deficits and instead created a long-term 
scheme to finance social spending.60 Alongside the capitalisation process, however,
59 Privatisation is here used in its more narrow meaning and refers to a transfer of public enterprises to the 
private sector.
60 For more information on the capitalisation scheme, see: Cominetti and Hofman, 1998; Salinas et. al., 
2002.
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some state companies also underwent straightforward privatisation. Between 1988 and 
1995 57 companies were privatised providing a revenue of US$810 million to the state 
(Bouton and Sumlinski, 1997); in the course of the capitalisation scheme US$1.6 billion 
were raised by year-end 1998 (Grebe Lopez, 2001:164).
To summarise, in contrast to other Washington Consensus policies privatisation has 
been one in which Bolivia proceeded rather reluctantly. It was only in 1994 that a 
privatisation strategy was developed. Even then Bolivia did not implement privatisation 
in the traditional form but created its own scheme named capitalisation. Bolivia’s -  as 
well as Ecuador’s -  reluctance to implement conventional privatisation policies comes 
as little surprise when considering the high degree of opposition to privatisation: a 
recent survey by Latinohardmetro showed that around 70 per cent of both Bolivia’s and 
Ecuador’s population disapprove of privatisation processes. 61 Bolivia’s anti­
privatisation protests in Cochabamba in 2000, resulting in the departure of the US 
company which had just acquired the city’s concession for water supply, as well as the 
current demand to nationalise the hydrocarbons sector, provide prominent examples of 
the extent of opposition in Bolivia.62
Ecuador. When considering privatisation policies, one has to take into account that 
Ecuador “never had such an extensive network o f state enterprises as to make this an 
urgent issue” (Williamson, 1990b:56). Under the presidency of Febres Cordero some 
first steps were undertaken and new legislation allowed the privatisation of state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs). The first transfers from public to private sector were carried out in 
1987 and 1988 with the sale of the banks Financiera Manabi and Financiera Guayaquil 
(Zank, 1990). While the Febres Cordero administration had thus paved some ground, 
little progress was made under the subsequent government of Borja. Notably, Ecuador 
even pursued policies to nationalise some sectors and thus acted in stark contrast to the 
prevailing logic of private sector superiority as advocated under the Washington 
Consensus. In September 1988, Boija announced that the state would take control of all 
oil production sections in which foreign companies had so far been involved. Around
61 Latinobarometro, 2001, cited in: Research Department Inter-American Development Bank (2002). 
“The Privatization Boom in Latin America”, in Latin American Economic Policies, Vol. 18:2.
62 In 1999 the license for water supply of Cochabamba was sold to the US company Bechtel. 
Subsequently, water rates increased substantially. The local population reacted with huge demonstrations 
starting in January 2000, at times attracting as many as 100,000 people. In the following battles between 
police and protesters more than 175 protesters were injured, some of them killed. Finally, the government 
ceded to the pressure and cancelled the contract. Bechtel claimed compensation of around US$40 million. 
For more information see: Fundacion Milenio, 2000a:33ff; Crabtree, 2005:16-32.
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one year later, the trans-Andean pipeline, previously controlled by Texaco, was taken 
over by the state oil company (Corporation Estatal Petrolera Ecuatoriana; later 
Petroleos de Ecuador, Petroecuador). This process of expanding the public ownership 
continued during subsequent years and by 1992 Petroecuador had taken full control of 
Texaco’s oil production facilities, which previously accounted for 87 per cent of the 
sector (EIU, Ecuador, 1992-93; 1993-94). Duran Ballen (1992-96) changed Ecuador’s 
course again and Congress passed a Modernisation Law in 1993, which provided a legal 
framework for privatising state-owned enterprises. Yet despite the aim o f privatising 80 
per cent of the state companies during his mandate, only a small number of companies -  
such as the national airline (Compania Ecuatoriana de Aviacion) as well as some hotels 
and banks -  were actually transferred to the private sector. Reasons for the 
government’s failure included the widespread opposition to privatisation policies:
“Opposition parties in Congress managed to hold up any large-scale privatisation by 
blocking the necessary legislation, while public opinion polls revealed that 80% o f  
Ecuadorians were against the program. ” (Roos and Renthergem, 1997:48)
Table 3.17: Privatisation: Bolivia + Ecuador
1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
: : : :
Bolivia • Privatisation Law; outlines privatisation of small enterprises, large 
+ strategic ones to remain state-owned;
• Capitalisation Law
Ecuador
‘ ■- ' ■ ■
• Legislation amended to allow privatisation of SOEs
• Nationalisation policies in oil production sector
• Modernisation Law: Duran Ballen aims to privatise 80% 
of SOEs but achieves little
• Legislation to accelerate 
privatisation largely fails
Source: Own elaboration.
Between 1988 and 1995 only eleven state enterprises were privatised resulting in total 
revenue of only US$169 million (Bouton and Sumlinski, 1997). During this time, 
Ecuador “lagged behind most other Latin American countries in the number o f  
enterprises privatized, revenues raised from  privatization, and foreign investment 
inflows from  privatization” (Nazmi, 2001:728-9). In 1998 crucial constitutional reforms 
were made and governments were now allowed to sell partial stakes in state-owned 
enterprises in strategic sectors such as electricity, telecommunications, water, and roads. 
In 2000 an attempt was made to introduce legislation that would facilitate the
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privatisation of public enterprises but largely failed (see Chapter 7.2). To summarise, 
despite implementing some legal changes quite early, Ecuador has proceeded rather 
slowly to privatise state-owned enterprises and not always consistently. While the 
necessary legislation is now in place, many enterprises are still publicly owned. As in 
the case of Bolivia, however, privatisation processes are not purely a matter of political 
will but often state companies simply cannot be sold due to the absence of buyers. In 
1997, for example, Ecuador tried to sell a 35 per cent stake in the telecommunications 
enterprises Andinatel and Pacifictel, but failed to do so given the lack of bidders (EIU, 
Ecuador, 1997-98).
3.8 S o c i a l  S e c u r i t y
Bolivia. From 1956 until 1996 Bolivia had a pay-as-you-go pension system in place, 
which over the years faced more and more problems due to administrative difficulties 
but also because the numbers of beneficiaries were rising while those of contributors 
were falling. In consequence, the basic pension system practically collapsed at the end 
of the 1980s. During the government of Sanchez de Lozada (1993-97) a new pension 
system was introduced forming part of the capitalisation strategy. The Ley de 
Pensiones, passed in November 1996, established a new pension system that was to be 
funded by the revenues of the capitalisation of public companies. In this system private 
pension funds would manage the dividends gained from the shares of the capitalised 
enterprises. It entailed an annual payment of a Bono Solidario (Bonosol) to all Bolivian 
residents over 65 years of age; when it was first paid in 1997 the amount was US$248 
per person. The total cost of this scheme reached US$95 million in this first year, about 
half of which had to be financed by external borrowing given that the revenues from the 
sale of enterprises were too low to cover the costs (Cominetti and Hofman, 1998:73). 
Already in 1998, now under the presidency of Banzer, the payment of the Bonosol had 
to be postponed given the financial strain the pension payment represented. Banzer then 
set out to reform the whole system and replaced the Bonosol by giving people the 
choice to either receive “popular shares” or to receive the Bolivida, an annual payment 
for people over 50. The Bolivida, worth US$60, was first paid in December 2000 (EIU, 
Bolivia, 2001:23). When Sanchez de Lozada returned to power in 2003 he reinstalled 
the Bonosol and increased the value of the annuity payment to BOB 1,800 (ca. US$234) 
for the period 2003-07. According to the Economist Intelligence Unit the current level 
of payments is not sustainable (EIU, August 2004:22). The pension reform has led to a 
large increase of fiscal deficits (see Section 3.2).
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Apart from the pension scheme, social funds have become an integral part of Bolivia’s 
social security system. In 1986 the first of those funds was set up: the Fondo Social de 
Emergencias (FSE) was funded by foreign donors and created around 100,000 
temporary jobs within community construction projects (Conaghan, 1994b:256). 
Countries throughout the region soon took up this model and also established social 
funds. Following the FSE a variety of other social funds was set up in Bolivia during the 
last two decades, all aimed at improving the living conditions of the poorest sectors of 
society.
Ecuador. While Bolivia was one of the nine Latin American countries which have 
carried out structural reforms of their pension systems during the last two decades 
(Mesa-Lago, 2005)63, Ecuador has so far not restructured its system. Ecuador uses a 
pay-as-you-go social security system, which would need to be radically reformed to 
make it sustainable (Beckerman, 2002:43). The central government provides 
contributions to its employees and also subsidises the Ecuadorian Social Security 
Institute (Instituto Ecuatoriano de Seguro Social, IESS), covering 40 per cent of the 
institute’s pension payments as well as other costs. The IESS remains solely in charge 
of the pension scheme; the private sector has not been involved in the system. In 1998 a 
new element was added to the social safety net as President Mahuad introduced the so- 
called Bono Solidario. This scheme provides a small monthly payment to pensioners 
and mothers of families whose income is below a certain limit.64 While the Bono 
Solidario was originally created with the purpose to soften the effects on the poor 
caused by a reduction in subsidies Mahuad had implemented, it has turned into the 
central element of the country’s social security system. In 1999 around 45 per cent of 
households received the Bono Solidario', the government spent 1.2 per cent of Ecuador’s 
GDP on the programme in 1999, and around 0.8 per cent of GDP in 2000 and 2001 
(Parandekar et al., 2002:152). Research has shown that the scheme does not always 
reach its target group of poor families (Beckerman, 2002:40). Several small-scale social 
security provisions exist, such as a fund that finances infrastructure projects in 
emergency situations, and others providing assistance in the areas of education, health 
and nutrition.
63 Chile (1981), Peru (1993), Colombia and Argentina (1994), Uruguay (1996), Bolivia and Mexico 
(1997), El Salvador (1998), Costa Rica (2001), and the Dominican Republic (2003-06) reformed their 
pension systems (Mesa-Lago, 2005:687ff.).
64 At first mothers were paid US$15 per month and pensioners about half this amount (Parandekar et. al., 
2002:151); to qualify household income had to be below US$150.
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3 .9  M is c e l l a n e o u s  ( F o r e ig n  D e b t , H y d r o c a r b o n s , C o c a , A id ) 
Foreign Debt.
Figure 3 .1 8 : Total Debt Service (% of exports), Bolivia + Ecuador
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003
□  B o liv ia  ■  E c u a d o r  Source: W orld Development Indicators, A pril 2005.
Bolivia. As in the rest of Latin America, Bolivia obtained a large number of foreign 
credits during the 1970s: its debt rose from US$782 million in 1971 to US$3.5 billion 
by 1979 (Jameson, 1989:88). In 1980 Bolivia owed half o f its debt to private creditors. 
From the early 1980s onwards the creditor profile started to change, however, as official 
creditors (mostly multilateral organisations) were the only ones willing to lend. By 1998 
the share of Bolivia’s debt to private creditors had fallen to 0.8 per cent (Antelo, 
2000:30). It was in June 1986 that Bolivia reached a stand-by agreement with the IMF, 
for the first time in six years, which allowed the country to have its debt rescheduled in 
the Paris Club and re-opened the doors for new credits provided by the multilateral 
organisations. In 1998 Bolivia qualified for the HIPC (Heavily Indebted Poor 
Countries) initiative of the IMF and the World Bank, which allowed it to lower its debt 
levels. The debt relief granted to Bolivia under the HIPC terms amounted to US$156.8 
million in 2002, and reached US$153.4 million in 2003 (Fundacion Milenio, 
2004:17).65 The degree o f indebtedness has gradually fallen during the last twenty 
years: while the debt service (as percentage o f exports) was 45 per cent on average 
during the 1980s, it was reduced to 32 per cent on average during the 1990s; the rate for 
2003 was 20.9 per cent (WDI, 2005).
65 The G-8 summit o f  July 2005 decided an extension o f the HIPC terms for 18 countries, among them 
Bolivia. The specific terms are as yet unclear, however.
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Ecuador. Parallel to Ecuador’s petrol boom during the 1970s, the country accumulated 
a huge amount of debt within a relatively short time period: foreign debt rose from 
US$242 million in 1970 to US$7.7 billion in 1982 (EIU, Ecuador, 1992-93:37). The 
total debt grew more slowly from 1982 onwards as the availability of credits decreased. 
In October 1982 the country re-scheduled its debt for the first time and since then has 
done so several times. In 1995 Ecuador qualified for the Brady Plan66, which entailed 
re-structuring the debt and had the effect of making new credit lines available. With the 
onset of the economic crisis and currency depreciation in the late 1990s, total debt 
levels rose again dramatically: from 77 per cent of GDP on average during 1995-98 to 
105 per cent in 1999 (EIU, Ecuador, 2000:41; 2001:47). In consequence, Ecuador was 
unable to fulfil its obligations and in 1999 was the first country to default on its Brady 
Bonds. In the subsequent negotiations with the private sector creditors, the Ecuadorian 
government secured a significant write-off. Due to the low rate of US dollar GDP at that 
time, however, the debt stock only decreased from 105 per cent of GDP in 1999 to 94 
per cent in 2000 (EIU, Ecuador, 2001:47). This represents one of the highest debt 
burdens within South America.
In 2002 Ecuador established an oil fund (called Fondo de Estabilizacion, Inversion y  
Reduccion del Endeudamiento Publico -  FEIREP), which had the objective to reserve 
resources for debt payments: 70 per cent of the fund was used to service the debt, 20 
was allocated to stabilisation and aid in case of natural disasters and 10 per cent went to 
education and health. In June 2005, under the recently installed President Palacio, these 
provisions were abolished and 35 per cent are reserved for debt buy-backs and to foster 
economic growth, 30 per cent are destined for social spending, 20 per cent for a trust 
fund protecting the country from potentially falling oil prices, and 15 per cent will go to 
environmental, technical and road building projects. During the 1980s Ecuador spent on 
average 41.2 per cent of its export earnings on servicing its debt; this level declined to 
27.2 per cent during the 1990s; and stood 27.9 at in 2003 (WDI, 2005). While 
Ecuador’s creditor profile also shifted towards multilateral and bilateral creditors during 
the post-1982 period, the change has not been as significant as in Bolivia. In 2000 
Ecuador owed around 52 per cent of its debt to private creditors, 30 to multilateral 
organisations and 18 per cent to governments represented in the Paris Club (Lucas, 
2000:30).
66 In 1989 US Secretary of the Treasury, Nicholas F. Brady, announced the “Brady Plan” which allowed 
Latin American countries to restructure their debt into a variety or “menu” of new claims.
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Figure 3.19: Oil Revenues, Ecuador
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Source: Own elaboration. Salgado and Santos, 1998:14 (1983-96); EIU, 2001:56 (1996-97); 2005:50 (1999- 
OS).
Hydrocarbons. Ecuador -  oil. Oil reserves were discovered in 1967 and by 1972 a 
pipeline was built and Ecuador started to export petroleum. Revenues from petroleum 
exports increased from a share of 3.9 per cent of GDP in 1973 to 8 per cent in 1981 
(Mosley, 1991:413). During the 1980s and 1990s oil was the country’s main export 
product; in 2004 petroleum exports accounted for 52 per cent o f total export earnings 
(EIU, Ecuador, 2005:36). Oil revenues provided between 9 and 9.9 per cent of GDP 
during the 1980s; by 1997 declined to 6.4 per cent and in 2003 stood at 6.1 per cent. 
Representing the state’s most important source o f income the petroleum sector 
generated 40.9 per cent of non-financial public sector income in 1983-84, 31.9 per cent 
by 1993-96 and 24.1 per cent in 2003 (see Figure 3.19). In 2003 a second oil pipeline 
resumed operations in Ecuador: the Oleoducto de Crudos Pesados (OCP). Proceeds 
from this pipeline were destined for the above-mentioned oil fund.
Oil is certainly the aspect that distinguishes the economies of Ecuador and Bolivia most. 
Given the importance o f oil revenues in the Ecuadorian economy it could be assumed 
that this has influenced the pattern of tax policy-making. Can the existence o f oil 
explain why Ecuador has been a slow tax reformer while Bolivia has introduced wide- 
ranging changes to the tax system? While the importance of oil should not be 
underestimated it is argued here that the pattern o f policy-making cannot be accounted
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for by the existence or non-existence of oil. As can be seen in Figure 3.19, the role of oil 
in Ecuador’s economy has gradually decreased since the 1980s. While it provided 40.9 
percent of the non-financial public sector in 1983-84 it almost halved to 20.9 per cent 
by 2002. If the argument goes that the memory of the petrol bonanza of the 1970s 
explains the reluctance of governments and society to reform the tax system and 
increase collection, then it should have been most difficult to introduce tax reforms 
during the 1980s. With the decline of oil revenues and the increased consciousness that 
oil cannot provide for everything, tax policy-making should thus have become gradually 
easier. Yet this did not happen. On the contrary, the only two cases where significant 
tax bills were introduced as suggested by the government occurred in 1986 and 1989 
(See Chapter 6). In the period since the early 1990s the introduction of tax reforms was 
extremely difficult for governments and generally they either failed or were 
significantly modified. This pattern is contrary to what one would expect if oil were the 
determinative variable in explaining the successful introduction of tax policies. Oil is 
not enough to explain why tax reforms either succeeded, failed or were modified in 
Ecuador.
Bolivia -  natural gas. Within the hydrocarbons sector oil plays only a limited role in 
Bolivia’s economy as all crude oil produced is consumed within the country. Natural 
gas, on the other hand, has become an important element and replaced tin as the biggest 
contributor to export earnings from 1980. In recent years its (potential) importance has 
further increased as since the mid-1990s large gas reserves have been found. Between 
1997 and 2003 the discovery of natural gas resources grew ten times (EIU, Bolivia, 
2004:28), which made Bolivia the country with the second-largest reserves in Latin 
America after Venezuela. Bolivia’s hydrocarbons industry was nationalised in 1937 and 
started to be managed by the state company Yacimientos Petroliferos Fiscales 
Bolivianos (YPFB). The YPFB held all rights over exploration and exploitation 
activities (also known as upstream activities) and also controlled the stages of refining 
and commercialisation (downstream activities). In 1990 the Paz Zamora government 
introduced a hydrocarbons law that submitted all upstream activities to a 50% royalty 
payment {Ley 1194). In 1994 the tax reform introduced by Law 1606 (see Chapter 4.4 
for other elements) also entailed significant changes to the hydrocarbons sector: a 
special tax on hydrocarbons {Impuesto Especial a los Hidrocarburos y  sus Derivados, 
IEHD) was created. It charges the commercialisation of hydrocarbon derivatives in the 
internal market be they internally produced or imported; the rates applied vary
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according to product. The new legislation also integrated the sector into the general tax 
regime, meaning that companies involved in any stage of the hydrocarbons industry 
would have to pay the corporate income tax (which was created by Law 1606). During 
the government of Sanchez de Lozada (1993-97) the sector was opened up after a new 
Hydrocarbons Law was passed in 1996 and the YPFB was gradually privatised. Private 
companies were given the right to export gas anywhere and at any price they chose. To 
attract investment in the sector royalties on new finds were set at 18 per cent only, while 
wells that were already operating bought by private investors were levied 50 per cent; 
the difference was to offset the significant costs of exploration. By 2000 all major assets 
of the YPFB were privatised and exploration and production activities were now fully in 
private hands. In consequence, private and foreign companies increasingly dominated 
the hydrocarbons sector and following this law total foreign investment in the sector 
rose drastically: while around US$200m were invested in 1989 (EIU, Bolivia, 1998- 
99:27), around US$400m were invested on average between 1998 and 2002 in the oil 
and gas sector (Dupleich et.al., 2003:24). FDI in this area was higher than in any other 
since 1997. This therefore underlines the importance of the hydrocarbons sector for the 
Bolivian economy.
Ever since the early 1970s Bolivia has exported natural gas to its neighbour Argentina. 
As outlined in Chapter 4.3 Bolivia experienced a budget crisis in 1991 as a twenty-year 
contract with Argentina expired and as export prices were re-negotiated and set at a 
much lower level. Consequently export earnings declined from US$232m in 1991 to 
US$90.2m in 1993 and remained below US$100m during the remainder of the 1990s 
(Dupleich et al., 2003:32). In the mid-1990s Bolivia won Brazil as a new export market. 
The construction of a gas pipeline to Brazil started in 1996 and exports commenced in 
1999. From then on export earnings from natural gas increased again and went from 
US$35.5m in 1999 to US$265.6m in 2003 (Dupleich et al., 2003:32). While earnings 
thus rose significantly after exports to Brazil begun, they never reached the levels of 
income generated during the 1980s.
Yet while production increased since the late 1990s, Bolivia is far from reaching its 
capacity for production given the large reserves discovered from the mid-1990s 
onwards. How to deal with the extensive remaining reserves has become subject to a 
major political controversy during the last years. The second government of Sanchez de 
Lozada (2002-03) considered a plan to export natural gas to Mexico and the US via a
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port in Chile. Though this option seems economically more viable than alternatively 
using a port in Peru, exporting via Chile is highly unpopular in Bolivia for historical 
reasons: in the War of the Pacific (1879-83) Bolivia lost its access to the sea to Chile. 
Domestic opposition to the plan was one of the catalysts for Sanchez de Lozada’s 
downfall in October 2003. Following the demands of large sectors of the society, 
President Mesa (2003-05) convened a national referendum on the state’s control over 
the privatised hydrocarbons sector in July 2004. The referendum resulted in a success 
for Mesa as the turnout was around 60 per cent and as all five questions asked were 
answered with the “yes” that Mesa had hoped for. Though the result clearly expressed 
the population’s interest in increasing state control over the hydrocarbons sector, it 
remained unclear how this should be translated into specific policies. In 2004 a new 
hydrocarbons law was discussed in Congress, which proposed to introduce a 
“complementary” hydrocarbons tax. It was passed in May 2005 and established a 32 per 
cent complementary tax to be paid in addition to the 18 per cent royalty payments and 
other taxes of the general tax regime (such as the corporate tax) (see also Chapter 5.3). 
Additional revenues of around US$320 million are expected {La Razon, 18.5.2005). In a 
first reaction, companies of this sector announced that they were to put all planned 
investment on hold {La Razon, 18.5.2005).
As can be seen from these paragraphs the hydrocarbons sector has played a crucial role 
in Bolivia’s economy. Given the significance of export earnings from this sector, any 
change in export levels or prices has a huge impact on Bolivia’s finances. When in 1991 
Argentina was behind with some of its payments and the contract was re-negotiated, a 
significant budget crisis was created in Bolivia, one of the principal reasons why the Paz 
Zamora government decided to increase the VAT rate in 1992. Particularly in the last 
couple of years the issue of how to deal with the natural gas reserves has become highly 
politicised. In 2003 Sanchez de Lozada’s proposal to export via Chile was one of the 
main triggers of the demonstrations that led to his downfall; in 2004, the wave of 
protests by social movements who demanded the nationalisation of the sector following 
the introduction of the hydrocarbons tax led to the resignation of Mesa as president.
In short, the hydrocarbons sector is of crucial importance to Bolivia’s economy but has 
also become an aspect of major political contention, which has played a significant role 
in the social conflicts Bolivia has experienced during the last years.
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Coca. Within Latin America Bolivia is the third biggest exporter and producer of coca 
after Colombia and Peru. Coca cultivation for the cocaine trade increased throughout 
the 1970s and 1980s and was concentrated in the Yungas (near La Paz), the Chapare in 
Cochabamba, and the Yapacani in Santa Cruz. These regions did not only provide the 
required climate but were also traditionally rather poor rural areas, a combination that 
made coca production an attractive option. By 1987 coca had become the largest export 
product, accounting for US$ 700 million in 1988 (Lasema, 1993:55). Revenues from 
this sector have often helped cushion the effects of austerity measures introduced, 
particularly during the period of the NEP (1985-89). Given that the USA made their 
assistance as regards aid and trade concessions increasingly dependent on coca 
eradication, the Bolivian government introduced several eradication schemes 
throughout the last two decades.
In 1988 an anti-drug law, the famous Ley 1008, was introduced, which had been co­
written by the US Agency for International Development. The Law established harsh 
penalties for drug-trafficking activtities and distinguished between legal production 
(coca production for traditional use), surplus production (which was to be gradually 
replaced by alternative crops), and illegal production (which was to be eradicated). The 
law defined narco-trafficking as illegal and prepared the way for eradicating coca 
production. Two regions, leaving out the Chapare, were declared as legal coca 
plantations. The bill was never fully implemented, however, as it was highly 
controversial within Bolivia. Given the resistance of the cocaleros and the lack of a 
national consensus on the issue, the Bolivian government never enforced all parts of the 
legislation. Plantations continued to grow and hardly any cocaine traffickers were 
prosecuted (Hallums, 1997). A pattern developed that when areas were cleared of coca 
plantations, producers easily changed location and replanted coca elsewhere. While 
internally not fully endorsing drug eradication policies, Bolivian governments have, 
however, continued to sign international drug agreements. Complying with international 
demands on drug enforcement was, as Hallums (1997:827) termed it, “a political and 
economic necessity” for Bolivia. Given the economic situation of Bolivia and its 
dependence on foreign aid, governments have generally chosen to pass anti-drug 
measures to please the US and other countries. Yet as pointed out by Painter, Bolivian 
governments have tried to maintain a balancing act between external pressure and 
domestic resistance to coca eradication by following “the politically expedient path o f  
doing the minimum necessary to appease the international community and thereby
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convince foreign governments o f the wisdom o f giving economic aid, while doing the 
least possible to disrupt the social peace o f the country” (Painter, 1994:77).
In 1997, however, things started to change as Banzer came to power (see Chapter 5.1). 
He announced the "Plan Dignidad”, which aimed at alternative development, 
eradication of coca, and drug use prevention. With strong support from the US, the 
Banzer government undertook a very active and often aggressive eradication 
campaign. 67 As regards eradication the “Plan Dignidad” seems to have been 
successful: fields were reduced from 48,000 ha in 1995 to 19,000 in 2001 (of which 
12,000 are legal).68 In consequence, revenues from the coca trade were reduced: while 
they represented 3.9 percent of GDP in 1990 they declined to 0.7 percent by 2003 (EIU, 
Country Profile 2004:26).69 The other side of this success was of course that the living 
standards in the Chapare sharply declined following the forced comprehensive 
eradication. This in turn led to social unrest and protests against the government. The 
Bolivian governments’ policy of co-operating with the US and eradicating coca 
plantations has led to a violent conflict in the Chapare. Settlements started growing in 
the Chapare from the 1970s onwards and significant numbers migrated there after the 
tin mines were closed in the mid-1980s. The population of Chapare grew from 24,000 
in 1967 to almost 250,000 in 1987 (Crabtree, 2005:35). Chapare’s settlers consider it 
their right to grow coca to earn a living but also to produce it for traditional uses such as 
coca leaf chewing, for products such as coca tea and toothpaste or for medical uses. 
Over the years the coca growers have become more and more organised and have often 
successfully challenged government policies on eradication. While in the beginning 
protest was largely limited to coca issues, coca growers have started to be involved in 
other economic and political issues in recent years. The MAS and Evo Morales have 
their background in this sector; the MAS has played a significant role in Bolivian 
politics since its creation in 1999. Morales received the second largest proportion of 
votes in the presidential elections of 2002, and was recently elected President in
67 Banzer’s determined approach has often been interpreted as an attempt to make up for the links he had 
to drug traffickers during his dictatorship (1971-78). The majority of the main parties and politicians have 
at one time or the other been accused of links to the illegal drug industry. Thoumi argued that these links 
logically exist since: “In a country with a small population and a very small elite, the illegal drug 
industry must penetrate the power structures to operate. " (Thoumi, 2003:257). This also helps to explain 
the half-hearted approach of many politicians to pursue drug eradication policies.
68 It seems that replanting has since increased again and rose to 28,450 (EIU, Country Profile 2004:27).
69 The decline has other reasons as well: there was a fall in the price for coca on the international markets 
and other sectors of the Bolivian economy experienced growth rates during the 1990s thereby reducing 
the relative importance of coca earnings (Thoumi, 2003:153).
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December 2005. Morales defends the rights of coca growers and promises to end all 
eradication programmes.
Coca has played a crucial role in Bolivia’s economy which is underlined by the fact that 
an estimated 5 to 13.5 per cent o f Bolivia’s labour force is employed in this sector 
(Thoumi, 2003:243). The forced eradication policies of the late 1990s and their social 
effects on the populations o f the affected regions, provide an important element for 
understanding the background o f the increasing levels of state-society confrontations 
and popular protests Bolivia has experienced in recent years (see Chapter 5).
Aid. With the introduction of structural reforms from 1985 onwards, Bolivia started to 
receive significant amounts o f donations and concessional loans from the international 
donor community. Foreign aid came to play an increasing role in the country’s 
economy: while in 1985 aid represented 6.9 per cent of Gross National Income (GNI), it 
rose to 12.3 per cent in 2003 (see Figure 3.20). Comparing these numbers to those of 
Ecuador, it becomes clear that aid has played a significantly more important role in 
Bolivia’s economy than it has in Ecuador where since 1985 aid has contributed between 
1.3 and 2.8 per cent to the country’s GNI and since 1997 has not exceeded 1 per cent. 
Confirming this difference, aid per capita ranged from US$57 to 105 in Bolivia between 
1999 and 2003, and was US$12 and 17 during the same period in Ecuador (WDI, 2005).
Figure 3.20: Aid (% of GNI), Bolivia + Ecuador
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Conclusion
Comparing the patterns of the various economic reforms, it emerges that in most areas 
the two countries have proceeded very differently, while in some aspects Ecuador and 
Bolivia reveal rather similar patterns.
• The changes introduced in Ecuador and Bolivia concerning public sector 
expenditure make clear that Bolivia has gone quite far to abolish subsidies, mainly in 
one cut in 1985 and has also increased its spending on health and education. Ecuador, 
by contrast, has decreased its social spending and opted for a gradual approach cutting 
subsidies on a more or less annual basis during the 1980s and 1990s. Frequently 
Ecuadorian presidents had to withdraw from subsidy cuts already announced. Yet 
Bolivia did not succeed in reducing the number of public employees and as of 1989 
numbers increased significantly; Ecuador on the other hand managed to cut central 
government employees during the 1990s.
• As regards tax reforms the two countries have proceeded rather differently. While 
Bolivia implemented a radical overhaul of its previously complex and inefficient tax 
system in 1986, Ecuador made some changes to the tax system especially since 1989 
but has often done so inconsistently. Often major changes of the tax system were made 
only to be reversed again after some time.
• Trade liberalisation was one of the main elements of Bolivia’s NEP. Tariffs were 
reduced radically in 1985 and were further lowered in subsequent years. By 1990 a 
tariff of 5 per cent on capital goods and 10 per cent on other imports was in place. In 
Ecuador, by comparison, reforms began at around the same time in the mid-1980s yet 
reductions were being made step-by-step and by 1991, after a new round of reforms, 
were still at a higher level than in Bolivia in 1985. Generally, in comparison to Bolivia’s 
rather consistent way of tariff elimination and reduction, Ecuador was far less 
consistent.
• As concerns reforms of the financial sector, Bolivia and Ecuador both introduced a 
major reform at about the same time: Bolivia liberalised interest rates in 1985, Ecuador 
did so in 1986. The two countries have also experienced a serious crisis of the banking 
system in the mid-1990s, in both cases partly caused by external factors, but also 
revealing that financial liberalisation had not been accompanied by the setting up of an 
effective regulatory and supervisory framework.
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• Exchange rate policy -  although both countries decided to float their exchange rates 
at an early stage, in 1985 and 1986 respectively, while Bolivia consistently maintained 
this system, Ecuador modified and reversed its exchange rate system several times 
during subsequent years.
• As regards foreign direct investment Bolivia implemented its main reform package 
in 1990, with some further liberalisation in 1999; Ecuador introduced reforms more 
gradually, sometimes inconsistently. Crucial policies such as equal treatment of foreign 
and domestic firms were introduced in Ecuador in 1997, eight years after Bolivia. Both 
countries are facing similar constraints on attracting FDI: the limited size of the 
domestic market, the underdeveloped infrastructure, a shortage of skilled workers and 
particularly in recent years political instability.
• Bolivia did not introduce any privatisation reforms at all during its first years of 
economic reforms and ultimately developed a scheme deviating greatly from traditional 
privatisation concepts. Under the capitalisation scheme starting in 1995, however, most 
public enterprises changed hands with the private sector. In recent years privatisation 
processes have been increasingly criticised and may even be reversed as the 
nationalisation of the hydrocarbons sector is currently called for by large sectors of the 
society. Ecuador, meanwhile, has introduced some pro-privatisation legislation ever 
since the mid-1980s. Yet despite these laws very few state-owned enterprises have 
actually been transferred to the private sector; in addition, Ecuador has increased the 
state’s control over the oil production sector.
• As concerns social security, Bolivia has implemented a wide-ranging structural 
reform of its pension system replacing the former pay-as-you-go scheme. In Ecuador no 
structural reform has been introduced so far.
While the patterns differ depending on the specific subject, in many cases Ecuador has 
introduced Washington Consensus reforms rather late and often in an inconsistent way 
throughout the 1980s and 1990s. Bolivia on the other hand has -  with exceptions such 
as public sector employment -  managed to introduce rather wide-ranging reforms 
consistently and at an early stage. Given that tax reform represents a good example for 
this pattern, it has been chosen as a case study for this thesis. Focusing on one area of 
economic reforms enables the consideration of policy-making processes in greater 
detail; at the same time it is assumed that an analysis of tax politics will provide insights
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into patterns of policy-making in these two countries more generally. The question 
asked in the subsequent chapters is:
Why have Bolivian presidents managed to introduce comprehensive tax policies during 
the 1980s and 1990s? For what reason have Ecuadorian presidents, by contrast, often 
failed to introduce the reforms intended?
After this and the previous chapter gave an overview of the political structures and the 
economic policies, we will now move on to the tax reforms introduced in Ecuador and 
Bolivia during the last two decades. In the course of this analysis it will become clear 
that the variations in institutional structures of the two countries influenced tax policy­
making processes and can help answering the questions above.
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4 Bolivia: Tax Reforms during a Period of Coalition Politics -  The 
Government of Paz Estenssoro, Paz Zamora, and Sanchez de 
Lozada (1985-1997)
4.1 T h e  G o v e r n m e n t  o f  S i l e s  Z u a z o  (1982-1985)
Though no attempt to introduce changes to the tax system was made during the 
presidential period of Siles Zuazo, a short outline of the period of this government will 
be given here to facilitate an understanding of the dynamics of policy-making in the 
succeeding Paz Estenssoro period. When Siles Zuazo came to power in 1982, he was 
supported by a coalition of the Union Democratica Popular (UDP), which was rather 
heterogeneous and went through a lot of internal arguments and disagreements which in 
turn made governing and responding to the economic crisis with coherent and wide- 
ranging policies difficult. As Juan Cariaga, who was to become a key figure in the 
economic team of the subsequent government, pointed out all the attempts made by the 
government to counteract the growing economic crisis basically failed because it was a 
minority government and many policy initiatives were blocked by the opposition -  
MNR and ADN -  in Congress, and also as Bolivia’s main trade union, the Central 
Obrera Boliviana (Bolivian Workers’ Confederation, COB), managed to pressure the 
government into considerable concessions (Cariaga, interview, 21.5.2004).
Consequently, the government was too weak to reduce the state’s expenditures, to 
devalue the real exchange rate adequately, and to improve tax collection -  measures 
which would have helped stabilise the Bolivian economy. In consequence, Bolivia 
increasingly lacked both internal and external income: internal as tax collection rates 
fell drastically reaching a level of only 15 per cent of government spending in mid-1985 
(Lynch 1994a: 103). Foreign lending had practically come to an end in the aftermath of 
1982 due to the debt crisis and the unreliable political and economic situation in Bolivia. 
Facing this lack of income and given the inability to cut public spending, the Siles 
Zuazo government took to the printing press. In consequence, Bolivia went through a 
process of hyperinflation in 1984-85, reaching an annualised inflation rate of 11,749.6 
per cent in 1986 (see Appendix D). Hyperinflation not only destroyed the savings of 
Bolivians, it also decreased the already low tax income further. According to Carlos 
Otalora, Executive Director of the Internal Revenue Service in 1983, 80 per cent of the 
fiscal deficit in 1985 was financed by monetary emissions (Otalora, interview,
12.5.2004). The fall of world market prices for tin, Bolivia’s main export product, 
further aggravated the economic crisis.
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4.2 T h e  G o v e r n m e n t  o f  P a z  E s t e n s s o r o  (1985-1989) 
Figure 4.1: Composition of Lower Chamber 1985, Bolivia
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Change of government. Faced with more and more calls for his resignation, President 
Siles Zuazo agreed in November 1984 to shorten his term by one year and to call for 
elections in 1985. The first round of the elections o f 1985 was won by Hugo Banzer 
Suarez, the army general who had ruled the country in the years 1971-78. While Banzer 
from the ADN gained 32.8 per cent, Victor Paz Estenssoro, head of the MNR and leader 
o f the revolution in 1952, came second with 30.4 per cent. He had been president 
already in 1952-56 and 1960-64 and is one of Bolivia’s leading figures of the twentieth 
century. As he had previously supported state-led development, his introduction o f 
wide-ranging structural reforms came as a surprise to many o f his supporters (see next 
section for reforms). Jaime Paz Zamora of the centre-left MIR, who had been Vice- 
president under the UDP government, ended up in the third place having won 10.2 per 
cent of the votes (CNE, 2005a).70 The subsequent second round of elections took place 
in the Congress, where its members had to choose from among the first three candidates 
as prescribed by the Bolivian Constitution in Article 90. The MNR managed to gain the
70 As Vice-president o f  the previous government Paz Zamora would constitutionally not have been 
allowed to stand as a presidential candidate in these elections. However, in exchange for agreeing to 
breach the Constitution -  which would have required him to take charge in the case o f the president’s 
resignation and by calling for early elections instead -  Paz Zamora asked for a second constitutional 
breach allowing him to be a presidential candidate in the 1985 elections (Paz Zamora, interview, 
19.5.2004).
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support of the MIR -  who at that time was not willing to vote for Banzer under whose 
military dictatorship many of its leaders had been persecuted -  and Paz Estenssoro was 
elected President. During his government ten parties were represented in the lower 
house of the Congress with the three main parties -  MNR, ADN, and MIR -  taking 
more than three-quarters of all seats.71
Though the MIR had supported Paz Estenssoro to become President, no ruling coalition 
between the MNR and MIR was set up and Paz Estenssoro started without a coalition 
partner after his inauguration in August 1985. Attempts to stabilise the disastrous and 
ever worsening economic situation became the main priority and soon after coming to 
power the government introduced drastic economic measures.
Decree 21060. Immediately after taking office Paz Estenssoro put together a small team 
of economic experts around Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada to develop an economic 
emergency programme in the shortest time possible. On 29 August, 1985 the President 
introduced the New Economic Policy (Nueva Politica Economica, NEP) via Decree 
21060. The main elements were: a) the peso was devalued by 93 per cent which brought 
an end to the artificial maintenance of the exchange rate and allowed the treasury to 
save the money previously spent on this; b) with few exceptions all consumer price 
subsidies were eliminated; c) foreign currency bank deposits were allowed, at free 
interest rates; d) labour laws were liberalised; e) government spending was reduced, for 
example, salaries of government workers were frozen between August and December 
1985; f) unprofitable mines were closed and around 20,000 miners (out of 30,000 in 
total) laid off; g) the economy was opened up to foreign trade and to international 
movements of capital (Lynch 1994a: 104-5; Jameson 1989:95-97; Conaghan 1994:255). 
All these measures were introduced by decree and thus came into force immediately as 
approval from Congress was not required. Bolivian presidents only have the 
constitutional right to introduce regulatory decrees which modify existing laws but 
cannot create new laws (see Chapter 2.2). As pointed out by Juan Urioste, constitutional 
adviser to the economic team formulating Decree 21060, great care was taken to use the 
decree as prescribed by the Constitution and all changes introduced represented 
modifications to existing laws (Urioste, interview, 11.5.2004). Given the wide-ranging 
changes contained, introducing these by decree probably still meant stretching the rules 
a bit. Once implemented hyperinflation was ended almost overnight: while the monthly 
inflation rates had been 66.5 per cent in August 1985 and 56.5 in September, in October
71 For some background information on these and other parties see Appendix F.
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it was -1.9 per cent (INE, 2005). Seen on an annual basis inflation went from 11,749.6 
per cent in 1985, to 276.3 in 1986 and 14.6 in 1987 (see Appendix D).
Coalition with the ADN. While President Paz Estenssoro was thus able to introduce 
wide-ranging economic measures via decree it was clear that in the long run he would 
need a coalition partner to be able to govern successfully and have his policy initiatives 
approved. The tax reform already on the government’s agenda would undoubtedly need 
to be introduced by law and thus required a vote in Congress. Soon after the 
introduction of the economic stabilisation measures, Paz Estenssoro started negotiations 
with ADN leader Hugo Banzer who subsequently decided to enter into a coalition with 
the MNR.
“After Paz Estenssoro was elected President and when he realised that the introduction 
o f economic stabilisation measures would be very hard and could generate a response, 
a popular opposition o f great magnitude, he realised that he needed the support o f the 
Parliament, he needed to create govemability and it is then that he convokes General 
Hugo Banzer Suarez for meetings and proposes to sign the Pacto por la Democracia 
and they sign a Pacto por la Democracia. ” (Pacheco, interview, 5.5.2004)
The Pacto por la Democracia (Pact for Democracy), signed on the 16th of October, was 
to last for almost four years and provided Paz Estenssoro with sufficient partisan 
support to introduce his reform proposals. The MNR and ADN together held 84 of the 
130 seats in Congress, which amounted to a comfortable majority. Banzer and the ADN 
largely agreed with the economic measures taken by Paz Estenssoro -  in fact the same 
Juan Cariaga who was part of the economic team behind the Decree 21060 had 
developed an economic policy programme for Banzer during his election campaign. 
According to Cariaga the programme written for Banzer and the 21060 shared a lot of 
common ground (Cariaga, interview, 21.5.2004). Thus there was a considerable degree 
of overlap in the approaches of both parties towards improving the economic situation 
of Bolivia which facilitated the creation of this coalition. This first coalition, therefore, 
deviates from the pattern that electoral coalitions pass into government coalitions -  it 
was only formed after the President was elected in Congress. The necessity to overcome 
Bolivia’s economic and political crisis has provided an incentive for co-operation in this 
situation. Although the Pacto por la Democracia did not involve the sort of power- 
sharing agreements the subsequent coalitions would, it was also based on the 
distribution of patronage: for a certain time period the ADN received the leading 
positions in several state agencies and corporations. In addition it was secretly promised 
that the MNR would support the candidacy of Banzer in the next election (Malloy,
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1991:51; F. Romero, interview, 25.5.2004). However, in the run-up to the elections, 
Sanchez de Lozada -  the successor to Paz Estenssoro as the leader of the MNR -  
decided to stand for the presidency himself and broke this informal agreement between 
MNR and ADN.72 This was to have a lasting effect on relations between the two parties 
and the ADN left the coalition a few months before the presidential elections in 1989, 
after it had become clear that Sanchez de Lozada would present himself as a candidate. 
Despite this unhappy ending, what had started as a political experiment in 1985 turned 
out to be a very successful coalition providing Bolivia with a period of political stability 
and a coherent introduction of economic policies.
The Tax Reform o f 1986
In early 1986 President Paz Estenssoro embarked upon reforming the no longer 
functioning tax system in order to consolidate the income side of public finances. This 
complemented the stabilisation measures of the previous August which had made 
considerable cuts in public spending. Once again he set up a small economic team 
around Sanchez de Lozada (then Minister of Planning), Juan Cariaga (then Minister of 
Finance) and Ramiro Cabezas (Minister of Tax Collection 1986-87) that was to be in 
charge of developing a proposal for tax reform in a relatively short time period. On the 
19th of March, the Paz Estenssoro government submitted its tax reform proposal to 
Congress and by the 20th of May it was approved by the legislature.
Main elements.73 The tax reform approved in May 1986 represented a complete 
overhaul of the previously complex tax system. Several hundred taxes were abolished 
and replaced by only six; revenue generation and administrative simplicity were the 
guiding principle for the new tax system (Mann 1990:33). Eduardo Antelo, economist 
and later Vice-minister of the Treasury, summarised the essence of this tax reform:
“Law 843 was a simplification o f the tax system. The number o f taxes was reduced and 
it basically changed to indirect taxes based on consumption, which are administratively 
a bit easier to control so that collections could be increased. This new system was 
strongly based on taxes like the VAT. ” (Antelo, interview, 24.5.2004)
At the heart of the new structure was a Value-added Tax (VAT): over 400 sales taxes 
were combined into a unified 10 per cent VAT. A wide range of exemptions was 
abolished. The new system eliminated all income taxes; the Personal Income Tax was
72 Apparently, Paz Estenssoro strongly opposed this decision of Sanchez de Lozada and wanted to fulfil 
the agreement with Banzer (F. Romero, interview, 25.5.2004).
73 See Appendix G for an overview of Bolivia’s tax system between 1986 and 2004.
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replaced by a "Complementary Tax” to the VAT. This 10 per cent withholding tax on 
all income could be reclaimed on the presentation of invoices up to the amount withheld 
(thus providing an incentive for people to ask for invoices). A 2 per cent Tax on the 
Presumed Profits o f  Companies was introduced instead of the Corporate Income Tax as 
it was easier to administer. The Property and Vehicle Tax ranged from 0.15 to 2.65 per 
cent for the presumptive income generated by real estate and 0.5 to 4 per cent for 
vehicles. A 1 per cent Transactions Tax on sales and other transfers of property was 
introduced, covering sales o f goods and services such as rents, professional fees, sales 
o f shares, real estate properties, motor vehicles, aircraft, also transfers of property at 
death or by gift. The Special Consumption Tax (also excise tax) represented another 
indirect tax imposed on alcoholic beverages, tobacco products, perfumes, cosmetics and 
jewellery at rates of 30 to 50 per cent. Some changes to the tax administration were also 
implemented, among them: the payment of taxes was now processed via the banking 
system and the Internal Revenue Service was re-organised. The tax reform established a 
scheme of "co-participation 75 per cent of all tax revenues would go to the central 
government, 10 per cent each to the departments and municipalities, and 5 per cent to 
the universities.74 Finally, a tax amnesty was declared, allowing taxpayers to pay a one- 
off tax for having their tax obligations until 31 December, 1985 forgiven.75
Table 4.2: Main Elements of 1986 Tax Reform
Tax Reform  of 1986
1) 10% VAT 
2) 10% “Complementary Tax”
3) 2% Tax on the Presumed Profits of Companies 
4) Property and Vehicle Tax: Property (0.15%-2.65%); automobiles, boats and
5)1%  Transactions Tax 
6) 30%-50% Excise Tax on cigarettes, alcoholic drinks, jewellery and
cosmetics
7) Changes to the Tax Administration 
8) “Co-participation”
Source: Own elaboration.
74 This aspect was added during the executive’s negotiations with the coalition partner ADN.
75 For more information on the elements o f  the 1986 reform, see Appendix E.
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The taxes outlined in Table 4.2 constitute the main elements of the new tax system 
introduced in 1986 by Law 843, bringing “one o f the simplest tax systems in the world” 
into existence in Bolivia, according to tax lawyer Alvaro Villegas (Villegas, interview,
28.5.2004).
Opposition to the reform. After the bill was made public in March 1986 and while it 
was discussed in Congress, criticism and opposition came from several sides. As 
regards political parties, opposition came mainly from the third-biggest party in the 
legislature, the MIR, which questioned the bill as pointed out by the party’s leader 
Jaime Paz Zamora:
“We saw the need for a tax reform andfor simplifying the tax system ... and we believed 
that this was positive, but we thought that its concept o f universality was not equitable. 
Therefore, we criticised this issue, we did not criticise the simplification but we 
criticised the concept o f universality. " (Paz Zamora, interview, 19.5.2004)
To provide an alternative for discussion the MIR submitted its own tax reform proposal 
to the Congress. Their project was a lot more progressive in its character and contained 
a higher number of exemptions to the VAT on basic articles and services. They also put 
the main focus on improving the administration which they saw at the heart of the 
problem: the tax base had been destroyed by the process of hyperinflation (which would 
have destroyed any tax base) {El Diario, 3.5.86:4). Most of the other smaller 
congressional parties -  as for example the MNRI {Movimiento Nacionalista 
Revolucionario de Izquierda) and PDC {Partido Democrata Cristiano) -  agreed with 
the MIR and equally rejected the tax reform. Despite the criticism of the specific 
proposal outlined by the government, most political parties agreed that some sort of tax 
reform was necessary. Outside the institutional political arena, the COB mobilised 
against the plans; several local Civic Committees issued statements against the tax 
measures before meeting as the National Conference of Civic Committees, which 
mainly criticised the centralist and regressive nature of the proposed changes {El Diario, 
7.5.86:8; 10.5.86:1;11.5.86:1).
Protest was also strongly voiced from the municipal level as mayors criticised the 
abolition of many small taxes whose income was part of their budgets {El Diario, 
22.3.86:7). They feared loss of resources and argued that the autonomy of town councils 
would be undermined. An extraordinary meeting of town councils was held in early 
April in Cochabamba where the potential effects of the tax reform on the municipalities 
were discussed and which concluded with a public statement rejecting the bill {El
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Diario, 2.4.86:3; 14.4.86:2). After some modifications were made to the law during the 
government’s discussions with the ADN (see next section) the bill had lost much of its 
previous centralist character. The municipalities were actually no longer disadvantaged 
by it as some local taxes were maintained and they would receive compensation for the 
ones to be abolished. Even after these changes, however, the mayors and town councils 
of Bolivia reiterated their criticism of the project and in early June even reissued their 
April statement (El Diario, 9.5.86:8; 14.5.86:7; 7.6.86:7).
With respect to the private sector, criticism came from the Confederation de 
Empresarios Privados de Bolivia (Bolivian Private Entrepreneurs’ Federation, CEPB), 
though signals were mixed as parts of the CEPB supported the measure while others 
tried to prevent it (El Diario, 6.4.86:4). According to Sandra Romero, current deputy 
manager for tax issues at the Camara National de Industrias (National Chamber of 
Industries, CNI), the Chamber disapproved of particular elements of the project pointing 
out especially the negative effects the planned Tax on the Presumed Profits of 
Companies would have on investments. On a similar line, the current manager of the 
CNI, Gerardo Velasco, explained that the business sector disagreed with the 2 per cent 
corporate tax and the 1 per cent Transactions Tax that the government’s project 
entailed:
“We tried to influence so that these two would not be introduced, or introduced but in a 
different way. For example, we said that we should pay one third o f the tax on presumed 
profits, which was at a rate o f 2 or 3 per cent, as it obviously represented a punishment 
fo r investment. " (Velasco, interview, 27.5.2004)
Their demand, however, was not answered and the taxes remained as set up in the 
original proposal.
Consensus reached with the ADN. The government largely ignored the various 
concerns of the different political parties and sectors of society and instead focused on 
reaching an agreement with its coalition partner. A series of meetings between the MNR 
and ADN were held to reach a consensus on the project. Banzer’s ADN, had several 
objections to the tax reform and criticised especially its “centralist spirit and its anti- 
constitutional essence contradicting the town councils’ autonomy” (ADN leader 
Alfredo Arce in El Diario 15.6.86:3). In the course of the negotiations with the MNR, 
the ADN managed to have its suggestions included. The principal changes to the 
original project were:
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a) the executive would not be delegated the right to modify tax rates (as the original 
project provided for);
b) the resources of the municipalities would not be affected; they would continue to 
receive the income of the vehicle and property tax. In addition they would get 10% of 
all taxes collected in their department, which represented a higher amount than what 
they used to obtain from the municipal tax on sales and transfers which was to be 
abolished;
c) universities would be allocated 5% of the total collection in their department. The 
original proposal had entailed a lower allocation {El Diario, 30.4.86:3; 1.5.86:1; 
9.5.86:1).
While these changes modified the tax bill, these changes were not major. Having thus 
reached a consensus, the project was jointly endorsed.
Tax reform approved. When the coalition partners MNR and ADN had reached the 
agreement, President Paz Estenssoro made use of his power to convene an extraordinary 
Congress, as provided by the Bolivian Constitution in Article 95,5. After several rounds 
of discussions the bill was approved by the Senate without any significant changes on 
the 20 of May, after the lower house had approved it on the 17 of May. Though the 
smaller parties in the lower house -  PS-1, MRTKL {Movimiento Revolucionario Tupac 
Katari de Liberacion), MNRI and FSB (Falange Socialista Boliviano) -  tried to prevent 
the new law and left the plenary when it came to voting to demonstrate their opposition 
to the bill, their manoeuvres made no difference as the tax reform was approved with 
the votes of MNR and ADN in both chambers. While the tax reform was thus decided 
upon and was to come into force on the 1st of August, the discussions did not stop there. 
The COB continued to protest against the tax measures, arguing that the workers would 
bear the highest burden; they even organised a consultation on the issue in late July in 
which 95 per cent of the 300,000 voters opposed the reform (EIU, 1986:18). Generally, 
however, the referendum was considered to be rather irrelevant, partly as it came at a 
time when the reform was widely accepted or simply was not on people’s minds any 
longer, and partly because the number of people the COB mobilised to participate in the 
referendum was rather limited. The government reacted to the continued criticism 
coming from different sectors of society, by putting a series of advertisements into the 
main newspapers of Bolivia in the aftermath of the decision. These advertisements 
explained the reform’s principal elements and the necessity of its introduction (El 
Diario, 25.5.86:3). Ministers of the Cabinet also organised press conferences to respond 
to questions and a campaign to inform about the advantages of the reform was carried 
out in the rural areas of the country (El Diario, 15.6.86:12;! 1.6.86:3).
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Why was the Reform Possible?
The tax reform of 1986 represented a complete overhaul of Bolivia’s tax system, one of 
the most far-reaching in Latin America at the time. Tax collection had declined steeply 
during the decade preceding the reform, and came close to total collapse in the process 
of hyperinflation. The reform thus almost started from zero and while the tax rates were 
not very high when compared to other systems, one has to bear in mind that for 
Bolivians the tax reform largely meant resumption of any tax payments at all. 
Considering this, why did the President manage to have this reform introduced?
Hyperinflation. The most obvious answer to this question is to refer to the process of 
hyperinflation Bolivians had gone through, which made them willing to accept wide- 
ranging economic measures in order to bring an end to, or avoid returning to, the 
traumatic experience the country had experienced in 1984-85. Fernando Illanes, Finance 
Minister in 1993-94, when asked why the reform was possible answered on this line:
“Because Bolivia had reached the bottom with the hyperinflation, the people accepted 
anything which would mean leaving this process o f hyperinflation, which is a process 
that is cruellest for the poor people because it is them who suffer most from 
devaluation... It was a moment in history which allowed that the population generally 
accepted drastic changes. ” (Illanes, interview, 4.5.2004)
A similar argument, namely that the Bolivian society accepted the 1986 tax reform due 
to their desire to overcome the experience of hyperinflation, was expressed by a large 
number of interview partners (Antelo, Candia, Cabezas, Felix, Millares, Otalora, Pereira, 
Doria Medina, Urioste, interviews, see Appendix B for dates). This willingness to 
accept partly rather harsh economic measures was already seen when in August 1985 an 
economic reform package was implemented via Decree 21060. However, at that time 
Bolivia was at the peak of the hyperinflationary process, which then had been brought 
to an end by the economic stabilisation measures of the same 21060, which caused 
inflation rates to tumble. At around the time of the tax reform in April 1986, the 
inflation rate stood at only 166 per cent (El Diario, 18.4.86:5), which is still high but 
low compared to the numbers of just a year earlier and on the decline. While 
hyperinflation was now over it still represented a recent experience that continued to be 
on the minds of Bolivians, increasing their support for the new tax system. Francisco 
Munoz of PriceWaterhouseCoopers expressed this fear:
(Inflation) “had lowered but not disappeared. The danger was a return to 
hyperinflation... You could not run the risk o f not creating a tax system and have 
hyperinflation return; the people were terrified o f this hyperinflation, so this issue had 
to be resolved thoroughly. ” (Munoz, interview, 11.5.2004)
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The government was quite aware of the potential the fear of a return to hyperinflation 
could have and used it for gathering support for the tax reform among the Bolivian 
population. The tax reform would mean the “definitive defeat o f the hyperinflationary 
process “ said Javier Campero Paz, Executive Secretary of the MNR; and both President 
Paz Estenssoro and Minister of Planning Sanchez de Lozada referred repeatedly to the 
necessity of the tax reform for preventing a return to hyperinflation (El Diario, 
9.5.86:1; 18.3.86:1 ;20.3.86:1; 21.3.86:1). Members of the government recurrently 
exploited the hyperinflation argument to demonstrate the need for reform whenever they 
publicly explained or defended the proposed tax bill. As entrepreneur Doria Medina 
pointed out the experience of hyperinflation provided a window of opportunity: “There 
had been so many problems with hyperinflation that an opportunity opened up to make 
important changes. ” (Doria Medina, interview, 25.5.2004). Hyperinflation thus appears 
a crucial factor in making the tax reform of 1986 possible.
Initial success and legitimacy. Apart from hyperinflation other variables played a role 
in facilitating the tax reform. The government’s economic measures so far had been 
quite successful; in particular, they managed to bring an end to hyperinflation soon after 
coming to power. In consequence, society had started to trust President Paz Estenssoro 
as he had already managed to deal with a crucial economic challenge at the beginning of 
his government. Juan Antonio Morales, President of the Central Bank since 1996, 
commented:
“The government could do this by taking advantage o f the boost they had received from 
their success in stabilisation... It is a reform which came in consequence o f a crisis and 
the initial success which the government had in stopping inflation. ” (Morales, interview,
24.5.2004)
The government’s initial success thus boosted social support for its other economic 
measures. Partly as a consequence of this success, the government of Paz Estenssoro 
had a lot of legitimacy and was therefore able to go ahead with its economic policies. A 
survey carried out in June 1986 gave very positive results about the achievements of 
President Paz Estenssoro so far and showed that 74.7 per cent of the people thought that
76the President had “earned a lot o f merit'’. Tax expert Eduardo Villegas considered 
this aspect of legitimacy as crucial in the case of the 1986 tax reform given that there 
had actually been considerable opposition to it from various sectors.
76 The survey was carried out by „Encuestas y Estudios“, a La Paz-based research institute. 13,000 people 
in various parts of the country were interviewed on the 17th of June (El Diario, 1.8.86:1).
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“We cannot say that the tax reform has been received that favourably, it has been 
subject to various struggles on the street, it has not been that simple at that moment. 
However, the President at that time had a lot o f legitimacy, and implemented a 
solution. " (Villegas, interview, 28.5.2004)
Emergency power. Between 1985 and 1989 President Paz Estenssoro made use of his 
constitutional power to declare several states of emergency, which were supported in 
Congress by the MNR and ADN. During the state of emergency the government 
banished hundreds of trade union leaders, among them COB leader Juan Lechin. These 
repressive measures diminished the protest potential of Bolivia’s principal trade union 
significantly. In addition, the COB had lost much of its convocational power as they had 
been discredited because many people saw them as partly responsible for the political 
and economic instability of the Siles Zuazo period. Some of the economic measures of 
the Paz Estenssoro government also reduced the base of COB members, for example as 
around 20,000 miners were fired, a process that Juan A. Morales called the “coup de 
grace to militancy” for the COB (Morales 1991:37). According to Maria Felix, tax 
analyst of the governmental research institute Unidad de Analisis de Politicas Sociales y  
Economicas (Unit for the Analysis of Social and Economic Policies, UDAPE), the 
government could introduce this tax reform and other economic policies because they 
managed to reduce the protest potential of the COB. President Paz Estenssoro took hold 
of its principal leaders and confined them to another province (Felix, interview,
30.4.2004). He was able to do this given the state of emergency that he had declared.
External influence. External influence seems to have played a limited role: though 
multilateral organisations put some pressure on Bolivia to lower its fiscal deficit, no 
suggestions were made as to how this should be done. Apparently both the World Bank 
and the IMF were not even particularly supportive of the tax reform in the beginning 
(Mann, 1989:386). Those who developed the reform were all Bolivian.
Coalition. For the reasons outlined above, most Bolivians accepted the restructuring of 
the tax system as there was a widespread feeling that something had to be done and that 
a complete overhaul was necessary. While popular support triggered by the experience 
of hyperinflation was crucial, the coalition that existed at governmental level constituted 
a complementary element providing the President with sufficient support in the 
institutional arena to get the reform approved. It is less easy to explain, by variables 
such as hyperinflation and others, why the reform proposed by the government went 
through without any significant changes. The dynamics taking place at the politico- 
institutional level seem more relevant in accounting for this.
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As outlined earlier a considerable degree of opposition to particular elements of the 
reform existed both inside the Congress and outside the political arena. Several political 
parties, such as the MIR and some of the smaller parties represented in Congress, 
criticised the regressive character of the reform and were in favour of allowing more 
exemptions to the VAT (for example on basic food items, to protect people on low 
incomes). The COB also criticised the regressivity and the municipal governments 
thought the reform too centralist and feared that their tax income would be reduced.77 
The private sector, mainly represented by the CEPB and the CNI in this discussion, 
tried to influence the legislation concerning the tax on companies and the Transactions 
Tax. Notwithstanding this opposition to various elements of the reform, the bill went 
through without any significant changes. The only modification that took this criticism 
into account were the provisions regarding financial resources and tax collection which 
had been revised during the negotiations between ADN and MNR and which appeared 
to accommodate protests against the centralist nature of the reform. Apart from this 
change, however, all other demands remained unmet. Napoleon Pacheco, Director of 
the prominent research institute Fundacion Milenio, evaluated the process as follows:
'7  believe the new President Dr. Paz rescued (the country, SL) from a bad experience 
and what he did was forming a political alliance with the principal party o f the 
opposition, which at that moment was the ADN. And from this moment starts what is 
called the politics o f consensus, ofpacts which allow the government to have a majority 
in the Parliament and can thus generate the conditions for governability. I  believe that 
this is the politically crucial element which allowed the government o f Dr. Paz 
Estenssoro to approve an evidently extremely complicated tax reform because - 
although technically there were a lot o f reasons to support a tax reform - i f  they had not 
had a consensus, the pact in the Parliament, probably it would not have been 
approved. ” (Pacheco, interview, 5.5.2004)
The government was able to introduce this tax reform as they saw fit because of the 
coalition that existed between the ruling party MNR and Hugo Banzer’s ADN. The two 
parties combined held a comfortable majority of 65 per cent of the seats in the Congress, 
which meant that once MNR and ADN agreed on an economic policy it was as good as 
implemented (apparently, the members of both parties generally voted with their 
leaders). Like Pacheco, Juan Cariaga was convinced that without the coalition between 
ADN and MNR the tax reform “would not have been possible” (Cariaga, interview,
21.5.2004).
77 At least after the modifications introduced during the MNR-ADN negotiations the tax reform did not 
actually reduce the income of municipal governments. However, this fear remained and the municipal 
governments maintained their opposition to the reform.
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In 1986, however, such a drastic tax reform was possible due to the recent experience of 
hyperinflation and social desire for stability, and the existence of the coalition between 
the MNR and ADN, which provided President Paz Estenssoro with sufficient partisan 
support to introduce the reform without major changes. The combination of popular 
support and coalition politics proved decisive in the successful approval of this tax 
reform.
Effects. As regards the effects of the reform in economic terms, tax collection increased 
ever since inflation was tamed, and further progress was made after the 1986 reform 
was introduced. Internal revenue tax collections increased from 2.32 per cent of GDP in 
1985 to 7.27 in 1988 (Cariaga, 1997:117; see also Chapter 3.2).
4.3 T h e  G o v e r n m e n t  o f  P a z  Z a m o r a  (1989-1993)
During the presidential election of May 1989 Sanchez de Lozada’s (MNR) strategy -  to 
run himself rather than leave the presidency to the former coalition partner and as had 
been agreed -  seemed to have paid off. He gained the highest number of votes with 25.7 
per cent. Banzer closely followed with 25.2 per cent and Jaime Paz Zamora (MIR) 
gained 21.8 per cent (CNE, 2005a). Several months of intensive negotiations followed 
during which the isolation of the MNR became more and more apparent. The breaking 
of the agreement had led to a complete estrangement with the former coalition partner 
ADN and Sanchez de Lozada’s aggressive election campaign left him unable to find 
any political allies for the second round of the election. By the time this took place in 
Congress in early August, an unlikely deal was struck: the ADN formed the so-called 
Acuerdo Patriotico (Patriotic Accord) with the MIR to support Jaime Paz Zamora in his 
bid for the presidency. Seen in the context of the recent Bolivian history the co­
operation of these two parties was rather unexpected: during the military dictatorship 
1971-78 of General Banzer many members of the MIR, including Paz Zamora himself, 
were persecuted, exiled, or even murdered. Paz Zamora explained in an interview how 
this unlikely alliance came about:
“I  believe this happens in politics, it happens in love and in everything, sometimes the 
adversaries become so adversarial that they respect each other. Or put otherwise, we 
had confronted each other so much and they knew that we had confronted each other in 
unequal conditions, being underground, that there was respect. There was credibility, 
so that I  could say they are from the right but I  can trust them when they give their word, 
and they said they are from the left but we can trust their words." (Paz Zamora, 
interview, 19.5.2004)
124
Be it for these reasons or because o f the lack of political alternatives, the MIR and the 
ADN joined forces and on 6 August, 1989 Jaime Paz Zamora -  who only came third in 
the popular vote -  was elected Bolivia’s President by the Congress for the period of 
1989-93.78 The Acuerdo Patriotico lasted throughout the whole governmental period of 
Paz Zamora and, as with the Pacto por la Democracia, provided the President with 
sufficient partisan support to have his policies implemented and to govern in a coherent 
way.
Figure 4.3: Composition of Lower Chamber 1989, Bolivia
1989 Num ber o f parties - 5 
Total Nr. o f Seats -130
MIR, 33
(Ruling
party)*
Source: Own elaboration. Data from 
www. observatorioelectoral. org
40
ADN, 38
*  R uling party here denotes  
the party o f  the president.
CONDEPA, 9
Distribution of power in Congress. The lower chamber o f Congress that was installed 
in 1989 had only five parties represented in it, the lowest number ever since Bolivia’s 
return to democracy. As in the previous legislative period three parties dominated in the 
legislature: MNR, ADN and MIR. The Conciencia de Patria (CONDEPA) which was 
founded by the radio and television presenter Carlos Palenque and which had its support 
base mainly in the Aymara-speaking population of La Paz and El Alto, was a newcomer 
to the Congress. CONDEPA presented itself as an alternative to the traditional parties 
and lobbied against neoliberal economic policies. Between the two coalition partners,
78 At that time the Constitution still provided for the Congress to choose from among the three most voted 
candidates o f  the first round. As from the presidential elections in 1997, the Congress chose between the 
first two.
125
the MIR and the ADN held 71 out of the 130 total seats in the lower chamber of the 
Congress.
Patronage. The MIR and ADN-led government did not succeed in its aim to cut public 
spending and public sector employment even increased, which had partly to do with the 
nature of the Acuerdo Patriotico. The distribution of patronage turned into an essential 
element to keep the coalition going. The ADN-MIR coalition controlled the executive 
branch together and governmental positions were shared between them: the ADN held 
ten ministries including some of the most influential ones such as Finance, Defence, and 
Foreign Relations. According to Lazarte, three new ministries, 16 undersecretaries, and
20,000 new positions in the public sector were created during the government of the 
Acuerdo Patriotico (Gamarra, 1992:34). In part these handouts of jobs were used as a 
way to reconcile members of Paz Zamora’s MIR itself, given their opposition to many 
of the liberal economic policies undertaken which they saw as contradicting their 
political ideology. On the other hand, coalition partner ADN demanded its share of 
positions to maintain its support for President Paz Zamora. While patronage as an 
instrument to create and uphold a governmental coalition had become more important 
during the Presidency of Paz Zamora, it seems to have been an inherent element of all 
Bolivian coalitions that existed since 1985 and of political dynamics in Bolivia more 
generally (Gamarra, 1994:122).
Economic policies. In his election campaign Paz Zamora had criticised the neoliberal 
economic policies introduced by Paz Estenssoro and had announced he would change 
the New Economic Policy. On coming to power, however, his rhetoric and policy 
position changed and he announced that: ‘Plans for national growth and well-being 
will be based on what has been achieved by the past administration ” (quoted in Lynch, 
1994a:112).Throughout his term, then, Paz Zamora continued and extended the NEP 
introduced by Paz Estenssoro and stuck to the market-oriented model. Some even 
considered his reforms more orthodox than those of his predecessor (Morales, 
1994:312). In January 1990 the Acuerdo Patriotico government launched Decree 22407 
which largely ratified the main elements of Paz Estenssoro’s New Economic Policy. 
Advances were made particularly in the area of trade liberalisation as all non-tariff 
barriers to trade were eliminated, import tariffs were reduced and incentives for private 
investment were created by new legislation introduced in 1990 and 1991 (Van Dijck, 
1998:36). Major structural economic measures, however, were not introduced during 
this governmental period.
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Given the gap between Paz Zamora’s election campaign and the policies he eventually 
introduced, he had undertaken a clear reversal of his policy position. As pointed out by 
Stokes (2001:92), the MIR’s minority status can largely account for this policy switch. 
As mentioned above, the coalition partner ADN held the majority of the ministries, 
including the most important ones, and obviously dominated the ruling coalition. It is 
therefore no surprise that the policies adopted come closer to those traditionally 
advocated and already supported in the previous governmental period by the ADN.
Social conflicts and states of emergency. The amount of protests and social conflicts 
was significantly lower than during the previous government’s term: while Ballivian 
(1999:39) accounts for 506 strikes between 1986 and 1989, there were only 109 during 
the years 1990-93. In part this reduction was simply a result of the continuing decline of 
the trade union movement’s power, in part it was due to the repressive measures that 
had been undertaken by Paz Estenssoro and were now continued by President Paz 
Zamora. Only a few weeks after coming to power, the Acuerdo Patriotico implemented 
a state of emergency in response to a teachers’ strike and then used this time period for 
arresting union leaders and forcing them to go into exile to other parts of the country 
(Morales, 1994:131; Gamarra, 1994:112).75
Tax Reforms during the Paz Zamora Government
The first change to the tax system during the Paz Zamora government was introduced in 
February 1990 when a law was approved that increased the rate of the Transactions Tax 
from 1 per cent to 2 per cent {Ley 1141, 23.2.1990). This case of tax legislation, 
however, will not be analysed and the case study considered from Paz Zamora’s 
presidential period is the 1992 tax bill which increased the VAT rate to 13 per cent. 
Both these tax laws where ultimately approved without any modifications made to the 
original proposal of the executive and the process surrounding their introduction was 
rather similar, which makes it sufficient to consider only one of the two. In terms of 
scope and potential tax collection an increase of 1 per cent in the Transactions Tax and a 
3 per cent increase in the VAT rate are more or less comparable. Yet VAT is a tax that 
is much more visible to people and can thus be expected to trigger more opposition
79 The Bolivian Constitution requires the Congress to approve states of emergency implemented by 
presidents. Since the Acuerdo Patriotico did not count on a two-thirds majority required to do so, 
however, and since it was unlikely any other party would support such a measure, the government used its 
majority in the legislature to impose a congressional holiday during the time of the state of emergency. 
The decision on this recess was taken without having reached a quorum, due to which the government 
was later accused of unconstitutional behaviour (Gamarra 1994:112,125).
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when raised than an increase in the rate of the transactions tax, which is usually mainly 
contested by the private sector. A VAT increase would therefore be more difficult to 
implement, which is why the 1992 was chosen as the case study to be examined.
1992 -  VAT increase from 10 to 13 per cent. The most important change to the tax 
system introduced during the Paz Zamora government was the VAT increase from 10 to 
13 per cent implemented in February 1992 {Ley 1314, 27.2.1992). It should be kept in 
mind that the reform of 1986 was rather comprehensive and that it was generally 
considered as having introduced an adequate tax system to Bolivia. Therefore it seems 
hardly surprising that tax reform was not one of the principal items on the agenda of the 
Paz Zamora government.
Background: contract change with Argentina.
„ We faced the crisis with Argentina, we would stop receiving the income from the gas 
exports to Argentina so that a financial hole was created and it became necessary to 
increase the tax. ” (Maria Felix, Tax Analyst -  UDAPE, interview, 30.4.2004)
In January 1992 the Acuerdo Patriotico proposed a VAT rise to 13 per cent to Congress. 
The tax bill was sent together with the general budget proposal. The VAT increase also 
implied a rise by three points in the complementary tax to the VAT. At the time, 
Argentina -  traditionally one of the principal buyers of Bolivian natural gas -  was five 
months behind in its payments and in May 1992 the contract that had set the terms for 
this deal between Argentina and Bolivia for the previous twenty years was to run out. 
The new contract to be set up between the two countries was to lower the price paid by 
Argentina drastically and losses of around US$150 million were expected {El Diario, 
25.1.92:2; 18.2.92:3). This loss of income represented a significant hole in the Bolivian 
budget which the government now attempted to fill with the proposed 30 per cent VAT 
increase which it hoped would raise an additional US$118 million {El Diario, 
21.2.92:1).
When defending the suggested tax bill to its critics, members of the government almost 
always pointed to the financial crisis caused by the fall in export earnings necessitating 
a measure to balance the budget {El Diario, various issues). Otherwise, however, the 
economy showed some positive trends: exports in sectors such as hydrocarbons and 
mineral and non-traditional exports had increased considerably; the inflation rate was at 
14.9 per cent on average between 1989 and 1993 (see Appendix D); and Bolivia 
managed to obtain various credits from multilateral organisations.
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Opposition to the Reform
Private sector. The private sector rejected the tax reform proposed by the government 
in January 1992 completely. Most outspoken on this issue was the CEPB who 
persistently criticised the measure via the media and directly in meetings with the 
government and tried to prevent the VAT increase. The General Secretary of the CEPB, 
Johnny Nogales, stressed that a tax increase was not an adequate measure to maintain 
the tendency of economic growth Bolivia currently experienced and to provide an 
incentive for investment; Carlos Calvo, the President of the organisation, complemented 
this argument by saying that it would make much more sense to reduce tax evasion and 
increase the number of taxpayers to make the system more universal rather than 
expanding the tax burden of those already paying (El Diario, 21.1.92:7;22.1.92:1). 
Another argument the CEPB frequently employed was that the real problem behind the 
country’s financial difficulties was the government’s uncontrolled fiscal spending (El 
Diario, 21.2.92:1;22.2.92:1). After meetings with the government and other lobbying 
activities remained without the desired result of the tax bill’s withdrawal, the private 
entrepreneurs’ organisation made a last attempt by carrying out a media campaign 
against the tax reform: one-page adverts were placed in all of the big national 
newspapers in which the main argument against the VAT increase was summarised and 
which called on all Members of Parliament to vote against the executive’s proposal.
The Santa Cruz based Camara de Industria, Comercio, Servicios y  Turismo (Chamber 
of Industry, Trade, Services and Tourism, CAINCO) was equally outspoken against the 
tax increase. Apart from using similar arguments to those of the CEPB they also 
reasoned that there should be some stability in the tax system and that the Law 843 of 
1986 for that matter should not be altered (which seemed a rather lame argument 
considering that the private sector did not protest when changes where introduced in 
their favour). CAINCO warned that the measure would deprive the population of its 
purchasing power which in turn would lead to inflation. They called repeatedly on the 
government to withdraw the proposed VAT rise and to cut spending instead (El Diario, 
21.2.92:9;23.1.92:15; 25.1.92:13). Other organisations -  such as the Camara Boliviano 
de la Construccion (Bolivian Chamber of Construction, CABOCO) or the Asociacion 
Departamental de la Pequeha Industria de La Paz (Departmental Association of the 
Small Industry of La Paz, ADEPI) -  joined in the protest and the lobby campaign 
against President Paz Zamora’s tax plans (ElDiario 23.1.92:11;29.1.92:6;3.2.92:3).
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COB against VAT rise. While the opposition campaign coming from the private sector 
was the most organised and forceful, rejection and protest was also prevalent among the 
workers. While the COB was predominantly concerned with the modest salary rise 
suggested by the government (which was part of the budget proposal sent together with 
the tax reform), Bolivia’s main trade union also persistently spoke out against the tax 
bill. The COB brought this issue up during their dialogue meetings with the government 
and organised mobilisations and protest marches against both the limited salary increase 
and the tax bill {El Diario 22.1.92:7; 29.1.92:1).
Opposition parties in Congress. While both the private sector and the trade unions 
concurred in their rejection of the government’s proposed VAT rise, this negative 
response was equally voiced by the opposition parties. All three opposition parties -  
MNR, IU {Izquierda Unida), and CONDEPA -  contested the measure. Ernesto 
Machicado, Member of Parliament for the MNR, the biggest party represented in the 
legislature, criticised the tax increase in the following way:
“It is a retrograde as it contradicts the fundamental pillar o f the tax reform o f 1986. 
The intention then was to charge little so that the people would pay. What the 
government is doing now is a reversion o f this policy and is charging a lot so that in the 
short term there will be a huge social upheaval and in the medium term people will 
evade taxes. I f  taxes are higher there will be more evasion. They are punishing those 
who are paying taxes which is a very small number o f people while what they should 
rather do is make those pay who do not. ” {El Diario, 21.1.92:3)
In Congress, the MNR presented its own proposal, which mainly suggested to raise the 
income from the transactions tax instead of implementing a higher VAT rate {El Diario, 
21.2.92:1). In the days before the vote on the bill in the lower chamber the MNR -  as 
the CEPB had done -  carried out a media campaign by putting adverts arguing for the 
VAT to remain at 10 per cent in the main national newspapers. While their genuine 
concern about the negative effects of the tax rise should not be questioned, the MNR 
certainly did not mind that a by-product of this campaign was to position itself for the
OA
presidential elections due a year later. All the main opposition parties were thus united 
in their rejection of the tax reform handed in by the executive, however, their joint votes 
only added up to 59 out of 130 in total (MNR -  40; CONDEPA -  9; IU -  10).
To summarise the opposition against the VAT rise: the fiercest criticism and extensive 
lobbying against the bill came from the private sector; in Congress all opposition parties
80 During the election campaign the presidential candidate, Sanchez de Lozada, promised to lower the 
VAT rate. When in power, he never fulfilled this promise.
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rejected the measure; the COB protested against it; and public opposition from other 
organised sectors was limited.
VAT increase approved in Congress. In the face of this opposition, the government 
usually referred to the loss of income from gas exports to Argentina. Cabinet members 
also pointed out that in the Latin American context the VAT rate of Bolivia was one of 
the lowest (Blanco, interview, 30.4.2004). Yet to a large extent the executive also 
simply ignored the critical voices. After the bill had been sent to Congress in January it 
was discussed as usual in the legislative commission and in the lower house. This 
process was delayed when in late January some legislators of the Acuerdo Patriotico 
parties themselves brought forward an alternative plan. They suggested to reduce
10,000 jobs in the public administration and including more sectors in the tax regime in 
exchange for not raising the VAT rate {El Diario, 29.1.92:3). After this proposal was 
made it was not heard of again, however, so that it can be assumed that the dissenting 
ADN and MIR members were brought back into line by their party leaders. On the 20th 
of February, the Acuerdo Patriotico was reported to have decided that the vote on the 
bill should be taken the following day. Consequently on the 21st of February the 
Parliament approved the tax reform (and also the budget) without any modifications 
with the votes of the ruling parties ADN and MIR. A few days later the Senate also 
passed the law which was subsequently promulgated by President Paz Zamora (27th of 
February). The executive had thus implemented its original proposal ignoring the 
opposition to the measure coming from various sectors. Even after the VAT increase to 
13 per cent was approved in the legislature the protests against this measure were 
maintained: the COB and university students announced a 48 hour strike and further 
demonstrations against both the salary and the VAT increase. The CAINCO as well as 
the MNR declared that they would present an appeal of nullity to the Supreme Court 
(which failed) {El Diario, 25.2.92:1,7; 28.2.92:1).
Why the Reform was Possible
The two ministers involved in this piece of tax legislation -  Minister of Finance David 
Blanco and Minister of Planning Samuel Doria Medina -  both referred to the opposition 
they experienced from various sectors and maintained that having the VAT rise 
introduced was extremely difficult and contentious; Blanco even claimed “it almost cost
O I
me my job ” (Blanco and Doria Medina, interviews, 30.4.+25.5.2004). When asked
81 In fact, Blanco left his position as Finance Minister soon after the reform went through. The change in 
this position, however, was part of a larger cabinet reshuffle undertaken by Paz Zamora.
131
why the reform of 1992 was possible, Bolivia’s prominent economist Juan Cariaga 
pointed out: “The people accepted the tax regime because ... the memory o f the 
hyperinflation was very strong. ” (Interview, Cariaga, 21.5.2004). Responding to the 
same question, Doria Medina claimed:
“The economic team had a lot o f credibility...; it was a moment o f economic growth, 
there was no crisis, so it was not that complicated. Thirdly, I  had to travel up and down 
the country to go and explain; and there was a good control o f the Congress. ” (Doria 
Medina, interview, 25.5.2004)
Doria Medina mentioned several aspects he considered important to explain why the 
VAT rise could be introduced. His argument concerning the absence of a crisis and the 
general period of economic growth was brought forward by various interview sources: 
Juan Carlos Pereira -  the then Director of the Bolivian Internal Revenue Service, Rosa 
Talavera -  tax expert of Price WaterhouseCoopers, and Juan A. Morales -  President of 
the Central Bank since 1996 -  all held that the rather positive economic circumstances 
and outlook made people more willing to pay taxes and to resist the VAT increase less 
strongly than they would otherwise have done (Pereira; Talavera; Morales, interviews, 
28.5.+20.5.+24.5.2004). In the quote above Doria Medina also pointed to the fact that 
the government had a “good control o f the Congress ". The tax proposal to increase the 
VAT from 10 to 13 per cent was a jointly elaborated bill of the two ruling parties ADN 
and MIR. Apart from the attempt of some members of these parties to have a different 
tax reform introduced the Members of Parliament of these two parties seemed generally 
in agreement with the VAT increase or at least willing to vote along party lines. The 
positive outcome of the attempted reform was hence predictable as the two coalition 
partners held a majority in the Congress. The existence of the governmental coalition in 
the form of the Acuerdo Patriotico can consequently be considered as a decisive 
element in explaining why this reform could be introduced especially when taking into 
account that significant opposition to the measure existed.
Effects. VAT collections rose after the increase of the rate: while they represented 1.93 
per cent of GDP in 1993, they rose to 2.31 in 1994 (DGII, 1997:26).
Special Tax Regimes
Another area in which changes to the tax system were made during the government of 
Paz Zamora were the special tax regimes. These provide small taxpayers of the informal 
sector with a low tax burden and a simple system (thus freeing them from issuing 
invoices, tax declarations and the like). The taxes collected under these regimes
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represent minimal amounts of the total tax income; in 2002 this was 0.1 per cent of all 
internal tax revenue (Ministry of Finance, 2003). While no official figures exist it is 
widely held that a large number of businesses with a considerable income hide in these 
regimes when they should actually pay taxes under the general tax system. To facilitate 
an overview, the development of these regimes will be summarised below, since the 
most significant changes to the special regimes have been introduced during the 
government of Paz Zamora.
From Paz Estenssoro to Paz Zamora. The parallel system to the formal tax regime 
was set up during the Paz Estenssoro period already: presidential decrees issued in 
February and May 1987 introduced the “Simplified Tax Regime” (Regimen Tributario 
Simplificado) just a short while after the new tax system decided upon in May 1986 had 
come into force (Decreto Supremo 21521, 13.2.1987; 21612, 28.5.1987). While the 
formal tax system was based on people and enterprises using tax registry numbers and 
being able to present invoices for all their transactions, this seemed an unrealistic 
requirement for small taxpayers and Paz Estenssoro decided to create a simplified 
system thereby also reacting to pressure coming from the informal sector. Taxpayers of 
low-income businesses, small retailers or artisans whose earnings were below a 
specified level formed part of this Simplified Tax Regime. They were classified into 
four categories and paid a fixed amount of tax instead of paying the tax on companies, 
the VAT, the Complementary Tax and the Transactions Tax. Taxpayers forming part of 
the system were not allowed to issue invoices for their goods and services. At the time 
of its creation in 1986, the simplified regime was planned as a transitory arrangement. 
The Minister of Tax Collection at that time, Ramiro Cabezas, commented on the idea 
behind the introduction of the simplified regime:
“Everyone could freely register and every taxpayer said in which category to register. 
We knew that some who were big would register as i f  they were small but what we 
needed to do was to cast a net like a fisherman, so that all would enter the net and once 
we had them in the net what we needed to do was to check that only the small ones 
would be in this regime and that the middle and large ones would leave it. Then there 
was a change o f government and the new government did not do this work. ” (Cabezas, 
interview, 29.4.2004)
During the time of Paz Zamora’s presidency not only did his government not attempt to 
limit the taxpayers inscribed in the simplified regime, as outlined by Cabezas, he was 
also widely criticised for having amplified this parallel tax structure. In 1991 Paz 
Zamora issued a decree to establish another parallel regime called the “Integrated Tax 
System” (Sistema Tributario Integrado) aimed at the transport sector (Decreto 23027,
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10.1.91). All owners of up to two vehicles used for urban or provincial public transport 
would be entitled to register and pay a fixed, rather low, amount. The Integrated Tax 
Regime has been in existence ever since its creation in 1991 and, as a tax analyst of the 
National Chamber of Industry pointed out, it is widely believed that
“the big transport entrepreneurs are hiding in it, ..., those who have no more than one 
vehicle do not pass to the general regime so they put the name o f their mother, their 
daughter etc. so that they will not be taken out o f the regime. ” (S. Romero, interview,
28.5.2004)
Other people interviewed confirmed this view that it is common practice in the transport 
sector to distribute the vehicles owned among the family members so that a higher tax 
payment in the general system could be avoided (e.g. Villegas, interview, 28.5.2004). 
Apart from having created another special tax regime which allowed another sector to 
avoid paying taxes under the general system, the Paz Zamora government also 
amplified the existing Simplified Tax Regime by introducing a change to the process of 
registration in 1990 {Decreto 22555, 25.7.1990). According to Juan Cariaga:
“Paz Zamora introduced a regulatory decree which was detrimental to the registration 
and by being detrimental to the registration it became impossible to control the 
simplified regime... it was a regulatory decree which distorted the whole concept o f the 
simplified regime... it created a loophole due to which 100,000 people have entered. " 
(Cariaga, interview, 21.5.2004)
The two decrees issued by Paz Zamora in 1990 and 1991 thus represented significant 
changes to the special tax regimes and allowed more people to avoid taxation under the 
general regime. While Cariaga gave the number of 100,000, other estimates claimed 
around 200,000 people had left the general tax regime due to the changes introduced {El 
Nuevo Dla, 7.4.2004). Why were these changes to the tax system introduced? Paz 
Zamora himself described it as a response to the informal sector and considered it as the 
key to the “social peace” he enjoyed during his presidential period (Paz Zamora, 
interview, 19.5.2004). The measures were taken in reaction to the pressure the sectors 
concerned put on the government, particularly from the transport sector which 
ultimately managed to have its own special regime set up. To this day the 
“transportistas " are a significant political player in Bolivia as they have often used the 
powerful instrument of threatening a public transport strike to have their demands 
fulfilled. Though practically all governments (including even the one of Paz Estenssoro 
which created the special tax regime in the first place) have been subjects to the 
pressures of the informal sectors, the Paz Zamora government seems to have given in to 
their demands more than others did. Juan A. Morales (President of the Central Bank
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since 1996) held the opinion that President Paz Zamora introduced these changes out of 
“pure populism " as the small traders of the informal sector would always represent a 
large pool of potential voters (Morales, interview, 24.5.2004). Political analyst, 
Napoleon Pacheco, put the emphasis on the issue of legitimacy instead:
“The government o f Paz Zamora yielded easily to the pressures... In the 1989 elections 
Paz Zamora was the third, but ...he managed to get the votes o f the second which was 
Banzer. So he was legally elected as President, however had no legitimacy before the 
population which saw that another candidate had won. Therefore the Paz Zamora 
government, in a search for legitimacy, yielded easily to these pressures and started to 
distort the tax regime. ” (Pacheco, interview, 5.5.2004)
Table 4.4: Overview Special Tax Regimes, Bolivia
Sim plified  T ax  R eg im e
(Regimen Tributario 
Simplificado)
In teg ra ted  T ax  S y s te m
(Sistema Tributario 
Integrado)
U nified R eg im e fo r 
F a rm ers
(Regimen Agropecuario 
Unificado)
Introduced 13.2.1987 10.1.1991 27.12.1996
Legislation D ecree 21521 D ecree 23027 D ecree 24463
G overnm ent P az  E stensso ro P az Zam ora S an ch ez  d e  Lozada
T arget
Group
Small b u s in esses , 
s tree t vendors, artisans T ransport sec to r Farm ers
Source: Own elaboration.
During the government of Sanchez de Lozada (1993-97) the special tax regimes were 
extended further. In December 1996 the “Unified Regime for Farmers” {Regimen 
Agropecuario Unificado) was introduced, aimed at keeping farmers out of the formal 
tax structure and allowing them to pay a rather low unified tax {Decreto 24463, 
27.12.1996).
The elimination of these regimes has often been demanded and has been a thorn 
particularly in the side of the private sector. The CNI, for example, proposed to 
eliminate the regimes and free low-income groups of the informal sector from tax 
payments completely (as the costs of administering the amounts paid were higher than 
the income anyway), and conduct a re-classification so the businesses previously hiding 
would become part of the general system (Vidaurre, interview, 28.5.2004). This 
proposal was in its essence taken up by President Mesa, who attempted to abolish the 
special regimes. In early April 2004, the finance minister explained that the elimination 
would mean that people of low income would no longer pay any contribution; at the 
same time the reform would entail a re-categorisation aimed at discovering the large
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evaders hiding in the system {El Nuevo Dla, 7.4.2004). After this announcement 
massive protests and marches occurred and in the end, the government of Mesa gave in 
to the pressures, withdrew the plan, and declared that all special tax regimes would be 
maintained {El Nuevo Dla, 22.4.2004). In fact, in a way President Mesa again amplified 
the special tax regimes. In a decree issued in May {Decreto 29494, 14.5.2004) the 
amounts applying to the Simplified Tax Regime were readjusted: while so far everyone 
earning up to BOB 18,800 qualified to register for the simplified tax system {Decreto 
24484, 29.1.1997), Mesa raised the amount to BOB27,736, thus making more people 
eligible than previously.82 According to Alberto Machicado, Vice-minister of Tax 
Politics between 1997 and 2002, this change would distort the system even more 
(Machicado, interview, 25.5.2004). At the same time, however, the Mesa government 
carried out a large-scale re-categorisation process that had been initiated during the 
Sanchez de Lozada period in which taxpayers had to re-register, aimed at reducing tax 
evasion and discovering those businesses falsely inscribed in the special tax regimes.
The special tax regimes were all established and subsequently modified by decree, and 
were therefore at the complete discretion of the president. Given that the Bolivian 
Constitution only provides presidents with the ability to issue regulatory decrees and 
does not give them the power to introduce new legislation, the legality of these special 
regimes has sometimes been questioned. Tax lawyer Alvaro Villegas defined these 
regimes as “unconstitutional” and pointed also to the fact that in terms of legal 
procedure they could easily be abolished (Villegas, interview, 28.5.2004). A simple 
decree would suffice to abolish this parallel structure; however, this has proved to be 
politically impossible ever since the Simplified Tax Regime was introduced in 1986 as a 
“transitory measure”. The existence of these regimes indicates a limit of the institutional 
approach: pressure of popular sectors brought the special tax regimes into existence and 
prevented presidents from abolishing them -  though they would have had the 
institutional means to do so. However, this example also shows how the private sector
a  a
lacked influence on tax measures.
82 Those earning BOB5,001-27,736 are classified into six categories, the charges being: BOB 16, 66, 146, 
218, 518, 646 respectively, paid every two months. Those earning less than BOB5,001 are exempt 
CDecreto 29494, 14.5.2004).
83 Vice-ministers to the Minister of Finance are appointed to oversee different areas; one of them is Tax 
Politics.
84 In Ecuador no special tax regimes exist, the informal sector does not pay taxes. A few years ago an 
attempt was made to introduce a simplified tax regime in order to amplify the number of taxpayers and 
include the informal sector. The reform was rejected in Congress, however.
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4.4 T h e  G o v e r n m e n t  o f  Sa n c h e z  d e  L o z a d a  (1993-1997)
1993 elections. In 1993 Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada won a plurality in the presidential 
elections for the second time after he had already received the highest number of votes 
in the 1989 elections. Sanchez de Lozada (MNR) gained 35.6 per cent and thus defeated 
Hugo Banzer (21.1 per cent, ADN) with a clear margin in the first round. This was the 
only presidential election since 1985 in which a candidate received more than 30 per 
cent of the votes in the first round. The MIR had not presented a presidential candidate 
as they had remained loyal and presented itself with the ADN as the Acuerdo Patriotico 
in the elections. The two populist parties CONDEPA and UCS were the third and fourth 
placed candidates, having gained 14.3 per cent and 13.8 per cent of the votes 
respectively (CNE, 2005a). While CONDEPA had already participated in the 1989 
elections, UCS was a new party to the political scene. The UCS was founded by Max 
Fernandez, owner of the country’s largest beer brewery. It had its support base mainly 
among the urban poor and received votes from throughout the country (in contrast to 
CONDEPA which is mainly La Paz and El Alto based).
Finding coalition partners. While Banzer and the Acuerdo Patriotico did not accept 
the victory of their opponent Sanchez de Lozada for a while, the MNR managed to 
negotiate the support of the MBL, a small leftist party, in early June, which later 
developed into a governmental coalition -  termed Pacto por el Cambio (Pact for 
Change). This first deal sent a signal, and shortly afterwards Banzer admitted his defeat 
by congratulating Sanchez de Lozada and by announcing that the Acuerdo Patriotico 
members would vote for him in the elections of the second round in Congress. A few 
weeks later, another coalition partner was found in the UCS with whom the MNR 
formed the Pacto por la Gobemabilidad (Govemability Pact). What was new about the 
situation in 1993 was that the ruling MNR was not dependent on forming a coalition 
with the second or third-biggest party in Congress since they held such a large number 
of seats. The room for manoeuvre was hence much bigger in Sanchez de Lozada’s case. 
It was also the first coalition that consisted of three political parties rather than two. 
Together with the UCS and the MBL President Sanchez de Lozada was able to count on 
the support of 79 out of 130 Members of Parliament: 52 of his own MNR, 20 of the 
UCS, and 7 of the MBL.85
85 Apparently also the members of CONDEPA voted in favour of the main laws proposed by the 
government (Ballivian, 1999:42).
137
Figure 4.5: Composition of Lower Chamber 1993, Bolivia
1 9 9 3 Num ber o f parties - 9 
Total Nr. o f Seats -130
AP (ADN + MIR). 
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* Ruling party here denotes 
the party of the president.
To facilitate the formation of these coalitions, however, the political allies demanded 
their share of government positions. The UCS received the Ministry o f Defence, two 
undersecretary positions, two ambassador posts, the presidency o f one regional 
development corporation and the first vice-presidency of both the Chamber of Deputies 
and the Senate. The MBL in turn was able to negotiate the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
some key congressional posts, and at least one embassy (Gamarra and Malloy, 
1995:423-24).
Economic reforms. In his election platform Sanchez de Lozada announced his policy 
proposals as a “Plan de Todos promising a “social market economy” it aimed at 
providing economic stability, improving health and education, promoting citizen 
participation, facilitating investment, reducing corruption, and creating jobs (Gamarra, 
1997:385). He also promised to lower taxes. Once in power, Sanchez de Lozada (with 
the help o f the votes o f the coalition members) introduced several wide-ranging 
economic policies during its administration between 1993 and 1997, principally in the 
areas of privatisation, education and decentralisation. A series o f “second-generation” 
reforms was undertaken; the Capitalisation Law, Popular Participation Law, and 
Education Reform Law, all introduced during the first year o f the Sanchez de Lozada 
government.86 While the reforms introduced mirror his election campaign to a large
86 For more information on the capitalisation process see Chapter 3.7.
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extent, the “social” market model took a back seat: though he had promised to alleviate 
social costs, he introduced austerity measures particularly during the first two years of 
the government in order to prevent an economic crisis (Gamarra, 1997:387). As will be 
seen later on, Sanchez de Lozada also did not keep his promise to lower taxes.
Instability of coalition. That these reforms were introduced during the first year of his 
government was probably to the advantage of Sanchez de Lozada as governing and 
keeping the coalition together became more and more difficult over time. The UCS 
proved to be rather unreliable: their leader Max Fernandez repeatedly complained about 
being left out of the decision-making process by Sanchez de Lozada and there were 
frequent rumours that the UCS was about to leave the government. They ultimately did 
leave the coalition in December 1994. However, within months they decided to rejoin 
and were back in the coalition in mid-1995. In late 1995 UCS leader Fernandez died in 
a plane crash, which left the party severely weakened and a rather inactive coalition 
partner for the rest of the legislative period. Apart from these inter-party difficulties the 
President was also facing some intra-party problems. A conflict evolved between the 
members of the MNR and the cabinet (to which Sanchez de Lozada had appointed 
mainly technocrats rather than long-term party members). At that time a joke among the 
Bolivian political class said that “Sanchez de Lozada forgot that to govern Bolivia one 
must always sign a pact with the MNR. ” (Gamarra, 1997:386). By March 1994 the 
discontent among the MNR partisans had reached such proportions that the MNR leader 
gave in to the pressures and restructured the cabinet replacing many of the private sector
R7people by party loyalists. Sanchez de Lozada thus had to change his strategy and make 
relations with the MNR party members more of a priority in order to secure support for 
his economic policy proposals. This pattern supports the thesis brought forward by 
Javier Corrales who argued that a harmonious relationship between the executive and 
the ruling party is necessary for the introduction of deep economic transformation 
(Corrales, 2002).
Social conflicts. The government was confronted with various strikes and protests 
during its four years in power. The COB organised various marches and university 
students and teaching unions demonstrated particularly against the education reform. 
Gamarra argued that this resurge in the degree of social conflict (after a relative low 
during the Paz Zamora period) can be accounted for by the relative fragility of the
87 Another major cabinet reshuffle took place in September 1995.
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ruling coalition on the one hand, and the increasing frustration of the Bolivian 
population with the results (or lack thereof) of the austerity measures and economic 
policies undertaken since 1985 (Gamarra, 1997:389).
Tax Reforms during the Sanchez de Lozada Government
As of mid-November 1994, the Sanchez de Lozada government started to circulate a 
proposal regarding the budget for the upcoming year, part of which entailed new tax 
legislation. The executive finalised the project by late November when it was sent to the 
Congress for discussion. The main changes planned for the tax system were:
a) replacing the 2% Tax on the Presumed Profits by a Corporate Income Tax of 30%;
b) raising the rate of the Transactions Tax from 2% to 3%;
c) modifying the Special Consumption Tax (new tax on sale of vehicles of 20%; 
alcohol and soft drinks now levied a fixed amount per unit instead of a percentage);
d) modifying Property Tax: a) rates for real estate lowered at top end; b) rates for 
vehicles increased.
Corporate Income Tax to replace tax on presumed profits. The 1986 reform had 
abolished the Corporate Income Tax and had put a Tax on Presumed Profits in its place 
given that it was easier to administer. Generally, however, this form of taxation was 
considered to have many disadvantages so that the possibility of re-introducing a 
Corporate Income Tax had been discussed for some time also within the private sector. 
Ramiro Cabezas, one of the protagonists of the 1986 reform and hence responsible for 
the Tax on Presumed Profits of Companies, explained why the tax was introduced in the 
first place and what disadvantages it turned out to have:
“For simplicity we applied a Tax on the Presumed Profits o f Corporations, which made 
it very easy to calculate the tax, made it very easy fo r  the taxpayer to make their 
payments. However, it had the disadvantage that the companies which made losses had 
to pay the tax on the presumed profits anyway. And it had the other disadvantage that 
some companies with capital from abroad could not deduct the tax on presumed profits 
in their country o f origin." (Cabezas, interview, 29.4.2004)
Cabezas pointed to the negative effects of the tax created in 1986 on the companies 
within Bolivia as well as foreign enterprises investing in the country. As regards the 
companies within Bolivia, the Tax on Presumed Profits was widely considered to be 
distortionary as companies who probably had valuable assets would not necessarily 
generate high incomes, while a company with few assets, on the contrary, might 
produce high profits (Antelo, interview, 24.5.2004). In extreme cases a company might 
make losses and still would need to pay the Tax on Presumed Profits and thereby further
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reduce its potential for productivity. Juan Antonio Morales, President of the Central 
Bank since 1996, summarised the shortcomings of this tax:
The Tax on Presumed Profits “had a very defective design ... The businessmen 
considered it (the Corporate Income Tax, SL) as being better because the previous tax 
was a tax on the assets o f the companies, on their machines, their buildings and they 
said very often that the company was not producing and on top o f it we have to pay this 
tax. The tax on profits, on the other hand, was a tax on something that was principally 
verifiable. ” (Morales, interview, 24.5.2004)
In consequence of this, the private sector mainly welcomed the initiative of the 
government to introduce a tax on enterprise profits, as some parts of this sector had 
lobbied for this change for a while. Gerardo Velasco of the CNI pointed out that they 
had pushed for this change to happen as well (Velasco, interview, 27.5.2004). While 
this was one motivation for the government to introduce the change, the aspect 
regarding foreign companies, as mentioned by Cabezas above, was at least as important 
as the argument concerning the distortions created for Bolivian companies. At the time 
of this tax reform Bolivia was undertaking to privatise its state companies and earlier in 
the same year, in February 1994, a “Capitalisation Law” had been approved in Congress 
giving the legal framework for this endeavour. The Tax on Presumed Profits was a tax 
that foreign companies could not deduct from their tax payments back home, which, 
however, would be possible with a corporation tax. Given this situation changes to the 
tax system became necessary to facilitate the capitalisation process, as commented upon 
by Carlos Otalora, Director of the Internal Revenue Service later on during the Sanchez 
de Lozada government (1996-97), who said that “in order to capitalise, Bolivia had to 
change the system ” (Otalora, interview, 12.5.2004).
In summary, there were two main reasons why the government decided to introduce a 
Corporate Income Tax in 1994: on the one hand to eliminate distortions created by the 
previous Tax on Presumed Profits and to introduce a more just tax; and secondly as the 
tax was not deductible abroad and therefore presented an obstacle to foreign investment 
the government was keen to attract at this moment when the capitalisation process 
began. Another aspect that most probably was part of the government’s deliberations as 
well -  though not part of the public discourse -  was that the collections of the Tax on 
Presumed Profits were extremely low. As Juan Cariaga, who was involved in 
establishing this tax, said “the Tax on the Presumed Profits o f Companies did not 
collect anything, everyone got indebted and no one paid taxes” (Cariaga, interview,
21.5.2004). According to data of the Internal Revenue Service, the income generated
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from the Tax on Presumed Profits represented merely 0.42 per cent of GDP on average 
between 1987 and 1994 per year (DGII, 1997:26).
Apart from the corporation tax, some other changes to the tax system formed part of the 
proposal: the Transactions Tax introduced by Law 843 in 1986 at a rate of 1 per cent 
and raised to 2 per cent in 1990, was now proposed to be increased to 3 per cent. This 
tax was generally strongly contested by the private sector for its cascade effect. As 
regards the changes to the excise tax the most important element was the proposed 
introduction of a 20 per cent tax on the sale of vehicles. Some of the excise taxes were 
also to be restructured: the levy on alcohol was unified, and several products were now 
charged a fixed amount instead of a percentage (for example, alcohol such as beer and
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wine, soft drinks). The rates of Property Tax on real estate were lowered at the top end 
(e.g. the owner of real estate worth BOB400,000 now had to pay an annual tax of 
BOB 1,700 instead of BOB2,880). The tax levied on vehicles (cars, motorboats, 
airplanes), however, was increased, ranging from 1.5-5 per cent (previously 0.5-4 per 
cent). Excise tax for jewellery and electrical appliances was abolished.
President Sanchez de Lozada explained the measures declaring that they represented a 
restructuring of the tax system, the effect of which would be neutral and would not 
affect living costs. As regards the Corporate Income Tax, its introduction had become 
necessary due to the capitalisation process and would benefit the business sector. 
Several times he defended the measure as a means of avoiding the implementation of a 
fuel price hike (an argument he also used to threaten the opposition) and criticised the 
opponents of the reform as he considered the demonisation of the reform unfair {El 
Diario, 23.11.94:1;22.12.94:1). Even before the proposal was submitted officially -  but 
more forcefully after that -  opposition came from political parties, trade unions, local 
governments, and particularly from the private sector.
Opposition to the Reform
Private sector. When the government’s plans were first made known, the Bolivian 
Private Entrepreneurs’ Federation (CEPB) immediately started setting up what was to 
become a rather massive campaign against the proposed tax legislation. While they 
generally agreed to replacing the Tax on Presumed Profits with a Corporate Income Tax, 
they strongly criticised the rate of 30 per cent proposed by the government and
88 The rates were: Beer, wine, spirits -  BOB 1.20; Soft Drinks -  BOBO. 15 (rates to be adjusted annually 
depending on the exchange rate to the dollar). Ley 1606, 22.12.1994.
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suggested a rate of 20 per cent instead. The other element of major concern to the 
private sector was to maintain the Transactions Tax at its current 2 per cent. Carlos 
Chazal, President of the CEPB, summarised their position:
"We are against any tax increase, be it the VAT, the Transactions Tax, among others. 
Because o f this we have come to fight and to show that the corporation tax should never 
be higher than 20 per cent as it would deprive the national private sector o f  
competitiveness. ” {El Diario, 19.11.94:9)
Other arguments used by this private sector organisation were: that the measure had a 
recessionary effect on the economy {El Diario, 20.11.94:1; 17.11.94:11); that the 
possibilities for development would be diminished by the reform {El Diario, 
10.12.94:5); that other countries would not have such high rates as 30 per cent in their 
Corporate Income Tax {El Diario, 17.11.94:11); that Bolivia would lose out against 
other countries when implementing this tax regime and lose its competitiveness to 
attract investment in this period when countries of the developing world were opening 
their economies {El Diario, 15.12.94:1). As an alternative to the measures announced 
by the government, the CEPB proposed to amplify the universe of taxpayers {El Diario, 
21.11.94:4). In late November the CEPB decided to declare a state of emergency for all 
private entrepreneurs of the country and convened an extraordinary Congress {El Diario, 
24.11.94:1; 1.12.94:1). While declaring a state of emergency might not have many 
practical consequences it had a symbolic meaning and showed the determination of the 
CEPB to prevent the changes to the tax system. Holding an extraordinary Congress 
confirmed this as it is not a measure the entrepreneurs’ federation has often resorted to. 
To lobby against the reform proposal the CEPB spread their criticism widely and not 
only entered into direct discussions with the executive but also convened meetings with 
the leaders of the different parties represented in Congress, with Members of Parliament 
and senators, and with the economic commissions of both chambers. In addition to these 
meetings, a position paper was formulated and distributed widely. Apart from 
attempting to win over the institutional arena of Bolivian politics, the private sector also 
carried out a well organised campaign in the public sphere. A series of advertisements 
criticising the tax bill was placed in the country’s largest newspapers and articles 
summarising the points of view of the CEPB repeatedly made the headlines and could 
be found on the first page of the papers {El Diario, 20.11.94:13; 2.12.94:1).
Other private sector organisations joined forces with the CEPB and spoke out against 
the planned tax increases of the government. The CNI criticised the proposal of a 3 per 
cent Transactions Tax and a 30 per cent (or later 25 per cent) corporate tax and
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reminded the government that they had in fact promised to lower taxes in their election 
campaign, therefore the least they should do would be to maintain the current rates {El 
Diario, 17.11.94:8). According to the Camara Nacional de Comercio (National 
Chamber of Commerce, CNC) the 1 per cent rise in the Transactions Tax would trigger 
a considerable rise in living costs and would represent an attack on the country’s 
productivity and competitivity. Furthermore, the measures would increase informality 
and smuggling {El Diario, 19.11.94:15). The Federacion Boliviano de la Pequena 
Industria (Bolivian Federation of the Small Industry, FEBOPI) went as far as 
threatening to stop paying their taxes should the legislation get through; they proposed a 
series of alternative measures instead, all of which were aimed at reducing the tax 
burden of their sector {El Diario, 26.11.94:9; 12.12.94:4).
In early December the government of Sanchez de Lozada agreed to enter into 
negotiations with the private sector as represented by the CEPB: after a series of 
meetings the executive did not give in to the demands of the private sector for a 20 per 
cent Corporate Income Tax, though, however, did agree to lower the proposed rate to 25 
per cent. Another minor concession was made in excluding fruit juices from the excise 
tax which had been claimed by the corresponding sector {El Diario, 20.12.94:8); the 
rates established for wine and beer also formed part of the negotiations but were 
maintained by the government. The increase to a 3 per cent Transactions Tax -  though 
heavily contested by the business lobby -  remained unmodified {El Diario, 10.12.94:5). 
While the government claimed that the modifications made represented a consensus 
reached with the private sector organisation, the CEPB declared that no agreement 
existed and that their concerns had not been heard {El Diario, 17.12.94:12). They thus 
remained opposed also to the new version of the bill. The CEPB continued to criticise 
particularly the 3 per cent tax on transactions and the 25 per cent for the Corporate 
Income Tax which they considered as being too high. When assessed in a comparative 
perspective this claim seems questionable, however, as in many other Latin American 
countries rates were higher than 25 per cent. Top rates of the tax on corporations 
averaged 38.1 per cent in Latin America in 1991 and 34.2 per cent in 1997 (Shome, 
1999:5).89
89 Data was provided for 18 countries from South America, Central America and the Caribbean; it was 
unavailable for other years. Note that the comparison has its limits given that a flat rate is compared with 
top rates.
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Political parties. Opposition to the project came also from the majority of the parties 
outside the ruling coalition, most strongly among them the ADN but also CONDEPA 
and former coalition partner UCS. The UCS had left the ruling coalition in the month 
the tax reform was presented (a few of its members nevertheless continued to vote with 
the government). The opposition parties accused the government of using an easy way 
to balance the fiscal deficit and criticised the planned changes regarding transactions 
and corporation tax using arguments similar to those of the CEPB. They also pointed 
out that the current economic situation was not actually that good and that raising taxes 
would not be the appropriate measure at the moment (El Diario, 22.11.94:3,7). After the 
new legislation passed Congress several of the parties that had been opposed -  ADN, 
MIR and CONDEPA -  handed in an appeal of unconstitutionality to the Supreme Court 
(which was not approved, however).
COB and municipal governments. After the proposed tax legislation was made known, 
rejection also evolved within the trade union and popular sectors. Bolivia’s main trade 
union, the COB, criticised the reform measures and reproached President Sanchez de 
Lozada for not keeping his election campaign promise to lower the VAT rate to 10 per 
cent and considered the bill an “attack against the interests o f the country’s 
municipalities” (El Diario, 21.12.94:7). They announced protest marches and a national 
strike, most of which, however, were only carried out after the reform had already been 
approved and then had little effect (El Diario, 25.11.94:11;20.12.94:4;30.12.94:5; 
28.1.95:5). Other organisations equally condemned the government’s plans as did, for 
example, the transport sector and the National Federation of Mining Cooperatives (El 
Diario, 3.12.94:5; 19.12.94:5). In Santa Cruz a joint meeting of the trade union 
movement, private entrepreneurs, the universities, representatives of the agricultural 
sector, and the legislators of Santa Cruz was organised to analyse the tax bill. This 
rather unusual co-ordination of diverse groups resulted in a joint document that 
criticised the executive’s plans (El Diario, 3.12.94:11). While opposition was thus 
voiced from the trade unions and other sectors it was not as forceful in 1994 as their 
reactions to other cases of tax reform. This can be explained by the fact that part of the 
reform did not affect these sectors (as was the case with the newly introduced 
corporation tax); or in the case of the 1 per cent increase of the Transactions Tax, its 
effects were not as easily understood as, for example, a VAT increase would have been 
(even though an increase in this tax ultimately increases consumer prices in a similar 
way).
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The strongest opposition to the reform, apart from the private sector, came from the 
municipal governments. The issue of contention was the provisions made regarding the 
Special Consumption Tax and the Property Tax: the municipal governments pointed out 
that the project would have all income from the excise taxes go to the national Treasury 
while previously the municipalities had received a share via the system of “co­
participation” (coparticipacion), which entitled them to 20 per cent of all revenue of 
national taxes, according to the new Popular Participation Law of 1994 {Ley 1551, 
20.4.94). The municipalities protested that the tax on real estate and vehicles were 
lowered and opposed this as they received a share of these taxes so their income would 
be reduced {El Diario, 17.12.94:6). While it was true that the rates for real estate were 
lowered at the top end, the charge levied on vehicles was actually increased (see section 
on the elements of the tax reform above). The municipalities thus feared a decrease in 
their income and their representative body -  the Association of Municipal Governments 
-  consequently campaigned heavily to prevent the proposed changes {El Diario, 
15.12.94:15;17.12.94:6; 30.12.94:6). The universities joined in this protest and declared 
a state of emergency to show their opposition as they alleged that: “The tax reform 
eliminated the tax destined for the universities and notably reduced the municipal 
governments' dominance over taxes. ” {El Diario, 21.12.94:7)
The opposition of the municipal governments, however, was apparently based on a 
misinterpretation of the tax bill: in fact, the “co-participation” principle was not at all 
affected by it and would also continue to apply to the excise taxes. While the 
municipalities assumed that their income was to be reduced they were actually to 
receive more money in consequence of this reform. Surprisingly, however, the 
government did not publicly clarify this issue while the discussion was going on and 
simply ignored the criticism of the municipal governments. Only after the bill was 
approved in Congress, cabinet members made public statements on this issue. President 
Sanchez de Lozada was the first to point out that the municipal governments and 
universities would receive significantly more money than before {El Diario 22.12.94:4); 
a statement that was elaborated further when Gaby Candia, the National Secretary of 
Finance, gave a press conference a day after the reform had passed Congress:
“The municipalities' and universities' income will not be reduced, therefore it is not an 
attack as is manifested, rather with the reforms to the law a considerable increase o f  
their incomes will be produced, because the co-participation o f the VAT and the excise 
tax is maintained. " {ElDiario, 23.12.94:8)
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The Ministry of Finance declared that the protests were due to ignorance of the law and 
therefore unjustified. This correction of the widespread misinterpretation of the new tax 
legislation was later backed by figures published by the government: the reform would 
cause an increase of around 10 per cent in transfers to the municipal governments {El 
Diario, 13.1.95:8;29.12.94:11). This clarification revealed that the opposition of the 
municipalities had indeed been based on false assumptions. In a meeting held by the 
Association of Municipal Governments of Bolivia it was decided that they would call 
off all protest measures and accept the changes introduced to the tax system as they 
realised that their budgets were actually not affected and would even benefit in some 
regions {El Diario, 12.1.95:6).
1994 reform approved in Congress
In mid-December, after the executive made some changes to the tax reform due to the 
negotiations with the private sector, the discussion of the bill in Congress was speeded 
up by the ruling coalition. Since the new tax legislation was supposed to come into 
force by the beginning of the fiscal year starting on 1 January, 2005, the government 
had some urgency to have it approved before the end of the year. In the session taking 
place a few days before Christmas, the members of the opposition parties were absent as 
they wanted to symbolise their discontent with the fact that the government had not 
consulted them and the wider society about the proposed reform at all {El Diario, 
23.12.94:1). The reform was then approved without any modifications with the votes of 
the MNR, MBL, and MPP {Movimiento Popular Patriotico, a group that split up from 
the CONDEPA and joined a coalition with the MNR) which formed the ruling coalition, 
and also the votes of some dissidents of the UCS. Two days later the tax reform was 
confirmed also by the Senate and subsequently promulgated by President Sanchez de 
Lozada.
The legality of the new legislation was questioned by the opposition parties for two 
reasons. Firstly, the session convened by the President of the lower chamber, Javier 
Campero Paz, on the 20th of December was considered to be unconstitutional. The 
leaders of the opposition parties -  ADN, MIR, UCS, CONDEPA, VSB {Vanguardia 
Socialista Boliviano), EJE Pachakutik -  pointed out that the Parliament had just a few 
days earlier decided upon the congressional recess to start on the 19th of December {El 
Diario, 20.12.94:3). According to their view, Paz Campero had ignored this decision 
and by assembling the Parliament had violated legislative procedures. The other
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argument used by the opposition was the apparent lack of a quorum during the session. 
Given the 130 seats in the Bolivian Parliament a quorum is reached with 66 of its 
members present. Several reports of the session stated, however, that no quorum had 
existed at several times during the discussion (El Diario, 21.12.94:1+3). Since the 
opposition was not present during the session, no one asked to have the quorum verified 
and the session continued without interruptions. A few days after the discussion in the 
Parliament it was reported that the official record of the session had registered 65 
legislators to be present. According to El Diario the Secretary of the Lower Chamber 
then proposed to change this number to 68 (which would represent a quorum) and 
President Campero Paz approved of this change and signed the document to “legalise” 
the tax reform (El Diario, 23.12.94:3). In the aftermath of the decision the opposition 
parties presented a directive of nullity to the lower chamber’s President, arguing that the 
procedure surrounding the tax reform had been unconstitutional given the decision of 
the recess and the lack of a quorum. Javier Campero Paz, however, rejected the appeal 
(ElDiario, 22.12.94:4; 23.12.94:3).
Table 4.6: Tax Reform of 1994 -  Original Proposal and Approved Legislation
Original Proposal Approved
Corporate Income 
Tax 30% 25%
Transactions Tax 3% (previously 2%)
Excise Tax
a) 20%  tax  on sa le  of vehicles; 
b) fixed am ount for alcohol + soft drinks
a) 18%  (vehicles) 
b) fruit ju ices exem pt
Property Tax
a) 0.35%  -1 .5 %  on property (from 0.15% -2.65); 
b) 1.5% - 5% on vehicles (from 0.5%-4%).
Source: Own elaboration.
Summary. The reform approved in December 1994 represented the second most 
important piece of tax legislation (after the 1986 reform) introduced during the last two 
decades. At its centre was the introduction of a Corporate Income Tax, other important 
elements included an increase in the Transactions Tax, and changes to the excise and 
property taxes.
While the great bulk of the proposed legislation was approved as proposed by the 
executive some modifications were introduced in the course of the discussions. 
President Sanchez de Lozada was facing a period of instability in his ruling coalition, as
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its main coalition partner UCS left the very month the tax reform was being discussed; 
other coalition partners such as the MPP lost some members during that period. The 
coalition was thus fragile and it was not always certain if the MNR would reach a 
majority of votes in the Congress to approve the bill, as was reported by El Diario in 
early December: “Majority o f MNR in the Parliament in Danger ” (4.12.94:4). The 
pressure to modify the proposed reform came mainly from private sector groups in 
response to which the government made some concessions; most significantly the 
Corporation Income Tax rate was lowered to 25 per cent. Demands by the business 
groups for an even lower rate and other changes were ignored by the Sanchez de Lozada 
government, however. In Congress -  where votes came from the MNR, its coalition 
partner MBL and some other smaller parties -  the bill was approved without any further 
modifications. The government was in the fortunate position that the ruling party itself 
already held 52 seats in the Parliament, adding up to 59 together with the MBL, which 
already came close to a majority in the 130 seat strong legislature. Despite this 
favourable position some extra-institutional manoeuvring was apparently necessary for 
introducing this reform as it seems that no quorum was reached in the session where the 
tax bill was approved.
Effects. In terms of economic outcomes the reform can be evaluated as rather positive. 
Tax collections of the Transactions Tax rose from 1.6 per cent of GDP in 1994 to 2.1 
per cent in 1995; the new Corporate Income Tax resulted in revenues of 1.4 per cent of 
GDP in 1996 while the previous Tax on Presumed Profits had collected 0.6 per cent of 
GDP at its best throughout its existence (DGII, 1997:26).
Conclusion. In all cases considered in this chapter -  1986, 1990, 1992 and 1994 -  tax 
reforms could be introduced due to the existence of a ruling coalition providing 
presidents with sufficient partisan support in Congress. In 1986, hyperinflation was an 
additional crucial factor which made Bolivians accept the introduction of a wide- 
ranging economic reform. The memory of hyperinflation still seems to have played a 
role in the introduction of the 1992 reform. Business groups had little influence on the 
three tax reforms: hardly any concessions were made in 1986; in 1992 the private sector 
opposed the tax changes heavily but the government went ahead without any 
compromises; only in 1994 did interest groups manage to achieve some changes yet still 
remained unsatisfied with the modified version. Protests against the tax reforms by trade 
unions and other popular sectors, particularly the COB, occurred in all cases. In 1986, 
however, their protest potential was weakened, as Paz Estenssoro made use of his
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emergency powers to this end. In 1992 the COB protested against the VAT rise but was 
mainly concerned with achieving a higher salary increase; in 1994 protest from trade 
unions and popular sectors was limited as the tax changes were not that visible and 
largely affected the private sector. In none of these cases did the protest of trade unions 
and other sectors make any difference to the tax reforms ultimately introduced. No 
evidence was found that external actors played a significant role in any of these cases. 
In 1986, for example, there was some external pressure to lower the fiscal deficit, yet no 
specific proposals were made and neither the World Bank nor the IMF were particularly 
supportive of the tax reform at first.
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5 Bolivia: The Decline and Eventual Breakdown of Coalition 
Politics -  Tax Reforms during the Governments of Banzer, 
Sanchez de Lozada and Mesa (1997-2004)
5.1 T h e  G o v e r n m e n t  o f  B a n z e r  a n d  Q u ir o g a  (1 9 9 7 -2 0 0 2 )
In the elections of 1997 Hugo Banzer presented himself as presidential candidate for the 
fifth time since Bolivia’s return to democracy and for a second time won a plurality of 
the votes (which he had had already in 1985 but then did not get elected in the second 
round). Banzer and his ADN won 22.3 per cent, followed by the MNR with 18.2 per 
cent, the MIR with 16.8 per cent, the UCS with 16.1 per cent and CONDEPA with 17.2 
per cent (CNE, 2002a). The noteworthy pattern of this election was that five parties all 
received between 16 and 22 percent o f the votes thus giving them relatively equal 
power within Congress. UCS and CONDEPA, which had been quite strong already in 
the previous election of 1993, maintained and extended their important position within 
the Bolivian Congress. At the same time the 1997 election confirmed the declining 
trend the traditional political parties were experiencing as the MNR, ADN and MIR 
together received fewer votes than they previously had.
Figure 5.1: Composition of Lower Chamber 1997, Bolivia
Num ber o f parties - 7 
Total Nr. o f Seats -1 3 0
UCS, 21
Condepa, 17
MBL, 4
MNR, 26
Source: Own elaboration. Data from * Ruling party here denotes
www. observatorioelectoral. org the party of the president.
ADN, 33 
(Ruling party)*
MIR, 25
“Mega-coalition”. Following the first round of the election Banzer’s ADN managed to 
reach agreements with the MIR (its coalition partner o f the 1989-93 period), the UCS
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and CONDEPA. With their support the former military dictator Banzer was elected 
President by the Bolivian Congress on 6 August, 1997. The coalition partners 
supporting his election became a governmental coalition and posts were shared between 
them. What was unusual about Banzer’s approach to coalition-building was that he did 
not cease to find partners when a majority was ensured but carried on to integrate as 
many parties as possible. Ultimately, four out of the five main parties represented in 
Congress formed part of the ruling coalition, practically leaving the MNR as the only 
opposition party (together with the smaller MBL and IU). Together these parties held 96 
out of the 130 seats in the Chamber of Deputies and 24 out of 27 seats in the Senate. 
The coalition can therefore be truly termed a “mega-coalition”. When asked why 
Banzer chose to involve such a heterogeneous group of parties, Salvador Romero 
Ballivian of the National Electoral Court maintained:
“Banzer was -  in quotation marks -  an innovator in this perspective because he put 
together an immense coalition that can be explained not because he wanted to have a 
great majority in the Parliament but because he had been a dictatorial leader in the 70s. 
By forming this enormous coalition he wanted to say 'look, now I  am a democrat and I  
have been elected with more than 80 per cent o f the Parliament’s votes in a democratic 
manner’ ... there was this psychological dimension, which actually had nothing to do 
with politics. ” (Ballivian, interview, 28.4.2004)
While President Banzer’s motivation can perhaps be explained by his desire to enter 
history in a certain way, on the political level the coalition constructed by him turned 
out to be rather difficult to manage. As could have been expected, it was difficult to 
come up with a coherent programme and there was a high level of in-fighting almost 
from the start. As a result, CONDEPA was the first party to leave in August 1998, a 
year after the coalition had come into existence. This was not a major loss since the 
ruling coalition still held a comfortable majority. The situation became slightly more 
precarious when the NFR was expelled from the coalition in February 2000 for the 
following reason. The leader of the NFR, Manfred Reyes Villa, was the Mayor of 
Cochabamba where in January 2000 a popular uprising forced the government to re- 
nationalise the city’s water supply system which had been privatised only months 
earlier (see also Chapter 3.7). Prior to the conflict, a committee sent by the executive 
went to Cochabamba to negotiate a 20 per cent rise in the water rates; the Mayor Reyes 
Villa, however, boycotted the measure. This led to the ousting of the NFR from the 
government coalition as President Banzer accused Reyes Villa of a lack of loyalty to the
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government.90 The NFR had formed an electoral coalition with Banzer; on their 
exclusion from the coalition the eleven NFR Members of Parliament became a separate 
parliamentary group.
According to the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) the ruling coalition was left with 
only 64 seats in Parliament in April 2000, down to 62 by July of the same year (EIU, 
2000:9; July 2000:4). While this was technically not a majority any longer (the 
Chamber of Deputies has 130 seats), the government was still generally able to gather 
sufficient votes as seven CONDEPA legislators continued to support the government 
after their party had left the coalition (EIU, April 2000:12). In addition, given the lack 
of coordination among the opposition parties and the frequent absence of many 
legislators in parliamentary discussions 64 or 62 votes of the ADN -  MIR -  UCS 
coalition most probably represented a de facto majority. However, even though the 
coalition was down to a more manageable number of three parties, in-fighting between 
them continued, especially when the presidential elections of 2002 drew nearer. On 23 
March, 2001, the Congress was temporarily closed due to a conflict between the parties 
of the ruling coalition (EIU, April 2001:12). During the presidential period of General 
Banzer the initially formed “mega-coalition” thus went through a process of gradual 
dismantling. Edgar Millares, who was the Minister of Finance during the first year of 
Banzer’s presidency, commented on this process:
“The first split in the coalition happened during the first year when they have to get rid 
o f CONDEPA and by and by they had to do away with the other parties because there 
was no objective for the future, I  believe, and the government’s programme that was put 
together was rather incidental. ” (Millares, interview, 29.4.2004)
Reforms during Banzer’s government. Banzer’s election campaign had been rather 
vague and did not entail any specific economic policy programme. He did, however, 
promise to fight poverty and to improve social services that had been neglected during 
the previous years, which appealed to large parts of the electorate. His conservative 
ideology based on the concepts of order, stability, work and family also seems to have 
attracted voters from a conservative farmer background as well the urban middle class. 
He also used sought to boost his election campaign by criticising the reforms introduced 
by Sanchez de Lozada, particularly the capitalisation law. Prior to the elections Banzer 
as well the leaders of the MIR and CONDEPA had signed a public document
90 According to the ADN until that time an agreement existed to nominate Reyes Villa as joint 
presidential candidate of ADN and NFR in the next elections (Fundacion Milenio, 2000a:9).
153
committing themselves to thoroughly revise the capitalisation process (Paz Rada, 
interview, 26.5.2004). On coming to power Banzer repeated his promise to defeat 
poverty and announced he would fight corruption and narco-trafficking and commit to 
implementing social justice in the country. Since his electoral programme was based on 
broad concepts rather than concrete policy proposals and his coalition was extremely 
heterogeneous, governing became rather difficult and few of his electoral promises were 
kept. Consequently, only few major structural reforms were introduced during this 
period. The first policy initiative launched in mid-1998 was a reform of the pension 
system set up by predecessor Sanchez de Lozada (see Chapter 3.8). Other important 
initiatives of the government were: the project of the National Dialogues91; the 
renegotiation of Bolivia’s foreign debt within the framework of the HIPC initiative; 
some measures to deepen financial sector liberalisation as Bolivia was fully opened to 
foreign bank operations in 1998; further incentives for foreign investment through the 
“Ley Corazon ” which facilitated investment in the border areas of the country; and the 
so-called "Plan Dignidad” aiming to drastically cut the production of coca (effectively 
the politics of eradication was strongly intensified during the Banzer government). Only 
a limited number of companies were privatised during the government of Banzer, 
because most had already changed hands during Sanchez de Lozada’s presidency. 
Despite Banzer’s earlier statements the capitalisation process remained untouched. In 
the eyes of CONDEPA, therefore, Banzer had broken his agreement, which was a major 
reason for CONDEPA’s departure of the coalition in 1998 (Paz Rada, interview,
26.5.2004).
Social conflict. In addition to the lack of an economic vision and a coherent programme 
social conflicts represented another obstacle to the introduction of wide-ranging policies 
during the government of Banzer. Particularly in April, September, and October 2000 
and also in September-October 2001, there were strikes, civil unrest and road blockades, 
organised by coca growers, teachers, miners, rural peasants and pensioners who were 
protesting against various government policies. The police had to intervene in 102 cases 
of social conflict in the first half of 2001 alone (EIU, July 2001:13). In response to the 
various protests, the government made concessions to the peasants concerning 
legislation of land reform, granted a 50 per cent pay rise to the lower ranks of the police
91 In October 1997 President Banzer called for the First National Dialogue with the purpose of sharing a 
vision of Bolivia’s future between the society and the government. It brought together representatives 
from a diverse range of groups and came up with reform proposals concerning a wide range of issues, e.g. 
the revision of labour laws; the obliteration of cocaine production; the modernisation of the Armed 
Forces; or constitutional reforms.
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force and struck deals with the other protesting sectors listed above. The earlier 
mentioned conflict in Cochabamba made the government re-nationalise the water 
company. According to the Bolivian think tank Fundacion Milenio the situation of 
social unrest experienced in 2000 was only comparable to the highly tumultuous period 
of 1984-85 {Fundacion Milenio, 2000b: 42-3).
Change of President. In July 2001 Hugo Banzer was diagnosed with lung cancer and 
was soon unable to fulfil the tasks of the presidency. He resigned and handed over his 
office to Vice-president Jorge Quiroga Ramirez in August 2001, at that time 37 years 
old, who remained in power until the end of the governmental period one year later.92
Tax Reforms during the Banzer -  Quiroga Government
Table 5.2: Increase of Excise Tax, January 2000
Excise Tax Previous Rate Law 28.1.2000 Law 23.11.2000
C igarettes and 
tobacco 50% 56% 50%
V ehicles 18% 21%-33% 18%
Soft drinks BOBO.18 (per litre) BOBO.33(83% increase) BOBO.18
Alcoholic drinks BOB1.44 BOB2.00 (39% increase) BOB 1.44
Source: Own elaboration. Based on Ley 2047, 28.1.2000; Ley 2152, 23.11.2000.
Few changes were introduced to the tax system during the government period of Banzer 
and Quiroga. As regards the main internal taxes the only modification made was an 
increase in the excise taxes legislated in January 2000. The changes introduced by this 
law entailed an increase in some rates of the excise tax: cigarettes were now levied 56 
per cent (up from 50 per cent previously), a progressive rate from 21 to 33 per cent 
replaced the former 18 per cent flat rate for the sale of cars (depending on price and 
fuel); the fixed charge on soft drinks and alcohol was also increased.
By the end of 1999 the government of Banzer was facing a considerable fiscal deficit, 
mainly caused by the costs of the new pension system (see Chapter 3.8). To balance the 
deficit the government considered various options such as a fuel price hike or an 
increase in the rates of the excise tax. According to the Vice-minister of Taxation at that
92 Banzer died of his illness on 5 May, 2002.
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time, Alberto Machicado, he and the people of the Internal Revenue Service were 
opposed to the latter proposal as they feared higher excise taxes would raise tax evasion. 
The finance minister and the President were in favour of this increase, however, as it 
represented the politically easiest measure (Machicado, interview, 25.5.2004). Herbert 
Muller, then Minister of Finance, gave his own version when asked why the 
government had opted for a change in the excise taxes:
‘7 am telling you an anecdote that is not very well known in the country: it was because 
one o f them went outside, it was the Minister o f the Presidency, and gave a press 
conference while we were discussing and so the President could not contradict his 
minister. It was a bit that the events obliged the President and obliged all o f us to adopt 
this measure. ” (Muller, interview, 10.5.2004)
According to Muller, the measure was thus a “political accident” given the pre-empted 
public announcement of the tax increase by a cabinet member. In the subsequent 
discussion of the proposed tax legislation within the ruling coalition, the UCS opposed 
the initiative, yet ultimately failed to convince its allies.93 The government had always 
argued that these changes to the tax on consumption would prevent an increase in petrol 
prices. Only a few months later, however, the prices for petrol were raised in April and 
then again in June {Fundacion Milenio, 2000a: 17). Opposition to the excise tax increase 
came mainly from the private sector; as Machicado reported the tobacco industry and 
car importers were literally “hitting the roof" and Muller added that rejection was 
strongly voiced by the CEPB whose President saw himself affected as a producer of 
wine and spirits (Machicado; Muller, interviews, 25.5.+10.5.2004). Other private sector 
groups also mobilised against the bill as, for example, did the Santa Cruz-based 
CAINCO which claimed that the tax bill would cause production costs to rise, making 
products more expensive and demand decline (La Razon, 19.1.2000:B7). When decided 
upon in Congress, “Law 2047” received a majority of votes by members of the ruling 
coalition and was approved without any modifications to the executive’s original 
proposal (Muller, interview, 10.5.2004). In a survey of Bolivian business leaders about 
the greatest mistake of the government during the previous months, the increase of the 
excise tax was the issue mentioned most.94 The private sector kept up its pressure and in
93 It comes as little surprise that the UCS opposed the bill given that its leader, Johnny Fernandez, owned 
Bolivia’s principal beer company (Cerveceria Boliviano Nacional). However, the influence of the UCS 
within the coalition (despite holding a significant number of seats) was weak also because at the time the 
bill was discussed the beer company was involved in a tax fraud scandal. In late January 2000 the Internal 
Revenue Service published the amounts the company was supposed to pay, which raised the profile of the 
scandal (La Razon, 26.1.2000.B6).
94 Survey carried out in July 2000 by Marketing and Nueva Economia, cited in: Fundacion Milenio, 
2000a:26.
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November 2000 the government gave in and reversed the increase of the taxes {Ley 
2152, 23.11.2000).
Reform of Internal Revenue Service. Reforms were initiated in other aspects of the 
tax system during the Banzer -  Quiroga government. In early 2000 two bills were 
presented to Congress: one to implement a new tax code95 and another to reform the 
Internal Revenue Service. The former experienced a long delay as its suggestions 
proved too contentious and a new tax code was ultimately only introduced in 2003. The 
latter bill, however, went ahead during the Banzer -  Quiroga period and the so-called 
Law o f Institutionalisation o f Internal Revenues was approved by Congress in 
December 2000 {Ley 2166, 22.12.2000). The reform had two main elements: firstly a 
directorate (executive president and five directors) was elected by Congress for five 
years (instead of annual appointments of a new leadership). The President would 
propose names which would need confirmation by a two-thirds majority in the 
legislature. Secondly, the selection of personnel underwent a significant change, as the 
employees of the Internal Revenue Service (SIN)96 were now chosen by professional 
entry exams. Bolivia’s Internal Revenue Service was generally considered to be a 
hugely politicised and corrupt body. Eduardo Antelo, Vice-Minister of the Budget at 
that time, explained (referring to the Internal Revenue Service and the customs 
authority):
"The political presence in these institutions has always been quite strong; they were 
seen as institutions o f collection not only for the state but also fo r  the political parties ” 
(Antelo, interview, 24.5.2004)
In a World Bank survey, the respondents considered that 75 per cent of the employees at 
the Internal Revenue Service had been chosen for political reasons (World Bank, 
2000a:9). Previously, every government used to appoint a new director to the Internal 
Revenue Service to have somebody loyal to their parties installed. A change of director 
usually implied a change of a large part of the personnel too, which was obviously 
detrimental to continuity in the reform process as pointed out by the former director of 
this body, Juan C. Pereira (Pereira, interview, 28.5.2004). Apart from the negative 
impact on the efficiency of reform and collection, these arrangements also made the 
organisation prone to corruption and turned it into "booty o f  the political parties”
95 The Codigo Tributario, or tax code, is here defined as regulating the relations between state and 
taxpayer, the tax administration, the rights and duties of tax collectors, as well as penalties. Tax rates are 
established by individual pieces of legislation and do not form part of the tax code.
96 With the introduction of the institutionalisation law the Internal Revenue Service was named Servicio 
de Impuestos Nacionales (SIN); previously it was called Servicio Nacional de Impuestos Intemos (SNII).
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(Trigo, interview, 20.5.2004). It is hardly surprising then that the political parties were 
opposed to the new legislation. In consequence the new law experienced considerable 
delay: though presented in early 2000 it was only approved in December of the same 
year; the actual implementation then suffered another delay as a new director was 
elected by Congress in autumn 2001 (EIU, October 2001).
Despite the opposition of the political parties, however, the new legislation was passed 
and implemented due to support from the ruling coalition. Eduardo Antelo described the 
process as being extremely difficult but considered that public opinion and the media 
had helped: cases of corruption within the Internal Revenue Service had been subject to 
public discussion as the media frequently reported on these cases, with photos and 
articles making the headlines of the newspapers. This pressure to reform the Internal 
Revenue Service hence made it impossible for the political parties to directly oppose the 
executive’s reform initiative (Antelo, interview, 24.5.2004).
This institutionalisation process of the Internal Revenue Service has generally been 
evaluated very positively. The leadership of Executive President Eduardo Zegada at the 
SIN has often been praised (Munoz, interview, 11.5.2004). Appointed in 2001 he was 
the first head to have lasted for three governments (Quiroga, Sanchez de Lozada, Mesa),
07which can be considered as an indicator for the success of the reform. Secondly, the 
announced fight against corruption seems to have impacted on the de-politicisation of 
the SIN (Serruto, interview, 31.5.2004). In another area, however, the reform process 
has so far not produced a significant change: according to Carlos Otalora, Tax 
Superintendent for La Paz, while tax collection has increased, it has not been due to a 
greater efficiency of the tax administration but due to higher collections through the 
customs (Otalora, interview, 12.5.2004).
5.2 T h e  S e c o n d  G o v e r n m e n t  o f  SAn c h e z  d e  L o z a d a  (2002-2003)
The elections taking place in May 2002 produced rather surprising results: while 
Manfred Reyes Villa of the NFR was leading in the opinion polls for weeks before the 
elections, he ended up in the third place only (20.91 per cent) and the winner turned out 
to be Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada (who had already governed between 1993 and 1997). 
While he and his MNR gained 22.46 per cent o f the votes, the second placed candidate 
was a newcomer to the formal political arena: Evo Morales of the Movimiento al
97 On 5 April, 2005 Zegada resigned from the position for “personal reasons”. The previous Vice-director, 
Rafael Vargas Salgueiro, was appointed his successor (El Deber, 6.4.2005).
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Socialismo (MAS) was close behind Sanchez de Lozada with 20.94 per cent (CNE, 
2005a). The results showed that the electorate was highly divided as the three 
candidates obtained around 20 per cent of the votes.
Figure 5.3: Composition of Lower Chamber 2002, Bolivia
2002
Num ber o f parties - 8 
Total Nr. o f Seats -130
NFR, 25
MIP, 6
UCS, 5
PS,  1
MAS, 27
(Ruling party)
* Ruling party here denotes 
Source: Own elaboration. Data from CNE. the party of the president.
The composition of the Congress showed a balance o f forces rather different from 
previous legislatures. The ADN, which had been one of the two biggest parties in every 
Congress since 1985, faced collapse as it won only 3.40 per cent o f the votes, which 
translated into four seats in the legislature. CONDEPA, mainly due to internal struggles, 
had practically disappeared in 2002 (0.37 per cent). The UCS saw its base greatly 
diminished as it won only 5.51 per cent, down from around 15 per cent previously 
(CNE, 2005a). Both the MAS and the MIP (6.09 per cent) were new to Congress. 
Established in 1999 this was the first general election the MAS took part in. Its leader 
Evo Morales was the leader o f the coca workers based in Chapare. The Indigenous 
Movement Pachakuti (MIP) was led by the Aymara Felipe Quispe, who was also known 
as “El Mallku”. Quispe was also the leader of the Confederation Sindical Unica de 
Trabajadores Campesinos de Bolivia (Single Union Confederation o f Bolivian Peasant 
Workers, CSUTCB), which had been a protagonist in the social protests during the 
Banzer government.
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Coalition-building. The negotiations to establish a coalition turned out to be rather 
lengthy and complicated. Though for a while it looked as if the MNR could reach an 
agreement with the NFR, this party ultimately refused to enter into a coalition with 
Sanchez de Lozada. Since the MAS kept its own claim to the presidency, the only 
possible partner remaining was the MIR. This put the party of Jaime Paz Zamora in 
quite a strong negotiation position and it managed to gain a high share of government 
positions in exchange for entering the coalition: six ministers, four governors (out of 
nine in total), and the Presidency of the Chamber of Deputies {Fundacion Milenio, 
2003:31). The agreement reached between the MNR and MIR -  called the “Government 
of National Responsibility” -  was announced on the 25th of July, just ten days before the 
elections in the Congress. While some analysts considered the entry of the MIR into the 
coalition as the result of some tactical manoeuvring of Paz Zamora to make the MNR -  
NFR alliance fail {Fundacion Milenio, 2003:31); the MIR leader himself asserted that 
they had entered the pact against their will and that the USA pressured his party to 
support the government of Sanchez de Lozada:
“They told us, ‘Jaime, the USA has only two lists, one o f enemies and one offriends. On 
which side does the MIR want to be, on the friends ’ or the enemies' one? ’ ‘On the side 
o f the friends, o f course. ' ‘Well then, the government o f Goni ’, who was one o f them, ‘is 
strategic for us. ' In a conference we had decided not to enter... When I had to announce 
that we would enter I  said in front o f Goni and Mesa how difficult it was to love Bolivia 
under certain circumstances. ” (Paz Zamora, interview, 19.5.2004)
Paz Zamora thus explained why he entered this coalition in a rather dramatic style and 
made the USA responsible for this step. While there is evidence that the USA had 
indeed intervened through its Ambassador Rocha (Gamarra, 2003:314) and while they 
certainly had an interest to prevent Evo Morales from coming to power, it is unlikely 
that the MIR entered the ruling coalition fully against its will. Blaming someone else 
may have been a way to distract from accusations that the MIR was joining the 
government in order to receive patronage spoils. This, however, was widely considered 
as the MIR’s main motivation to join the coalition and Fernando Romero, who worked 
together with Sanchez de Lozada in the economic team during Paz Estenssoro’s 
government, maintained that the ruling coalition “was a political chaos, it was strictly 
fo r reasons o f convenience and not o f convictions” (F. Romero, interview, 25.5.2004). 
The UCS became the third member of the coalition. Making use of the fact that the 
MNR was dependent on their votes, they threatened not to enter the coalition thereby 
trying to achieve a higher share of patronage. The UCS ultimately received: the 
Ministry of Justice, the lower chamber’s Commission for Human Development, the
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Vice-ministry of Alternative Education, and two embassies {Fundacion Milenio, 
2003:37). Having thus achieved the support of the MIR and the UCS, Sanchez de 
Lozada was elected President on the 5th of August with 84 of the votes in his favour, 43 
went to the second placed Evo Morales (PDBA, 2002).
A coalition that was started by the coalition partner MIR saying that it is difficult to 
love Bolivia when one had to enter a coalition with Sanchez de Lozada was bound to 
face difficulties. Given an apparent lack of common ground as regards necessary policy 
measures, already by September internal problems within the coalition appeared and the 
media termed the government as “a marriage o f separate beds ” {Fundacion Milenio, 
2003:32).
Policies. Sanchez de Lozada’s election campaign in 2002 had four main pillars: 
overcoming the economic crisis, fighting corruption, combating social exclusion, and, 
most prominently, “obras con empleos” (public works with jobs). The MNR’s 
campaign platform stressed the severe economic crisis the country was currently 
experiencing, and proposed an “Emergency Plan” as a remedy, which entailed the 
following proposals: implementing measures to reactivate the economy, introducing 
social policies, deepening the process of institutionalisation, modernisation and 
increasing transparency of the state. It proposed, furthermore, to restore the regulatory 
character of the state -  while the market would assure efficiency, the state was to 
guarantee social justice and solidarity (Zegada, 2002:69). This rather social democratic 
discourse represented indirectly signalling to the electorate that he would introduce 
policies different from those introduced during his presidency in 1993 to 1997, where 
he had in fact reduced the regulatory role of the state, to the strong disapproval of large 
sectors of the electorate. As he had in the 1993 election campaign, he again promised to 
lower taxes.
On coming to office President Sanchez de Lozada announced the introduction of a 
“Plan Bolivia” which was mainly aimed at creating jobs but also at restructuring the 
financial and corporate sectors. In order to avoid the tumultuous state-society relations 
experienced by his predecessor he set up commissions with various opposition groups 
such as coca growers, landless farmers or miners. Only two significant pieces of 
legislation were introduced during the first half year of the government: in November 
the re-introduction of the BONOSOL (see Chapter 3.8); and a law for the provision of 
free healthcare for pregnant women and children under the age of five {Leyes 2427 +
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2426, 28.11.; 21.11.2002). Given the degree of in-fighting prevalent within the ruling 
coalition agreeing on economic measures was difficult and no other significant reforms 
were introduced during the second government of Sanchez de Lozada.
The Attempt to Introduce an Income Tax: February 2003
“It was terribly badly managed. I f  someone wanted to manage something very badly I  
think they could not do it as well as they did in this case. ”, was the evaluation of 
entrepreneur Doria Medina on the government’s attempt to introduce a Personal Income 
Tax in February 2003 (Doria Medina, interview, 25.5.2004). Soon after coming to 
power the government started to discuss possible changes to the tax system, as a way to 
bring down the fiscal deficit from 8 to 5 per cent, which amounted to US$240 million. 
This reduction also formed part of an agreement the government had reached with the 
IMF {La Razon, 30.1.2003). Different ideas were discussed, among them the 
introduction of a tax on Cable TV and mobile telephoning. Between November and 
January, however, the deliberations circled mainly around the introduction of an income 
tax and frequent meetings between the President, the Minister of Finance, Javier 
Comboni, and the Vice-minister of Tax Politics, Fernando Cossio, on this issue took 
place (Cossio, interview, 10.5.2004). Ultimately, the executive decided for the 
following tax measure, which was announced by President Sanchez de Lozada via 
national television on 9 February, 2003:
a) VAT and Transactions Tax. Lowering the VAT to 12.5 per cent (from 13 per cent) 
and the Transactions Tax to 2.5 per cent (from 3 per cent)
b) Personal Income Tax alias Changing the Complementary tax to the VAT. Previously 
this withholding tax charged at the same rate as the VAT on all income could be offset 
on the presentation of invoices. This system of collecting invoices was now to be 
abolished and people were to pay 12.5 per cent on their incomes -  with a tax-free 
threshold of BOB880.
These proposals were sent together with the budget for the year 2003 which entailed a 
10 per cent budget cut in spending on the executive, the legislature and the judiciary. 
They also provided for some salary increases -  depending on the sector between 2 and 8 
per cent which were generally considered as very low -  and also stated that the budget 
of universities would not be increased. The government stressed that the proposal would 
not entail the introduction of new taxes {La Razon, 7.2.2003). While this was 
technically true, the elimination of the mechanism to reclaim the tax paid, in practice 
meant the introduction of an income tax (though disguised under the name 
complementary tax to the VAT). It was to be different from traditional income taxes
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though, as it did not allow any of the usual deductions to that tax, for example, for size 
of the family etc. Given the absence of these deductions, the Bolivian version of the tax 
on income was set at a lower rate than usually (12.5 per cent). To defend the measure, 
the executive referred to the unsustainable fiscal deficit; the changes to the taxes were 
expected to raise US$90 million in additional income for the state {La Prensa,
10.2.2003). They also argued that changing the mechanisms of the Complementary Tax 
to the VAT would correct a dysfunctional system:
“The issue o f offsetting the taxes by presenting invoices is a national scandal, everyone 
produces their own bills. To avoid that this kind o f phenomenon continues to happen we 
will attack this issue. " {El Deber, 31.1.2003)
The high degree of fraud with invoices is widely known within Bolivia, according to 
constitutional expert Urioste even a whole “industry o f false invoices " exists (Urioste, 
interview, 11.5.2004). Several commentators on the reform, however, for example the 
former Vice-minister of Tax Politics Machicado (1997-2002), considered that the 
system should be kept anyway since it provided people an incentive to ask for invoices 
and thus ensured the payment of VAT. Consequently, it would be better to attempt 
limiting the falsification of bills (Machicado, interview, 25.5.2004). Yet no matter how 
hard the government tried to justify the announced tax measure, the negative reaction 
from all parts of the Bolivian society was unanimous and immediate.
Opposition to the Reform
Political parties. All opposition parties rejected the reform; the most outspoken among 
them the MAS and its leader Evo Morales:
“It is not possible that the crisis is solved by an (impuestazo ’ on the Bolivian people. 
Our members will be here permanently so that we can jointly organise mobilisations 
against this ‘impuestazo ’. ” {La Prensa, 10.2.2003)
“Impuestazo” was to become the word for this attempt of the government to introduce a 
Personal Income Tax and has the connotation of something being imposed by the 
President. It is leaned on the term “gasolinazo” used when governments increased petrol 
prices. While presidents have the power to introduce petrol price hikes simply by decree 
and can thus really impose it, tax reforms have to be approved by the legislature and an 
“impuestazo” as it is commonly understood is hence not possible. Given, however, that 
the tax reform announced by President Sanchez de Lozada was widely perceived by the 
population as a measure already decided upon rather than a proposal, the term
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“impuestazo” came to denote not only opposition to the income tax but also against 
government practices.
The MAS announced that it would carry out its opposition both within the Congress and 
on the streets and started mobilising its supporters {La Razon, 11.2.2003). Together with 
its criticism of the potential income tax, the party publicised its own proposal: petrol 
companies should pay 50 per cent royalties instead. The next biggest opposition party in 
Parliament, the NFR, had a similar alternative proposal, suggesting that the taxes levied 
on the petrol sector rise to 50 per cent but also that more effort should be made to 
uncover tax evaders. NFR leaders complained about the “incapacity” of the government 
and announced their resistance to the tax reform in the legislature and -  if unsuccessful 
there -  that they would also call its supporters to carry out civil disobedience {La Razon,
10.2.+11.2.2003). The smaller opposition parties in Congress equally spoke out against 
the initiative of the executive, as did the MIP whose leader, Felipe Quispe, called for 
mobilisations {La Razon, 11.2.2003). Two days after the President Sanchez de Lozada 
had aired the tax bill on TV, the opposition parties -  MAS, NFR, MIP, and PS -  
declared that they would call the ministers involved in formulating the bill to a vote of
Oftcensure. While the rejection of presidential initiatives is a usual move on the side of 
the opposition parties, the fact that several of them did not restrict their protest to the 
legislative space and instead mobilised their supporters for street protests represented a 
rather new phenomenon in Bolivian politics. Equally unusual, and more precarious for 
Sanchez de Lozada, was that his coalition partner MIR also publicly challenged the 
proposed tax reform {La Razon, 12.2.2003).
Private sector opposition. Various business organisations started questioning the 
announced tax reform soon after it was made public. The CEPB’s President, Carlos 
Calvo, criticised:
“I  consider it a real shame that the government, under the influence o f the IMF, opted 
for diminishing the economy by pro-cyclical measures which will intensify recession 
and unemployment. This ‘impuestazo ’ imposed on the population, apart from  
considering it unjust, will mean that consumption, investment, and sales will decline 
and create higher unemployment. ” {La Razon, 10.2.2003)
The CEPB called on the government to withdraw its plans and convened an emergency 
meeting of its members the day after the measure was announced; by day two of the
98 The ministers in question were: Oscar Farfan, the Minister of Economic Development; Javier Comboni, 
Minister of Finance; Jos6 Guillermo Justiniano, Minister of Sustainable Development; Juan Carlos 
Virreira, Minister of Foreign Trade (La Razon, 12.2.2003).
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publication of the government’s plans, the CEPB had orchestrated a media campaign 
and had placed one-page advertisements in Bolivia’s main newspapers criticising the 
mismanagement of the country’s public finances and calling for discarding the 
economic measures put forward {La Razon, 11.2.2003). Other private sector groups 
were equally alerted and assessed the proposal negatively, as did the Santa Cruz based 
CAINCO which expected informality to rise in consequence to the introduction of an 
income tax {La Razon, 10.2.2003), an argument which was also presented by the CNI. 
Its President, Roberto Mustafa, considered that the elimination of the system to present 
invoices would augment illegal trade, evasion and smuggling and generally complained 
that those who always paid their taxes would once again be punished {La Razon,
11.2.2003). Other private sector organisations -  such as the Asociacion de Bancos 
Privados (Association of Private Banks, ASOBAN), the Federacion de Empresarios 
Privados de La Paz (Federation of Private Entrepreneurs of La Paz, FEPLP) or the 
Camara Departamental de Exportadores (Departmental Chamber of Exporters, 
CADEX) -  joined in the protest and recommended to improve the administration of 
existing taxes as an alternative to creating new tax burdens. Analysts and experts in the 
field mainly criticised the design of the tax: Alberto Machicado, who was Vice-minister 
of Tax Politics for several years (1997-2002), considered that the executive should have 
opted for smaller, but progressive tax rates (Machicado, interview, 25.5.2004); 
Napoleon Pacheco of the Fundacion Milenio held that the base line of BOB880 was too 
low and that it would be better to tax only those earning more than BOB3,000 or 4,000 
(Pacheco, interview, 5.5.2004).
Trade unions and other sectors. The reaction from the trade unions, principally the 
COB, was equally swift and uncompromising. Satumino Mallku, Executive Secretary of 
the COB, made a public statement saying:
"The income tax affects the great mass o f workers who have a salary between BOB800 
and 2,500. 80 per cent will suffer the consequences o f  this tax... Again economic, 
political, and social responsibility is burdened on the worker's shoulders. We don’t 
have an alternative to taking protest measures. " {La Razon, 10.2.2003)
In a direct response to the TV message of Sanchez de Lozada, the COB sent a letter to 
the President asking him to stop the implementation of the economic measures and 
announced a national strike for the 13th of February {La Prensa, 10.2.2003). The plan to 
hold a 24 hour strike on that date won more and more supporters as other sectors 
promised to join in and organise demonstrations to force the government to withdraw 
the “impuestazo" {La Razon, 11.2.2003). Two days after the tax measure was
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publicised the Federation of Universities of Bolivia held an extraordinary Congress 
during which they rejected the income tax, declared a state of emergency for the 
universities, and organised mobilisations. Their protest, however, was not purely aimed 
at the tax increase but also against the government’s refusal to increase the funds for 
higher education in the budget presented. The powerful CSUTCB led by Felipe Quispe 
proclaimed that while they did not see themselves affected by the measures they would 
join in the mobilisations together with the other sectors of society. Altogether a wide 
range of other organisations and sectors joined in the rejection of the government’s 
plans, including the Bolivian Society of Engineers, the Association of Lawyers, the 
health workers, the teachers’ union and the Association of Economists {La Razon,
11.2.+12.2.2003).
The events of 12 and 13 February. Police mutiny. While the diverse sectors of 
Bolivian society thus started to mobilise against the measure, the protest turned into a 
state crisis when the Bolivian police went into mutiny three days after Sanchez de 
Lozada announced his economic plans on TV. The police had demanded a salary 
increase for a while, however, the budget that was sent together with the tax measure 
provided that their salaries would only be increased by 2.2 per cent. This was less than 
the increase for the other sectors and even below the previous year’s inflation rate of 2.3 
per cent {La Razon, 10.2.2003). In the morning of the 11th of February some police units 
in La Paz did not take up their work and the actual mutiny was launched at 14.00 by the 
Grupo Especial de Seguridad (Special Security Group, GES).99 “The salary we earn is 
a misery and the 'impuestazo' affects the whole population ”, maintained a mutinous 
policeman {La Prensa, 12.2.2003).100 The police’s demand was a 40 per cent (later 50 
per cent) increase of their salaries as well as the withdrawal of the income tax.101 Within 
hours other police units, mainly in La Paz but also in other parts of the country, joined 
the mutiny. The capital and other parts of the country remained without police vigilance 
and in the evening of the 11th, government officials started negotiating with the police.
99 The GES has around 450 members and is Bolivia’s best trained police unit. Its tasks include: to 
reestablish public order when necessary; to protect the legislative palace and other public institutions; and 
to assume counterterrorist functions. It is based around the comer from the presidential palace and 
Bolivian Congress and by going on strike neglected their duty to protect these buildings. The GES had 
already been the principal force behind a police mutiny in 2000 during the government of Banzer, which 
resulted in the government granting a 50 per cent salary increase to the police {La Razon, 12.2.2003:C3).
100 A lower rank police officer was earning BOB800 per month, a sub-lieutenant BOB 1,000 and 1,200, 
sergeants and lieutenants BOB 1,500 {La Razon, 12.2.2003).
101 These were the principal demands though a long list of other things was made, as, for example, claims 
for food vouchers. For the list and more information on the police mutiny, see: Fundacion Milenio, 
2003:70-74.
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According to the Fundacion Milenio the government gave in to 70 per cent of the 
police’s demands -  apart from the one to withdraw the tax measure -  in the course of 
that night (Fundacion Milenio, 2003:72). However, the police units did not accept this 
agreement as they insisted in the rejection of the “impuestazo” and the mutiny 
continued. Napoleon Pacheco evaluated the police mutiny as follows:
“The position o f the Sanchez de Lozada government was completely wrong because he 
stated that he would not negotiate with the police under pressure. But the measures o f  
pressure o f the police were extended, more units joined in the strike and obviously in 
this context -  which was at two or three days after the creation o f the income tax was 
issued -  this acted like a kind o f catalyst for the protest because the rebelling police 
affirmed in their discourse that they opposed the creation o f new taxes against the 
people and obviously this discourse spread out. ” (Pacheco, interview, 5.5.2004)
The next day, the 12th of February, events in La Paz accelerated. In the morning 
students of a nearby high school (Colegio Ayacucho) gathered on La Paz’s main square, 
the Plaza Murillo. Protesting against the government’s measures they threw stones 
against the main government building and thereby marked the beginning of a conflict 
that would turn out to be violent. Members of the GES also assembled on the Plaza 
Murillo and fired tear gas on government buildings, for the protection of which they 
were originally hired. At 11.00 President Sanchez de Lozada called in the army to 
restore order and to protect public buildings. With the army present on the Plaza Murillo 
confrontations between them and the police occurred during the following hours and 10 
policemen and four soldiers were killed.102 More and more civilians gathered in La 
Paz’s city centre to protest against the government’s plans. At 16.00, at the peak of the 
conflict, President Sanchez de Lozada gave a message on the national television, in 
which he called for an end of the conflict and announced the withdrawal of the tax bill. 
Ironically, it was on this day that the executive’s proposal for the new tax legislation 
had reached the legislature. As Alvaro Villegas, who was part of the economic team 
developing the tax reform, narrated they had been in the process of presenting the bill to 
the legislature when they were overtaken by the events outside the legislative palace:
“The day that we first discussed in the Senate and in the specific commissions about 
these issues — ... in the moment we were explaining someone knocks on the door asking 
us to vacate the building as they were surrounding the Palace. ” (Villegas, interview,
28.5.2004)
Though the trigger of the conflict was thus withdrawn, the protests and mutiny 
continued until an agreement with the police -  including a 50 per cent salary increase -
102 Resentments between police and military are based in Bolivia’s history as during thel952 revolution 
the army defended the incumbents of the regime while the police supported the MNR-led revolution.
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was reached the next day (for an overview of the events of the 12th and 13th o f February 
see Table 5.4).
Table 5.4: Chronology of the ‘Impuestazo’, February 2003
9  P resident Sanchez de Lozada a n n o u n c es  th e
F e b r u a r y  in troduction  of a  Personal Incom e Tax on TV.
10 W idespread m obilisations a g a in s t the  “impuestazo”
F e b r u a r y  begin.
11 A police u n it in  La Paz re fu ses  to go o u t on s tre e t
F e b r u a r y  patrols.
14.00 Police un it, GES, goes in to  m utiny , o th er u n its  follow. 
The police dem and  the  w ithdraw al of th e  incom e ta x  
an d  a  50% increase in  the ir sa la ries . La Paz rem ains  
w ithou t police vigilance.
19.00 G overnm ent s ta r ts  negotiations w ith  police.
12
F e b r u a r y
13
F e b r u a r y
Executive’s tax  project received by C ongress.
10.00 S tu d en ts  assem ble on Plaza M urillo an d  th row  stones a t 
governm ent palace. GES fires te a r  gas a t th e  building.
11.00 P residen t calls in  the  arm y to in tervene an d  tak e  control 
of Plaza M urillo. D uring th e  following h o u rs  
confron tations betw een the  m ilitary  and  th e  police a n d  
p ro teste rs  occur. 10 policem en an d  4 so ld iers a re  sho t.
16.00 In a  television m essage P resid en t S anchez  de Lozada 
w ithdraw s the  tax  m easu re  in  a n  a ttem p t to pacify th e  
situa tion .
from Public bu ild ings -  as  the  M inistry  of Labour, the  Vice-
17.00 presidency, the  M inistry of S u s ta in ab le  D evelopm ent, 
and  the  party  head q u arte rs  of th e  MNR, MIR an d  UCS -  
are  looted and  b u rn ed  by civilian p ro tes te rs .
D uring the  n igh t -  fu rther looting a n d  vandalism  occu rs  
-  of shops, a  beer brew ery a n d  o th e r b u s in e ss  prem ises.
P ro tests organised by the COB; su p p o rte rs  of political 
parties  MAS, PS and  NFR jo in  in, M iners’ U nion a n d  
o ther secto rs of civil society. Calls for resignation  of 
Sanchez de Lozada. In confron tations several civilians 
are  shot, m any  in jured. Later on th e  governm ent w ould 
be accused  of having placed sn ipers . F u r th e r  looting 
an d  ac ts  of vandalism  occur, m ain ly  in  El Alto.
16.00 Police accep ts agreem ent w ith  governm ent an d  tak es  u p  
its  w ork again. The s itu a tio n  in  La Paz a n d  o ther p a r ts  
of th e  coun try  goes back  to norm al.
33 people die and  ca. 200 a re  in ju red  on 12 + 13 
February .
Source: Own elaboration.
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Why the Reform Failed
The planned tax measure was withdrawn by Sanchez de Lozada in consequence of a 
police mutiny and a popular uprising. At that time the bill had barely reached the 
institutional level, as on that day the executive’s proposal had just arrived at Congress 
and was about to be discussed. At least as regards tax reforms this course of events was 
unprecedented since the beginning of political stability in Bolivia in 1985. Why did the 
attempt to introduce an income tax in February 2003 fail, and what triggered the popular 
uprising against the measure?
Communication (or lack thereof). As several interview partners pointed out there 
were serious problems of communication concerning the proposed income tax reform 
on the side of the government as well as bad management (Interviews: Antelo, Blanco, 
Cariaga, Cossio, Doria Medina, Machicado, Millares, Morales, Munoz, Talavera, 
Villegas, for dates see Appendix B). The influential entrepreneur and one of the main 
heads of the MIR, Samuel Doria Medina103, referred to the mixed messages coming 
from the government during the months preceding February:
“In September they informed us that they would increase taxes; in October they said we 
will not raise taxes but we will tax phone calls and mobile phones; in November they 
said something else -  they changed permanently. ” (Doria Medina, interview,
25.5.2004)
The government took quite a long time to develop the tax legislation with which they 
hoped to limit the fiscal deficit; they also gave ambiguous signals to society about the 
reforms planned. Only a few days before the planned tax changes were announced, the 
Minister of Finance, Javier Comboni, publicly stated on the 3rd of February that no tax 
on salaries would be levied (Opinion, 5.2.2003). According to Central Bank President 
Morales the government made a mistake by denying that this reform would be 
introduced: “The government communicated its intentions very badly. Firstly, it denied 
that this tax was going to happen, and afterwards they released it, so the population felt 
deceived. ” (Morales, interview, 24.5.2004)
Once the executive managed to come to an agreement about the tax bill, this 
inconsistent course was not rectified by a coherent attempt to convince the other 
political parties, interest groups and the wider population about the reform’s advantages. 
On the contrary, after President Sanchez de Lozada announced the measure on TV, few
103 After a conflict with Paz Zamora, Doria Medina left the MIR in late 2003 and set up his own party, the 
Unidad Nacional (UN). He is one of the main candidates for the presidential elections in December 2005.
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further explanations were offered and those given were often confusing. Even the 
person responsible for the reform, Vice-minister of Tax Politics Fernando Cossio, 
admitted that there was a lot of misinformation; and former Minister of Finance, Edgar 
Millares, claimed that the vice-ministers had tried to confuse the people (Cossio; 
Millares, interviews, 10.5.+29.4.2004). In the weeks prior to the announcement the 
government had repeatedly stressed that any proposed reform would make those who 
“earned more, pay more”. From these declarations it was to be expected that the 
government would come up with a highly progressive tax. In his televised message, 
Sanchez de Lozada emphasised again that “it would be a tax which affects those who 
have a higher income” {La Razon, 11.2.2003). In fact, however, the proposal was to put 
a flat rate of 12.5 per cent on all salaries regardless of their level. Additionally, this flat 
rate did not represent an altogether regressive form of taxation given the provision that 
the amount of two minimum salaries was to be deducted before any payments. Thus, the 
effective rate would actually be less than 12.5 per cent and would depend on salary level. 
For example, someone who earned BOB 1,000 would deduct BOB880 and then pay 12.5 
per cent on the remaining BOB 120; someone earning BOB5,000 would pay 12.5 per 
cent on BOB4,120; thus the higher the salary the less the deduction of two minimum 
salaries would make a difference and the closer to an effective rate of 12.5 per cent the 
taxation would get. Given this mechanism the tax on income was “slightly progressive”. 
The explanations given and media presentation led to a great deal of confusion about the 
nature of this tax. As Eduardo Antelo, previously Vice-Minister of the Treasury, pointed 
out:
“In the moment when it was presented, came out in the press and was explained in the 
form o f calculations so that every person could calculate how much tax they would be 
paying, they put what you earn in the first column, deduced the two minimum salaries in 
the second column and in the third column the same rate was applied, so it appeared as 
i f  everyone paid the same tax, the one who earned BOB1,000 or the one who earned 
BOB20.000. So it was not something very intuitive and the people said that this is not 
what the President is saying... the headlines o f many newspapers said that the 
government is lying. ” (Antelo, interview, 24.5.2004)
Minimum salaries. This apparent contradiction in the government’s “taxing the rich” 
discourse was aggravated by the decision to tax anyone earning more than two 
minimum salaries, equalling the amount of BOB880 (ca. US$117). By contrast, the 
current version of the “Complementary Tax” to the VAT allowed for an exemption of 
four minimum salaries. As was explained later on, and confirmed by several people 
involved in the creation of the tax bill, the government considered the proposal of two 
minimum salaries only as a starting position for the negotiation in the Congress, where
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they expected to have this exemption raised to at least four minimum salaries (Cossio; 
Villegas; Otalora; Talavera, interviews, 10.5.+28.5.+12.5.+20.5.2004).
“The President took the additional decision to enter with the position o f two minimum 
salaries so that in the Congress he could concede up to five minimum salaries and thus 
leave teachers and police outside. This was his real stance but in the culture ofpolitical 
negotiation, with the experience o f the President i f  he would enter with a proposal o f 
five it would be increased to ten, so he entered with a proposal o f two... It never 
reached the Congress and the story was over... The approach o f the President is 
understandable; it had, however, a devastating effect as the people believed that it 
would really be two minimum salaries, which is very tough. ” (Gray-Molina, interview,
7.5.2004)
Gray-Molina, who was involved in setting up the tax reform as the head of the 
governmental think tank UDAPE, also reported that the original proposal contained a 
higher number of minimum salaries and also a differentiated tax rate (thus being more 
progressive). According to his account, the original proposal was then changed by the 
President, the Minister of Finance, and the Vice-minister of Tax Politics (Gray-Molina, 
interview, 7.5.2004). In retrospect these changes can only be considered as a significant 
political mistake, which raised the level of resistance against the measure. A tax with 
differentiated rates, levied on those earning an amount equal to a higher number of 
minimum salaries, might have led to a less severe reaction in the population. Given the 
proposal put forward by the government, however, it was perceived as an unjust tax that 
would affect the great majority of people instead of being a form of “taxing the rich” as 
the President had announced.
Simultaneity of budget and tax reform. While the failures in communicating and 
conceptualising the tax bill played an important role in triggering the massive protests, 
other factors had an equally negative influence. The tax legislation was put forward by 
the government at the same time as the budget for 2003. Eduardo Antelo considered this 
as contributing to the situation that was to evolve:
“You had political fronts opened with all sectors that somehow depend on the state ... 
you were in fact in a difficult process o f negotiation about this (the salary increase, SL) 
and additionally you were reducing their salary levels because you were putting a tax 
on them. “ (Antelo, interview, 24.5.2004)
The presentation of the annual budget and particularly the provisions for salary rises are 
traditionally contentious. In the case of the budget presented in February 2003, the 
increase in salaries was very low and left many sectors dissatisfied. In fact, it was this 
issue which apparently made the police decide to go into mutiny, which in turn 
triggered the events of the 12th and 13th of February. The provisions for the budget
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opened political fronts with other sectors as well: for example, the universities heavily 
opposed the decision not to increase their budget line yet simultaneously called for the 
withdrawal of the tax proposal. While sending the tax bill together with the budget thus 
seems to have been a mistake, the simultaneity argument has its limits given that many 
of the previous tax reforms were sent together with the budget and introduced 
successfully.
Recession. Another aspect often considered as dooming the tax reform attempt to 
failure was the economic situation in Bolivia. Former Minister of Finance, Fernando 
Candia, stated:
‘Tom don *t do this in times o f crisis, no one charges taxes in crisis, no one increases 
taxes in crisis, and no one creates new taxes in crisis and I  believe that this has been the 
main error in February. The state evidently needed funds -  that is undeniable. However, 
the economy was and still is so depressed that charging an additional tax was simply 
putting a powder keg on fire, it was going to burst in any case, so it was something very 
foolish. ” (Candia, interview, 6.5.2004)
The strong reaction of society against the government’s attempt to implement an 
income tax in February 2003 was exacerbated by economic recession. Apart from the 
political difficulties, several commentators also condemned the measure on technical 
grounds: charging taxes during recession would lower consumption and savings, which 
in turn would aggravate the recession further (Candia, interview, 6.5.2004).
Inexperienced ministers. Several interview partners also considered that President 
Sanchez de Lozada had made a mistake in the choice of his ministers. Entrepreneur 
Doria Medina said:
“They had a Vice-minister o f Tax Politics who was very young and without any 
experience ... Cossio with all his inexperience carried out this wrong project, badly 
done, badly explained, so it did not work because they had done badly. " (Doria Medina, 
interview, 25.5.2004)
One apparent mistake was a largely technocratic approach to the tax reform which took 
little account of its political feasibility. Fernando Cossio, Vice-minister of Tax Politics, 
described the tax bill they put together: “It would have made the Bolivian tax system 
like a text book... with the President we wanted to get an absolutely pure law. ” (Cossio, 
interview, 10.5.2004). This comment makes clear that Cossio had previously not 
considered the political aspects, but focused on technical criteria. He did not consider 
that a piece of legislation -  though possibly technically perfect -  might ultimately not 
go through. Ministerial lack of experience might therefore have contributed both to
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conceptual mistakes of the tax reform, and the failures in communicating and explaining 
the reform after its announcement. Ultimately, however, launching the bill was the 
decision of Sanchez de Lozada so the strategic mistakes involved were mainly his 
responsibility.
Mistakes of S&nchez de Lozada and weak coalition. Given the failures outlined it 
remains to be asked why Sanchez de Lozada did not anticipate the massive opposition 
this tax bill would trigger. Between 1993 and 1997 he had governed next to 
unchallenged and had introduced several major economic policies. The Bolivian 
economist Cariaga considered that "Sanchez de Lozada believed that he could do as he 
liked, as he had done during his previous government and he met with a lot o f  
resistance” (Cariaga, interview, 21.5.2004). On coming to power Sanchez de Lozada 
put a lot of energy into forming a coalition, which was fragile from the start, however. 
Relations between the MIR leader Paz Zamora and Sanchez de Lozada had been quite 
conflictive and the two parties rarely managed to reach consensus on economic policies. 
In the case of the tax reform undertaken, Sanchez de Lozada had apparently not reached 
a proper consensus with his coalition partners. Paz Zamora claimed that their opinions 
were not taken into account (Paz Zamora, interview, 19.5.2004). In the course of the 
conflict the MIR distanced itself from the initiative signalling that not even the coalition 
partner of the ruling party agreed to the proposed tax reform. This meant that the tax 
measure appeared as a purely executive-led initiative with next to no supporters within 
the Congress. Jaques Trigo, finance minister during the previous government, 
considered that Sanchez de Lozada made a mistake in not negotiating the tax measure:
“The error that Sanchez de Lozada made was his failure to negotiate the so-called 
‘impuestazo’... in the Congress. I  think he should have negotiated first in the Chamber 
o f Deputies or with the political parties, including the MAS, and in the Senate... and 
only then launch the ‘impuestazo’ so that the ‘impuestazo’ could be ... an initiative o f  
the Congress instead o f being an initiative o f the executive. So this was a political 
mistake because the truth is that you cannot pass any law, less so one o f taxation or the 
like, i f  it is not negotiated with the Congress. I f  you have no ally in the Congress the law 
does not pass. ” (Trigo, interview, 20.5.2004)
Apparently the measure was not even fully supported by the ruling party MNR itself, 
which asked for modifications and an internal argument evolved. During the two-day 
conflict it was reported that the majority of the MNR’s legislators wanted to have all 
ministers related to the economic team responsible for the reform leave the cabinet {La 
Razon, 13.2.2003 :A22).
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In addition, introducing this tax meant breaking an explicit electoral campaign promise 
to lower taxes. Sanchez de Lozada had already failed to keep the same promise when he 
came to power in 1993; during his presidency he did not reduce any taxes and even 
increased some (for example, the transactions tax). Lozada’s second U-turn made the 
population even more reluctant to accept the measure.
Legitimacy. When winning the elections, Sanchez de Lozada was only supported by 
about one-fifth (22 per cent) of the population, hardly a strong mandate to govern. He 
was rejected by large sectors of society who were highly critical of his previous period 
of government 1993 -  1997. Accordingly Fernando Romero, who was with Sanchez de 
Lozada on the team to develop decree 21060, maintained that the conflict of February 
2003 came about for the following reasons:
"I  think this was used by the anti-Sanchez de Lozada movements. I  think that this is also 
strongly linked to the enormous weakness and fragility and the enormous concept o f  
favours with which Sanchez de Lozada established his coalition during his second 
government... The forces against President Sanchez de Lozada were desperate, as from  
February the intention was to make Sanchez de Lozada leave, he had no legitimacy and 
a very low support o f 22 per cent o f the vote. ” (F. Romero, interview, 25.5.2004)
Since the day of the election then, the government lacked legitimacy within Bolivian 
society and the events of February 2003 also expressed a larger social discontent with 
the Sanchez de Lozada government. Tax Superintendent Ramiro Cabezas described the 
attempted tax reform as “the last straw to break the camel's back" (Cabezas, interview,
29.4.2004), which made large sectors of society express their opposition to the measure 
and to the government on the streets.
External influence. Within Bolivia there was a widespread belief that the attempt to 
introduce an income tax was something that the IMF had tried to impose; statements 
like the one of Satumino Mallku of the COB saying that “the government is carrying 
out the recommendations and impositions o f the IM F" expressed a common evaluation 
of the situation (La Razon, 10.2.2003:12). During the first months of the Sanchez de 
Lozada government negotiations with the IMF about a credit package were undertaken 
and almost finalised at the end of January 2003, which would have allowed Bolivia to 
receive credits of about US$4 billion from the World Bank, the IDB, and the 
Corporacion Andina de Fomento (Andean Development Corporation, CAF) under a 
three-year programme (La Razon, 10.1.+30.1.2003). The condition attached to the 
agreement was lowering the fiscal deficit from 8.5 per cent to 5.5 per cent (La Razon,
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22.3.2003).104 The decision to choose the income tax to reduce the deficit seems to have 
been an independent decision of the economic team of Sanchez de Lozada. Central 
Bank President Morales explained that “The recommendation o f the IMF is not about 
this tax, but about reducing the deficit. " (La Razon, 12.2.2003:C 11). And President 
Sanchez de Lozada mentioned in an interview that the policy advised by the IMF was to 
carry out a petrol price hike (La Razon, 11.2.2003:C6-7); finally, the IMF itself denied 
having proposed tax increases to the Bolivian government (La Razon, 15.2.2003:14). 
While some external pressure thus existed to undertake measures to lower the deficit, no 
specific policy recommendations were made and the tax reform proposed was 
developed by the government’s economic team. As many economic analysts pointed out 
the situation of such a high fiscal deficit was unsustainable, thus measures to reduce it 
would most likely have been undertaken even in the absence of an agreement with the 
IMF. What did play a role, however, was that much of the public perceived the 
government as blindly following the IMF’s recommendations, which further discredited 
the government and made the tax measure appear not really necessary.
Summary. The failure of the income tax due to popular protest can be explained by 
various factors: the government failed to communicate its proposal effectively and a 
strategic error was made by setting the exemption rate at two minimum salaries only. 
The timing of the reform represented a further difficulty: Bolivia was experiencing an 
economic recession and the tax bill was sent together with the annual budget which 
alone would have sparked significant opposition given the low salary increases it 
provided for. Furthermore, introducing any economic reform would have been difficult 
for Sanchez de Lozada given his lack of legitimacy and extremely fragile government 
coalition.
The Sanchez de Lozada Government after February. Though the calls for the 
President’s resignation became more and more widespread during the conflict, Sanchez 
de Lozada survived the events of February, though with his government severely 
weakened. In an opinion poll carried out after the February events, Sanchez de Lozada 
had a support rate of only 21 per cent (Fundacion Milenio, 2003:33). In August 2003 
the NFR of Manfred Reyes Villa became a member of the ruling coalition. The coalition 
of MNR, MIR and NFR provided President Sanchez de Lozada with a two thirds
104 After the events of the 12th and 13th of February the negotiations about the agreement were resumed 
and modifications introduced. The IMF agreed to soften the conditions and required a deficit reduction of 
only 2% instead of 3%. Ultimately, however, the programme was not implemented as the political 
upheavals of February and October 2003 made it unviable.
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majority in Congress -  105 out of the 157 seats (in both the upper and lower chamber) 
(EIU, October 2003:4). After joining the government NFR leader Reyes Villa saw his 
popularity rate fall to half its previous level (EIU, October 2003:13). Since it was 
foreseeable that joining an unpopular government would not go down well with NFR 
followers, the primary motivation to join obviously seemed being able to get hold of 
government spoils. At the end of the negotiations the NFR received three ministries 
(Labour, Sustainable Development, and Financial Services), and nine vice-ministries in 
exchange for their support of the Sanchez de Lozada government {La Razon, 6.8.2003). 
Only a few months after Sanchez de Lozada had reduced the size of the cabinet in 
March in order to reduce public spending105, these side-payments required an increase 
in the number of ministers from 13 to 15, several new vice-ministries and other 
positions were also established. When analysing the process of incorporating the NFR 
into the government, Juan Antonio Morales, President of the Central Bank, considered it 
as being dominated by the discussion about the distribution of positions:
“As a consequence o f February the government tried to extend its political base later 
and tried to incorporate other people, the NFR as well, but it lost so much time to 
discuss positions, who would go to which public office, and the economic crisis 
continued and thus it happened what happened in October. ” (Morales, interview,
24.5.2004)
Tax code.106 Soon after the NFR entered the coalition a new tax code was approved. 
The previous tax code had been valid since 1970 -  with a few changes being introduced 
during the government of Paz Zamora -  and was generally often considered too lenient 
on evaders (Munoz, interview, 11.5.2004). Already during the Banzer government a 
new tax code had been put forward. Former finance minister Herbert Muller reported 
this was not passed due to the opposition of the private sector and the main opposition 
party, the MNR (Muller, interview, 10.5.2004). Once in power, the MNR took on this 
project and ultimately introduced a tax code very similar to the one formulated by its 
predecessors (Machicado, interview, 25.5.2004). Opposition to the tax focussed on 
prison sentences for certain cases of tax evasion. This aspect was still opposed mainly 
by the private sector when the tax code was discussed in Congress in July 2003 and the 
government made some changes as a result. Apart from the private sector there was 
little awareness outside the Congress about the changes to the tax code undertaken. 
With the help of the votes of the MNR, MIR, NFR, UCS, and ADN -  the tax code was
105 The so called Ley LOPE, Ley de Organizacion del Poder Ejecutivo (Law of Organisation of the 
Executive Power), entailed a budget cut of 10% in the spending on the executive power. It restructured 
the executive and among other changes ministries were reduced from 16 to 13 (Ley 2446, 19.3.2003).
106 See definition in Section 5.1.
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approved in late July (Ley 2492, 2.8.2003). Its full implementation was delayed by 
several changes introduced during the government of Carlos Mesa from October. Some 
aspects of the code were softened, for example, the time scale for repaying tax debts 
was extended.
October 2003. The newly established ruling coalition did not last for very long. As of 
September 2003 a series of anti-government protests evolved, which -  according to 
John Crabtree (2005:101-2) -  were triggered by three main issues: a) in El Alto the 
mayor attempted to change local property tax administration. People feared that this 
administrative measure meant an increase in tax and mobilised against it ultimately 
forcing the mayor to withdraw the plans; b) in the Altiplano the peasant federation of 
Felipe Quispe organised road blockades in an attempt to make the government yield to a 
list of demands; c) thirdly, a huge demonstration took place in La Paz on the 19th of 
September where thousands of protesters voiced their rejection of the government’s 
plans to export gas and called for a referendum on the energy policy of the country. 
Discussions about what to do with the country’s large natural gas reserves had been 
going on for a while. A recent project proposal from a private sector company to export 
gas via a port in Chile to the USA -  which the government had not fully accepted yet 
but seemed to favour -  was perceived by the population as a done deal. It was heavily 
opposed by various social groups and led to the demonstration aimed to make the 
government rethink its plans.
This chain of events led to a gradually evolving protest movement unified by its joint 
rejection of Bolivian gas exports via Chile to the USA and by its opposition to the 
Sanchez de Lozada government. As the conflict intensified, the government called in 
the police and the army to bring the protests to an end. In the second week of October 
the confrontation escalated and 59 -  predominantly civilian -  people were killed. In the 
course of these events, the President gradually lost what had remained as his support 
base as coalition partner NFR withdrew and Vice-president Carlos Mesa distanced 
himself from the President and as even the urban middle class no longer backed his 
government. On the 17th of October Sanchez de Lozada resigned and went into exile to 
the USA after having been in power for only 14 months. In the evening of the same day 
the Congress accepted his resignation. As prescribed by the Constitution Vice-president 
Mesa was sworn in as Bolivia’s new President.
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5.3  T h e  G o v e r n m e n t  o f  M e s a  (2003-2005)
On coming to power President Mesa, a well-known television broadcaster and historian, 
promised to fulfil several demands that were voiced during the protests of the preceding 
weeks: he announced to hold a referendum on gas exports and to convene a constituent 
assembly to carry out political reforms. For the latter he established a congressional 
commission which would define the powers, scope and representation of the constituent 
assembly. In another attempt to distinguish himself from his predecessor’s government, 
Mesa also emphasised that he would govern without political parties. Napoleon Pacheco, 
Director of Fundacion Milenio, commented on this approach:
"The government o f Carlos Mesa is characterised by a disdain for the political system 
with the argument that the population is tired o f the politicians. And evidently a large 
part o f  the Bolivian population is tired o f the politicians because o f the corruption, 
because they don’t work, they don ‘t do their job as they should do. " (Pacheco, interview,
5.5.2004)
Being a political independent himself, Mesa broke with the model of the past and 
decided he would govern without a formal coalition in Congress. This way he distanced 
himself from the model of a coalition politics dominated by patronage in recent years 
and also from the traditional parties in general, which had become largely discredited 
within society. From the beginning Mesa enjoyed rather high popularity rates reaching 
67 per cent in November 2003 and holding at 60 per cent by July 2004 {Fundacion 
Milenio, 2004:33). Regarding policy initiatives, an important legislation of February 
2004 introduced constitutional amendments aimed at increasing popular participation 
within the democratic system. The bill’s principal changes were: a) the possibility to 
convene a referendum on controversial matters of national interest; b) the mechanism to 
convene a constituent assembly for proposing constitutional amendments; c) a right for 
the public to present legislative initiatives along with the executive and the legislature; 
d) the possibility for independent candidates and those of social movements to stand in 
general and municipal elections thus ending the monopoly of political parties (EIU, 
May 2004:13-14).
Referendum and hydrocarbons tax. By far the dominant policy issue on the agenda of 
the Mesa government was related to the referendum on gas exports and the related issue 
of a new hydrocarbons law. The referendum was convened for 18 July, 2004 and aimed 
to give the population a say in the government’s policies toward the hydrocarbons 
sector and the question of the gas exports. To test public opinion on these issues five 
questions were formulated, which were widely considered as being confusing and
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rigged towards eliciting the answer favoured by the government. The result was positive 
for President Mesa as an average of 77 per cent of the voters answered positively to the 
questions and the general turnout of around 60 per cent was rather high (EIU, August 
2004:7). John Crabtree described the results:
"On three o f the questions -  the repeal o f the existing hydrocarbons law, the assertion 
o f national ownership o f hydrocarbons at the wellhead and the strengthening ofYPFB -  
the "yes ” vote was well over 80 per cent On the two others -  the use o f gas to negotiate 
with Chile and the approval o f gas exports subject to meeting local industrial demand -  
the margin was lower, but well over half " (Crabtree, 2005:107).
While the referendum provided President Mesa with a certain mandate, translating this 
mandate into policies was still difficult since the questions were ambiguously 
formulated and open to interpretation and also any legislation -  referendum or no 
referendum -  required the approval of the Congress. Mesa put forward a proposal to 
reform the hydrocarbons law in February 2004: a “complementary” tax on the 
hydrocarbons sector (in addition to the 18 per cent royalty payment). This 
“complementary” hydrocarbons tax would incrementally raise taxes on oil fields: 
depending on their level of production they would pay up to 32 per cent of additional 
taxes. Though President Mesa hoped that the results of the referendum would provide 
him with enough backing to go ahead with introducing this legislation, the bill 
experienced considerable delays in Congress and led to a crisis of government in early 
2005. Several opposition parties -  principally the MAS -  blocked the introduction of 
the bill as they considered it far too lenient.
Mesa’s Attempt to Introduce a Tax Reform
Given that Mesa inherited a precarious fiscal situation from his predecessors, measures 
to either reduce spending or increase income had to be taken sooner or later and a few 
months after coming to power different ideas concerning a possible tax reform were 
circulated by the executive. The Minister of Finance, Javier Cuevas, for example, 
announced in early January that changes to the Complementary Tax on VAT were to be 
introduced {El Diario, 6.1.2004). During the following weeks several options were 
discussed, among them, for example, reimbursing those earning more than BOB4,000 
only 6.5 per cent of the 13 per cent withholding tax {El Diario, 13.1.2004). Other 
possibilities considered by the government were variations of this proposal. In the 
media comparisons were made to the "impuestazo” that Sanchez de Lozada tried to 
introduce in February 2003 (though in fact the proposals were rather different). After 
several weeks of discussion the government dismissed the idea in a press conference
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given by Finance Minister Cuevas (La Razon, 21.2.2004). Soon after the plan to tax 
income was given up, the government announced a completely new tax project:
a) a 1.5 per cent Net Property Tax on assets worth more than US$50,000, valid during 
2004
b) a 0.3 per cent Financial Transactions Tax on current and savings accounts in national 
or foreign currency, valid for two years (La Razon, 2.2.2004)
The Net Property Tax tax was to be a one-off tax charged on all houses, cars, holdings 
of shares and bonds; any private debts were to be deducted and only if the difference 
exceeded US$50,000 the 1.5 per cent would apply. According to Rosa Talavera, tax 
analyst of Price WaterhouseCoopers, the government had a dual agenda with this tax:
“The Net Property Tax was a tax with a double intention: the first was to collect 
something in order to alleviate the deficit; the second was to give the message that the 
problems would be resolved by taking into account the variable o f equity. ” (Talavera, 
interview, 20.5.2004)
Indeed, in his discourse President Mesa repeatedly stressed his aim of charging only 
those with high levels of income and to leave the poor unaffected (El Diario, 15.3.2004). 
As regards the Financial Transactions Tax (FTT), 0.3 per cent was to be charged on any 
transaction carried out on current and savings accounts -  be they held in dollars or 
bolivianos. Among economists a tax on financial transactions is usually greeted with 
little enthusiasm as it is considered to cause disintermediation in the banking system: 
people would avoid the tax by circumventing bank transfers, and in consequence 
collection of this tax would gradually decrease. The multilateral financial organisations 
generally reject any type of tax on financial transactions due to their distortionary 
effects. It therefore appears that external actors had no influence on the introduction of 
this reform.107 Former Minister of Finance, Fernando Candia, commented on the 
reasons why this tax was nevertheless introduced:
“In general it is a tax that is technically much discredited in the world... There are few  
places where the tax has worked. Thus, it has been a desperate measure given one could 
not charge anything else. ” (Candia, interview, 6.5.2004)
Candfa referred to experiences of other, mainly Latin American, countries with this tax. 
In Ecuador for example a tax on financial transactions was introduced in 1998 and
107 A document published by the IMF in 2001 summarised its position on this issue: “Bank debit taxes are 
not in principle an efficient source of revenue. Moreover, use of bank debit taxes as a long-term tool risks 
significant domestic disintermediation, which could be difficult to reverse even if and when the bank 
debit tax is revoked. In addition, the true cost of their introduction may be underestimated, particularly 
regarding their adverse impact on the yield of other major taxes if economic activity is driven 
underground. Finally, the incidence of these taxes is not transparent. The overall policy conclusion is that 
the use of these taxes should be avoided.” (Coelho et al., 2001:24). See also Singh et al., 2005:71.
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lasted for less than two years. There it was also introduced at a time when the 
government was desperate to achieve higher income but where other tax measures were 
simply unrealistic in political terms. Similarly, in this case in Bolivia: practically all 
other tax options -  for example anything relating to income tax or increasing the VAT 
rate -  had extremely low chances of being approved by Congress and would most likely 
trigger massive street protests. The government of Mesa thus chose these two taxes in 
the absence of any possible alternatives, as was also pointed out by Gray-Molina, head 
of the governmental think tank UDAPE at that time. He also reported that Mesa himself 
considered the FTT to be a “terrible tax" and that he chose it for pragmatic reasons 
(Gray-Molina, interview, 7.5.2004). The government hoped to raise US$35 million in 
additional income with the Net Property Tax and US$100 million by the FTT (El Diario,
20.2.2004). The executive sent the formalised proposal to the Congress in early 
February.
Opposition of Santa Cruz’s private sector. While several sectors and particularly 
various business organisations criticised the proposed tax measures, the Santa Cruz 
based CAINCO, was the most outspoken. It rejected both taxes as it thought they would 
have a recessive impact on the economy. According to their analysis the Net Property 
Tax represented a double taxation as it would be charged on assets which were already 
subject to other taxes. As regards the FTT, the private sector organisation expected that 
people would withdraw their money from the financial system (El Deber, 3.2.2004; El 
Nuevo Dla, 17.2.2004). CAINCO and other organisations lobbied particularly heavily 
against the introduction of the tax on property and in meetings with representatives of 
the government tried to convince them of the negative effects the tax would have. At 
first, however, their attempts were of no avail. CAINCO and other organisations from 
Santa Cruz then sharpened their discourse against the new taxes and in early March 
announced they would refuse to pay the Net Property Tax should it be introduced. They 
also called on all Santa Cruz-based legislators to vote against the bill. Responding to 
this pressure, President Mesa decided to withdraw the proposed property tax and 
subsequently sent a new bill to the Congress (El Nuevo Dla, 5.3.2004). The tax 
withdrawal is widely accepted to have been a result of private sector pressure from 
Santa Cruz. Gonzalo Vidaurre, economic analyst of the Chamber of Industry, gave 
details:
“The trend, le t’s say, for not approving the Net Property Tax started in the sector o f the 
East, exclusively o f CAINCO. CAINCO has a rigid position regarding this in the sense 
that there are large concentrations o f land, large concentrations o f cattle, and the
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entrepreneurs have rather large assets... The failure o f this tax, or to take a step 
backwards, o f the government, arises exclusively from the strong opposition o f the 
private sector in the East, o f CAINCO. ” (Vidaurre, interview, 28.5.2004)
Second bill. In the new bill the Net Property Tax was replaced by a complementary tax 
on property and vehicles and some modifications were made to the FTT:
a) A Complementary Property and Vehicles Tax: owners of houses worth more than 
US$50,000 to pay 1.5 per cent, one-off tax only valid in 2004; owners of vehicles to pay 
twice the amount they were charged in 2003, only valid in 2004;
b) FTT: 0.2 per cent, accounts in national currency excluded.
This provision, according to former Central Bank President Mendez, had the objective 
of helping to reduce the level of dollarisation of the banking system and strengthen the 
national currency (Mendez, interview, 7.5.2004). The government’s calculations 
anticipated US$35 million from the complementary property and vehicle tax plus 
around US$70 million from the FTT (per year), which would help lowering the 
expected fiscal deficit of US$700 million (or 7.9 per cent of GDP) (El Diario,
12.3.2004). Though the executive modified its proposal to appease its critics, the 
opposition to the tax measures continued also after the presentation of this second bill. 
Financial experts pointed out that the planned complementary tax on property was 
unconstitutional as it violated tax norms since it represented double taxation: the tax 
was already charged at municipal level (El Diario, 8.3.2004; Villegas, interview,
28.5.2004). Private sector groups argued in a similar way and the CEPB, CAINCO and 
other business organisations now jointly rejected the new bill. Bolivia’s main trade 
union, the COB, held protest marches where the “double taxation” plans of the 
government were denounced; and the federation of municipalities held talks with the 
government to convince it to change its plans particularly regarding the property tax. 
Finally, within the Congress it was only the MNR who supported the executive in its 
policy proposal; the other parties opposed them. Both MAS and NFR made an 
alternative proposal, which was to increase the royalties paid by the petrol sector to 50 
per cent (La Razon, 8.4.2004). Santos Ramirez, head of the economic team of the MAS, 
commented on their proposal for lowering the fiscal deficit:
“Let us put a higher royalty, not a tax, a higher royalty on the petrol companies, in 
particular those that are exploiting non-renewable resources, gas and oil in Bolivia’s 
case. " (Santos Ramirez, interview, 31.5.2004)
The suggestion, however, was not taken up by the government or any of the other 
parties as it was considered unrealistic. Facing criticism from various sectors and the
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clear absence of sufficient political support for the measure within Congress, President 
Mesa withdrew the Complementary Property and Vehicle Tax in early March. 
Therefore only the Financial Transactions Tax remained to be discussed by the 
Congress and in this case it first went to the Senate.108 On the 11th of March the upper 
chamber rejected the FTT (El Diario, 12.3.2004), which represented a heavy blow to 
the government of Mesa. In a televised message he heavily criticised the decision of the 
Senate and pointed out that he chose taxes that would only affect the rich and that these 
measures where necessary to lower the fiscal deficit. ‘7 will not be able to govern 
without the Congress ”, declared Mesa and he appealed to the legislature to back his 
measures (El Diario, 15.3.2004). This appeal worked and the bill on the FTT was 
reconsidered by the Senate (which is possible if someone asks for reconsideration of a 
bill and two-thirds of the Senate back the proposal). A few days later the Senate 
approved the FTT and the bill was sent to the lower chamber (El Nuevo Dla, 22.3.2004).
FTT approved by Congress. Though the MAS and the NFR maintained their 
opposition to the tax measures, the bill seemed set to be approved after the MNR and 
the MIR had declared they would vote in favour. The two parties were close to holding 
a majority as they held 62 out of the 130 seats in total, which made a favourable 
outcome likely. In this moment the Minister of Sustainable Development, Xavier 
Nogales, declared that all parties except the MAS had promised their support for the tax 
measure -  but only in return for public administration positions (El Deber, 26.3.2004). 
Not surprisingly, denial and outcry was the reaction of the accused parties and the 
discussion of the bill was brought to a hold. The congressional parties started to prepare 
for an interpellation of Nogales instead and the approval of the FTT seemed uncertain. 
Nogales was forced by President Mesa to withdraw his statement and make a public 
apology. In an unexpected turn of events, during the interpellation an explosion 
occurred in the Congress: a miner -  in an act to protest against the government and 
asking to have his pension payments returned by the state and given to the widow of his 
brother -  blew himself up with dynamite he carried on his body. With him two 
policemen were killed, several people were injured and part of the Congress building 
was severely damaged (La Prensa, 31.3.2004). When congressional activity was 
resumed the legislature decided not to censure Minister Nogales, as a consequence of 
the tragic events that had occurred -  according to President of the Chamber of Deputies 
Oscar Arrien (La Razon, 1.4.2004). Another turnaround happened as the MAS -  which
108 Though unusual it is possible that bills are first discussed in the Senate and then in the Chamber of 
Deputies.
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had always categorically rejected the FTT -  announced it would back the tax bill of the 
executive. While they still did not agree with the measure as such they explained their 
move by their wish to improve govemability (La Razon, 1.4.2004). With the votes of 
MNR, MIR, and MAS the Financial Transactions Tax was approved by the Chamber of 
Deputies on the 30th of March.
Summary. The FTT underwent some changes in the course of its discussion within the 
Congress and ultimately the following version was approved: the FTT was set to be 0.3 
per cent during the first year of its two-year existence, and 0.25 per cent in the second. 
Accounts holding less than US$1,000 and any accounts in bolivianos were exempt from 
the tax (Ley 2646, 1.4.2004). While the government hoped to introduce the tax as soon 
as possible significant delays occurred given that the banks found introducing the 
administrative procedures more complicated than anticipated. On 1 July, 2004 the FTT 
was launched and during the first five months the Internal Revenue Service collected 
US$35 million by way of this tax (La Razon, 1.1.2005).
Table 5.5: Stages of Introducing a Tax Reform, 2004*
Original Proposal
(1 February)
Revised Proposal
(4 March)
Approved by 
Congress (30 March)
a) 0.3%  Financial 
T ransactions Tax (FTT) a) 0.2% FTT a) 0.3% (0.25%) FTT
b) 1.5% Net Property Tax b) W ithdrawn
c) Property and Vehicle Tax c) Withdrawn
Source: Own elaboration. * Includes proposals formally sent to Congress only.
To summarise the process: after the first proposal for introducing a FTT and a Net 
Property Tax were sent to Congress, the latter was withdrawn by the executive facing 
great opposition from Santa Cruz-based private sector organisations. In the second 
official proposal the government came up with a third tax: one on property and vehicles. 
This was heavily rejected by private sector organisations nationwide (though 
particularly in La Paz where the tax would have had most incidence) but also by 
opposition parties in Congress and the wider society. After a while the government 
withdrew this tax as well. In a third stage the last remaining project, the FTT, suffered 
some significant modifications but was accepted.
Explaining the Fate of Mesa’s Tax Bill. There was a significant difference between 
the government’s original proposals and what was ultimately approved. Several times
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the executive had to withdraw its plans, in the end only one of the three taxes suggested 
was introduced, and even this one had undergone some significant changes in Congress. 
Given that the opposition to the FTT was also widespread -  though it was not as heavily 
rejected as the other two taxes -  one might wonder why the legislature accepted it at all. 
The prominent economist Francisco Munoz (previously PriceWaterhouseCoopers) 
evaluated this result as follows:
“The Parliament could not reject the two projects as it would have been like saying 
‘look, I  would like you to leave ’. Because, you sent me one law, I  don ’t approve it, you 
send me another one and I  don’t approve it either, and what is the government going to 
do, how shall it pay the salaries o f the state at the end o f the month? So there was no 
other option than to approve one o f the two. ” (Munoz, interview, 11.5.2004)
Munoz thus considered the approval of the FTT as the minimal outcome -  anything else 
would have equalled an attempt to question the government’s mandate. While this helps 
explain why the project was not fully rejected, looking at the counter-question -  why 
such a large part of the project failed -  seems at least as important. Part of the problem 
was that the government’s proposals contained elements which were not very carefully 
thought through. The Complementary Tax on Property and Vehicles could be seen as 
unconstitutional given that this tax was already charged at municipal level, and so the 
government was forced to withdraw this proposal. Political analyst Napoleon Pacheco 
considered that these measures were formulated very quickly under time pressure and 
without the usual rigorous analysis, which led to errors (Pacheco, interview, 5.5.2004). 
Weaknesses in the design of the tax bills can thus in part explain why parts of it had to 
be withdrawn and parts of it were considerably changed.
To explain further why President Mesa encountered such difficulties and why the 
reform attempt ultimately resulted in a failure one has to look at the nature of his 
government. The tax measures could simply not be introduced as Mesa did not have 
sufficient partisan support in Congress. Salvador R. Ballivian of the National Electoral 
Court made the following observation:
“This new government which does not have -  I  won’t say it has no majority in the 
Parliament — it simply has no faction and this has created a situation which obviously 
has no antecedents in the Bolivian democracy... This is a President who has no faction 
and where from the start the parties are neither in favour, nor against, but every project 
o f a law makes them say ‘this one yes, this one no, this one yes ’ -  it is something very 
strange for Bolivia. We really are in a universe which we haven’t known in the 
Parliament because previously the so-called “rodillo parlamentario” (parliamentary 
rolling pin, SL) has worked, which was actually the strict imposition o f the 
government’s majority. So i f  the government said this is the project, the so-called
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“rodillo parlamentario ” approved it because they had the majority in the Parliament 
and that was the end o f the story. ” (Ballivian, interview, 28.4.2004)
As Ballivian’s statement makes clear the situation was really unprecedented. President 
Mesa was a political independent who tried to govern without the backing of any 
political party represented in Congress. It was during the attempt to introduce changes 
to the tax system that it was demonstrated how difficult it was for the President to 
govern in this way. It seems he had hoped that the high popularity he enjoyed within 
society would help him to introduce policies he deemed adequate. When it came to 
introducing this first major economic policy, however, it became clear that positive 
public opinion did not automatically translate into the support of the parties represented 
in Congress whose votes were required for introducing legislation. The tax reform of 
2004 failed because of the absence of a coalition in Congress which would have 
supported the President’s initiative. Being without a coalition not only meant that the 
majority of parties strongly challenged the proposal and did not give their votes, it also 
meant that no one publicly defended the project making the executive more vulnerable 
to pressure from private sector groups. Mesa’s attempt also has to be seen in the context 
of a recent failure to introduce an income tax and that there was now a history of 
successful public opposition to tax reform. In this situation the choice of measures that 
would be socially acceptable was limited and implementing any changes to taxation 
would have been difficult for any government.
End of Mesa’s Government. As Mesa’s term went on, governing became increasingly 
difficult as he found his legislative initiatives blocked in Congress and at the same time 
faced growing levels of street protests. In March 2005 he offered to resign -  partly in an 
attempt to force the Congress into approving the earlier mentioned hydrocarbons bill. 
The legislature refused to accept his resignation. In May 2005 the Congress passed the 
hydrocarbons law with considerable modifications to the original proposal of the 
executive: a 32 per cent Complementary Tax on the Hydrocarbons Sector was 
introduced but in contrast to Mesa’s proposal this tax was non-deductible (meaning that 
companies would pay other taxes like the corporate tax on top of this) and would not be 
introduced incrementally but in one go.109 While this went much further than Mesa’s 
proposal and was immediately rejected by the private sector, this legislation did not go 
far enough for the MAS and a large number of social movements. Their proposal was to
109 The new legislation also established, for example, that companies had to change their contracts; that 
prices and sales would be controlled by the state; that 85 per cent of their personnel had to be Bolivians.
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nationalise the hydrocarbons sector and to convene a constituent assembly to rewrite the 
country’s Constitution. After the bill was passed street protests intensified and for 
around three weeks Bolivia was paralysed. Facing a situation of a deadlock, President 
Mesa again offered to resign on the 6th of June, which was accepted by Congress a few 
days later. After the next two officials in the line of succession waived their claim to the 
presidency, the head of the Supreme Court, Eduardo Rodriguez, was appointed on the 
9th of June. He considers himself as a caretaker President and new elections are now 
planned to take place in December. Though street protests have largely stopped for the 
moment, the next Bolivian president will be confronted with two difficult challenges: 
demands for the nationalisation of the hydrocarbons sector, and demands for regional 
autonomy of Santa Cruz.
Conclusion. While the pattern of coalition politics still facilitated the introduction of tax 
legislation during the Banzer-Quiroga government, economic policy-making became 
increasingly difficult. Though the increase of excise taxes was approved by Congress 
without any major problems, the President withdrew the new legislation several months 
later. This policy reversal was most likely because the ruling coalition had been greatly 
weakened by 2000 (as some coalition partners had left). In consequence, the thus 
weakened government was more vulnerable to pressure from the private sector which 
had lobbied for reversing the tax increase ever since its introduction. In February 2003, 
however, the proposal to introduce a Personal Income Tax failed already before it 
reached the institutional space of the Congress. A combination of factors proved 
explosive and a civil uprising -  for which the police mutiny proved to be the catalyst -  
occurred in the course of which the President was forced to withdraw his plans for an 
income tax. Clearly, it is extra-institutional aspects that account for why this reform 
failed. An explanation for why coalitions politics collapsed and why the pattern of tax 
policy-making changed in Bolivia will be sought in Chapter 8.4. In 2004 the tax reform 
undertaken by Mesa largely failed because of the absence of a coalition in Congress 
which would have supported the President’s initiative. Apart from the dynamics in 
Congress, business groups had some influence as they managed to make the 
government withdraw part of the bill. In 2004 no significant societal protest occurred as 
the taxes proposed did not seem to affect the popular sectors. In fact, the reason why 
these particular taxes were chosen by Mesa was to prevent the kind of protest that had 
led to the failure of the 2003 reform. External actors played a limited role in the cases of 
tax reforms analysed in this chapter: in 2003, though the IMF had made it a condition to
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lower the fiscal deficit, no specific proposal was made and the decision to introduce an 
income tax was domestically produced; the 2004 reform introducing an FTT was 
chosen due to political considerations and the FTT is generally rejected by the 
multilateral agencies.
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6 Ecuador: From Febres Cordero to Bucaram  (1984-1997) -  The 
Politics of Tax Reform
6.1 T h e  G o v e r n m e n t  o f  F e b r e s  C o r d e r o  (1984-1988): a  T a x  R e f o r m  by  
D e f a u l t
In 1984 Leon Febres Cordero o f the right-wing Partido Social Cristiano (PSC) came to 
power: though his principal opponent had won a plurality in the first round, Febres 
Cordero managed to overtake him in the second where he won 51.5 per cent o f the votes, 
while Borja received 48.5 per cent. His party, however, did less well in the elections to 
Congress as it achieved only nine seats, whereas Borja’s centre-left Izquierda 
Democratica (ID) represented the largest party in the legislature as they had 24 seats 
(Data from Tribunal Supremo Electoral, TSE).U0 The Congress was highly fragmented 
with 13 parties represented in it, thus making the formation of alliances extremely 
difficult.
Figure 6.1: Composition of Congress 1984, Ecuador
Number of parties -13  
Total Nr. o f Seats - 77
1984
Source: Own elaboration. Data from TSE.
PLR, 4 PCE, 2
PSC, 9 
(Ruling party)
FADI, 
PSE, 1 
PRE, 3 
FRA, 6
PNR, 1
PD, 5
Febres Cordero was a businessman from Guayaquil who had worked as the chairperson 
o f the Chamber of Industry based there. He was known as a committed neoliberal who 
considered unregulated markets as the most efficient way to achieve economic 
development. Febres Cordero ran the first round of his electoral campaign along this
110 For some background information on the PSC, the ID and other parties see Appendix F.
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ideological line and announced he would reduce the power of the state, cut government 
spending, and support private sector initiatives. As he lost the first round to Boija of the 
left-wing Izquierda Democratica (ID), however, he undertook a U-tum in his electoral 
campaign. Using the slogan “Pan, techo y empleo" (Bread, shelter, and jobs) he 
promised to raise basic salaries, to implement a housing scheme, and guaranteed that 
there would be no dismissals from government agencies (Lynch, 1994b:85ff). In the 
course of his government his policy record turned out to be rather mixed: while 
implementing market-oriented policies during the first half of his government, he 
withdrew from these during the second half. Shortly after his inauguration Febres 
Cordero announced a devaluation of the sucre, limited the minimum wage, eliminated 
all but a few price controls and increased petrol prices by 70 per cent. In the subsequent 
years Febres Cordero also introduced more wide-ranging structural changes such as 
steps towards trade liberalisation, removing export subsidies and reducing import 
tariffs. Meanwhile, due to falling petroleum prices in 1986 and an earthquake (bringing 
oil exports to a standstill) in early 1987 the economic situation deteriorated. Facing this 
situation Febres Cordero sharply cut subsidies, thus effectively raising fuel prices by 80 
per cent and public transport costs by 25 per cent. During 1987, however, Febres 
Cordero backed off from his previous policies, increased public sector salaries, imposed 
import restrictions and replaced the floating exchange rate -  which he himself had 
introduced earlier -  by a fixed one.
Tax reform.111 During the period of Febres Cordero’s government (1984-88), which is 
usually considered to have made great efforts to introduce radical changes in the 
economic system, no attempts to overhaul the tax systems were made. One significant 
change, however, was introduced: in 1986 the Sales Tax -  established in 1970 -  was 
increased from 6 to 10 per cent. The Sales Tax (also known as turnover tax) was the 
forerunner of the VAT (see definition in Chapter 3.2). Raising this tax has traditionally 
been extremely difficult in Ecuador, since the mid-1980s almost every government has 
tried to increase its rate and apart from this occasion in 1986 and in 1998, the attempts 
always failed. Why, then, was it possible for President Febres Cordero -  who faced an 
opposition-controlled legislature -  to introduce an increase by four points in the Sales 
Tax? The finance minister in charge of this bill, Francisco Swett, maintained:
“Febres Cordero had a closed opposition in the Congress, but i f  you know President 
Febres Cordero, you know that it is a man who does not fear confrontation and he is a
111 See Appendix G for an overview of Ecuador’s tax system between 1984-2001.
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politician o f force. And at that time he had at his constitutional discretion to declare an 
economic law as urgent and the National Congress had, i f  I  remember correctly, 15 
days to approve the project. Therefore what the executive did was to send all these 
projects within one clause o f projects and this way he was able to embroil the Congress 
into a problem o f an internal political discussion, which allowed that these measures 
got through. ” (Swett, interview, 15.4.2004)
The bill that Febres Cordero had sent contained a large number of economic reforms, 
one of which was this increase of the Sales Tax. To send more projects than a 
legislature can possibly deal with within 15 days was a strategy employed by this 
President rather often. In this case the Congress did not even once discuss this tax 
reform as they did not have the time. In consequence, the change was introduced by 
default, “por ministerio de la ley ”, as it is called in Ecuador. Finance Minister Swett 
expressed that it was this institutional mechanism -  allowing the President to send an 
economic law as urgent which could contain more than one project -  that made the 
introduction of the Sales Tax increase possible. This constitutional provision became 
discredited during the government of Febres Cordero, so that his successors did not take 
recourse to it (and while continuing to send bills as urgent, did not send such a large 
number of projects at a time). Later on the Constitution was changed to prevent this 
procedure formally (see Chapter 2.2). Since no other changes were introduced, at the 
end of the Febres Cordero government the tax system still featured a large number of 
different taxes and very high tax levels.
6.2 E c u a d o r ’s  T a x  S y st e m  R e f o r m e d : T h e  G o v e r n m e n t  o f  B o r ja  (1988-1992)
With the election of Rodrigo Borja in 1988 a politician from the social democratic 
Izquierda Democratica (ID) came to power and succeeded the government of Febres 
Cordero. His election campaign largely circulated around distancing himself from 
Febres Cordero: he criticised the anti-party discourse and defended the political system, 
attacking ffee-market economic policies and the adjustment measures introduced by 
Febres Cordero (Freidenberg, 2001:320). He repeatedly stated that there would be no 
surprise fiscal adjustments, in contrast to previous practice. Coming to power, however, 
Borja inherited a huge fiscal deficit, a fast accelerating inflation rate and a high debt 
burden. Alongside the announcement of a devaluation and an increase in electricity and 
energy rates he also raised the minimum wage substantially thus showing his 
commitment to a more heterodox approach than that of his predecessor. While 
essentially focusing on stabilisation efforts, Borja also initiated some wider-ranging 
structural adjustment policies -  including further trade liberalisation and a tax reform. In
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general, however, Borja is often considered to have failed to deliver the effective social 
reform which his ideology had promised during his presidency. (Carriere, 2001:142).
Figure 6.2: Composition of Congress 1988, Ecuador
Num ber o f parties -1 1  
Total Nr. o f Seats - 71
1988
PSE, 4 FADI, 2 p s c ,  8
30
(Ruling party) 
Source: Own elaboration. Data from TSE.
First part: 1988-90. Borja’s governing party -  the ID -  achieved an exceptional 
number of seats in Congress in the 1988 elections: 30 out of 71, or 42.3 per cent. This 
represented the highest number a ruling party has achieved in the last twenty years and
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none has ever come close to this result since. The ID was thus little short o f a 
majority. Mathematically, it was possible in this situation to form a coalition with only 
one other party apart from the ruling ID to hold a majority in Congress. Between 1984 
and 2004 the possibility to form a majority coalition with two parties was only given 
two times: between 1988 and 1990 and between 1996 and 1998. In all other two-year 
congressional periods (four-year ones since 1998) at least three parties were needed to 
form a majority.
Coalition with the DP. Soon after Rodrigo Borja took up the presidency he was able to 
form a coalition with the centre to centre-left Democracia Popular (DP), the party of 
Ex-President Osvaldo Hurtado (1981-84). At first more o f an agreement of 
collaboration with the government, this coalition became more formalised by a 
parliamentary agreement established on 27 May, 1989. With this agreement DP
112 The second-highest result was achieved by Mahuad’s Democracia Popular (DP) in 1998, which won 
28 per cent o f  all seats in Congress.
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members were appointed to ministerial and other positions in the public sector. 
Together the DP and ID mustered a majority in Congress, counting on 37 out of 71 seats 
in total. Given that also the FADI (Frente Amplio de Izquierda) supported the 
government and belonged to the coalition, it could rely on a rather comfortable majority 
(39 out of 71). This coalition is often considered as the only “real” coalition Ecuador 
ever had since its return to democracy. However, it seems that this co-operation was not 
considered as a coalition by its protagonists and that it was problematic right from the 
beginning. The leader of the parliamentary bloc of the DP, Patricio Vivanco, described 
the ID-DP relation as an “acuerdo politico ” (political agreement) that did not really 
function as a coalition (Vivanco, interview, 1.4.2004). When asked if he would consider 
this a governmental coalition, former President Borja answered in an interview:
“It was an agreement at parliamentary level which did not work out very well because 
many o f the government’s initiatives were not accepted and processed by the DP. 
People often say with certain thoughtlessness that I  had a majority in the first two years 
o f my government. This is partially true because effectively we had come to an 
agreement but this agreement was not kept because the DP disagreed with many reform 
projects which the government wanted to achieve... For every parliamentary initiative 
we had to open negotiations with this party (DP, SL). " (Boija, interview, 24.3.2004)
It is often considered that this coalition lasted for two years until the intermediary 
elections of 1990. However, the coalition came to an end already in November 1989. 
The DP announced it would leave the alliance and started withdrawing its members 
from the previously allocated positions. While there had been an internal division about 
this collaboration within the DP from the beginning, the opposition faction now seemed 
to have gained the upper hand. One of the principal opponents to co-operation with the 
government was former President Osvaldo Hurtado who considered it an “historical 
mistake” (cited by Vivanco, interview, 1.4.2004). Though the party gave programmatic 
disagreements as a reason for leaving the coalition, it seems certain that the upcoming 
mid-term elections of 1990 provided an incentive to defect as the DP did not want to 
reduce its electoral chances by being associated with government.
The above-mentioned failure to introduce the social policies announced in Borja’s 
electoral campaign is also due to the government’s lack of coalition partners. When it 
came to voting on social policies, smaller left-wing parties did not decide on ideological 
grounds but voted with the predominantly conservative opposition (Biles, 1998:231).
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1989 Reform
When in 1988 Rodrigo Borja was elected as President, he took a political decision to 
make tax reform a major focus of his presidency right on coming to power. In a first 
phase a tax reform was put forward which would simplify tax collection. Efficiency of 
collection was to be increased by simplifying paperwork and by establishing new 
collection locations; at the same time higher penalties for tax evasion were introduced. 
The reform was mainly administrative and contained few controversial suggestions so 
that the Ley de Control Tributario y  Financiero (Tax and Financial Control Law) was 
approved by Congress without any major discussion in December 1988.
Consultation with society. For the second phase which was to completely restructure 
the current tax system, a special commission was set up. Finance Minister Jorge 
Gallardo appointed Carlos Sandoval to chair the Tax Commission and gave them the 
task to develop a reform proposal. Apart from Sandoval this Commission consisted of 
various officials of the Finance Ministry, for example the Director of the tax authority 
(Direccion General de Impuestos Internos)U3, who worked together with some foreign 
consultants (mainly from Colombia, but also Spain and Bolivia). By late July the 
commission had developed a proposal, which finance minister Gallardo sent to 
President Borja, who then publicised it to start a process of discussion and public 
consultation. According to Gallardo himself the rationale behind this procedure was the 
following:
“The reform had to be discussed so that it would be accepted by civil society, we could 
not impose it from above, because then, in practice, it would have been rejected. " 
(Gallardo, 1995:37)
In order to facilitate the debate the Tax Commission had elaborated a publication 
containing the proposal for the tax reform, which was widely distributed throughout the 
whole country. Thousands of copies were handed out to universities, colleges, various 
chambers of commerce and industry, workers, teachers, businesses, the media, the 
Congress, the Supreme Court of Justice, and other public and private institutions. After 
the proposal for tax reform had thus been spread people had the possibility to hand in 
comments and criticism to the government for a period of 60 days until the 30th of 
September, 1989. Carlos Sandoval, adviser to Gallardo and head of the Tax 
Commission described this process:
113 At this moment the tax authority was a department of the Finance Ministry (called the Direccion 
General de Impuestos Intemos, DGII), only in 1998 it became an independent body -  the Servicio de 
Rentas Intemas (Internal Revenue Service, SRI).
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“Many people were invited to discuss, business organisations were gathered, also 
taxpayers, individual people. Big debates were organised in stadiums, open spaces, all 
over the country. The people came, newspapers reported -  even on the taxis they put 
transfers saying “link yourself to the tax reform, the tax reform benefits us a ll” etc. -  
there was a lot o f participation. The newspapers dealt with this process for six to eight 
months. The Minister as well as his advisers, we travelled to all parts o f  the country 
talking to people — it was something very participatory, something in which the people 
got involved. ” (Sandoval, interview, 26.3.2004)
The Tax Reform before the Legislature
After having received these observations the Tax Commission tried to include as many 
as possible, given they did not contradict the basic principles of the reform proposed 
originally (Sandoval, interview, 26.3.2004). The modified version was then put to the 
consideration of President Boija and some further time for debate was given. After 
several weeks of revising, Borja finally sent the tax reform as an urgent economic 
reform law to Congress on the 4th of December. Having been sent labelled as “urgent”, 
the Congress was obliged to discuss, approve or reject this proposal within 15 days. 
Failing to do so within this time period would have made the law come into effect 
automatically (por ministerio de la ley).
Opposition to the “urgent” character of the reform proposal. The government 
received a lot of criticism from the other political parties for choosing this procedure, 
even though it was rather common. PSC, PRE (Partido Roldosista Ecuatoriana), DP 
and FADI (the last two had been in alliance with the government shortly before) joined 
ranks to argue that a reform of such importance and complexity should not be rushed 
through and that within 15 days the legislature would not have the possibility to 
seriously analyse the document. Some even maintained that this procedure would 
disregard the legislative capacity of the Congress and that the executive had forgotten 
about the division of powers (El Comercio, various issues, 18.11.-10.12.2005). At the 
forefront of this opposition to the government’s decision to send the reform proposal 
marked as “urgent” was its previous ally -  the DP. Patricio Vivanco (DP) voiced his 
criticism repeatedly and argued that Borja’s attitude annulled the legislative capacity of 
the Congress, given that the Parliament would not be able to analyse the project or add 
anything to it (El Comercio, 5.12.89:3). The DP was the only party which went as far as 
threatening to not attend the discussion in the legislature if the government would not 
reverse its decision (and in effect later on did not attend the sessions). In defence to this 
mounting criticism calling for a withdrawal of the urgent character of the law, President 
Borja defended this procedure by stating: “Since when does using a constitutional
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power represent an aggression against the National Congress?” {El Comercio, 
4.12.89:1).
The criticism did indeed have no legal basis as the Constitution clearly gives presidents 
the right to send urgent economic reforms. What does and does not constitute “urgency” 
has never been clearly defined so that in practice presidents have always sent their 
economic reform proposals as “urgent” whenever they considered it to be urgent. The 
opposition was thus merely able to make a moral appeal. They also pointed out that 
under the previous government it was Borja’s ID which heavily attacked Febres 
Cordero’s habit to exploit this procedure. While not being able to stop this process, the 
discussion made clear that opposition to the government’s endeavour did exist. Borja 
reported that the political parties from the right spectrum opposed the government’s 
proposal for tax reform (Borja, interview, 24.3.2004).
Figure 6.3: Composition of Plenario 1989, Ecuador
1989
Num ber o f Parties - 7 
Total Nr. o f Seats - 28
(Ruling Party)
Source: Own elaboration. Data from Burbano & Rowland, 1998:62.
Legislative space: the “Plenario”. When the tax reform was sent in December, it came 
at a time when the National Congress did not convene, thus the task of deciding on this 
bill fell to the Plenario de las Comisiones Legislativas (Plenario) (see Chapter 2.4). 
That the Plenario had the power to decide on laws outside the periods during which the 
full Congress convenes seems to be exclusive to the Ecuadorian political system 
(abolished in 1998). Another rather striking fact is that only since 1996 did the 
composition of the Plenario need to be proportional to the composition o f the Congress
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(see Chapter 2.4). Consequently, in 1989 this was not a requirement and when 
comparing the composition of the Congress of 1989 to that of the Plenario of the same 
year, one finds, rather surprisingly, that significant distortions existed. While the ruling 
party -  ID -  did not have a majority in the Congress (see Figure 6.3), it did have a clear 
majority in the Plenario. While holding merely 42.3 per cent of the seats in Congress, it 
had 57.1 per cent in the Plenario. In addition, the Plenario was much less fragmented 
than the Congress as only seven parties were represented here, and 11 were part of the 
Congress.
The reason why the opposition parties so strongly objected to the procedure chosen by 
the government -  to send the tax reform as an urgent economic reform law -  now 
becomes clear. Under these circumstances the law had to be approved within 15 days -  
thus within the period of sessions of the Plenario. Had the proposal been sent without 
being labelled as “urgent” the discussion of the legislature could have been extended 
until the full Congress convened again. Given the different distribution of seats and 
given that the ruling ID was without allies at this moment, the opposition would have 
been able to make modifications or reject certain proposals in Congress. With its 
comfortable majority of 16 out of 28 seats in the Plenario, however, having this tax 
reform approved did not require political negotiation. During the last two decades this 
was the only situation when a single party was able to approve a law purely by counting 
on its own votes. Timing thus became an important aspect as sending the bill outside the 
period of the Congress made things much easier for the government of Borja.
Following the usual process, the Plenario discussed the proposal in a first debate on the 
5th and the 6th of December, after which the Commission for Tax, Fiscal, Banking, and 
Budget Matters (Comision de lo Tributario, Fiscal, Bancario y  de Presupuesto) 
elaborated a report on the basis of the original proposal and the comments made during 
the first discussion in the Plenario. In the debates that took place between the 12 and 
14th of December, the 126 articles of the reform proposal were approved with hardly 
any modifications. One of the few items that were slightly changed concerned the 
Special Consumption Tax (Impuesto a los Consumos Especificos, also excise tax) where 
the Plenario implemented some minor changes to the rates. On the 22nd of December 
the changes to the tax system came into force as the law was published in the Official 
Register {Ley 56, 22.12.1989).
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Contents of the reform. The changes introduced to the tax system were wide-ranging 
and until today the 1989 reform is generally held as the most radical tax reform of the 
last decades. In an interview, Ex-president Borja commented on the aims o f the reform:
“The government decided to simplify the tangle o f  more than a hundred messy, 
anarchical taxes and consolidate them in three fundamental ones: Income Tax, Value- 
added Tax, and Special Consumption Tax” (Borja, interview, 24.3.2004).
Accordingly the tax system was greatly simplified and many small taxes which 
generated little income (or which generated higher administrative costs than income) 
were abolished. Among the most important changes were the new provisions regarding 
income tax: the Personal Income Tax, which was previously ranged between 10-50 per 
cent, was lowered to 10-25 per cent. People earning less than 2.5 times the minimum 
wage were exempt from paying this tax.114 The number o f tax brackets was reduced 
from 15 to 4 (10, 15, 20, and 25 per cent). The Corporate Income Tax previously had 
progressive rates between 0-59 per cent and was now set at 25 per cent. The second 
main element o f this new tax system was a VAT of 10 per cent, which replaced the 
previous Sales Tax, which had been at the same rate. An excise tax represented the third 
pillar. Taxes on cigarettes, alcoholic drinks, beer and soft drinks were unified in one 
piece o f legislation under the concept of excise tax with charges ranging from 5-260% 
(for rates see Appendix G). To target administrative shortcomings of the current tax 
collection, provisions were taken to facilitate collection by simplifying the bureaucratic 
procedures: for example additional collection points were established and forms for tax 
declarations were substantially shortened and simplified. Some changes to the tax code 
were also introduced and penalties for tax evaders increased substantially.
Table 6.4: Main Elements of 1989 Tax Reform
Tax Reform 1989: Main Elements
: ' . : - ■ • ■ • > ■ ■ : . 
Income Tax: 1) Personal Income Tax: 10-25% (previously 10-50% 
23 Pnm orate In m m ftT flv  fn rev io m lv  0-59% V) Corp r t  I co e ax: 25% (pr i usly - )
Value-added Tax (VAT): 10%
Special Consumption Tax: 5-260% charges on cigarettes, alcoholic drinks,
beer and soft drinks
Penalties for tax evasion increased
Tax Administration: bureaucratic procedures simplified
Source: Own elaboration.
The amounts were adjusted over the years, in 2003 income o f up to US$6,800 per year was exempted.
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According to Carlos Sandoval, head of the Tax Commission, the reform achieved the 
following: “We created a system that was transparent, simple, equitable, and 
homogeneous — we reduced the tax rates drastically. ” (Sandoval, interview, 26.3.2004)
Why the Reform was Possible
Given that the reform of 1989 represents the most comprehensive change introduced to 
the tax system since Ecuador’s return to democracy, and given that introducing tax 
legislation subsequently often failed, it needs to be asked why this reform was possible 
and what conditions played a role in making it happen.
Plenario. As outlined earlier it can be argued that a major factor was the institutional 
aspect of allowing the Congress’s substitute -  the Plenario -  to decide on this economic 
policy, in combination with the fact that the legislation did not require the Plenario to 
be composed proportionally to the Congress. This feature of the political system 
allowed the reform to be approved basically without any modifications. In line with this 
argument, when asked why this reform was possible, many of my interview partners 
named as one of the most important reasons the fact that President Boija had a majority 
in the legislature (Interviews with Acosta, Better, Corral, Ribadeneira, Ruales, Sandoval, 
Swett, Valencia).115
Awareness of the need for change. Other conditions facilitated the process: for a start, 
a consensus existed that the tax system was outdated, far too complex and no longer 
appropriate leading to the accordance that substantial changes were necessary. The 
prominent Ecuadorian economist and political analyst Alberto Acosta considered:
“There was a very broad awareness in society that the tax structure had become a 
chaos. It was hugely difficult to understand what was going on so there was a feeling 
that something had to be done. ” (Acosta, interview, 23.3.2004)
The discussion process organised by the Borja government to consult the public opinion 
on the proposed changes to the tax system was outlined earlier. Minister of Finance 
Gallardo considered this process as “a democratic experiment which has never before 
been realised neither in the country nor in Latin America” (Gallardo 1995:110). It was 
the only time that a tax reform was processed in this way: since then no other president 
has chosen to consult society before fixing a reform proposal and sending it to Congress. 
This consultation process has led to a greater ownership of this tax reform and popular
1,5 Some of these assessments may be based on the misperception mentioned by former President Boija 
earlier, however.
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backing of the reform therefore provided a complement to the partisan support President 
Borja counted on in Congress.
Government campaign. Yet, public opinion was not only convinced of the process 
chosen by the government to introduce the reform but also largely agreed with its 
contents. It was widely perceived as being fair and not as aggravating the financial 
situation of the lower income classes. The government lobbied with the slogan “who 
owns more, pays more”, and the discourse used focused very much on the concept of 
justice, pointing out that this reform would not harm the common citizen in exchange 
for giving liquidity to the state but was aimed to implement social justice {El Comercio, 
21.11.89:2). In the weeks before the bill was sent to Congress, the government carried 
out a big campaign, placing advertisements in the main newspapers: using “ Tom won’t 
pay taxes!” as the main headline, people of different professions were informed that if 
their annual income did not exceed ECS2,000,000 (around US$3800 at that time) they 
would be exempt from paying income tax. Lobbying with such an apologetic sounding 
text might seem slightly counterproductive in a country where tax compliance is already 
quite low, yet the message that low income groups would not be taxed certainly went 
down well with the people addressed. The advertisement also gave easily 
understandable and precise information about income tax and who would pay it. The 
government campaign even used a logo -  RT Reforma Tributaria (Tax Reform) -  a 
rather unusual move representing an attempt to give a positive image for what is 
traditionally seen as an unpopular reform. Once the bill was passed in Congress, finance 
minister Gallardo commented:
“The country walks towards a new process o f economic development, a re-orientation 
o f economic resources towards a new model which is more just, fairer, without benefits 
fo r the privileged sectors but in a fair and general way just like the Constitution says. ” 
(Gallardo, Congreso Nacional del Ecuador, Acta No. 21-C)
A socially just reform. Looking at the tax system introduced, it becomes clear that the 
above is not mere rhetoric. Income tax rates -  at least the top rates -  were lowered both 
for Personal and Corporate Income Tax; consequently little opposition could develop 
from either side. Even though a VAT was introduced, it was to replace the previous 
Sales Tax set at the same rate of 10 per cent. Few people can be expected to have 
understood the technicalities of that change (see definition in Chapter 3.2). Pablo Better, 
Finance Minister during the second part of Boija’s government maintained:
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“The lowering o f the tax rate was something society accepted, i f  I  have to pay less 
income tax I  will support this project (Is what people thought, SL) ... There was no 
resistance in the society. ” (Better, interview, 30.3.2004)
At the same time, however, it was clear to everyone that with the overhaul of the tax 
system a new era would begin and that from now on evading taxes would become a lot 
more difficult and many people might pay more taxes than before. Acceptance of the 
reform can therefore not simply be explained by the fact that some taxes were to be 
lowered. Another factor increasing popular acceptance of this reform was pointed out 
by tax expert Wilson Ruales. He referred to the first phase of the tax reform in 1988 in 
which the changes introduced had benefited increased social spending (for example a 
literacy programme). According to Ruales this set a positive background for the 
subsequent reform proposal in 1989 (Ruales, interview, 23.3.2004).
External influence. External influence seems to have played a limited role. Multilateral 
organisations -  such as the IMF, the World Bank and the Inter-American Development 
Bank (IDB) -  can be ruled out: tax reform would only become part of their agenda in 
the 1990s. Sandoval, chairperson of the Tax Commission, affirmed that there had been 
no pressure whatsoever from any of the multilateral organisations (Sandoval, interview,
26.3.2004). There had, however, been a Latin America wide trend to introduce similar 
changes. Many other countries had carried out those reforms earlier: introducing a VAT 
and reducing the top rate of Personal Income Tax, which throughout Latin America fell 
from 50 per cent to 38 per cent between 1985 and 1991, while Corporate Income Tax 
was reduced from 43 per cent to 36.5 per cent on average (Shome, 1999:5,8). Chile 
introduced a major tax reform in 1984, Bolivia in 1986, Colombia in 1986 and Mexico 
in 1987, to give some examples. The Tax Commission set up to develop the Ecuadorian 
reform did consult with experts mainly from Colombia (also someone from Bolivia) as 
their tax reform was considered as a model (Sandoval, interview, 26.3.2004).116
Economic interest groups. In the case of the 1989 tax reform private sector groups had 
some influence even though the modifications they were able to gain from the 
government were very modest. The issue under attack from economic lobby groups was 
related to the provision of “adjustment for inflation”. The element of “adjustment for 
inflation” was important at times of high inflation rates. The change aimed at charging 
on real income rather than monetary income which was much distorted due to high
116 In fact, Sandoval pointed out that they considered the Colombian reform as a model rather than the 
Bolivian one as they thought the first was closer to their idea of a socially just tax system (Interview, 
Sandoval, 26.3.2004).
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inflation rates. The business sector heavily opposed this as it would increase their tax 
burden.117 In the end the government yielded to some extent to these particular 
demands: “adjustment for inflation” was introduced only gradually (Sandoval, interview,
26.3.2004). While a compromise was found on this matter, there are some indications 
for certain tensions between economic interest groups and the government. In an 
interview in El Comercio (9.11.89:1) Marcelo Pallares, President of the Chamber of 
Commerce of Quito, said it would be better for the government to ask the productive 
sector to participate in the tax reform commission so as to know their opinion directly, 
instead of them having to wait for a Pandora’s box. Former President Boija mentioned 
opposition against the reform from the business sector (Borja, interview, 24.3.2004). In 
his opinion:
"It is a question o f political will o f a government which does not respond to created 
interests; o f a party which was in power at the time and which had never defended the 
interests o f any pressure group, o f any chamber ofproduction. Thus, with this enviable 
freedom giving independence from privileged economic groups, we were able to do 
what appeared right to us and impose this decision. " (Borja, interview, 24.3.2004)
In Boija’s opinion, therefore, his government did not have to deliver the reform to 
economic interest groups because of their independence of these groups and their 
political will. While surely every party claims to be independent from pressure groups, 
the ID’s independence and lack of linkage was confirmed by outsiders (Ruales, 
interview, 23.3.2004). At the same time, however, it has to be kept in mind that some of 
the main elements of the reform were actually in the interest of the business sector, such 
as lowering the Corporate Income Tax.
Timing. Finally, timing was another factor conducive to the success of this tax reform. 
The government worked on this reform project from the beginning, introducing the first 
part of the reform already some months after coming to power (December 1988). Only 
one year into the four-year term of the government (and well before the intermediary 
elections) the second phase was started in late July 1989 and approved in December of 
that year. According to Carlos Sandoval, the reform thus came before a debilitation of 
the government, which facilitated its introduction (Sandoval, interview, 26.3.2004).
Effects. Though it is not within the scope of this work to evaluate economic outcomes, 
the results of the 1989 tax reform need mentioning. Though the government had 
expected that tax revenue would increase after the implementation of the reform, the
1,7 For more information on this issue see Chapter 4 of Gallardo, 1995.
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hopes were disappointed as numbers actually fell. While in 1989 tax income was 8.9 per 
cent of GDP, it fell to 8.0 per cent during both 1990 and 1991 (see Table 6.5).
Especially revenues from income tax decreased from 1.9 per cent of GDP in 1989 to 1.3 
per cent in 1990 (Salgado and Santos, 1998:65). The strategy of raising the number of 
contributors and thus increasing the 
revenue generated did not work out 
as apparently the increase in 
contributors did not make up for the 
reduced rates.
The Borja Government (1990-92). With the intermediary elections of 1990 the 
situation of the Borja government changed dramatically and introducing reforms 
became more difficult. The ruling party had its seats in Congress reduced by more than 
50 per cent and with its now 14 seats no longer represented the biggest party; in the 
Plenario the ID had lost its majority and now merely held four seats (down from 16 in 
1989). In consequence, gathering a majority for its reform projects became much more 
difficult for the government. Mejia-Acosta (2000:20) provided some interesting data on 
this: while the Borja government submitted 40 pieces of legislation between 1988 and 
1990 and got 22 (54.7 per cent) of it approved by the Congress; in the 1990-92 period 
only six out of 29 proposals were approved (21.3 per cent). Ecuador’s electoral system, 
which featured intermediary elections until 1998 thus did split a president’s 
governmental term into two very different periods. Since elections are always a measure 
of a government’s popularity, the 1990 elections showed the hugely reduced support 
President Boija enjoyed in society. The intermediary elections have allowed this 
reduced popular support to translate into reduced political support in the legislature, 
making governing more difficult. While of course in other countries presidents also lose 
support in the course of their governmental term, the lack of mid-term elections (few 
countries other than Ecuador had this) does make them largely keep the share of seats 
the ruling party gained in the first place. While governing might become more difficult 
during the course of a governmental term everywhere, conditions are more severe in 
Ecuador as gathering support in the legislative space becomes even more difficult.
118 The numbers do not include revenues from the oil sector.
Table 6.5: Tax Income (% of GDP), Ecuador
1987-92
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992
9.2 8.4 8.9 8.0 8.0 7.5
Source: Own elaboration. Data from BCE.
203
Figure 6.6: Composition of Congress 1990, Ecuador
Number of parties -11 
Total Nr. of Seats - 72
1 9 9 0
PSE, 8 FADI, 2
PRE, 13
PSC, 17
FRA, 2 ID, 13
  (Ruling party)
MPD> 1 CFP, 3 PLR- 3 PCE’ 3
Source: Own elaboration. Data from TSE.
Figure 6.7: Composition of Plenario 1990, Ecuador
Number of Parties -10  
Total Nr. of Seats - 281 9 9 0
PCE, 2
Source: Own elaboration. Data from Burbano & Rowland, 1998:65.
PSE, 4
PLRE, 1
PRE, 4
1
Another indicator o f the huge obstacles that President Borja’s government was facing in 
the second part o f its term is the increased rate of congressional interpellations (see 
Chapter 2.2) members of Borja’s cabinet had to go through. Minister of Agriculture 
Marcos Espinel, for example, had to appear 28 times in front o f Congress to defend 
himself against censure initiatives in his 24 months in office -  a procedure which
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certainly somewhat distracted him from following policy initiatives (De Janvry et al. 
1994:45). Between 1988 and 1992 ten ministers were threatened by Congress with a 
vote of censure, eight of whom were effectively censured and had to resign (Burbano 
and Rowland, 1998). All of the removals from office took place in the last two years, 
thus after the intermediary elections.
Tax reform. The government of President Borja had planned a follow-up phase to the 
tax reform introduced in 1989. After a VAT had been introduced with that reform, 
another reform was to eliminate the exonerations from this tax. Yet this subsequent 
reform was never realised. Pablo Better, finance minister during this period, reported 
that he was working on a reform proposal but in the end the President did not even send 
the project to Congress as Borja did not have a majority in the legislature any longer 
and there was a strong opposition (Better, interview, 30.3.2004). No significant changes 
to the tax system were thus introduced during the years 1990 to 1992. Pablo Better 
considered that the planned tax reform
“was not politically viable. In the second half o f presidential periods you cannot do 
anything in Ecuador. You cannot introduce important legislation. ” (Better, interview,
30.3.2004)
Summary. The reform introduced in 1989 can be considered as the most important 
change to the tax system during the last decades. Two elements should be stressed: on 
the one hand there was an extraordinary political situation given that the ruling ID had 
won such a large share of seats in Congress. Constitutional provisions concerning the 
Plenario allowed President Boija to have the reform approved there, where the ID held 
a majority and had no need for forming alliances. Complementing this institutional 
aspect was the popular support brought by a consultation process, an exceptional 
democratic experiment of involving society in the policy-making process. While these 
are considered the main reasons for the success of the reform, other factors have played 
a role. Generally there was awareness -  in society and the political parties -  that the tax 
system was outdated, far too complex, and needed some significant changes. As regards 
the content of the reform, the proposal was mainly accepted as it appeared to be a 
socially just reform. Opposition was limited since, for example, income tax was actually 
lowered. External influence only came through the fact that most Latin American 
countries had already introduced similar changes. Finally, timing was crucial -  the 
reform was introduced in the first part of Boija’s government before he lost political 
support. The situation of Boija’s government dramatically changed after the 
intermediary elections in 1990. His government was effectively split into two very
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different periods, one during which important legislation was introduced and a second 
marked by political conflict and little legislative activity and success. The constitutional 
provision of intermediary elections consequently had a considerable influence on 
Borja’s ability to introduce tax reform, and more generally, to govern.
6.3 T a x  R e f o r m s  d u r in g  t h e  G o v e r n m e n t  o f  D u r a n  B a l l e n  (1992-1996)
In 1992, the conservative politician Sixto Duran Ballen won the presidential election, 
heading the Republican Union Party (PUR). Duran had been a long-standing member o f 
the PSC and twice its presidential candidate; after the PSC had denied him the 
presidential candidacy for the 1992 elections, he founded a new party, the PUR, in order 
to be able to stand. The party, however, did not survive after this governmental period 
and can thus be considered as an electoral vehicle allowing Duran to gain the presidency. 
The shortcomings o f this approach showed its effect in the composition o f the Congress 
where President Duran’s PUR took only 12 out of the total 77 seats, or 15.6 per cent. 
The Congress was highly fragmented, with none of the parties being able to form a 
majority without at least two other parties. The PUR represented only the third biggest 
party in Congress, both the PRE and Duran’s previous party PSC held higher numbers 
of seats.
Figure 6.8: Composition of Congress 1992, Ecuador
1 9 9 2  Number of parties -12
Total Nr. of Seats - 77
PLN, 1 ID, 8
PSE
PRE, 15
P C E ’ 5
PLR, 2 
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PUR, 12
FRA, 1 DP, 6
Source: Own elaboration. Data from TSE.
President Duran had managed to form a coalition with the Partido Conservador 
Ecuatoriano (PCE), which only held five seats. The ruling coalition o f PUR and PCE
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thus counted on 22 per cent of all seats in Congress. In the Plenario the ruling PUR held 
six out of 28 seats. One year later the situation changed significantly as many legislators 
disaffiliated from their parties. Disaffiliations -  for which Ecuadorians even coined a 
word “camisetazos” (changing shirts) -  are a frequent phenomenon in Ecuador. The 
Constitution does allow disaffiliated members to keep their seat in Parliament, so 
leaving a party carries no personal consequences. Other Latin American countries 
provide that legislators have to give up their seat if they disaffiliate from their party, as, 
for example, in Bolivia (since 1997). During the governmental period from 1992 more 
and more legislators became independent: the legislators of the CFP, PLN (Partido 
Libertad Nacionat) and FRA disaffiliated thus making these parties disappear within 
Congress completely; the ID lost four of its members, the DP three, the PRE three and 
the ruling PUR lost two of its legislators. This lack of party discipline exceeded the 
traditionally already high levels: by August 1993 18 per cent had disaffiliated (see Table 
2.4 in Chapter 2.5). The Congress was now even more fragmented and independents 
represented an important political force.
Economic reform programme. During his election campaign Duran Ballen had 
campaigned for a return to free-market policies such as privatisation and 
decentralisation (Roos and van Renterghem, 1997) thus stressing his difference to his 
predecessor Borja. As another indication of his ideological orientation he had chosen 
Alberto Dahik, who had served as economy minister under Febres Cordero and who 
was known as a convinced neoliberal, as the vice-presidential candidate. Yet in the 
course of the campaign Duran Ballen also shifted to the centre in many of his statements 
and limited his orthodox discourse to increase his popularity among broader sectors of 
the population. Once in power, however, his policies were mainly market-oriented in 
character. One month after coming to power he announced plans to raise the price of 
petrol by 125 per cent, double electricity rates, and devalue the sucre by 35.5 per cent. 
In the first half of his term he significantly lowered the fiscal deficit, reduced public 
sector jobs by around 10 per cent, and deepened trade liberalisation. Some of Duran’s 
more long-term structural policies were not always successful: especially his 
privatisation plans failed as he faced severe opposition from a large number of interest 
groups. In addition, his attempt to change the land reform law met with fierce protest of 
the indigenous movement due to which he had to modify this policy. Many of his 
structural reform plans also failed due to lack of support for his policies in the 
opposition-controlled Congress.
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Tax Reform 1993
At the end of 1993 a major tax reform was elaborated by the government: a) VAT was 
to rise from 10 to 18 per cent, b) exemptions to VAT reduced, c) a 1 per cent Tax on 
Fixed Assets introduced, d) some excise taxes on luxury items raised, and e) a 25 per 
cent Tax on Stock Market Gains established (see Table 6.9). The government argued 
that the current economic situation was so severe that a radical tax reform was needed to 
reduce the fiscal deficit. Vice-president Dahik pointed out that the country had lost 
ECS1 billion in one year due to the fall of oil prices (El Comercio, 17.12.93:6).
Opposition and protest. The opposition to the reform proposal questioned the 
government’s evaluation of the economic situation. Many argued on a similar line to the 
representative of the banking sector, Alejandro Penafiel, who questioned the severity of 
the economic difficulties and who deemed such drastic measures unnecessary given that 
the problem was of a short-term nature since oil prices would, in his opinion, certainly 
increase sooner or later (El Comercio, 20.12.93:16). The opposition and protest to this 
reform was widespread and voiced immediately after its announcement. The Consejo de 
Camaras y  Asociaciones de la Produccidn (Council of Chambers and Associations of 
Production) sent a letter to the President contesting the reform, specifically opposing the 
increase of the VAT rate, and pointing out that the Special Consumption Tax should 
rather be lower than higher (El Comercio, 16.12.93:6). Other economic interest groups 
from both Quito and Guayaquil joined in and criticised the proposal heavily. Protest 
also came from the popular sectors of society, various trade unions119 and social 
movements took to the streets criticising the latest economic policy proposed by the 
government (El Comercio, various issues December 1993). Completing this alliance of 
opposition, members of the institutional political level spoke out against the reform 
publicly, as did the Vice-president of the Congress Bruno Frixone. The main arguments 
were that the suggested policy would have a serious negative effect on the economy and 
increase unemployment.
Congress rejects reform. The opposition outside the political system was reflected 
inside it, the great majority of parties had already demonstrated their opposition to the 
reform and the government failed to mobilise partisan support for this proposal in 
Congress. Especially the proposal to raise the VAT from 10 to 18 per cent found little or 
no support. Consequently, most of the plan was rejected and the attempt to reform the
119 For example, FUT -  Frente Urtitario de Trabajadores; CTE -  Confederation de Trabajadores\ UNE — 
Union National de Educadores.
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tax system failed. As regards the main elements of the reform: a) VAT stayed at the 
same level; b) exemptions to VAT remained unchanged; c) the 1 per cent Tax on Fixed 
Assets was rejected; and d) excise taxes were actually lowered rather than increased as 
originally proposed (see Appendix G). Thus all proposals for increasing or establishing 
new taxes were turned down, except one: e) a 25 per cent Tax on Stock Market Gains 
was approved by Congress. However, this new tax faced such strong opposition by 
business groups who heavily lobbied against it, that the government ultimately 
conceded and withdrew it in February 1994. Several of its minor articles were approved; 
however, in general the reform had been deprived of practically all its main elements. 
The reform can thus be considered as a failure.
Table 6.9: Tax Reform (attempt) 1993 -  Main Elements
Original Proposal Reform Approved
VAT increase  from 10 to 18% R ejected
R eduction of VAT exem ptions R ejected
1% Tax on Fixed A ssets R ejected
Increase of som e excise taxes Som e excise  tax es  lowered
25% Tax on Stock Market Gains Approved (withdrawn som e m onths later)
Source: Own elaboration.
Former Finance Minister Cesar Robalino commented on this unsuccessful attempt:
“President Duran and his party had few votes in the Congress, so that the majority o f  
the legislators were not from the government and the government did not really manage 
to convince. We could not convince, not I  as the Finance Minister, nor the Minister o f  
Government, nor the Vice-president who then helped us to make contacts in the 
Congress. We could not convince the legislators. ... The Congress defeated us, they 
defeated us completely. The idea was to increase the VAT ... but the Congress decided 
that under no circumstances any tax could be increased. All political parties united to 
defeat the proposal to increase taxes and this is not exceptional in Ecuador. " (Robalino, 
interview, 5.4.2004)
Given the failed tax reform and the high fiscal deficit, President Borja soon announced 
an increase on the price of domestic fuels (by 71-140 per cent) on 28 January, 1994. 
While a hugely unpopular measure in society, this is a measure for which presidents do 
not need the approval by Congress as it can simply be decreed. The pattern of a failed 
tax reform followed by a fuel price increase was very common during the last twenty 
years.
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Why the reform failed. In many respects the tax reform attempted by Duran’s 
government can be considered as the opposite to the reform undertaken in 1989. In 1993 
the conditions simply did not allow this reform to go through. President Duran came to 
power with a ruling party that counted on a very low number of seats in Congress. This 
base had eroded even further one year later and at the time o f this reform endeavour 
some disaffiliations had occurred. As regards the content o f the reform proposal several 
taxes were to be raised and some new ones introduced. In retrospect one might consider 
especially the VAT rise to 18 per cent as highly unrealistic and ask how much the 
creators of this reform took political viability into account when putting it forward. 
Opposition and protest came from all sides immediately after it had been announced. 
All sectors of society -  economic interest groups, trade unions, social movements -  
criticised and opposed the reform. In Congress, the reform was outright rejected given 
the opposition of a great majority of the parties. While sectors o f society and Congress 
facilitated the reform undertaken in 1989, public and congressional opposition led to the 
failure of the tax reform undertaken in 1993. Extra-institutional and institutional 
opposition had formed a double veto group.
Mid-term elections - 1994.
Figure 6.10: Composition of Congress 1994, Ecuador
Number of parties -13  
Total Nr. o f Seats - 771994
Source: Own elaboration. Data from TSE.
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The mid-term elections held in 1994 once again completely altered the political power 
balance in Congress. The ruling PUR was reduced to a mere three-seat party with six o f 
the other parties holding more seats. Some o f the opposition parties managed to increase
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their share in Parliament: the main opposition party PSC now held 26 seats (previously 
21), the left-wing MPD {Movimiento Popular Democratico) went up to eight (from 
three); PUR’s coalition partner PCE also gained in the elections and now had seven 
seats (up from five) which led to the rather unusual situation that the coalition partner 
was actually bigger than the ruling party itself. Now being one of the smaller parties 
Duran Ballen’s party no longer held any seats at all in the Plenario. While the first part 
of President Duran’s government had been relatively stable, the second part between 
1994 and 1996 was a period of high political and economic instability. Especially 1995 
was a critical year mainly because of the military conflict with Peru. The military 
intervention, lasting one month in early 1995, aggravated the already tight financial 
situation of the public sector. According to Salgado and Jacome (1995:58) the direct 
cost of the military operations (excluding the money spent on buying weapons) were 
around US$350 million, which represented approximately 2 per cent of that year’s GDP. 
Another destabilising factor was difficulties in the electricity sector, which made energy 
rationing necessary. While rationing had happened frequently before, it had never 
reached such serious levels. Between 1995 and 1996 the country underwent more than 
six months of electricity rationing, which severely limited economic growth in general.
At the political level, legislative-executive conflicts became rather intense. In June 1995 
Vice-president Alberto Dahik denounced corruption prevalent in the Congress referring 
specifically to a case where one party demanded ECS200 billion in exchange for voting 
in favour of a particular legislation. His accusation obviously referred to the PSC. At the 
same time accusations against government officials of giving bribes to legislators to buy 
their votes were widespread. This conflict resulted in the impeachment of Vice- 
president Dahik (requested by PSC leader and Ex-president Leon Febres Cordero), who 
subsequently went into exile. Governing was also made more difficult for President 
Duran given that the opposition parties in Congress joined ranks and formed a 
parliamentary coalition of PRE, FRA, MPD, ID, DP, and APRE (Accion Popular 
Revolucionario Ecuatoriano). The government lost even more credibility and 
legitimacy when a popular consultation held at the end of 1995 resulted in a huge failure.
1995: “Wartime Tax Measures”
The costs of the earlier mentioned military conflict between Ecuador and Peru of 1995 
brought public finances into a precarious situation and measures to counterbalance the 
widening fiscal deficit became necessary. In May the government put forward a tax 
reform which became known as “wartime tax measures” (EIU, No. 1 1995) Its main
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elements were: a 2 per cent tax on the purchase price of all automobiles (valid for one 
year); a war tax equivalent to a two-days’ salary paid by all public- and private-sector 
employees; and the removal of exemptions to VAT. While the first two measures found 
widespread support, the latter was questioned and criticised. Industrialists opposed this 
proposal by arguing that resources should be found by restructuring the budget instead 
of extending the coverage of VAT (EIU, No.l 1995). On a similar line many people in 
and outside Congress voiced their opposition holding the opinion that sufficient 
additional taxes would already be paid and that the focus should be put on improving 
tax collection instead (EIU, No. 2 1995). When decided in Congress, the removal of 
VAT exemptions was consequently rejected. However, the 2 per cent Vehicle Tax as 
well as the two-days’ salary payment were approved by a great majority in the 
legislature.
“At the time o f the military conflict with Peru a special tax on the value o f motorised 
vehicles was created for one time only ’, which we paid with pleasure and knowing that 
it was for an absolutely justified cause, in which the Ecuadorian soldiers gave a lesson 
o f manliness, strategy and bravery. ” Pablo Ortiz Garcia, Superintendent of Companies 
{El Comercio, 30.12.96:5)
This statement of Ortiz Garcia reflects well the spirit of patriotism prevalent in Ecuador 
during the conflict with Peru. Patriotic feelings led in this case to popular support for 
the tax measure proposed by the government. Popular support for the President had 
increased during this time, as reflected in some opinion polls: while President Duran’s 
popularity rates had fallen to only 23 per cent in August 1993 one year after the 
beginning of his government (down from 51 per cent in August 1992), at the end of his 
term in 1996 these rose significantly to 38 per cent (Cedatos, 2004). Data for 1995 are 
unfortunately unavailable; it seems quite likely, however, that his popularity had been 
even higher at the time of the conflict. This general support for the government can 
explain why this tax reform was successful despite the fact that: a) a reform intent to 
increase taxes had failed one-and-a-half years earlier; b) this policy came in the third 
year of government with just one year to go to the next elections, a time when 
introducing new legislation usually becomes more difficult; c) the ruling coalition of 
PUR and PCE only held 13 per cent of seats in Congress. Under normal circumstances 
these conditions would have made the success of such a measure highly unlikely, yet 
the war opened a window of opportunity for the introduction of this change to the tax 
system. Modesto Correa, the finance minister120 responsible for developing this policy
120 Modesto Correa was Minister of Finance between September 1994 and April 1995. He thus left in the 
month before the reform was actually introduced.
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proposal commented in an interview on the interplay between popular and 
congressional support:
“An additional tax o f 2 per cent was very well received in society because in this 
moment there was a spirit o f giving, o f helping the country due to the conflict situation 
.. .I t  was favourably received by the people and when the Congress saw that the people 
received this well and that public opinion said they would be willing to contribute, the 
dynamic at the Congress level worked out very quickly. ” (Correa, interview, 15.4.2004)
Yet, while it seems surprising that people would support an increase in their tax burden, 
it also needs to be pointed out that the measures proposed were moderate. Even though 
they introduced a new tax (2 per cent on vehicles) it was only a temporary measure (as 
was the two days’ salary payment) and also represents a tax that generally attracts less 
opposition than, say, an increase in the VAT rate. The more long-term change of 
eliminating VAT exemptions was rejected. Taxing vehicles can easily be sold as a 
measure which is mainly paid by richer people leaving lower income groups unaffected. 
Mario Ribadeneira, who was finance minister during the first year of Duran’s 
government (August 1992 -  July 1993), commented on the policy chosen by his 
successor:
“It is a typical measure o f desperation when resources are lacking. And here demagogy 
comes in as well. The tax on vehicles is a tax on the rich which is sold demagogically. 
So this is the easiest measure, a measure so elemental, so primitive, but for the very 
same reason so easy. " (Ribadeneira, interview, 20.4.2004)
Yet, while certainly also chosen for demagogic reasons, the Vehicle Tax also had the 
advantage of allowing rapid introduction and collection. Money would come in quickly, 
which was what the government needed in a year of extensive unforeseen expenses.
Summary. The government of Sixto Duran Ballen attempted two tax reforms worth 
mentioning during its period in office (1992-96): the ambitious reform undertaken in 
1993 resulted in a failure due to the widespread opposition in both Congress and society. 
During the last year of his government, however, Duran Ballen managed to introduce 
some -  though modest - tax measures despite the limited partisan support he had in 
Congress. This can be largely explained by the situation the country experienced of the 
conflict with Peru, which had triggered popular support. Favourable public opinion, 
positive and rapid dynamics within the legislature represent a rather unique procedure in 
Ecuador. As former finance minister Modesto Correa pointed out Ecuador would 
consequently need to be in permanent conflict if it would want to have new tax reforms 
approved... (Correa, interview, 15.4.2004).
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6.4 How T ax  R e fo r m  Fa il e d : T he  G o v er n m en t  o f  Bu ca ra m  (1996-1997)
In 1996 Abdala Bucaram from the populist PRE won the presidency. During his 
election campaign he promised to protect real incomes and create jobs and attacked the 
country’s upper class. He announced that subsidies on basic foods and fuels would be 
increased and pledged better health and education services. Bucaram left open, 
however, how all this would be financed. While Ecuadorian presidents have often 
departed from their electoral platform once in power, Bucaram’s policy-switch seems 
the most extreme. Shortly after assuming the presidency he quickly increased prices for 
cooking gas, electricity and petrol and started to privatise state-owned enterprises. His 
economic team around Minister of Finance, Pablo Concha, started working on a 
convertibility plan, which would introduce the Argentinean model o f pegging the 
currency to the dollar. These measures and plans came much to the surprise o f his 
electorate who had expected a rather more heterodox economic programme. The 
heralded social reform consisted of a few measures only, among them a social housing 
programme.
Figure 6.11: Composition of Congress 1996, Ecuador
Number of parties -11 
Total Nr. of Seats - 82
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Source: Own elaboration. Data from TSE.
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By far the largest party in Congress was the PSC, the party which had hoped to win the 
presidency in these elections; their candidate Jaime Nebot, however, only came second. 
President Bucaram’s ruling party PRE gained 23.3 per cent of all seats in Congress (19 
out o f 82). The governing party managed to form a coalition with the FRA -  the party 
of Alarcon who was to become Bucaram’s successor -  yet this party only held three
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seats in the 1996 Congress. It turned out to be extremely difficult for Bucaram to find 
support from other parties. The largest party in Congress, the PSC, was the party which 
had hoped to win the presidency in these elections, and was now not willing to support 
the PRE. Already during the election campaign Bucaram had used an approach that can 
hardly be called diplomatic. As Ex-Finance Minister Francisco Swett pointed out: 
“Bucaram broke with all norms and patterns o f  behaviour and dedicated him self to 
insulting.” (Swett, interview, 15.4.2004). Often he was even offensive and while in 
government used words like “rateros, maricas, and anihados ” to refer to legislators of 
other parties (El Comercio, 6.1.1997:2). Burbano and Rowland summarised Bucaram’s 
approach to governing during the first six months:
“Far from  organising and executing a coherent government plan and call fo r  
agreement, the executive swept away with the political parties searching fo r  the 
conformation o f  an official majority, dismantled the social movements and threatened 
the media with the aim o f  silencing the denunciations o f  corruption.” (1998:83; my 
translation)
This style together with the fact that the traditional parties were reluctant to be seen as 
an ally of the populist PRE made the formation of alliances around legislative projects 
even more difficult than it generally is in Ecuador anyway.
Figure 6.12: Composition of Plenario 1996 (December), Ecuador
Number of Parties - 9 
Total Nr. of Seats - 35
Disaffiliated, 9
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Source: Own elaboration. Data from Burbano & Rowland, 1998:82.
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In the Plenario the situation looked a bit different. In the months following its 
installation in August 1996, several members o f the Plenario had disaffiliated from their 
parties. Almost all these disaffiliated members supported the government (most
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probably Bucaram had made some kind o f deal with them). Given the nine votes o f the 
PRE plus one o f coalition partner FRA together with around eight votes from the 
disaffiliated legislators, Bucaram held a fragile majority in the Plenario at the time of 
the tax reform (while being far from a majority in the full Congress).
Tax Reform 1996
A few months after coming to power Bucaram’s government attempted to introduce his 
first major structural reform. This ambitious project aimed at increasing tax collection; 
when announcing it Bucaram stressed the need for improving collection and fostering 
tax culture {El Comercio, 1.12.96:10). In November 1996, President Bucaram sent the 
proposal as an urgent economic reform law to Congress. Its main elements were:
Table 6.13: Tax Reform, 1996
Tax Reform Attempt - 1996
a) A large increase in excise taxes levied on alcohol, cigarettes, and other luxury
goods;
b) 2% Vehicle Tax. This tax had been in existence during 1995 to help finance the 
military conflict with Peru. The same tax was proposed to be continued and levied 
on all motorised vehicles less than five years old;
c) Elimination of VAT exemptions;
d) 1% (one-off) Tax on Companies;
. . . ■
e) Corporate Income Tax lowered from 25% to 20 (or to 10% if profits reinvested;
f) Harsher penalties for tax evasion (see Table 6.15).
Source: Own elaboration.
Minister o f Finance Pablo Concha described the aims o f the reform in an interview with 
El Comercio (9.12.96:2):
“We are not assigning new taxes; we are eliminating the distortion o f  the system and 
attacking tax evasion. The only new tax is the 2 per cent tax on vehicles and the 1 per  
cent tax on companies is a one-off tax. What does the reform hinge upon? On the 
elimination o f  distortions, evasion and corruption. ”
Concha’s statement, while outlining the objectives o f the tax reform, also implies a 
reaction to the criticism the project would receive, which held that the government 
planned to introduce new taxes.
Opposition from all sides. After this tax reform proposal was sent to Congress, 
opposition to it started immediately. PSC, DP (the largest and third-largest party in
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Congress) and the ID stated officially that they would oppose the creation of new taxes. 
The MPD and Nuevo Pais also declared their rejection of the policy proposal. From the 
interest groups outside Congress the Bucaram government received varying signals: 
while the banking sector was mainly in favour of the reforms proposed, Quito’s 
Chamber of Commerce opposed them arguing that they would provide an incentive for 
the smuggling of cigarettes and liquor (given the high increase of the excise duties for 
these products) {El Comercio, 3.12.96:B6).
Meanwhile the discussion of the new tax policy was started in the Plenario as the law 
was sent at a time when the full Congress did not convene (see Figure 6.12). The 
discussion mainly related to procedural matters at first, as members of the opposition 
questioned whether this project could be decided upon by the Plenario rather than in the 
complete Congress. Several legislators argued that the Plenario did not have the legal 
capacity to deal with this proposal. A member of the PSC, Flores Troncoso, stated that 
the project confused legislation with constitutional reforms {Congreso Nacional del 
Ecuador, Acta No. 14). He referred to the parts of the proposal which aimed at 
introducing harsher penalties for tax evasion. For such a measure constitutional changes 
were required, which in turn did not fall into the capacity of the Plenario, an 
extraordinary period of sessions in Congress would be necessary. This extraordinary 
session was exactly what the opposition was calling for. While arguing legalistically 
saying that the reform could not be discussed in the Plenario due to its constitutional 
contents, a strategic calculation was certainly also behind their argument: in a fully 
convened Congress, the opposition parties would definitely be in the majority, while 
this was not necessarily the case in the Plenario, After this point had been raised 
repeatedly, Fabian Alarcon, the President of the Congress, declared that a discussion on 
the reform proposed could not be carried out in the Plenario, for the reasons mentioned 
by various legislators. According to Article 6 of the "Ley Organica de la Funcion 
Legislativa " the President of the Congress has the right to convene an extraordinary 
Congress. After Alarcon met with President Bucaram regarding this issue, the latter 
decided to withdraw the project. A discussion of this project in the Congress rather than 
the Plenario was not in his interest given the more limited presentation of governmental 
legislators in that space.
Tax reform -  second attempt. After the economic team around Minister of Finance 
Concha had revised the first reform proposal, the government of Bucaram presented its 
second version to the legislature some days later, on 10 December, 1996. There had
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been two substantial changes. On the one hand all parts relating to penalisation for tax 
evasion had been taken out to avoid any elements requiring a constitutional change. 
With this modification the reform proposal entailed only non-constitutional changes, 
which the Plenario could take decisions on. The second main change concerned the new 
rates for excise taxes. While the first version had provided for a huge increase in the tax 
rates for goods like tobacco and alcohol, the new reform proposal presented now 
contained significantly lower increases.
Excise tax. The excise tax was first introduced in Ecuador during the government of 
Osvaldo Hurtado (1981-84) where the collections were designated for creating an 
emergency fund for floods in the coastal areas. Under the subsequent government of 
President Febres Cordero (1984-88) excise duties were increased in order to fund health 
programmes. During the presidency of Borja (1988-92), then, excise tax rates for 
cigarettes, beer and other products were doubled. Several years later, in 1995, President 
Duran Ballen (1992-96) lowered the rates again: black tobacco (pipes and cigars), for 
example, was reduced from 25 to 15 per cent, and Virginia tobacco (cigarettes) from 
100 to 67 per cent (Ley 110, 29.12.1995). The rates introduced by this reform were the 
ones the Bucaram government wanted to modify one year later in December 1996.
Table 6.14: Excise tax
Until Dec. 1996 1st Proposal 
(28.11.96)
2nd + 3rd Proposal 
(9.12.96)
Virginia tobacco 67% 300% 103%
Black tobacco 15% 200% 48%
B eer 30% 80% 43% ,
Alcohol (other than  beer) 20% 240% 63%
Source: Own elaboration.
The first proposal set out to increase excise tax rates drastically: the rate for alcohol, for 
example, was to be increased from 20 to 240 per cent. After the government had 
announced this plan on the 28th of November, intense lobbying from the potentially 
affected industries started immediately. The tobacco industry (Agro-industria 
Tabacalera) mounted a campaign in the national newspapers, in which advertisements 
criticised the increase of the excise duty for cigarettes. The representative of Philip 
Morris in Ecuador, Sobalvarro, entered into conversations both with the government 
and with legislators from different parties trying to convince them of the damage an 
increase of the excise tax would cause to the industry. Santiago Bucaram, member of
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the PRE, reported about two meetings he had with the Philip Morris representative 
Sobalvarro {El Comercio, 11.12.96:3). Rafael Cuesta, legislator of the PSC, complained 
about the presence of Sobalvarro in the legislative space and asked the President of the 
Congress to ban the Philip Morris representative from entering the Congress {El 
Comercio, 9.12.96:3). The tobacco industry and especially Philip Morris had thus 
intensely lobbied the government to change the excise tax proposal. In consequence, the 
increased excise duties were cut significantly by the government. While alcohol, for 
example, was to rise from 20 to 240 per cent in the original plan the revised version 
now provided for a rate of 63 per cent (see Table 6.14 for other changes).
The second proposal in the Plenario. Upon receiving the significantly modified tax 
reform, the President of Congress Fabian Alarcon decided that the discussion could go 
ahead in the Plenario given that it had the power to discuss, approve or reject legal 
reforms presented by the executive. Only if no quorum would be reached in the 
Plenario, would he call for an extraordinary session of Congress. While the opposition 
parties (PSC, DP, ID, MPD, Nuevo Pals) acknowledged that some positive changes had 
been made they considered the second proposal essentially the same as the first and 
therefore maintained their opposition. Despite this negative reception of the new 
proposal by the main opposition parties, the government was optimistic about being 
able to get the reform through. PRE legislator Padilla stated that in addition to the votes 
of the government “Apart from the 18 government votes, another two from the PSC and 
one o f the ID will be added’ {El Comercio, 11.12.96:3). Yet only one day later El 
Comercio announced that the FRA -  which had so far been part of the government -  
would withdraw arguing that they preferred being able to decide independently on 
legislative matters. A few days later the withdrawal of the FRA was ultimately 
confirmed when the Tourism Minister, Napoleon Ycaza (a member of the FRA) 
resigned. At the same time the FRA called on all its members holding positions in the 
public sector to do likewise {El Comercio, 15.12.96:C2).
The departure of the FRA meant that the government lost one crucial seat (vote number 
18 out of 35) in the Plenario, where on the 18th of December the second tax reform 
proposal was discussed. At the beginning of the session 18 out of the 35 legislators were 
present: while the opposition was mostly gathered, all but one of the governmental 
legislators were absent. El Comercio (19.12.96:6) reported that President Bucaram had 
retained the PRE legislators from the session as they had not managed to mobilise 
sufficient votes for approving the legislation. The one PRE representative who attended
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the session, Santiago Bucaram, represented the 18th person necessary for reaching a 
quorum. However, in the moment the quorum was announced the latter left the room 
saying that without him they would be without a quorum (El Comercio, 19.12.96:6). In 
this moment the President of the Congress, Fabian Alarcon, decided to call for an 
extraordinary session of Congress as he was not willing to allow the proposed law to 
come into force by default.121 It was certain that a quorum would be reached in the full 
Congress given that the opposition parties held a majority there (in the Plenario 
reaching a quorum was more difficult for the opposition as the government was close to 
holding a majority and as usually participation was not complete). For his decision to 
convene the Congress, Alarcon was later accused of beginning his treason against 
Bucaram by Victor Hugo Sicouret of the PRE (Sicouret, interview, 16.4.2004).
It became more and more likely that also this second reform proposal would be rejected 
or significantly modified given that the decision was now to be taken in the Congress 
where those opposition parties who had publicly rejected both versions represented the 
majority. Being aware of the potential failure, the government took recourse to outlining 
the negative consequences of rejecting the law: Finance Minister Concha announced 
that drastic cuts would become necessary as the current fiscal deficit was 6 per cent; in 
addition negotiations with multilateral organisations would be seriously affected (El 
Comercio, 20.12.96:1+6). Yet the next day, the 19th of December, things took a slightly 
unexpected turn as Alarcon decided to hold a session in the Plenario contrary to his 
previous pronouncement. In this space the government managed to secure a majority for 
having the first two articles of the reform approved. These articles, however, 
represented smaller elements of the reform (e.g. determining that all public entities 
would pay income tax). After this session Alarcon defended the decision to hold this 
session in the Plenario saying that he wanted to use this space to resolve the easier 
aspects before moving to the Congress (El Comercio, 20.12.96:6). One day later, on the 
20th, the Congress convened and the project was largely rejected: out of the 11 articles 
discussed, seven were turned down, including the main provisions of the project. While 
the debate continued and a defeat of the reform became clear, President Bucaram sent a 
fax to the Congress and withdrew the proposed legislation (Congreso Nacional del 
Ecuador, Acta No. 2).
121 If the Plenario would not pronounce itself about the law within 30 days after the proposal had been 
sent by the Executive, it would automatically be introduced by "Ministerio de la Ley”.
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Tax reform -  third attempt. A few days later, on the 23 rd of December, the 
government of Bucaram sent a third version of the tax project. The proposal was scaled 
down significantly: only 11 articles were left (from previously 48) and major elements 
such as the elimination of VAT exemptions and the 2 per cent Vehicle Tax had been 
taken out. What was left were: the increase in excise taxes (the rates proposed were the 
same as in the second proposal); the 1 per cent Tax on the Net Capital of companies as a 
one-off payment; and the reduction of Corporate Income Tax from 25 to 20 per cent (or 
10 per cent if profits were reinvested) (see Table 6.15). After this third proposal was 
sent, President of Congress Alarcon declared that he would proceed as previously: the 
bill would be treated in the Plenario yet should no quorum be reached there he would 
convene an extraordinary session of Congress. The government thus deprived of the 
potential strategy to leave the Plenario inquorate, accordingly made its legislators 
participate in the session. On the 27th of December, finally bringing this story to an end, 
the third version of the tax reform was largely approved by the Plenario, including all 
the main elements mentioned earlier. The approval of this third version of the tax bill 
can be explained by various aspects: Firstly, the government was close to holding a 
majority in the Plenario and the legislator of the former coalition partner FRA gave its 
support for some parts of the bill. The possibility of deciding on the bill in the Plenario 
rather than the full Congress thus gave an advantage to the government. Secondly, it 
was difficult for the opposition to maintain its rejection of the project after it was 
trimmed to such an extent that basically all elements previously criticised had been 
taken out. The former discourse of opposition to the creation of new taxes was no 
longer sustainable either. The opposition parties had consequently become more flexible 
and did vote in favour of some of the articles. Still, they continued to disapprove of 
some elements, yet due to unfortunate manoeuvring, they were unsuccessful and the 
proposal got through. This happened in the case of excise taxes. When it came to 
deciding on the article on the excise duties, 32 legislators (out of 35) were present: 16 
from the government, Wilson Merino from the FRA, and 15 of the opposition. While 
the FRA had officially left the government a short while ago, legislator Merino voted 
with the government on several parts of the project. On the issue of excise taxes, 
however, Merino had made clear that he would vote against their increase. When it 
came to voting on this matter, the 15 legislators of the opposition left the room in a clear 
attempt to leave the Plenario without quorum. One of the legislators who had left -  Luis 
Borja from the PSC -  had a substitute (Humberto Delgado) who was known to vote 
with the government. Thus when Borja had left, Delgado took his place and the votes of
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the government rose to 17; at the same time the number necessary for a quorum was 
reached (17 from the government plus Merino from the FRA). In consequence, the 
article on excise taxes (and the main element of the third proposal) was approved. In 
retrospect one can only consider this as a mistake or miscalculation of the opposition: 
had they stayed and voted the result would have been 16 for the government and 16 for 
the opposition (given that Merino had previously announced he would vote against it). 
According to the rules, the article on excise duties would not have been approved {El 
Comercio, 28.-31.12.96).
Table 6.15: Evolution of Bucaram’s Tax Reform
1st Proposal
28.11.1996
2nd Proposal
9.12.1996
3rd Proposal
23.12.1996
Approved
27.12.1996
Excise Tax: 8-300%122 Excise Tax: 8-103% Approved
2% on cars Withdrawn —
VAT: elimination of exemptions Withdrawn —
1% (one off) Tax on the Net Capital of Companies Approved
Corporate Income Tax: from 25 to 20%, or to 10% if profits reinvested Approved
Tax Code: penalties of 2 to 5 
years introduced for tax fraud Withdrawn —
—
Source: Own elaboration.
Why the Reform Failed
Looking at the evolution of the tax reform as undertaken by the Bucaram government 
and comparing what had been proposed in the beginning and what was ultimately 
introduced, the project can be considered as having failed. The outcome of this tax 
reform project was determined by several factors: the unfavourable situation the ruling 
party held in the legislature given their low share of seats; the consistent action of the 
opposition which had closed ranks after insults from Bucaram and the government’s 
attempts to bypass the legislature; the constitutional right granted to the President of 
Congress to convene an extraordinary Congress, an option used by Alarcon to avoid 
having the law introduced by default which opened the possibility for the clear defeat of 
the second proposal; the influence of economic interest groups as regards the excise 
taxes; and the opposition parties’ unfortunate manoeuvring leading to the approval of
122 For individual rates see Table 6.14 above and Appendix G.
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the new excise taxes. Finally, it should be mentioned that popular opinion played a 
rather limited role. Society largely did not take much notice of the tax measures 
proposed by the government as newspaper coverage of that period shows. Public 
opinion was only mobilised when it came to a more visible economic policy soon after 
the tax reform had failed.
From tax reform to the fall of President Bucaram. As both President Bucaram and 
Minister of Finance Concha had already announced when the tax reform was in danger, 
other fiscal measures would be necessary to reduce the deficit. Accordingly, a couple of 
days after the tax reform failed and little additional income from tax collection was to 
be expected, Bucaram announced an increase in the price of cooking gas on 8 January, 
1997. This measure triggered a wave of protests throughout the country: demonstrations 
by pensioners, teachers, social movements such as the indigenous organisation 
Confederation de Nacionalidades Indigenas (Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities, 
CONAIE), the unemployed, Ecuador’s main trade union, the FUT, and other groups 
were carried out throughout January protesting against the government of Bucaram and 
its economic policies. On the 5th of February protests were at their peak with a huge 
demonstration in Quito and other cities, which was called by some the largest 
mobilisation of the last 50 years (Ribadeneira, Hernandez et al. 1997:227). The next day 
an extraordinary session of Congress was convened, which declared President Bucaram 
as mentally incapable to govern and named President of Congress Fabian Alarcon as 
interim President of the Republic.
While there is no direct link between the failed tax reform and the ousting of Bucaram 
there is certainly an indirect one. The opposition parties had become increasingly 
determined to overthrow the government. The Minister of Housing of the Bucaram 
government, Victor Hugo Sicouret, already interpreted the defeat of the tax reform as an 
indicator for the political parties’ plan to bring an end to Bucaram’s presidency: “The 
National Congress rejected everything because they already wanted to bring down the 
government. ” (Sicouret, interview, 16.4.2004). On the other hand popular protest 
played its role in bringing about Bucaram’s ultimate overthrow after having been in 
power for only six months. Given the failure of the tax reform, the government of 
Bucaram was forced to take a fiscal measure for which the approval of the legislature 
was not needed -  consequently, the price of gas was raised by presidential decree. It 
was this measure which triggered the massive protests, with more and more people
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calling for Bucaram to step down, which the Congress ultimately used as a justification 
for its decision to dismiss Bucaram.
6.5 C r e a t io n  o f  t h e  SRI d u r in g  A l a r c 6 n  G o v e r n m e n t  (1997-1998)
In December 1997, during the interim government of Fabian Alarcon (1997-98)123 an 
important reform creating a new, autonomous Internal Revenue Service (Servicio de 
Rentas Internas, SRI) was passed by Congress (Ley 41, 2.12.1997). The previous tax 
collecting body -  part of the Ministry of Finance -  was widely considered corrupt and 
inefficient. Teresa Minuche, former President of the Legislative Commission for Tax 
and Budget Matters (1992-93), commented: If you had gone to the Internal Revenue 
Service before 1997, “you would have found some horrible offices, some terrible people 
without any training, who took bribes from the taxpayers. ” (Minuche, interview,
25.3.2004). With the legislation introduced in late 1997 a process of institutionalisation 
was started, which significantly changed Ecuador’s tax collection system. Once Elsa de 
Mena was appointed as Director of the SRI in September 1998, the organisation was 
completely overhauled: new offices were set up, computer equipment was renewed, and 
-  most significantly -  new staff was hired. All former members of staff had to undergo 
examinations, which were only passed by 35 out of the 1700 employees; all those who 
failed were dismissed (De Mena, interview, 20.4.2004). New staff was employed, 
trained and paid; a careers-based scheme introduced, salaries were raised (to reduce 
incentives for corruption), made transparent and allocated according to efficiency. The 
reform has generally been evaluated very positively as expressed by Simon Bustamante, 
President of the legislative commission responsible for tax matters at the time (1998- 
2000):
“Without a doubt, having created the Servicio de Rentas Intemas completely changed 
the system o f tax collection in the country. Through this entity tax evasion was reduced 
significantly, collections improved. " (Bustamante, interview, 20.4.2004)
In the years after the SRI was set up, tax revenues started to increase particularly as 
regards the VAT: while revenues were US$756 million in 1997 by 2001 they had 
almost doubled to US$1,47 billion (SRI, 2004). Considering the significance of the 
legislation it seems surprising that it was introduced during the interim presidency of 
Alarcon. His government was able to introduce hardly any reforms at all, Beckerman 
(2002:35) stated: “This government had inadequate political support for anything more 
than caretaking. ” All of Alarcon’s significant initiatives were turned down by
123 Alarc6n was from the small centre-right party Frente Radical Alfarista (FRA), which held only three 
seats in Congress at that time.
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Congress; in early 1998, for example, it proposed a series of tax measures (such as a tax 
on gross corporate income, an increase in the VAT rate) but these were opposed by 
Congress and the society at large and therefore failed.124 Why, then, did the law to 
establish the SRI pass in December 1997? It seems likely that the legislature simply did 
not realise the potential scope of this reform. Gustavo Arteta from the think tank 
CORDES (Corporation de Estudios para el Desarrollo), who described the 
introduction of the legislation as “a miracle”, maintained:
"Maybe they thought that this was a question o f an arrangement o f bureaucrats, an 
issue where nothing would happen and in the end they said yes. ... This is what I  think 
happened there, one o f those things that was approved and would have no impact 
whatsoever and which was a matter o f makeup like in many other cases o f institutions 
where they change the name and in the end it continues as before. ” (Arteta, interview,
7.4.2004).
The Director of the SRI, Elsa de Mena, argued in a similar way and considered that the 
legislators "definitely did not realise ... they approved the law but never believed that 
this law could give rise to a transformation o f the tax administration. " (De Mena, 
interview, 20.4.2004). Former Minister of Finance, Pablo Better, considered the 
measure “superficial” when it was proposed and only later realised the difference it 
made (Better, interview, 30.3.2004). Another indicator is that the newspapers did not 
take any notice of the discussion surrounding this bill at the time, and no reporting took 
place. Both within the Congress and outside it, then, the legislation relating to the 
creation of a new tax agency was not considered as significant, which explains why it 
passed during the otherwise rather uneventful government of Alarcon.
Conclusion. The cases considered in this chapter provide ample evidence that specific 
institutional provisions had a significant influence on presidents’ possibilities to 
introduce tax legislation: In 1986 the constitutional decree powers allowed President 
Febres Cordero to introduce a significant increase in the Sales Tax. The reform of 1989 
was possible mainly -  though helped by popular support -  because of the constitutional 
provisions regarding the Plenario, which allowed President Borja to have the reform 
approved in a space where his party held a majority. The governments of Duran Ballen, 
Bucaram and Alarcon largely failed to introduce their tax reforms undertaken in 1993, 
1996, and 1998 due to the lack of congressional support. That Duran Ballen managed to 
have some small tax changes introduced in 1995 was because of the extraordinary
124 The only significant change to the internal taxes that was passed was a lowering of the excise taxes: 
from 8-103% to 8-75% (for individual rates see Appendix G). By way of this law the changes passed by 
Bucaram only half a year earlier were practically reversed (Ley s/n, 31.7.1997).
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situation given the conflict with Peru; the passing of the bill to restructure the Internal 
Revenue Service under Alarcon in 1997 can be explained by the Congress's failure to 
grasp the significance of the reform.
No evidence was found that external actors played a significant part in putting tax 
reforms on the agenda. Though in the case of the 1989 reform, for example, Ecuador 
was influenced by reforms carried out elsewhere in the region, there was no pressure 
from the multilateral institutions, which only started to be concerned with tax reform 
from the early 1990s.125 Given the consultative process employed by the government no 
substantial public protest occurred in 1989. In 1993, on the other hand, protests by trade 
unions and social movements against the tax measures were widespread and backed up 
the opposition parties’ rejection of the bill in Congress. When Bucaram attempted his 
tax reform in 1996, society took little notice and protest only evolved once Bucaram had 
introduced the more visible measure of a price increase. As regards business groups, 
though they managed to gain minor changes to some of the tax policies, they did not 
have a major impact. In 1989 the private sector achieved only a few concessions from 
the government as a response to their criticism of the bill; in 1993 its opposition 
strengthened the general rejection; and in 1996 business groups had an effect on one 
aspect of the tax bill, as lobbying of the tobacco industry led to the introduction of a 
much lower excise tax increase than planned.
In short, while popular support or opposition played some role in the fate of the 1989 
and 1993 tax bills, it was principally the internal dynamics of the Congress that 
determined the outcomes.
125 That tax reform was not on the multilateral organisations’ agenda in the 1980s becomes clear, for 
example, when tracing their publications record on the issue: the first paper of the World Bank dealing 
with tax reform was published in 1991 (IBRD, 1991).
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7 Ecuador: Tax Reforms during the Governments of M ahuad and 
Noboa (1998-2001)
7.1 F r eq u e n t  C ha ng es  t o  t h e  T ax Sy st e m : M a h u a d ’s G o v er n m e n t  (1998- 
2000)
After a situation of high political instability culminated in the overthrow of President 
Bucaram in February 1997, and a period of a “lame duck” interim government during 
the presidency o f Alarcon, Jamil Mahuad of the DP was elected as Ecuador’s new 
President in July 1998 and subsequently assumed power in August. One o f the most 
striking features o f this election was the fact that the PSC had not put forward a 
presidential candidate. In the previous elections the PSC candidate Jaime Nebot had 
come second; the fact that one of the most important parties of Ecuador’s political 
landscape would not have a candidate running for the presidency was significant. It is 
commonly held in Ecuador that Mahuad got to the presidency with the help o f the PSC, 
which facilitated votes for him especially from the coastal areas (El Comercio, 
14.11.98:5). Mahuad was elected with 51.2 per cent of the votes against 48.8 per cent of 
his opponent, Alvaro Noboa of the PRE (TSE, 2004). This close result did not provide 
Mahuad with a particularly strong mandate, however.
Figure 7.1: Composition of Congress, 1998
1998 Number of parties - 13 Total Nr. of Seats-125
MUPP-NP, 6 Others*, 11 PCE, 2 (R u lina Partv)
MPC 
FRA, 
ID, 15
*1 1  seats were taken b y  10 different alliances o f parties  
including the parties a lread y  n a m e d  plus another 5.
Source: Own elaboration. 
Data from TSE.
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Yet some aspects seemed to provide President Mahuad with an advantage compared to 
other Ecuadorian governments: Mahuad’s ruling party DP was the biggest party in 
Congress, something that between 1984 and now had only been the case during the 
Borja government. In addition, the DP counted on the second largest share of seats held 
by a ruling party during the same period: 28 per cent (or 35 out of 125 seats).126 Given 
that the Congress was highly fragmented with 13 parties represented, it was 
nevertheless clear that governing would be difficult.
Economic situation and policies. In his election campaign Mahuad made rather 
specific promises (partly triggered by the huge promises made by his opponent Alvaro 
Noboa who was running for the PRE): subsidies would be targeted on the poorest 
sectors, he would create thousands of jobs, build new hospitals and homes for the 
homeless, yet despite these expenses the inflation rate would be kept down (Carriere, 
2001:144). These promises were difficult to keep, however, given the dire economic 
situation of the country. When Mahuad took over the presidency he inherited a hugely 
difficult economic situation: the fiscal deficit was around 7 per cent of GDP; inflation 
reached 45 per cent; oil prices were at an extremely low level of approximately US$7 a 
barrel; costs to repair damages caused by the climatic phenomenon El Nino were nearly 
US$300 million; debt servicing represented 41 per cent of the budget (Carriere, 
2001:144); and the trade deficit was more than US$1 billion for 1998 (Lucas, 2000:29). 
Economic measures to tackle this situation were to be expected and Mahuad made his 
first moves about a month after taking office: in September he devaluated the currency 
and subsidies were eliminated making the price of cooking gas rise by 510 per cent, 
diesel by 39 per cent and electricity by 353 per cent {El Comercio, 15.9.98:1). 
Simultaneously, however, a voucher system benefiting mothers below a certain level of 
income was introduced to counterbalance the cancellation of subsidies. The elimination 
of subsidies resulted in a huge loss of popularity for Mahuad: while he had enjoyed 
rather high levels when coming to power, his rates fell by 33 points (from 77 to 44) 
within only eight days of announcing this measure (El Comercio, 22.11.98:3). Faced 
with considerable protest, Mahuad re-introduced the subsidies later on. During the first 
months of his presidency, Mahuad dedicated his time mainly to the peace negotiations 
with Peru with which Ecuador had been in a military conflict in 1995. His attempts 
were successful and in October 1998 a peace agreement was signed.
126 The ID during the first half of the Borja government (1988-90) held the largest share held during the 
last two decades: 42.3%.
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Parti: Tax Reform 1998
At the same time as a devaluation and elimination of subsidies, President Mahuad and 
his economic team announced a major tax reform, one of its main elements being an 
increase of VAT from 10 to 14 per cent. This proposal, never formulated concretely in 
writing, received a lot of criticism and found no support among political parties in 
Congress. Soon after the VAT reform had been suggested by the government, the leader 
of the main opposition party in Congress, Jaime Nebot of the PSC, came up with an 
alternative plan: income taxes should be abolished and replaced by a 1 per cent 
Financial Transactions Tax (FTT), levied on all operations carried out via financial 
institutions. The rationale behind this proposal was explained by the current PSC leader 
and legislator during the period, Xavier Neira:
“We proposed it as a way to search for an alternative formula to a tax which no one 
paid to one that everyone would pay, because everyone draws cheques. ” (Neira, 
interview, 16.4.2004)
A certain populist discourse was also used to convince as the PSC pointed out that the 
tax on financial transactions would mean taxing the rich since it was the rich who 
circulated money and not the poor. Yet the intention was possibly rather the opposite: 
Sandoval, who played a crucial role in developing the 1989 reform, claimed that it was 
in the interest of Guayaquil’s entrepreneurs -  who he considered are represented by the 
PSC -  to replace the income tax by an FTT as the latter one would be easier to evade 
(Sandoval, interview, 26.3.2004). The PSC shared the policy proposal not only via the 
media but also with the government and all parties represented in Congress and initiated 
an informal discussion about it. Parties like the ID voiced their criticism of the proposal 
by sending a statement to Jaime Nebot pointing out that they could accept the FTT only 
if it would be introduced complementary to the income tax; MUPP-NP had a similar 
view, and the PRE rejected the FTT completely (El Comercio, 20.10.98:6). Formally, 
however, the PSC had no possibility whatsoever of presenting its proposal officially: 
while legislators used to have the right to present bills regarding any issue to Congress, 
this right had been restricted by the new Constitution that had come into force in 1998. 
Article 147 says that “Only the President o f the Republic can present projects for laws 
which would create, modify or abolish taxes, increase public spending or modify the 
political-administrative division o f the country." (Constitution 1998. My translation). 
The only possibility open to the PSC was thus to convince the government of its ideas.
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The government, which had considered the alternative proposal made by Nebot, gave 
signals that it would take up the idea of an FTT but was not willing to abolish the 
income tax as they wanted to keep the constitutional principles of progressiveness and 
equality of the tax system. Finance Minister Fidel Jaramillo is reported to have said on 
the 19th of October that the executive was thinking of including Nebot’s proposal but 
that at no time would it replace the income tax {El Comercio, 7.11.98:2). On this line 
the government presented its proposal on the 23rd of October, which contained: a) 
lowering the income tax to 10-20 per cent (from 25 per cent top rate); b) a Financial 
Transaction Tax of up to 1 per cent; and c) eliminating VAT exemptions (see Table 7.2). 
The government had hence decided in favour of a “mixed formula”: keeping (a 
lowered) income tax and introducing the FTT. While Mahuad’s government had thus 
clearly made an effort to find a compromise and had even completely abolished its 
original proposal to increase the VAT rate, the PSC, however, was firmly opposed to 
this proposal. Jaime Nebot asserted that the mixed formula would "denature " the FTT 
{El Comercio, 10.11.98:2) and PSC legislator Marcelo Dotti announced that the votes of 
the PSC were conditioned on the government’s proposal to be exactly the same as the 
one originally suggested by Nebot {El Comercio, 8.11.98:3).
After it became clear that the PSC would vote against the reform suggested by the 
government and after another two weeks of discussion, President Mahuad backed in and 
did not go ahead with sending the mixed formula to Congress. Instead, he sent the pure 
FTT proposal -  as invented by the PSC -  to the legislature on the 9th of November. A 1 
per cent tax on financial transactions was to be introduced and the income tax (both 
personal and corporate) abolished; the suggestion to eliminate VAT exemptions had 
been taken out. The only slight modification that Mahuad’s government made to the 
PSC proposal was that they put a condition on the existence of this change to the tax 
system: the FTT was to be maintained as long as it would render US$600 million per 
year (around 3 per cent of GDP), otherwise income tax would be automatically 
reinstated in 2001.
Table 7.2: Proposals for Tax Reform 1998
14.9.1998 
VAT Proposal
23.10.1998 
“Mixed Formula”
9.11.1998 
Financial Transactions Tax
VAT 14% 
(from 10%)
a) Income Tax 10-20% (from 25%) 
b) Financial Transactions Tax - up to 1% 
c) elimination of VAT exemptions
a) Income Tax abolished
b) 1% Financial Transactions 
Tax
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Opposition to FTT. After the announcement of the plan it was immediately rejected by 
several parties in Congress including the ID, PRE and MUPP-NP (Movimiento 
Pachakutik - Nuevo Pais), who stated clearly that they would vote against this proposal. 
Disapproval came also from a wide range of economic experts who did not approve of 
the FTT on technical grounds:
“With some professionals we had opposed this system for the effects it would provoke in 
the system and also because it would result in an inequitable taxation. ” (Ruales, SRI, 
interview, 23.3.2004)
Technocrats also referred to similar taxes having been introduced in other Latin 
American countries and, for example, in Argentina, Venezuela and Uruguay this tax 
was abolished after a couple of months since it did not bring the expected results {El 
Comercio, 9.11.98:3). Gustavo Arteta, Academic Director of the influential think tank 
CORDES, confirmed in an interview that the FTT “was introduced despite all the 
technical recommendations” (Arteta, interview, 7.4.2004). Perhaps even more 
significant is that Mahuad’s own economic team was opposed to the PSC proposal as 
well and favoured the mixed formula. As Francisco Swett, President of the Central 
Bank at that time pointed out: “Mahuad accepted it against his economic team's point 
o f view. ” (Swett, interview, 15.4.2004). In particular, Minister of Finance Jaramillo was 
against abolishing income tax as his earlier mentioned statement shows; El Comercio 
(8.11.98:3) reported him to have defended the mixed formula until the last day. The 
same newspaper repeatedly reported on the unfavourable opinion towards replacing 
income tax by the FTT within the Ministry of Finance more generally (see also Ortiz, 
interview, 30.3.2004). The Minister of the Administration, Ana Lucia Armijos, 
proposed a mixed form in which the 1000 biggest companies pay income tax just one 
day before the ultimate proposal was sent to Congress {El Comercio, 9.11.98:3). There 
is thus ample evidence that Mahuad acted against his economic team when he decided 
to ignore both proposals they had elaborated (the VAT increase and the mixed formula).
Criticism came also from multilateral organisations who considered the FTT as an anti- 
technical tax for the distortions it created in the financial sector. IMF officials criticised 
the measure repeatedly and even after the proposal was sent to Congress, IMF head 
Camdessus questioned a tax on financial transactions by referring to the negative 
experience of other countries with this type of tax {El Comercio, 17.11.98:B1).127
127 See also Chapter 5.3 on the view of multilateral organisations on financial transactions taxes.
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Finally, opposition was voiced within Mahuad’s ruling party DP. The party had 
traditionally held a view of a just tax system assured by a progressive income tax. By 
abolishing it, according to their view, it was no longer ensured that who owned more 
would also pay more. The FTT proposal thus shattered their long held views and several 
members of the DP opposed the measure. Raul Hurtado, Vice-President of the 
Legislative Commission for Tax, Fiscal, Banking, and Budget Matters and DP member, 
stated: “The Democracia Popular was internally opposed to this reform but externally 
it had to vote in favour o f the reform in Congress. ” (Hurtado, interview, 13.4.2004).
FTT approved by Congress. Despite this criticism from several sides, Mahuad stood 
by his plan and the FTT proposal submitted by the executive went through the 
traditional procedure in the legislature. It seemed certain that the proposal would have 
sufficient votes for approval as the DP, PSC and some smaller parties who had declared 
their support for the project represented a clear majority. However, before it came to the 
final discussion on Congress, it seemed for some time that the tax reform was in danger: 
in mid-November some legislators of the ruling DP who had been rebelling against the 
tax proposal made an attempt to change course. They tried to bring the mixed formula 
back on the agenda and negotiated with other parties in Congress to form a majority for 
this proposal. Given that those parties who had previously supported this idea -  such as 
the ID or MUPP-NP for example -  continued favouring the mixed formula, chances did 
not look too bad. However, only a few days later President Mahuad called his 
legislators to order and any attempt to topple the president-backed proposal for an FTT 
came to an end. After a short delay caused by this incident, the tax reform was approved 
without modifications by Congress -  with the votes of the PSC, DP, FRA, PC (Partido 
Conservador), and MCNP (Movimiento Ciudadanos Nuevo Pais) -  in late November 
(Congreso Nacional del Ecuador, Acta No. 43).
Why Mahuad accepted FTT. Considering the opposition Mahuad faced both from his 
own ranks and from outside the question is why he accepted Jaime Nebot’s proposal. 
Mahuad’s own statements give some evidence for this: he reported that in a meeting 
with his economic team someone said that if an economics student would have 
proposed the 1 per cent on financial transactions he or she would not have passed even 
the subject Finances I. Mahuad replied that the student might not pass Economics but 
would certainly pass Public Administration (El Comercio, 12.11.98:4). The anecdote 
makes clear that Mahuad was probably not totally convinced of the economic measure 
as such but was aware of the political realities, which did not allow him to introduce a
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policy of his choice. In an earlier interview President Mahuad said: “I f  it would be in my 
hands to introduce the tax reform, I  would do it. But it is not. Therefore, I  invited the 
Congress (to discuss it, SL).” (El Comercio, 20.9.98:3). The political situation was that 
while Mahuad’s ruling party held a comparatively high number of seats in Congress, 
these represented less than a third of the seats thus far from the majority. Alfredo 
Arizaga, who would become finance minister later during this government, evaluated 
the situation of President Mahuad as follows:
“Mahuad wanted to increase tax collection and did not have a majority in the 
Congress; he had to form a majority with someone, the party Izquierda Democratica 
and all the parties o f the left refused to raise taxes... And the Partido Socialcristiano... 
sustained that the income tax was a perverse tax and that they would be willing to 
support an initiative o f the government given their initiative would be adopted which 
was the Financial Transactions Tax.” (Arizaga, interview, 31.3.2004)
It does not seem particularly co-operative to offer support for one’s own initiative, yet 
the PSC’s strategy to just hold on to its own proposal without the slightest willingness 
to negotiate was ultimately successful. While the PSC was thus certainly not the easiest 
partner, it was a party that brought several advantages with it. Choosing this party, 
which was the second biggest, meant that just this two-party alliance practically held a 
majority in Congress. No further agreements with other parties were necessary; this was 
a much easier arrangement than a multi-party agreement. The PSC also seemed the best 
option as there was some overlap between DP and PSC as regards their economic 
visions. The “socialcristianos” had already voted with the government of Mahuad on a 
number of issues (for example the peace treaty with Peru) and also had not opposed the 
elimination of the subsidies in September (since this was introduced by decree there was 
no vote on this issue but during the discussions the PSC showed some tacit agreement 
while Mahuad received harsh criticism from other political parties). Certainly, Mahuad 
also looked to the future -  given that he was only at the beginning of his government he 
would need a coalition partner for the rest of the term. Political analyst Simon Pachano 
explained Mahuad’s choice in this sense as he drew attention to the fact that the 
government needed the PSC’s support for its modernisation plan. Given the 
composition of Congress, according to Pachano, forming a stable majority for the 
executive’s modernisation plan without the PSC would have been impossible (El 
Comercio, 21.11.98:3).
Considering the above, Mahuad’s decision in this case can be interpreted as political 
pragmatism: rather than not being able to introduce any reform at all, he preferred to
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take the politically viable way even though that meant fully adopting the proposal of 
another party.
‘7  chose this way, because on the 31st o f May, when in the evening the composition o f  
the Congress was known, any objective analyst came to the conclusion that the country 
would remain without a tax reform. The PSC had signed documents before a public 
notary stating that they would not touch taxes. And thinking that the extreme left would 
vote in favour o f raising taxes, thinking that popular groups would vote for this, is 
impossible. And my people would play on my side but we did not reach 51 per cent o f 
the votes.” (President Mahuad in an interview with El Comercio 22.11.98:3).
Mahuad’s statement makes clear he thought to only have the choice of either accepting 
the PSC proposal or not achieving any tax changes whatsoever. This pragmatism was 
also expressed by the fact that he chose to assign a potential temporary character to the 
new tax: should the FTT not raise a certain amount of income, it would be abolished 
and a new -  and improved -  income tax would be established. Another aspect is 
important for explaining why Mahuad accepted the FTT proposal: the FTT was a tax 
that would bring regular income rather than once a year as the income tax. Money 
would be flowing in just a few months after it was decided upon, and collection was 
expected to be higher than it had been for income tax. The government calculated that 
around US$700 million would be raised in 1999 {El Comercio, 10.11.98:2), which 
represented around US$220 million more than collected otherwise {El Comercio, 
7.11.98:2). With this money, Mahuad would have resources available to fulfil his 
announced programmes to a certain extent. Several people referred to this “cash flow 
argument” as a decisive element, including Victor Hugo Sicouret from the opposition 
party PRE but also Francisco Swett, President of the Central Bank and partisan of the 
PSC (Sicouret; Swett, interviews, 16.4.+15.4.2004). In addition, President Mahuad 
himself admitted this indirectly: when asked in an interview by El Comercio 
(22.11.98:3) why he had accepted it and if it was because of the bucket of money the tax 
offered on a daily basis, he answered that the point mentioned would be already 
sufficient for seriously considering such a tax.
Effects of FTT. While the income generated by this tax even exceeded the calculations 
made by the government, the overall effects of introducing this tax were generally 
evaluated as negative. Ex-finance minister Jaime Morillo Battle (1975-76, 1981-82) 
commented: “This provoked an incredible chaos, provoked capital flight, provoked that 
many transactions started to be carried out on the margins o f the banks and that 
deposits in the banks went down. ” (Morillo, interview, 7.4.2004). Many of the bigger 
companies took to depositing their money abroad, and were thus able to avoid paying
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the tax. According to some estimates capital flight reached US$400 million in January 
1999 (McConnell, 2001:73-4). Many people saw the increasing decapitalisation of the 
banks as a major factor contributing to the banking crisis Ecuador experienced in 1999 
(Arizaga, interview, 31.3.2004).
Evaluation of 1998 tax reform. It is difficult to classify this episode of tax reform into 
a success-failure scheme as on the one hand, the proposal ultimately sent by the 
executive to Congress was fully approved and could thus be considered as a success; on 
the other the reform attempt can be seen as a failure as President Mahuad was forced to 
completely give up his original proposal. Economist Pablo L. Paredes pointed out that 
making compromises is a common process in politics, but in this case the government 
had to give in very much (Paredes, interview, 7.4.2004). There are several reasons why 
an opposition party (PSC) was able to determine the tax agenda by itself: in a first phase 
Mahuad was rather absorbed by his negotiations for a peace treaty with Peru which was 
finally signed in late October. While this represented a significant political achievement, 
it meant that economic policies were not a priority for him during these early months of 
his presidency. Since the government was busy with other things, the PSC used its 
chance to bring into play its own plans for tax reform. The procedure around the 
introduction of this reform was rather novel: generally it is the executive that proposes a 
reform, sends it to Congress and then tries to find sufficient support. In many cases, 
such as that of Bucaram’s attempt to introduce a tax reform (see Chapter 6.4), this 
procedure did not work and reforms failed (or at least were drastically modified) as 
governments simply did not find enough partisan support for their approval in Congress. 
Mahuad managed to avoid such a failure -  and it seems certain his government’s 
original proposal to increase the VAT from 10 to 14 per cent would have been defeated 
had he sent it to Congress without any previous consulting. Mahuad chose to consult 
first and to submit his bill to the legislature only when he was certain that he had formed 
a majority for it. Already at the beginning of the process to introduce a tax reform, 
President Mahuad explained his approach in an interview with El Comercio:
“Usually, what they do here is to send the project without talking beforehand and I  
believe here you have to talk, invite the Congress to have a discussion, have meetings, 
exchange concepts, see on which points there is an agreement and on which points 
there is not Then we elaborate a proposal that could be acceptable. ” (El Comercio, 
20.9.98:3).
This approach of discussing first and building an acceptable proposal has some parallels 
to the reform undertaken in 1989 (with the difference of course that then it was the
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government’s proposal which was accepted in the end) where Borja’s government also 
went through a consultation process before sending it to Congress. A difference was, 
however, that in the case of the tax reform of 1998 public opinion seems to have played 
a limited role. Society’s focus was on the economic measures taken by Mahuad in 
September and protests were aimed at reversing the elimination of subsidies which had 
led to a huge price increase for gas and electricity.
April 1999: Tax Reform Part II
Economic situation. In early 1999 the economic situation deteriorated further as the 
fiscal deficit, as calculated in early April, stood at 7.3 per cent of GDP {El Comercio, 
1.4.99:B3). During the first months of the year unemployment rose dramatically and 
according to the Labour Ministry 400 companies went bankrupt between January and 
April 1999 causing around 90,000 people to lose their jobs (Lucas, 2000:31). 1999 was 
particularly marked by the crisis in the financial sector: between November 1998 and 
February 1999 five banks crashed and were then bailed out by the state, with the costs 
reaching around US$1 billion (Lucas, 2000:9). On the 9th of March President Mahuad 
announced a bank holiday and deposits were frozen to prevent a massive withdrawal of 
money. One week later banks were re-opened and the freezing of deposits was relaxed. 
Especially due to the difficulties in the banking sector, the government faced huge extra 
expenditures that necessitated further efforts to rectify public finances. Social spending 
was cut by 50 per cent in real terms during the whole of 1999 (Lucero, 2001:62); in 
mid-March the government took to increasing fuel prices by 163 per cent, which 
triggered massive protests in the society so that in the end, President Mahuad agreed to 
lower them.
Tax reform. Additionally the Mahuad government proposed Congress a tax reform in 
early March of which the main element was a VAT increase from 10 to 15 per cent, and 
also planned to introduce a Vehicle Tax of 4 per cent (see Table 7.3). Given the 
categorical refusal of the PSC to give its support for any measure that would entail 
raising taxes or introducing new ones (other than the FTT), the government changed its 
course and broke off from the coalition partner with whom it had introduced the FTT 
legislation of November 1998 and in whom it had set hopes for a more long-term co­
operation. Instead Mahuad turned to the other parties represented in Congress. Yet his 
proposal to changing the VAT rate again (just as in September 1998) did not find any 
supporters and the government gave up this plan when it had become clear that it was 
not politically viable. The government of Mahuad then started to discuss with various
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parties -  DP, ID, MUPP-NP, MCNP, MPD, PSE and PC -  which showed some 
willingness to co-operate and this alliance then worked on a joint proposal. Economic 
analyst, Gustavo Arteta, commented on this process:
“There was no consensus to increase the VAT but there was a consensus on all these 
other reforms, so that in this process the government distanced itself from the Partido 
Socialcristiano ... they put back the income tax and this was approved with a coalition 
o f the centre and the left, the centre, centre-left, and the left. Thus it was a complete 
rupture with the right, the social-christian right, thinking o f the Christian-democrats 
(DP, SL) as centre-right. It was a total political change. " (Arteta, interview, 7.4.2004)
The proposal the newly formed coalition finally agreed upon was made public in late 
March and contained the following changes to the tax system:
a) reinstatement of income tax (at a lower rate than previously);
b) abolition of FTT (from 2000)
c) elimination of VAT exemptions (maintained for basic food items and
medicine);
d) 2-4 per cent luxury Vehicle Tax (2 per cent for cars worth ECS120-200m; 4
per cent on those of higher value);
e) 1 per cent Tax on Corporate Assets.
The main element of this rather comprehensive programme was the re-introduction of 
the income tax, which had been abolished only several months earlier. The reform also 
intended to create two additional taxes: a Vehicle Tax (which was similar to the one that 
had also been installed for one year during the Duran government as a “wartime tax 
measure” and which Bucaram tried to introduce in December 1996 but failed) and a 1 
per cent corporations tax (similar to the one valid in 1997 as introduced in Bucaram’s 
term). Another significant aspect was the elimination of VAT exemptions which had 
been tried unsuccessfully by many governments. Soon after this agreement was reached, 
the government sent the project as an urgent economic law to Congress, thus allowing 
30 days for a decision by the legislature. While things seemed to be steering towards a 
quick approval, a delay occurred as some of the seven parties involved in the alliance 
started questioning some aspects of the version sent by the executive. Some of the 
points questioned did not directly refer to the tax reform but to other elements entailed 
in the Ley de Reordenamiento de las Finanzas Publicas (Law of Restructuring the 
Public Finances). Thus the government of Mahuad entered again in discussions with 
MUPP-NP (which questioned the process outlined for salary increases) and also the ID, 
which was the most important coalition partner as it counted on 17 seats in Congress 
while the others only held six or less. After agreeing to some compromises, the
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executive sent a revised version to Congress in early April. However, this version 
included no major changes.
On the 15th of April the Congress initiated the final debate and a part of the project was 
approved. A few days later Guayaquil’s Chambers of Commerce, who had been 
opposed to various parts of the tax reform (especially the creation of new taxes and die 
changes to the tax code), announced that it would organise a strike on the 22nd 
paralysing production throughout the country to try and stop these measures. Francisco 
Alarcon, President of the Chamber of Industrialists, railed against the reform:
"... this project which circulates in the Congress and which will finish o ff the 
productive sector o f the country. We are fighting against this law and against the 
reforms to the tax code which are monstrous. ’’ {El Comercio, 20.4.99:2).
The opposition from this side and the announced strike (which did not really take off) 
did leave the Congress largely untouched. In the following days the remaining parts of 
the tax reform were approved with the votes of the earlier mentioned parties. Out of 62 
articles only two minor ones were rejected: a) a change in the tax code allowing the 
closure of establishments which do not pay their taxes, b) tax on concessions for beach 
areas levied on the prawn industry.
Table 7.3: Tax Reform April 1999
Proposed Approved
VAT increase 
from 10 to 15%
4% Tax on 
Vehicles
a) Income tax reinstated (as of May ‘99) - top rate 15% (from 25%)
b) 1% FTT m aintained in 1999 (abolished in 2000)
c) Tax on luxury vehicles of 4% on ca rs  worth m ore than ECS200m  
payable in 1999 only; 5% on helicopters, p lanes, yachts in 1999, 
2% thereafter
d) Elimination of VAT exem ptions
e) 1% Tax on Corporate A ssets valid in 1999
f) Modification of tax code to improve collection and  prison penalties 
for tax evasion established
Source: Own elaboration.
While the project had hence gone through Congress almost unaltered, President Mahuad 
took recourse to his veto power as provided by the Constitution and tried to impose 
some last refinements: he re-introduced one of the two rejected articles and suggested 
that the FTT should be kept as an advance payment also in the year 2000. The Congress 
managed to mobilise a two-thirds majority to override the latter veto as the published
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law shows: the Ley 99-24 from 30 April, 1998 determined that the FTT would be 
abolished as of 2000. The other veto, however, went through and the change to the tax 
code was introduced. Later on this provision would lead to a process of great 
consequence as the national tax authority (SRI) carried out a very visible campaign 
closing down tax evading shops and marking them with big posters (Arteta, interview,
7.4.2004). The campaign is held to have helped raise tax collection considerably.
Table 7.3 shows the main elements of the tax reform approved in April 1999 (and 
compares it to the original government proposal).
Summary. In the tax reform undertaken in April 1999, the government again did not 
manage to have its original proposal implemented as an increase of the VAT rate was 
rejected by all political parties in Congress. The government itself considered the 
project to have failed as indicated by Ana Lucia Armijos, Minister of Finance at that 
time:
"What is being discussed in Congress was not the government’s original proposal. The 
adequate thing to do would have been to raise the VAT, correcting the exonerations. ” 
(El Comercio, 13.4.99:2)
While the original project thus failed, ultimately some significant changes to the tax 
system were introduced, approved by an alliance between ruling party DP and other 
parties from the centre, centre-left, and left. Private sector group opposition failed to 
influence the tax reform.
November 1999: Tax Reform Part III
Despite the tax reform of April 1999 and some other fiscal measures, the economic 
situation deteriorated further during the remainder of the year. Oil was at an all-time 
low price at only US$7 per barrel. Given the significant dependence of the Ecuadorian 
economy on the income generated by oil, the influence of this fall in export earnings on 
the already strained public finances was enormous. The sucre devalued dramatically, 
reaching 25,000 to the dollar by Christmas 1999 (McConnell, 2001:75). In September 
1999, Ecuador saw itself forced to default on its Brady bonds (worth US$5.6 billion). 
No other country had so far defaulted on its Brady bonds and Ecuador was increasingly 
losing the confidence of foreign investors. Remaining on good terms with the 
multilateral credit agencies, such as IMF and World Bank, was more important than 
ever in this situation and the Ecuadorian government negotiated about a stand-by 
agreement with the IMF during autumn 1999. The IMF had made it clear that a VAT
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increase (to 15 per cent) would be a prerequisite for this agreement as was clearly stated 
by its representative in Ecuador, Jeffrey Franks {El Comercio, 1.10.99:B1; 27.10.99:5). 
Facing the critical economic situation and influenced by the demands of the multilateral 
organisations the government of Mahuad developed yet another tax reform and sent it to 
Congress in September together with the budget proposal for 2000.
The government’s reform entailed to increase the VAT rate from the current 10 to 15 
per cent -  it was the third time Mahuad tried this within twelve months. Another 
element was to maintain the FTT -  at a rate lowered to 0.3 per cent -  during the year 
2000, after the legislation approved in April had determined this tax would terminate at 
the end of 1999. The income tax was to be increased with the top rate of both the 
corporate and personal version of the tax reaching 25 per cent. It was intended that the 
tax base of the Personal Income Tax would be lowered from the current ECS80 million 
to 30 million, thereby amplifying the pool of taxpayers significantly (see Table 7.4 for 
details of the reform proposal). In the light of the continued refusal of the PSC to 
negotiate any increase of taxes whatsoever even in this time of economic crisis, Mahuad 
turned again to the smaller parties who had been his allies in April’s tax reform. The 
government negotiated especially with the ID, FRA, DP, PS and MUPP-NP. In the 
course of their discussions Mahuad had to give up his plan of a 15 per cent VAT given 
that none of these parties was willing to support the measure. However, for the first time 
during this governmental term, the opposition became more flexible and was willing to 
increase this tax somewhat: a consensus was reached on raising VAT to 12 per cent. Yet 
this concession did not come without conditions attached to it, as Mahuad’s allies 
demanded that the product of this VAT increase would be designated to the municipal 
governments, which in turn made it easier for them to defend the measure when facing 
their constituencies. This was against the interest of the executive but they ultimately 
gave in to this demand.
Regarding the income tax, the top rate of 25 per cent -  for both Personal and Corporate 
Income Tax -  as proposed by the government found approval among the parties 
involved in the negotiations. The aspect they did not agree with, however, was the 
lowering of the tax base, the lowest level to which they would consent was ECS60 
million. There was agreement on keeping the tax on financial transactions, though the 
opposition parties proposed a rate of around 0.5-0.8 per cent instead of the 0.3 per cent 
intended by the government. The negotiations about details and percentages carried on 
for weeks. In mid-October MUPP-NP declared that it would not support the reform; yet
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without their votes the multi-party alliance around this reform did not represent a 
majority {El Comercio, 20.10.99:7). While the time passed on and still no consensus 
was found, the media increasingly criticised the inactivity of the Congress and the 
politicians. The government started negotiating with MUPP-NP in order to bring the 
party back into the alliance. An agreement was ultimately reached during a discussion in 
Congress at the end of October (the reform had been sent to Congress almost two 
months earlier): during a debate, the legislator Raul Hurtado from the DP summarised 
the points around which a majority seemed to have evolved and submitted this summary 
as a document for approval to Congress. His proposal was approved by 51 out of 97 
legislators present and then, according to the rules, was sent to the commission 
responsible for tax matters {El Comercio, 27.10.1999). The commission, in turn was 
only to edit the text, and then re-submit it for the second and final debate to Congress. 
This procedure speeded up the process as now the differences within the Commission 
were no longer relevant.
The main elements of the reform which had majority-backing in Congress were: a) 
VAT of 12 per cent (gains of increase to be passed on to municipal governments); b) 
FTT to be maintained at 0.8 per cent during 2000, prepayment mechanism kept; c) 
Income Tax: Personal 5-25 per cent (tax base ECS80 million128); Corporate 25 per cent 
(see Table 7.4).
Table 7.4: Tax Reform November 1999
Original Proposal Approved Tax Reform
VAT: 15%  (from 10%) VAT: 12%(revenues of increase for municipalities)
FTT: 0.3%  (from 1%) FTT: 0.8%
Incom e Tax: 
a) Personal: 5 -2 5 %  (b ase  ECS30m ) 
b) Corporate: 25%
Incom e Tax: 
a) Personal: 5 -2 5 %  (b ase  ECS80m ) 
b) C orporate: 25%
Source: Own elaboration.
All these elements where approved basically by the alliance the government had 
managed to form with the ID, FRA, PC, PS and MUPP-NP. However, as regards the 
increase of the VAT rate, MUPP-NP voted against it thus showing that the government 
had not managed to come to a deal with this party in the negotiations following
128 Ca. US$3,200 under the dollarisation exchange rate.
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MUPP-NP’s announcement to vote against the reform. Yet fortunately for the 
government the 60 votes reached with the remaining allies (ID, FRA, PC and PS in this 
matter together with the votes of the ruling DP) were sufficient as only 97 members out 
of the 125 in total attended the session {El Comercio, 27.10.99). The PSC, PRE and 
MPD voted against all of the issues proposed. However, their voting can be interpreted 
as a subtle support for the measures: had they abstained instead, the measures would not 
have been approved, because -  according to the Constitution -  abstentions are not 
counted as valid votes and the valid votes (in favour and against) have to reach at least 
an absolute majority of the members of Congress. Francisco Swett, PSC member and 
former finance minister, evaluated his party’s behaviour in this sense: “There was an 
opposition o f words but not o f deeds. " (Swett, interview, 15.4.2004).
Evaluating the tax reform of November 1999. Comparing the government’s original 
proposal to what was ultimately approved, once again the executive did not manage to 
get much of its reform proposal through. Great modifications were made given that 
Mahuad was obliged to form a multi-party alliance in which all of its members had 
diverse ideas and demanded different concessions. Instead of increasing the VAT to 15 
per cent, it was raised to just 12 per cent; instead of the resulting higher revenues 
benefiting the strained central government finances, these were to be allocated to the 
municipalities. The tax reform ultimately approved can hardly be called a drastic fiscal 
measure to counterbalance the deficit. The finance minister at the time, Alfredo Arizaga, 
considered the increase as an “insufficient” fiscal measure (Arizaga, interview,
31.3.2004). In consequence, the reform can be considered as having failed. Still, some 
modifications were introduced and after all, it was the first VAT increase since this tax 
was introduced in 1989 (the Sales Tax, its predecessor, was raised in 1986). It was 
already the third time that the government had proposed to raise the VAT rate but until 
now all the opposition parties had refused to consider this. This time, however, they 
proved more flexible and ultimately did give their support for a 2 per cent increase. The 
degree of the economic crisis had been perceived by most of the political actors and 
they were thus more open to accept measures which they would not have accepted at 
other times. An official of the Internal Revenue Service, Gustavo Guerra, pointed out 
that there had been a consciousness of the crisis and that it was for this reason that the 
Congress was more flexible and tolerant (Guerra, interview, 23.3.2004).
Yet legislators were only willing to support the increase given that the revenues would 
benefit the municipal level, which was against the will of the government and
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represented a significant further concession. In addition to the greater willingness for 
taking unpopular measures on the side of the Congress, this tax reform also received 
much less criticism and protest from popular sectors than was usually the case. When 
asked how the tax reform was received in the society, Minister of Finance Arizaga 
described the reaction as: “A reaction that was rather lukewarm, ..., I  believe that at the 
end o f the day the citizenry also thought that there was a serious problem with the oil 
price at this level/' (Arizaga, interview, 31.3.2004). Complementing the support (or 
lack of protest) the reform enjoyed both in Congress and society, also the economic 
sectors stated their approval of the measures. During the discussion in the legislature, 
various Chambers of Production sent a joint letter to the head of state and of Congress 
expressing their approval of a VAT increase to 12 per cent {El Comercio, 8.10.99:8). As 
mentioned, external influence seems to have played some role in putting the VAT 
increase to 15 per cent on the agenda - as the IMF made it a condition for granting a 
stand-by agreement to Ecuador in autumn 1999. Since this increase did not get through, 
external influence was limited as regards this tax reform.
The End o f Mahuad's Government
At the end of 1999 the government still had not managed to find a way out of the 
economic crisis and no agreement with the IMF -  which would have allowed a new 
inflow of money -  had been reached. Mahuad’s popularity had been decreasing during 
the year mainly because of the way he dealt with the banking crisis where he used large 
amounts of public funds for bailing out banks and during which many people lost their 
savings. A further blow to his popularity occurred in October 1999 when it was 
publicised that he had links with Fernando Aspiazu, the owner of one of Ecuador’s main 
banks, the Banco del Progreso and who was imprisoned during summer of that year for 
tax fraud (Paredes, interview, 7.4.2004). Aspiazu announced that he had contributed 
around US$3 million towards Mahuad’s election campaign. When on the 9th of January, 
President Mahuad announced the dollarisation of the Ecuadorian economy, this measure 
was the last straw. Thousands of people took to the streets to protest this measure and 
the government of Mahuad more generally; on the 11th of January a “Parliament of the 
People” was created, CONAIE, the umbrella organisation of the indigenous movement,
thcalled for a national strike, and on the 19 of January around 10,000 protesters gathered 
in Quito. On the 21st the army general, Lucio Gutierrez, the President of the CONAIE, 
Antonio Vargas, and the former President of the Supreme Court of Justice, Carlos 
Solorzano, took over the presidential palace and installed themselves as the so-called
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government of “National Salvation”. After a few hours of intensive discussions and 
heavy external pressure the coup d’etat was aborted, the three leaders stood down and 
Vice-president Gustavo Noboa was sworn in as Ecuador’s new President.
7.2 O n e  St e p  F o r w a r d  -  T w o  St e p s  B a c k : T a x  R e f o r m  u n d e r  N o b o a  (2000- 
2003)
In January 2000 Vice-president Gustavo Noboa, a political independent and former 
university director, succeeded Mahuad and took office as President. Since no new 
elections had taken place the Congress was still essentially composed as elected in 1998 
(see Figure 7.1). The biggest change was a split in the DP whereby 13 out of the 32 DP 
members separated from the party and formed the MIN (Movimiento Independiente 
National) after the fall of Mahuad. The MIN was the only party supporting President 
Noboa on an almost permanent basis and declared itself as governmental party. Noboa’s 
economic policies differed very little from those of his predecessor: he continued with 
dollarisation, enhanced privatisation plans and increased efforts to come to an 
agreement with the IMF. During his first year of government Noboa set out to introduce 
two significant pieces of legislation: the Law of Economic Transformation and the Law 
of Investment Promotion and Citizen Participation, both better known as “Trole I and
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The first law (March 2000) introduced the necessary legislation and constitutional 
changes for dollarisation; the second statute (August 2000), contained reforms of the 
labour markets and paved the way for extending the privatisation of state enterprises. 
The first law was approved relatively swiftly in Congress where President Noboa was 
able to count on the support of the DP (ex-party of Mahuad) and the PSC who agreed 
with the economic measures taken; for the second one Noboa could not gather a 
majority as the legislature was heavily opposed. However, Trole II came into force by 
default as Congress was involved in another discussion and did not manage to deal with 
the bill within the 30 days given; not wanting to act in such a blatant way against the 
Congress, Noboa decided to amend parts of the law and sent another version, the so- 
called Trole III, which watered down the previous bill on several issues. The legislature, 
however, still greatly modified the legislation before approving it, in response to which 
Noboa vetoed the bill. Technically, Trole II was now valid. Yet in December of 2000, 
the Constitutional Tribunal declared large parts of this legislation unconstitutional (for
129 They were named “Trolley Laws” after a trolley bus recently introduced as a new form of public 
transport in Quito. The analogy being that these laws have many elements, like the trolley has many 
carriages, and because they were processed on a fast track.
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example, restrictions on foreign investment in the hydrocarbons sector lifted by Trole II 
were re-established) and Noboa had thus failed with his project to a large extent. This 
pattern was to be almost exactly repeated in 2001 when the President attempted to 
increase the VAT rate.
In late December Noboa introduced some austerity measures: a 100 per cent price 
increase on cooking gas, a 75 per cent increase of price for public transportation, and 
increase of petrol prices. This triggered huge protests mainly by the indigenous, peasant 
and social movements taking place during January 2001. The situation escalated in early 
February when a state of emergency was declared during which it came to clashes 
between police and protesters. After a few days, however, an agreement was reached 
between the government and the indigenous movement and the conflict was resolved.
Attempt to Increase the VAT
“The last reform was a disaster. ” 
Elsa de Mena130
Original proposal. On entering the second year of his presidency Noboa started 
planning a fiscal reform and in early March submitted a bill to Congress -  as an urgent 
economic reform law -  to introduce some changes to the tax system. The government’s 
proposal contained the following elements: a) VAT was to increase to 15 per cent from 
the prevailing 12 per cent; b) Corporate and Personal Income Tax (top rate) were 
lowered to 20 per cent; c) the SRI was supposed to take responsibility for running the 
customs (see Table 7.6). During the first debate in Congress (20th of March) basically 
all parties represented in Congress rejected the main element of the reform which was 
the increase of the VAT rate to 15 per cent. It was only the MIN which announced it 
would support this measure. After a defeat of the VAT increase became more and more 
probable, the government brought forth a compromise proposal hoping they would be 
able to find allies for it. VAT was now suggested to rise to 14 per cent only and would 
be lowered to 13 per cent from the following year. However, even this altered version 
did not convince any of the opposition parties in Congress who ratified their rejection of 
a higher VAT rate.
When the second (and decisive) debate was held in the legislature during the 28th, 29th 
and 30th of March three reports were issued by the legislative commission responsible,
130 Director of Internal Revenue Service (SRI). De Mena, interview, 20.4.2004.
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the Commission for Tax, Fiscal, Banking, and Budget Matters: a majority report 
supported by the DP and ID, and two minority reports by the PSC and PRE. None of 
these reports proposed a VAT increase to the legislature. While the situation of having 
two or more reports from this legislative commission (which has seven members) has 
occurred frequently, the fact that none of these reports (not even a minority one) 
supported the main element of the government’s tax reform proposal is unusual. 
However, because Noboa was a political independent this situation was possible.
Reform rejected by Congress. When on the 30th of March the bill was voted upon, the 
government’s proposal failed. El Comercio (30.3.2001:1) commented this outcome with 
the headline “Taxes: Noboa Loses the Battle”. The increase of the VAT rate to 15 per 
cent (which was still the official proposal) was rejected by 86 votes against the measure 
and only eight in its favour (from the MIN). The lowering of the income tax did not 
pass either. The policy to have the customs being taken over by the Internal Revenue 
Service did not even reach the stage of being voted upon: several parties -  the PSC, the 
PRE and even the otherwise government-supportive MIN -  questioned the 
constitutionality of this proposal and argued that an urgent economic reform law could 
only make changes to ordinary laws and not to organic laws. The parties mentioned 
made the case that the measure would require modifications to the organic laws on 
customs and could thus not be proceeded with. The motion put forward on this was 
carried and thus a major element was stripped from the reform proposal even before it 
came to voting. Several elements of the tax reform, though not of the same significance, 
were approved, however. Among them: a 10 per cent Tax on Public Events; a tax on 
vehicles; a modification in the salary scheme of Personal Income Tax. When asked why 
the tax reform failed, Noboa’s economic adviser and former Vice-minister of Finance, 
Alonso Perez-Kakabadse, maintained:
“The Congress o f course does not want to get the political blame, so they said no. They 
accepted most o f the reform but not the VAT because that would involve a great 
political cost. " (Perez-Kakabadse, interview, 3.12.2004)
Partial veto. After the main elements of the tax reform developed by the executive had 
been blocked by the legislature, Noboa’s government announced to use a partial veto, 
which the President carried out only few days after the decision in Congress (date of the 
veto 9.4.2001). While not objecting to all modified parts for strategic reasons, President 
Noboa used this instrument to put a crucial element of the original plan back in: the 
VAT rate was to increase to 14 per cent (not 15 per cent as it was provided for in the 
original proposal), apparently the government thought the lower rate would provoke
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less opposition. After the partial veto was announced the Congress had 30 days to either 
agree to the elements changed by the partial veto for which a simple majority of the 
legislators present was required, or alternatively to ratify the version originally approved 
by the Congress. For the latter, however, two thirds of the total members of Congress 
(82 votes) were needed (Constitution, Art. 153). Overriding a partial veto was thus 
rather difficult especially when considering that usually not all members were present at 
the sessions. Before it came to voting on the partial veto, President Noboa visited the 
Congress to try and convince the legislators of the importance of this tax reform. When 
defending the increase in the VAT rate he argued:
“Voting negatively on the veto sent would mean a rupture with the IMF and the loss o f 
a loan o f US$150m in support o f the monetary reserve; the same amount o f loans from  
the World Bank; o f US$I20m from the IDB; the rupture with the Paris Club and the 
loss o f social projects worth US$300m which had been agreed with the governments o f 
the Club; the loss o f the Financial Protocol with Spain for US$420m." (President 
Noboa, El Comercio 29.4.2001:2)
In this speech and at other times Noboa mainly used this argument of the rupture with 
the multilateral agencies and the loss of income that went with it to explain why 
increasing the VAT rate was necessary. He thus outlined possible consequences but 
never really clarified why a higher VAT rate was a necessary measure for Ecuador per 
se. He made no reference to why the economic situation required an increase or 
mentioned technical arguments for this measure, he only referred to potential 
consequences and thus implicitly communicated that the VAT rise was something 
demanded by external agents. A day after the speech all main parties in Congress -  DP, 
ID, PRE, PSC, MIN and MUPP-NP -  confirmed that they would continue to oppose 
increasing the VAT. By then the Internal Revenue Service had published new figures 
which showed that tax collection as regards the VAT had improved by 78.7 per cent 
during the first trimester of 2001 in comparison to the same period in 2000 {El 
Comercio, 1.5.2001:1). Many of the politicians in Congress used this as an argument 
that an increase in the VAT rate was not actually necessary for achieving higher 
collections.
VAT increase goes ahead. Before the decision on the partial veto was taken, the media 
reported repeatedly about the government’s attempts to convince legislators from 
various parties -  mainly the PRE, some from the DP and ID -  to either abstain during 
the elections or just to be absent. The strategy was to spoil the opposition’s chances to 
gather the 82 votes necessary for overriding the veto. When the vote was taken on the 
2nd of May, the opposition did indeed not manage to mobilise sufficient votes as only 78
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legislators voted against the VAT increase to 14 per cent. The opposition had thought 
they would definitely overturn the veto and was consequently rather surprised by the 
result, one legislator called for a rectification and the vote was repeated. However, this 
time even less votes were achieved: 76. It was reported that 14 out of the 22 legislators 
of the PRE had either abstained or were not present even though the party leadership 
had confirmed a number of times that the PRE would vote against the VAT rise. Party 
leader Victor Hugo Sicouret even announced that any PRE member who would not 
attend the session would be sanctioned with expulsion from the party {El Comercio, 
3.5.2001:3). Similarly, several DP and ID members were absent. These missing votes 
together with 11 votes from the government-supportive MIN and those of some 
independents in favour were sufficient to make the attempt to override the veto fail.
Pork-barrel(ing). The Democracia Popular subsequently went ahead and -  only days 
after the vote -  expelled its four members who had not followed the party line in this 
issue. It was generally assumed that these legislators had received some benefits from 
the government in exchange for the votes (or rather their physical absence). The leader 
of the congressional party DP, Raul Hurtado, practically stated that the members of his 
party had entered a deal with the government. When asked if legislators had been 
“bought” in the debate on the VAT, he answered:
w  j
“The five legislators o f the DP who did not vote against the VAT increase on the 2 o f  
May, went to Carondelet (presidential palace, SL) in the morning o f that day. Draw the 
conclusion yourself " {El Comercio, 10.5.2001:3)131
The 14 PRE legislators tried to explain their behaviour arguing that they did not want to 
join the game directed by the PSC (who had been the main opposition party and the 
only one who was unified in its vote against the VAT increase) whom they considered 
as being the cause of the economic crisis Ecuador was facing. While this not 
particularly convincing argument was presented as the official reason it was widely 
believed that there had been some deal between the government and the PRE legislators 
regarding the possibility for a return of their leader Bucaram. Ever since the ex­
president went into exile in Panama, the party has tried to strike a deal for him to be 
able to return to Ecuador without being imprisoned. The widely-held belief that there 
had been a deal which ultimately allowed the partial veto to go through (the 14 PRE 
votes were crucial, had they voted against the veto as they had always announced, the 
82 votes needed for overriding it would have been easily achieved) was later on
131 It is not known what benefits the DP legislators received from the government.
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confirmed: in late July President Noboa issued a decree which would allow convicted 
ex-presidents to return to Ecuador and complete their sentence under house arrest (see 
El Comercio, various issues; EIU, August 2001).
Only two former presidents were living in exile: Bucaram and Mahuad. Bucaram was 
still considered to be the leader of his party (the PRE), and was keen on returning to 
Ecuadorian politics and, ideally, stand again as candidate for the presidency. Since this 
was not the case for Mahuad, the decree, allowing Bucaram to lead the PRE from home 
(though not giving him permission to stand for elections himself), seemed designed for 
him. Generalising the decree to give this right to all former presidents can be considered 
a rather feeble attempt of disguise. The obvious link between the vote on the partial veto 
in May and this decree issued in July was widely made and commented upon in the 
media though -  of course -  denied by the government. After the decree was published, 
Rodrigo Paz from the DP and former mayor of Quito commented:
“(Noboa, SL) appears absolutely virginal in the way he deals with the Congress: he 
says he did not buy legislators and now we see that he is fulfilling a pact with 
Bucaram. ” (El Comercio, 6.8.2001:2).
The measure received much criticism and was subsequently withdrawn by the 
Constitutional Tribunal as it violated the principle of treating citizens equally before the 
law. Apart from the PRE and the DP legislators (plus the three ID ones) who facilitated 
the passage of the 14 per cent VAT bill by their absence, the MIN was the third party in 
this round. The legislators of the MIN also received some benefits for their partisan 
support in Congress. Newspapers reported that some public offices were reshuffled and 
MIN members appointed to them in the aftermath of the tax reform episode (El 
Comercio, 8.7.2001:3).132
Unconstitutional -  or According to the Rules?
Yet the opposition did not want to submit to the failure and made huge efforts to have 
the VAT rate remain as it was. A few days after the vote one legislator from the DP, 
Ramiro Rivera, presented a motion for the reconsideration of the vote. The two-thirds 
required by the Constitution for this procedure were achieved (79 out of 116 legislators 
present voted for it) and another vote was permitted on the VAT increase. Subsequently 
the Congress voted again on the partial veto on the VAT rate and it was asked for the 
agreement to the provision of the partial veto (VAT 14 per cent). The result was 73
132 The son of the MIN legislator Fulton Serrano was appointed as governor of the province El Oro and 
another relative was put in charge of the Provincial Health Management (El Comercio, 8.7.2001:3).
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votes against, none in favour and thus fell short of the 82 votes needed for an over-ride 
{El Comercio, 9.5.2001:3). According to the Constitution the partial veto would be 
enforced and the VAT consequently increased to 14 per cent. As Article 153 of the 
Constitution (1998) provides:
“...If the veto is partial, the Congress has to examine it within 30 days countedfrom the 
day the presidential veto was submitted and can, in a single debate, agree to it and 
amend the project, with the favourable vote o f the majority o f  people attending the 
session. It can also ratify the project initially approved with the vote o f two-thirds o f its 
members. In both cases, the Congress is to send the law to the Official Register for its 
promulgation. I f  the Congress does not consider the veto within the period assigned, it 
is understood that it has agreed to it and the President o f the Republic stipulates the 
promulgation o f the law in the Official Register... ” (My translation)
What had happened in this case is that the Congress had neither agreed to the project as 
proposed by the partial veto, nor had it ratified the law originally approved. The 
Congress had thus failed to pronounce itself on the issue and the text of the partial veto 
would come into force by default. However, it can also be considered that the 
Constitution is slightly vague on this point as it basically gives the options of: 
a) agreeing with the veto, b) rejecting the veto, or c) not considering the veto. Strictly 
speaking the Congress had done none of the three in this situation. Noboa’s Minister of 
Government and former representative of Quito’s Chamber of Commerce, Marcelo 
Merlo, considered that there was a legal vacuum which triggered the situation that the 
President considered the measure was approved since the Congress had not said 
anything while other people thought it needed explicit approval. “There is no clarity on 
this constitutional norm ", according to Merlo (Interview, 22.4.2004).
The situation that ensued after the vote in Congress and the debate about the partial veto 
can only be described as constitutional chaos. The legislature sent the version of the law 
they considered to be the rightful one to the Registro Oficial (Official Register, RO): it 
did not contain the VAT increase to 14 per cent (many legislators had argued after the 
vote that the VAT increase had been rejected given there had been 73 votes against and 
none in favour). At the same time the executive interpreted the vote as a failure on the 
part of Congress to override the veto and itself sent a version to the Registro Oficial 
insisting on the 14 per cent VAT rate. This caused the rather novel situation that two 
versions of the same law were published in the Registro Oficial {Ley 2001-41,
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14.5.2001). The presidential version was enforced for the time being and the Internal
1Revenue Service started charging VAT at 14 per cent as from 1 June, 2001.
Table 7.5: Tax Reform 2001
Original Proposal
(1.3.2001)
Reform Approved
(30.3.2001)
Partial Veto
(9.4.2001)
Vote on Partial Veto
(5.-8.5.2001)
VAT 15% (from 12%) Rejected VAT to 14% Attempt to override veto failed
Income Tax rate 20% 
(from 25% ) R ejected
SRI in charge of 
custom s Eliminated
Source: Own elaboration.
The Constitutional Tribunal and arguments for unconstitutionality. The
Coordinadora de Movimientos Sociales (Coordinating Committee of Social Movements, 
CMS) announced in mid-May that it would present an appeal to the Constitutional 
Tribunal asking it to declare President Noboa’s partial veto unconstitutional. Their main 
argument was that the President violated the law by vetoing something that had not 
been approved by the Congress in the first place. Vetoes could only be pronounced on 
what had been approved by the legislature {El Comercio, 4.5., 15.5., 16.5.2001). The 
PSC, who later also handed in a case to the Constitutional Tribunal, accused the 
President of unconstitutional behaviour for the same reason, as the following statement 
of Xavier Neira (current leader of the PSC and ex-legislator) showed:
“A veto can only be placed on the parts o f the law that have been approved. The 
President cannot incorporate subjects into the partial veto which have not been treated 
in the law and even worse it is not possible to try and reintroduce subjects which in the 
debate had been explicitly rejected by the National Congress as it occurred in the case 
about which we are talking, the increase o f the VAT from 12 to 14 per cent. ” (Neira, 
interview, 16.4.2004)
Several other people concurred with this interpretation of the Constitution, for example 
Gustavo Arteta, Director of the think tank CORDES. He explained that since the 
Congress did not approve anything related to the VAT the President could not actually 
veto anything. Had it been the case that the Congress had somehow stated that the VAT 
rate would remain at 12 per cent, the President could have vetoed it and put back his 
original proposal of the VAT increase. Additionally, Noboa did not even simply put in
133 It would be worth exploring the role of the SRI in this case and to what extent they took a political 
stance when deciding to apply the version of the law which included the VAT increase.
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his original proposal -  which was a VAT of 15 per cent -  but changed it to 14 per cent. 
By doing so he sent a new proposal which Arteta considered as sending almost a new 
law (Arteta, interview, 7.4.2004). Constitutionalist Antonio Rodriguez accused Noboa 
of disrespecting the norms by proceeding as he did and pronouncing himself on the 
rejected instead of the parts approved (El Comercio, 13.5.2001 :C2). Following the CMS, 
the Frente Popular (Popular Front) equally handed in an appeal of unconstitutional 
procedure using the same argument as the social movements but also claiming that the 
President had arrogated himself functions he did not possess by sending his texts for 
publication to the Registro Oficial (El Comercio, 15.5.2001:1+3). Thirdly, also the PSC 
submitted a demand to the Constitutional Tribunal using similar arguments as the first 
two arguing that the executive made a procedural mistake as it could not promulgate a 
text via an official letter but only by a decree-law. (El Comercio, 18.5.2001:3). This 
position was shared by the PSC member and former President of the legislative 
commission responsible for tax matters Simon Bustamante, who said in an interview:
“(The President, SL) commits an unconstitutional act; the Congress had already sent 
the law to the Registro Oficial and here ends the procedure. The President comes and 
sends another letter to the Registro Oficial insisting in the four vetoes. This is 
unconstitutional. ” (Bustamante, interview, 20.4.2004)
Tax expert Wilson Ruales from the SRI considered that President Noboa had committed 
an “unpardonable error" when sending a letter to the Registro Oficial. In doing so he 
did not use the appropriate mechanism for getting his proposal through as the 
Constitution outlines that -  in case the Congress neither agreed to the veto nor rejected 
it as Ruales thought was the case here -  the President should formulate a decree-law and 
send it for promulgation to the Registro Oficial (Ruales, interview, 23.3.2004). 
President Noboa thus seems to have made a procedural mistake that could have been 
avoided easily. To summarise, several groups went to the Constitutional Tribunal with 
an appeal of unconstitutional behaviour by the President. Various arguments were used 
and different interpretations of what exactly had been unconstitutional existed: a) the 
president cannot veto what was not approved in the first place; b) the president cannot 
send a text that differs from his original proposal; c) the president made a procedural 
mistake when sending a letter to the Registro Oficial.
It is not within the scope of this work to analyse which is the right position and which -  
if any -  procedure was unconstitutional. Yet this case shows clearly that there is a great 
uncertainty about some constitutional provisions. However, the situation was ultimately 
caused by the fact that the Noboa government basically had no partisan support in
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Congress. Had a majority of the legislature somehow consented to the content of the 
veto, it is likely it would have just passed even if certain procedural mistakes had been 
made. Francisco Swett, Ex-finance minister and Central Bank President, evaluated the 
reactions to the partial veto and the accusations of unconstitutional behaviour:
“I f  the political will would have been to raise (Idle VAT, SL) from 12 to 14 per cent, 
one can be sure it would have passed from 12 to 14 per cent and they would have found 
the legal reasons to do so... It was a political movement which had its legal base. 
However, these situations are never black and white. It depends on who has the 
majority and who has the political power. And usually who tries to raise taxes is in the 
defensive. Usually it is like this and even more so in the case o f the government o f  
Gustavo Noboa which was legislatively impotent. ” (Swett, interview, 15.4.2004)
Decision of the Constitutional Tribunal. After the different demands from the Popular 
Front, the CMS and the PSC were handed in to the Constitutional Tribunal the usual 
procedure took its course and the discussion within the Tribunal lasted several weeks. 
The Tribunal consisted of nine members which had been appointed by the Congress. It 
is widely held in Ecuador that the Constitutional Tribunal is largely a politicised body 
and people can usually allocate a party label to all of its members. When it came to 
taking a decision on this issue in early August the vote resulted in a draw: four members 
voted that the VAT increase was unconstitutional and four claimed it was constitutional. 
The ninth member of the body -  a deputy to another member absent at that time -  said 
he was not sufficiently informed about the case and asked for the vote to be postponed 
until the following week. The result reflected the dynamics and alliances there had been 
in Congress on this issue where it was mainly the PSC and the ID who led the 
opposition bloc against the tax reform. In the space of the Constitutional Tribunal the 
four members voting for unconstitutional procedure were partisans of the ID, PSC and 
the PSE, while the ones defending President Noboa’s position were related to the DP, 
the PRE and an independent {El Comercio, 3.8.2001:8).
The day after this vote, Noboa’s government publicised that since the five votes 
necessary had not been achieved, the claim of unconstitutionality had been rejected. As 
the rules did not allow a second vote on the same issue the matter was therefore settled 
and the VAT rate of 14 per cent would be maintained {El Comercio, 4.8.2001 :B4). The 
Constitutional Tribunal, however, had a different understanding of the rules. Its 
President, Marco Morales, asserted that to reject or approve a matter five votes were 
necessary. Since these five votes were not reached for either rejection or approval, 
nothing had been resolved and a new vote was necessary {El Comercio, 4.8.2001 :B4). 
Consequently, some days later a new vote took place, which resulted in five votes in
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favour of declaring the VAT increase unconstitutional as in the meantime the deputy 
member had made up his mind this way. With this decision the tribunal declared that 
the partial veto and its subsequent publication in the Registro Oficial were 
unconstitutional and would be withdrawn. As a result the VAT increase, which had 
come into effect in May that year, was unconstitutional and would be reversed again to 
its previous rate of 12 per cent. In his first reaction President Noboa declared that he 
would not accept the recent decision of the Constitutional Tribunal maintaining the 
position that the vote had already been taken. He announced that the VAT would 
continue to be charged at 14 per cent {El Comercio, 8.8.2001:3). A few days later, 
however, the President revised his previous stance and accepted the decision. Insisting 
in his interpretation would have meant challenging the highest-decision making body on 
constitutional matters and putting the democratic system in danger. Noboa announced 
that the VAT would be lowered again to 12 per cent as of 1 September, 2001.
Table 7.6: VAT Rates during 2001
Until 1 J u n e 1 J u n e 7 A u a u s t 1 S e p te m b e r
VAT 12% => VAT 14% => Constitutional Tribunal:“VAT rise unconstitutional” => VAT 12%
Source: Own elaboration.
Politicised Constitutional Tribunal. What is striking about the discussion is the fact 
that hardly any legal arguments as to why the procedure breached the Constitution and 
which particular process was unconstitutional were made either during the discussion or 
when the decision of the Constitutional Tribunal was announced. The discussion had 
boiled down to the political argument of being against or for the VAT increase. 
Economist Pablo L. Paredes analysed the reasons for the decision taken by the tribunal:
“Obviously it was the political pressure. The Constitutional Tribunal never takes 
decisions for legal reasons; the Constitutional Tribunal is clearly political. You can say 
“here are the members o f the Constitutional Tribunal: this one is Socialcristiano, this 
one is Socialcristiano, this one is from the ID ” -  everyone has his label. Consequently, 
the important decisions o f the Tribunal are political not legal." (Paredes, interview,
7.4.2004)
As stated at the beginning, the Constitutional Tribunal is widely held as a politicised 
body in the Ecuadorian society; a view which was confirmed and described by several 
interview partners (Interviews, Carrera, Corral, Guerra, Hurtado, Morillo, Paredes, 
Sandoval, Swett, for dates see Appendix B). In recent years the Tribunal has taken on a 
more and more prominent role and has been involved in deciding on legislative matters
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several times. In December 2000 and October 2001, for example, it declared parts of the 
earlier mentioned Trole II legislation unconstitutional. Analysing the legal system and 
its influence on economic reform decisions lies beyond the scope of this work and can 
only be exemplified by the case outlined here. What is striking for this analysis is that 
the political opposition managed to transfer the space of a decision on the VAT increase 
after it had failed to stop the measure in Congress. With the Constitutional Tribunal a 
new veto player appeared and managed to make the tax reform fail.
Why the Reform Failed
Influence of external actors. There had been clearly a significant, if not decisive, 
influence from the multilateral agencies to put the tax reform on the agenda and to 
include an increase of the VAT rate to 15 per cent. Already in 2000 the government of 
Noboa had promised this measure in a stand-by agreement with the IMF (April 2000). 
In February 2001 Ecuador reached a preliminary agreement with the IMF and Finance 
Minister Jorge Gallardo called on the Congress to approve the forthcoming tax reform 
in order to allow the country to access much needed financial resources (Hoy,
15.2.2001). Alonso Perez-Kakabadse, former economic adviser to Noboa, pointed out 
the country’s dependency on the IMF at a time when access to the financial markets 
were cut off; he also maintained that for the stand-by agreement: "One o f the conditions 
o f the IMF, and this has always been a key factor, was to increase VAT" (Perez- 
Kakabadse, interview, 3.12.2004). When the tax proposal was put forward, IMF and 
World Bank representatives made frequent statements on the necessity of a higher VAT 
rate. In late March the Ecuadorian IMF representative, Jeffrey Franks, published an 
article in El Comercio titled (,Ten Reasons for Raising the VAT" (22.3.2001:5), some 
weeks later Guillermo Perry, World Bank representative for Latin America, explained 
to the Ecuadorian media why the multilateral organisations insisted on this reform. As 
referred to earlier, President Noboa himself used the pressure of these external actors as 
an argument. A day before the final debate in Congress the IMF even announced that it 
would abandon the country if the executive’s tax reform would not be approved (a 
threat they did not carry out). The opposition parties of the left considered the reform 
proposal to be imposed by the IMF and rejected the VAT increase as a measure against 
the people (Interview, Paredes, 7.4.2004).
It is thus obvious that external influence was hugely important in the development of 
the reform. Since the reform failed, however, external factors clearly had no (positive)
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influence on the decision-making process. When analysing why the tax reform failed, 
the influence of external actors can thus be largely neglected.
Economic interest groups. There is little evidence of influence by economic interest 
groups. While business groups and the chambers of commerce from Guayaquil seemed 
clearly opposed to the tax reform (and most probably fed their rejection into Congress 
through the PSC), the economic interest groups based in Quito took a different line. 
Quito’s Chamber of Commerce, for example, sent an open letter of support for the VAT 
increase to the President of the Congress during the debate {El Comercio, 29.3.2001:2). 
Signals were thus mixed.
Popular opposition. Apart from the political parties’ opposition in Congress, there was 
also widespread rejection of the measure (mainly the VAT increase) within society. At 
the time of the reform round tables between the government and the indigenous 
movement were in place, which had been set up earlier during the year.134 The tax 
reform was an important element of these negotiations and since the government had 
first proposed the tax reform the indigenous movement had asked the executive to 
withdraw the project. They repeatedly demanded that the VAT remained unchanged. 
When the executive handed in the partial veto, the indigenous leaders called off their 
negotiations with the government to express their protest against this procedure. When 
the process of involving the Constitutional Tribunal in the decision on the VAT rate was 
started, it was a representative of society -  the CMS -  who first handed in an appeal. 
While it is difficult to measure how much influence popular opposition had in this case, 
it certainly did play a role and the government of Noboa faced a hostile society with its 
tax proposal in addition to a hostile Congress. Several interview partners referred to the 
opposition of the social movements (see, for example, Ruales, interview, 23.3.2004) and 
former Minister of Finance and President of the Monetary Board, Jaime Morillo Battle, 
observed that the ultimate rejection of the VAT increase by the Constitutional Tribunal 
was to a significant extent due to the public rejection of this measure and the fact that 
there was a widespread opposition expressed by street protests, newspaper coverage and 
declarations on television (Morillo, interview, 7.4.2004).
Executive-legislative power struggle. When Noboa became Vice-president in 1998 he 
was the first political independent in this position. Since the 1996 elections people who
134 Part of the agreement reached between the government and the indigenous movement after the earlier 
mentioned January 2001 austerity protests provided for the establishment of permanent negotiation tables 
between the two sides on a number of issues. For more information on this see Lucero, 2001.
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were not affiliated to a political party could present themselves as candidates. This 
enabled Noboa to first be elected to the position as Vice-president and later on to 
become the first independent President of Ecuador since the country’s return to 
democracy. Given that he had no support base in Congress governing became quite 
difficult for him, however, and the opposition parties often formed a majority to block 
his proposals. The composition of Congress remained largely as had been when Mahuad 
came to power: the legislature was highly fragmented and even for Mahuad governing 
had been difficult though his ruling party had 28 per cent of the seats. Jaime Carrera, 
from the Observatorio de la Politica Fiscal (Observatory of Fiscal Politics), affirmed 
that this lack of partisan support caused several of Noboa’s reform attempts to fail:
“He did not have support for any reform in the Congress, neither for any tax reform nor 
fo r any economic reform in general -  he tried to privatise the electricity and 
telecommunications companies or some tax reform, he tried to raise the VATfrom 12 to 
14 per cent but this was also impossible. That is to say politically he could do almost 
nothing because he had no political support whatsoever." (Carrera, interview,
29.3.2004)
According to Carrera, Noboa only managed to remain in power because oil prices were 
high during this period and he was therefore able to counterbalance the fiscal deficit.
Conclusion. The period of Mahuad’s government provides several cases of significant 
changes to the tax system, which were mostly not particularly coherent. They are a good 
example of an erratic pattern of tax reforms in Ecuador which can be largely explained 
by the dynamics in Congress.
Table 7.7: Tax Reforms under Mahuad (VAT, FTT and Income Tax)
November 1998 April 1999 November 1999
Original
Proposal
VAT: 14% 
(from 10%)
VAT: 15%
a) VAT: 15%
b) FTT: 0.3%
c) Income Tax: 25% top 
rate
Approved
Reform
a) Income Tax 
abolished
b) 1% FTT
a) Income Tax reinstated 
(15% top rate)
b) 1% FTT in 1999 
(abolished in 2000)
a) VAT: 12%
b) FTT: 0.8%
c) Income Tax: 25%
Source: Own elaboration.
Within a single year -  between November 1998 and November 1999 -  Ecuador 
abolished its income tax, reintroduced the income tax (both personal and corporate) 
with a top rate of 15 per cent only half a year later, and put it back to its previous level
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(25 per cent). Simultaneously, a tax on financial transactions was introduced in the first 
reform, abolished in the second one, and the third reform provided for maintaining it. 
Three times the government tried to increase the VAT rate and three times it failed, 
though in the third attempt a slight increase to 12 per cent (instead of the proposed 15 
per cent) was achieved.
The outcomes of all three reforms show the complexity of having an economic reform 
approved in a situation where the executive faces a highly fragmented legislature and 
where coalition-building is extremely difficult. The government of Mahuad was forced 
to make major concessions to have any reforms approved at all. In the case of the 
November 1998 tax reform, Mahuad chose to form an alliance with the second biggest 
party in Congress, which ultimately meant, however, that making concessions and 
finding a compromise was not sufficient: Mahuad gave up on his original plan 
completely and adopted the PSC proposal to replace income tax by the FTT. His 
decision to accept this tax reform instead of trying to negotiate something more similar 
to the government’s ideas can be interpreted as political pragmatism and the 
government’s hope that the PSC would be a long-term ally in Congress. Because that 
was not the case, for the reforms in April and November 1999 Mahuad changed his 
approach, built a multi-party alliance and developed a common reform proposal with 
them. A number of concessions to the demands of the various parties involved were 
made. The outcome of the dynamics the government of Mahuad faced in Congress was 
that in all three reforms the executive failed to introduce its original plan; the fact that 
the Mahuad government managed to have any tax reforms introduced at all was due to 
President Mahuad’s choice to first negotiate a proposal for tax reform and build an 
alliance around it and only when an acceptable proposal was achieved was this sent to 
Congress (as was the case in both November 1998 and April 1999). In this his 
government differed from others who often sent their tax reform proposals to the 
legislature directly and were then not willing to make concessions when their proposal 
turned out to be politically unviable (for example Duran Ballen’s attempt in 1993, see 
Chapter 6.3).
Considering that Ecuador experienced its worst economic crisis of the last decades, the 
tax reforms introduced in an attempt to improve public finances cannot be regarded as 
far-reaching. “Economic crisis” as a variable thus seems to have had a limited influence 
on the President’s possibilities to introduce economic policies. When Mahuad
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ultimately did take a radical step -  by introducing dollarisation -  he triggered political 
instability and was overthrown soon afterwards.
During the different tax reforms undertaken by Mahuad little public protest occurred; 
opposition by social movements and other groups was more focused on the price 
increase of gas and electricity which he introduced at the beginning of his term.
When the tax reform of 2001 was discussed in Congress the lack of political support led 
to an outright rejection of the reform with the opposition to the VAT increase at its heart. 
However, this was only the beginning of a power struggle between the executive and 
the legislature. By using the device of a partial veto President Noboa was stretching the 
rules in order to overturn the legislature’s decision. To prevent the Congress from 
mobilising the two-thirds majority necessary to overturn the veto the executive 
apparently made deals with several members of the PRE and some other parties 
resulting in a vote falling short of the 82 ballots necessary for overriding a veto. This 
combination of making use of a constitutional provision and extra-constitutional deals 
with opposition parties allowed the VAT increase to go through and be implemented -  
for some time. Given the degree of opposition to this measure not only in Congress but 
also beyond, several parties and groups from outside the formal political system tried to 
bring the tax increase down by turning to the Constitutional Tribunal which approved 
the appeals submitted and declared the VAT increase as unconstitutional. Social 
movements played a crucial role in this process via the Coordinadora de Movimientos 
Sociales (CMS).
The tax reforms introduced or attempted during the governments of Mahuad and Noboa 
do not support the theory that business groups were the decisive variable. In the cases of 
the 1999 (II) and the 2001 reform private sector groups did not undertake any major 
attempts to influence the policies; as regards the 1999 (I) tax measure, private sector 
group mobilisation failed to stop the bill; and in 1998 there is no evidence that 
economic interest groups carried out any direct lobbying though the idea to replace the 
income tax with an FTT possibly originated in this sector. In the more recent tax 
reforms attempted in Ecuador, external actors were more prominent than they had been 
until the mid-1990s. In 1998 they actively lobbied in Ecuador against the FTT, while 
both in 1999 and 2001 a VAT rate of 15% was made part of an IMF stand-by agreement. 
While external actors thus tried to influence the reforms and helped putting some of 
them on the agenda, they had no impact on the decision-making process: the FTT was
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introduced against their will, and the two attempts to increase the VAT failed. Other 
variables like the internal dynamics of the Congress are more conclusive in the 
decision-making process for the policies.
The process and fate of the tax reform undertaken by the government of Noboa in 2001 
can be explained by the fact that he was not able to find any support for this measure 
either in Congress or society. There are similarities to the government of Mahuad where 
the income tax was abolished for half a year and then reinstated (see Section 7.1); under 
Noboa the VAT rate was increased for only three months and later set again at the 
previous level. It provides a good example for how the dynamics in Congress have led 
to an often erratic course of introducing tax reforms in Ecuador.
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8 Conclusion: Comparing Ecuador’s and Bolivia’s Reform  
Experiences
Having set out to determine under which conditions presidents are able to introduce 
their economic reforms, the last four chapters have provided a detailed analysis of the 
politics of tax reform in Ecuador and Bolivia. In this final chapter the experiences will 
be compared and conclusions drawn.
There is a marked contrast in tax policy-making between Ecuador and Bolivia: In most 
cases when Ecuadorian presidents attempted to introduce tax reforms during the last 
two decades these either failed or suffered significant modifications. Yet in Bolivia tax 
reforms were successfully introduced throughout the 1980s and 1990s. From 2000 
onwards, however, tax policy-making became increasingly difficult and the pattern 
became more similar to that of Ecuador. This analysis will compare the tax reform 
experiences of Bolivia in its first phase with those in Ecuador; after this inter-country 
comparison, the two phases of tax policy-making within Bolivia shall be considered.
8.1 How I n s t i t u t i o n s  H e l p e d  o r  H i n d e r e d  T a x  R e f o r m  (1 9 8 0 s  a n d  1990s) 
Bolivia. During the governments of Paz Estenssoro, Paz Zamora and the first 
government of Sanchez de Lozada a number of tax reforms were introduced 
successfully: in 1986, 1990, 1992 and 1994 these were approved just as they had been 
proposed by the executive (a modification was made to the 1994 one given the pressure 
of the private sector). They were implemented despite the existence of fierce opposition 
in several cases. Particularly when the VAT was raised to 13 per cent in 1992 the 
measure was rejected by several sectors and when a Corporate Income Tax was 
introduced in 1994, private sector groups lobbied heavily against the rate of 25 per cent 
that was approved. In all four cases, the tax policies could be introduced due to the 
existence of a ruling coalition which provided presidents with sufficient partisan support 
to have the measure approved by Congress. The majority held in Congress, which 
basically ensured the approval of almost any policy proposed by the executive ex ante, 
also allowed the government to ignore criticism from opposition parties, private sector 
groups, trade unions or other sectors. Not only did the government coalitions facilitate 
reforms to be introduced but also allowed that they were maintained. Bolivia’s tax 
system was coherently changed over the years (see Table 8.1 and Appendix G for an 
overview 1986-2004).
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Table 8.1: Tax Reforms in Bolivia -  Overview
Year President Proposal of Government Outcome
1986 PazEstenssoro
Radical overhaul of tax system: 
over 450 taxes replaced by 7 Approved
1990
Paz Zamora
2% Transactions Tax (from 1%) Approved
1992 VAT rise to 13% (from 10%) Approved
1994 Sanchez de Lozada
a) 30% Corporate Income Tax 
b) 3% Transactions Tax (from 2%)
Approved with slight 
modification: 
a) 25% corporate tax;
b) approved
Source: Own elaboration .
Ecuador. In Ecuador, by contrast, an increase from 6 to 10 per cent in the Sales Tax 
was implemented in 1986 and a major reform was successfully introduced in 1989. 
Apart from these cases, however, all subsequent tax proposals made by presidents were 
either outright rejected by Congress (1993, 1998, 1999 (I)), only a minor part of the 
legislation was approved (1996), or the proposal was greatly modified (in 1999 (II)), or 
another institutional actor made the tax bill fail (as was the case in 2001 when the 
Constitutional Tribunal declared the VAT rise unconstitutional). In short, in all these 
cases -  except the 1986 and 1989 reform -  presidents were unable to introduce their 
policy proposals as they intended. All these tax reforms were attempted by minority 
governments and in no case were presidents able to count on or gather sufficient 
partisan support for their tax laws. This inability of presidents to introduce their policies 
resulted in a rather erratic pattern of taxation in Ecuador: examples of this occurred 
during the government of Mahuad, when in 1998 income tax was replaced by a tax on 
financial transactions and the income tax was re-introduced only half a year later; or in 
2001 under Noboa when the VAT was increased to 14 per cent and lowered again to 12 
per cent after only three months of being in force.
As the Tables 8.1 and 8.2 show there was an overall pattern that while in Bolivia wide- 
ranging reforms to the tax system were usually approved, most reform attempts in 
Ecuador were rejected or greatly modified. While aspects such as pressure from the 
private sector or external influence were rather similar in the two countries, the major 
difference between them was that a majority coalition approving reforms in Congress 
existed in Bolivia but was absent in Ecuador. Several institutional aspects contributed to 
causing this difference.
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Table 8.2: Tax Reforms in Ecuador -  Overview
Year President Proposal of Government Outcome
1986 FebresCordero Sales Tax 10% (from 6%)
Approved 
(by default)
1989 Borja Overhaul of tax system. Many small taxes abolished. Approved
1993 DuranBallen
a) VAT 18% (from 10%) 
b) Reducing VAT exemptions 
c) Raise excise taxes
Rejected
1996 Bucaram
a) Excise tax increase 
b) 2% on cars
c) Elimination of VAT exemptions
d) Corporate tax 20% (from 25%)
All but d) rejected
1998
Mahuad
VAT 14% (from 10%) Rejected
1999 (I) VAT 15% (from 10%) Rejected
1999 (II) VAT 15% (from 10%) Modified (VAT 12%)
2001 Noboa VAT 14% (from 12%) Rejected
Source: Own elaboration.
Plenario. Analysing Ecuador’s tax reform of 1989 it turned out that the reform passed 
without modifications due to the “institutional oddity” of the Ecuadorian system, which 
allowed the Plenario to decide on legislation (see Chapter 2.4). Given that the Plenario 
was not required to be proportional to the representation in Congress, the ruling party 
had a majority in this proxy body, which it did not hold in the full Congress. The 
possibility of having the tax bill approved in this legislative space rather than in the 
Congress thus allowed President Borja to pass his reform without any modifications 
(see Chapter 6.2). In later reform attempts this possibility did not have similar effects on 
tax policy-making given that after Borja no other government held a majority in the 
Plenario (Borja had achieved this since he was close to holding a majority in the 
Congress as well; he held the highest number of seats in Congress of all ruling parties 
since Ecuador’s return to democracy). With the new Constitution of 1998 the Plenario 
was deprived of its right and since then it needs to be the full Congress approving 
legislation.
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Decree power. In Chapter 2.2 Ecuadorian presidents were described as having rather 
strong decree powers. Did these make any difference to presidents’ attempts to 
introduce tax reforms? In one case they did lead to the introduction of a bill which 
would otherwise have been difficult: in 1986 President Febres Cordero managed to have 
the rate of the Sales Tax increased from 6 to 10 per cent. The law was sent -  as one of 
many reform proposals -  as “urgent” which meant that the legislature had only 15 days 
to decide on them. Given the amount of bills received the Congress simply did not 
manage to discuss all of them and the tax reform was one of those that came into force 
by default. Later on this practice of sending more than one bill at a time was prohibited 
and decree power became less important. It continued to have the effect that Congress 
had no possibility to delay the discussion and a decision on tax reforms was thus usually 
taken within one month. Yet it did not help presidents introduce their proposals since 
they were not able to simply decree as Congress was allowed to vote on the bills (if they 
managed in the time given).
Veto power. Ecuador’s presidents also enjoyed the power of veto but made little use of 
it for tax or other economic policies over the last two decades. In 1999 Mahuad 
managed to change the reform somewhat by using a partial veto (a part of it was 
overturned by Congress though) and in the case of the attempted VAT increase in 2001, 
President Noboa used a partial veto after the Congress had rejected his proposal. 
Though there was a near consensus against the reform, the legislature did not manage to 
mobilise the two-thirds of the votes necessary to overturn the veto (essentially because 
Noboa had made a deal with the PRE regarding the return of Bucaram so that the PRE 
legislators abstained in the vote). The VAT rate was increased and it looked for a while 
as if the veto had been a powerful instrument that had allowed the President to introduce 
the reform. Given, however, that Noboa did not have a majority of the parties 
represented in Congress behind him, the opposition managed to transfer this clash 
between executive and legislature to another level. The Constitutional Tribunal -  which 
mirrored the power relationship of the parties in Congress -  declared the VAT increase 
to be unconstitutional and its introduction was reversed. While it can be argued that 
there had been procedural mistakes in the way the veto was used, it was clear that the 
decision of the Constitutional Tribunal was a reiteration of the legislature’s rejection of 
the bill. Had a majority in Congress been in favour of a higher VAT rate, the 
Constitutional Tribunal would most probably not have found any fault with the 
procedure of the veto.
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Emergency power. The possibility to declare a state of emergency was taken advantage 
of by several Bolivian presidents and generally resulted in greatly diminished public 
protests against economic reforms. It most notably had an influence on the Bolivian tax 
reform introduced in 1986 during the government of Paz Estenssoro. He made use of his 
constitutional power to declare a state of emergency several times during his term 
between 1985 and 1989, which helped to significantly reduce the opposition and 
mobilisation potential of trade unions (particularly the COB). The thus limited public 
protests against the tax reform of 1986 facilitated its introduction.
The literature in the field of empirical institutionalism (see Chapters 1.2 and 2.2) has 
traditionally looked at these constitutional powers of the president -  such as decree and 
veto power -  to explain govemability. Looking at the cases of Ecuador and Bolivia, 
however, it has become clear that these powers had only limited influence on 
presidents’ ability to introduce reforms and by themselves cannot account for the 
differences in policy-making between the two countries.
Coalition-building. Given that the Bolivian system was able to produce coalitions, 
govemability was enhanced and significant reforms to the tax system could be 
introduced. The various reforms of the 1980s and 1990s outlined in Chapter 4 and 5 
were all possible due to the inter-party coalitions existing in Bolivia at the time. In 
Ecuador, by contrast, the absence of stable coalitions made most tax reform attempts 
fail, apart from those cases where presidential powers (decree power in 1986) or other 
institutional aspects (Plenario mechanism in 1989) facilitated them. A case has 
therefore been made that in future institutional analyses of presidential systems, the 
variable of coalition-building capacity should be integrated. This aspect has previously 
been neglected given the assumption that presidential systems are unable to form 
coalitions. In several cases the existence of coalitions has helped presidents to introduce 
wide-ranging economic reforms just as Paz Estenssoro was able to implement his 
economic reform programme in 1985 with the help of a ruling coalition. The Bolivian 
experience can be compared to that of Brazil where in 1995 the Cardoso government 
managed to introduce a wide-ranging economic reform programme thanks to the 
coalition in place. While the existence of coalitions can explain the difference between 
patterns of policy-making in Ecuador and Bolivia, the question is why one country 
produced coalitions and the other did not. As shown in Chapter 2 both Ecuador and 
Bolivia have a fragmented multi-party system and share several features regarding 
electoral procedures, proportional representation, and majority elections. Still, Bolivia
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formed a pattern of coalition-building since 1985 and Ecuador’s coalitions were fragile 
and short-lived at best. It is argued that the points presented below can explain this 
phenomenon.
Bolivia. Second round election o f  president. In Chapter 2 the procedure surrounding 
the election of presidents was already outlined: in Bolivia, when it came to a second 
round during die presidential elections (which was always the case), the president was 
not chosen by popular vote but by the Congress (choosing between the first two 
candidates). This electoral procedure provided an incentive for coalitions to be formed 
to elect the president. Similar to the procedure in parliamentary systems, the president 
required a positive vote of the Congress to get into power and to form a government. 
Finding allies to support the election of a president in the second round therefore 
became necessary and coalition negotiations took place before the elections. These pre- 
electoral coalitions have then usually carried on and turned into governmental coalitions.
Table 8.3: From Art. 90 to Approval of Tax Reforms
Art. 90 of the Constitution: in case of second round presidents to be elected by
Congress
%
Provided incentive for coalition-building
#
Stable ruling coalitions provided presidents with sufficient partisan support in Congress
£
Executive’s tax reforms approved by Congress and introduced
Source: Own elaboration.
The pattern of stable coalitions that developed since 1985 lasted until October 2003.135 
The coalitions provided presidents with sufficient partisan support to have their reform 
proposals approved. Not only were Bolivian presidents able to introduce the tax reforms 
analysed in this thesis, they generally introduced rather wide-ranging economic policy 
reforms during this time period. The pattern observed in the case of Bolivia can thus be 
summarised as in the Table 8.3: presidents were generally able to introduce the tax 
reforms they proposed because they counted on the support of a ruling coalition in 
Congress, which in turn was facilitated by the procedure surrounding the second round 
elections of presidents set out by Article 90 of the Constitution.
135 It is difficult to establish an exact date here. By October 2003 the pattern had certainly not been stable 
any longer; yet at this date coalition politics experienced its most intensive crisis.
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The importance of electoral rules in bringing about coalitions is underlined when 
comparing Bolivia to other countries where stable ruling coalitions have been formed. 
Chile, for example, uses a binominal electoral system in which two seats per district are 
elected. This creates strong incentives for parties to build electoral coalitions as smaller 
parties stand no chance of winning one of these two seats. In consequence, the Chilean 
party system since 1989 has consisted of several parties that are organised in two stable 
coalitions.
Patronage. While the electoral formula can account for why coalitions come into being 
in the first place, it is patronage that explains why coalitions last. As Geddes (1994:152) 
pointed out patronage is the "glue that holds coalitions together in Latin America ”. As 
scholars of Bolivia pointed out the coalitions formed were essentially based on 
patronage payments, usually consisting of public sector positions (see, for example, 
Gamarra 1997). As was outlined in Chapters 4 and 5, the coalition agreements in 
Bolivia always entailed a sharing of ministerial and other positions, a procedure which 
became more and more important over the years. While during the government of Paz 
Estenssoro (1985-89) it was not yet a major driving force of the coalition, already 
during the subsequent government of Paz Zamora (1989-93) side payments played a 
significant role and by the time of the coalition formed under Sanchez de Lozada’s 
second presidency (2002-03) the pact seemed to be glued together by little more than 
patronage. Presidents also frequently changed the number of cabinet positions so as to 
accommodate the demands of coalition partners. This happened, for example, in 2003 as 
Sanchez de Lozada increased the number of ministries from 13 to 15 when the NFR 
entered the coalition (see Chapter 5.2).
Ideological convergence. As pointed out by Foweraker (1998) lower levels of 
ideological polarisation make the formation of coalitions more feasible. Accordingly, an 
aspect that also facilitated coalition-building in Bolivia was that the three main parties -  
MNR, ADN, and MIR -  that dominated the period of coalition politics, had developed 
rather similar views on the type of economic policies that needed to be introduced (see 
also Chapter 2.4). A good example is that the reform programme developed by Banzer 
and his ADN during the election campaign in 1985, had a lot of similarities to what was 
eventually introduced under the presidency of Paz Estenssoro (MNR). Given that there 
was agreement on the policy agenda, the formation of coalitions was facilitated by this 
ideological convergence.
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Ecuador. In Ecuador, where the president is elected by popular vote in the second 
round, the difficulties of governing in the context of a highly fragmented multi-party 
system have been daunting. The political system provides no incentive similar to 
Bolivia’s for the formation of inter-party coalitions. No executive since the return to 
democracy in 1979 was able to rely on a stable governmental coalition. The few 
coalitions that were formed during the last two decades (for example, the coalition 
between the ID and the DP during the government of Boija lasted just over a year) were 
generally rather volatile and -  more often than not -  presidents had to rely on forming 
ad hoc alliances around specific policy proposals. Informal alliances in which deals 
were made with a number of legislators occurred, for example, in 2001 as Noboa tried 
to prevent the Congress from overriding his veto (see Chapter 7.2). This lack of stable 
partisan support in Congress made the implementation of comprehensive and consistent 
economic policies difficult: proposals made by reform-minded presidents were often 
either blocked or significantly watered down. Several aspects can explain the absence of 
stable coalitions in Ecuador.
Electoral formula. In contrast to Bolivia, Ecuador’s electoral formula -  majority run­
off -  provides no incentive for the formation of coalitions as presidents can come to 
power without a majority vote in Congress. A large number of the Ecuadorian 
interviewees pointed out that the country’s difficulties of govemability had to do with 
the second round election of the president while the deputies are already elected in the 
first round (Interviews: Acosta; Arizaga; Arteta; Carrera; Corral; de Mena; Hurtado; 
Minuche; Morillo; Ortiz; Pachano; Ribadeneira; for dates see Appendix B). Former 
finance Minister Arizaga pointed out:
“One o f the great problems o f govemability which Ecuador has is that the deputies are 
elected in the first round when there is a large number o f candidates to the presidency. 
This provokes that the president who is finally elected in the second round does not 
count on a majority in Congress. " (Arizaga, interview, 31.3.2004)
Would the deputies, on the other hand, be elected in the second round of the presidential 
elections the president’s party would certainly hold a higher number of seats in 
Congress which would make governing easier, Arizaga assumed. Apart from this 
electoral procedure which has contributed to making the president’s party count on only 
a relatively small number of seats in Congress, the situation is aggravated by Ecuador’s 
difficulties of coalition-building.
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Patronage. Given that patronage was a crucial aspect to holding coalitions together in 
Bolivia, the question is why Ecuadorian presidents were not able to use side payments 
to other parties in a similar way and thereby achieve stable coalitions. The answer lies in 
the fact that the Ecuadorian system provides a strong disincentive for coalition 
formation.
Mid-term elections. Until 1998 Ecuador elected a new Congress every two years. On 
the one hand this had the consequence that during the second half of every president’s 
term their parties saw their representation in Congress greatly reduced and the minority 
status was aggravated. On the other hand this schedule of biannual elections meant that 
parties were practically in a permanent election campaign. As mentioned in Chapter 2.7 
in Strom’s contribution to coalition theory, he looked at how minority governments 
come into being. Strom (1990) argued that minority governments would occur either if 
parties were able to influence policy-making also while being in the opposition or if 
being part of a coalition would have adverse effects in future elections. This latter 
concept of “coalition avoidance” and his related concept of the “negative incumbency 
effect” apply to the case of Ecuador as parties did not want to be associated with the 
ruling party especially when elections were approaching. That there is a “negative 
incumbency effect” becomes easily clear when considering that during the whole time 
period dealt with here, not once was a ruling party re-elected to power.136 This pattern 
differs markedly from Bolivia’s where the three main parties -  MNR, ADN, and MIR -  
were re-elected as ruling party or party with the highest number of votes between 1985 
and 2002 and where being in power therefore did not have quite as detrimental an effect 
as in Ecuador. Since elections took place every two years parties often avoided forming 
part of a coalition altogether as they did not want to mar their electoral prospects. The 
fact that the DP defected from its coalition agreement with the ID in 1989, is a good 
example for the “negative incumbency effect” as the DP left in time to be considered a 
party independent from the ruling ID in the mid-term elections taking place in 1990. 
Strom’s second aspect to explain why minority governments occur also applies to 
Ecuador: as the various examples of tax reform show opposition parties do have the 
possibility to influence policies. Joining the government to have some power over 
policy decisions is therefore not necessary. In Bolivia by contrast, where the legislature 
functioned more like a “rubber stamp” (Gamarra, 1994:121) and where policies where
136 The ruling parties were: 1984 -  PSC; 1988 -  ID, 1992 -  PUR; 1996 -  PRE; 1998 -  DP; 2002 -  
MUPP-NP.
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generally introduced as proposed by the government, being part of the opposition had 
few advantages as one was shut out both from access to patronage and from policy 
decisions.
Apart from providing a disincentive to coalition-building, mid-term elections also had 
the effect that only during the first two years of the term major economic policy 
initiatives had any chance of success. Under President Borja (1988-92), for example, tax 
legislation was introduced in 1989. A second stage of this tax reform was planned yet 
given the changed circumstances in Congress after the mid-term elections the President 
did not even send the bill to Congress. During the subsequent governments Duran 
Ballen (1992-96) attempted to introduce a tax law in the second year of being in power 
in 1993 and Bucaram (1996-97) proposed a tax reform to Congress after four months of 
being in government. This pattern of undertaking major economic reforms at the 
beginning of a president’s term is of course not only related to the process of mid-term 
elections - introducing contentious reforms is easier for any government soon after the 
elections when popularity rates are still high. While this commonly called honeymoon 
thesis has some explanatory power it has its limits when comparing policy-making in 
Ecuador and Bolivia. In Bolivia there have been cases when presidents were able to 
introduce wide-ranging economic reforms also towards the end of their terms given that 
their support base remained and was uninterrupted by mid-term elections. The tax 
reform of 1992 when Paz Zamora (1989-93) managed to increase the VAT from 10 to 
13 per cent provides a good example.
Ideological Convergence. An ideological consensus around the type of economic 
policies to be introduced - as had developed in Bolivia among the three main parties -  
never existed in Ecuador. The policy positions of parties like Borja’s ID (in power 
between 1988-92) or Febres Cordero’s PSC (1984-88) clearly differed and co-operating 
in a coalition would therefore have been extremely difficult for these parties. As 
Coppedge (1998b:561) showed, Ecuador’s party system was significantly more 
ideologically polarised than Bolivia’s. Following Foweraker’s argument (1998) 
mentioned earlier, coalition-building was therefore probably less feasible in Ecuador. 
Still, in Bolivia also parties with a very different ideological programme joined the 
coalitions as was the case with both CONDEPA and UCS. Their co-operation had little 
to do with ideological convergence but was obviously motivated by their desire to 
access patronage. In short, while Ecuador’s higher degree of polarisation (as compared 
to Bolivia) may have contributed to making coalition-building more difficult, other
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aspects -  such as the electoral formula and the mid-term elections which prevent 
patronage from acting as a glue -  seem more relevant in explaining the differences 
between the two countries.
Presidential Powers and Vote o f  Censure. Finally, several other institutional aspects 
contributed to Ecuador’s difficulties of building stable majority coalitions. Given the 
extensive veto and decree powers granted to presidents an incentive is created for 
presidents to try and govern without being able to rely on a majority in the Congress. In 
practice, however, these powers were generally not sufficient for implementing 
economic reforms. In addition, the provision for the legislature to censure cabinet 
ministers -  which was made ample use of in Ecuador (see Chapter 2.2) -  made being 
part of the ruling coalition and cabinet rather undesirable. Ecuador has the highest 
cabinet instability in the region, followed by Brazil, Venezuela, and Colombia (Stein et. 
al., 2005:62). Holding a cabinet post in Ecuador, therefore, was an endeavour that had 
an uncertain time-span and entailed the risk of undergoing a tedious interpellation 
procedure convoked by the Congress. Cabinet positions are generally important 
patronage material offered to allies in exchange for their support as had been the case in 
Bolivia. Since Ecuadorian presidents were unable to grant the positions for the full 
governmental period -  as ministers could be censured at any point by the Congress -  
their value and attractiveness was reduced.
The first finding of the research undertaken can consequently be summarised as follows: 
when considering under which conditions presidents are able to introduce economic 
reforms of their choice, institutions do matter. While the more extensive formal powers 
granted to Ecuadorian presidents have generally not helped them to introduce policies, 
particular institutional aspects -  such as the Plenario and decree powers -  facilitated the 
introduction of reforms in some cases. The capacity to form coalitions turned out to be 
more important than presidential powers and since Bolivia’s political system was able 
to produce majority governments after 1985 presidents were able to introduce wide- 
ranging tax reforms in the 1980s and 1990s. Their Ecuadorian counterparts failed to do 
so due to the lack of institutional incentives for overcoming the political deadlock of a 
fragmented Congress. The existence of coalitions in Bolivia can be explained by several 
aspects: Bolivia’s coalitions were formed in the first place due to the institutional 
incentive of electing the president in Congress; they generally remained in place for full 
governmental periods due to the patronage logic holding them together; and ideological 
converergence between the three main parties made it easier for them to support each
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other’s governments. In Ecuador, by contrast, the electoral formula provided no 
incentive for coalition-building; the recourse to patronage to form stable coalitions was 
weakened by the existence of mid-term elections which meant that avoiding coalitions 
improved the electoral prospects of parties; and finally, presidential powers and the vote 
of censure represented other institutional disincentives to the formation of coalitions.
8.2  A l t e r n a t iv e  E x p l a n a t io n s
The argument outlined above largely relies on institutional aspects to explain the 
process of tax policy-making in Ecuador and Bolivia. In the literature on the politics of 
economic reforms other approaches have been used which shall be contrasted with the 
institutional argument in the following.
Interest groups. A common approach applied to explaining policy reforms focuses on 
the influence of interest groups. Based in the political economy framework, the 
approach argues that the content of economic reforms can be accounted for by the 
relative power of interest groups. Jeffry A. Frieden’s “Debt, Development, and 
Democracy” (1991) is a crucial work in this theoretical approach. Looking at the 
varying responses of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, and Venezuela to the debt crisis 
of the 1970s and 1980s, he argued that the economic policies undertaken in that period 
are the results of economic interest group pressures on policy-makers. Regarding 
research on the Andean countries, the business sector also played a central role in 
Conaghan and Malloy’s (1994) earlier mentioned analysis (see Chapter 1.2). Also in 
this thesis economic interest groups are seen as important actors in both countries and 
their position towards the tax reforms was consequently outlined in the cases analysed. 
Pressure from the private sector was successful in changing the tax policies studied in 
only a few cases. On occasion they managed to achieve some concessions but in a 
significant number of cases their lobbying had no influence whatsoever. Considering 
Ecuador: for example, in the case of the 1996 reform attempt undertaken by Bucaram, 
Ecuador’s private sector had some influence but was not the only determining factor. 
The opposition of business groups to increasing excise taxes was successful as the 
government modified their proposal in response to the pressure. However, in the 
ultimate decision on the proposal it was the legislature that determined the fate of the 
reform: the opposition counted on sufficient votes to turn the excise tax increase down 
but made a strategic mistake by leaving the legislative space and the increase ended up 
being approved. This episode in the Congress shows the importance of looking at 
legislative dynamics to explain policy reforms -  interest groups alone are not a
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sufficient explanation. During the government of Mahuad the Financial Transactions 
Tax was introduced against the interest of not only private sector groups but also 
economic experts, and the changes to the tax legislation approved by Congress in April 
1999 were equally rejected by economic interest groups.
Also in Bolivia interest group pressure similarly sometimes mattered and sometimes 
not: in the 1986 reform the business sector lobbied for some changes to the proposal but 
it was approved by the Congress despite the pressure. When the government of Paz 
Zamora intended to raise the VAT rate in 1992, economic groups started a massive 
campaign against the increase, yet ultimately failed as the coalition government went 
ahead introducing the tax reform anyway. In the subsequent reform private sector 
opposition had some success as the executive agreed to lower the proposed Corporate 
Income Tax to 25 per cent. However, this was only a partial achievement as the 
business sector had lobbied for 20 per cent and against the increase of the Transactions 
Tax to 3 per cent and remained heavily opposed also to the modified version of the 
legislation approved by the Congress. The attempted excise tax increase in 2000, on the 
other hand, represents a case where economic interest groups proved decisive: due to 
their pressure President Banzer agreed to withdraw the measure only a few months after 
its introduction. Similarly in April 2004 the opposition of business groups based in 
Santa Cruz managed to have the Net Property Tax dropped. In 2003, however, though 
private sector groups criticised the government’s plans to introduce a Personal Income 
Tax, it was popular protest that was decisive in leading to the failure of the tax reform.
This summary of the evidence gathered on the influence of Ecuadorian and Bolivian 
business groups on the tax reforms studied, shows that these groups did have a certain 
degree of influence in several cases yet this would not be sufficient to explain why 
reforms happened or failed. Several reforms were introduced despite massive protest 
and lobbying attempts of economic interest groups -  particularly in Bolivia during the 
time of coalition politics -  so they were not the decisive factor.
External influence. A number of scholars have investigated the extent to which 
external influences have played a role in shaping economic policies. Nelson (1990), 
Stallings (1992), Kahler (1992) and Weyland (2004), for example, applied an 
international-level approach and particularly considered how conditionality of 
multilateral organisations such as the IMF and the World Bank influenced the economic 
policies introduced by developing countries. Most of these authors, however, while
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claiming that external factors are important to take into account and often have a 
significant influence especially as regards agenda-setting, conceded that this 
explanatory framework has its limits and that domestic explanations are more important 
particularly when accounting for policy choices. At the non-academic level, however, 
the pressure and influence of external actors -  mainly the IMF and World Bank -  is 
often considered to play a great role in the countries studied.
Considering the cases of tax reforms in Ecuador and Bolivia the limits of this approach 
become quite clear. In the early reforms undertaken (e.g. 1986 in Bolivia and 1989 in 
Ecuador) external actors played no role as tax reform would only become part of their 
agenda in the 1990s. As regards the later reforms they sometimes had an influence on 
the agenda-setting process but cannot account for the decision-making process where 
domestic dynamics were decisive. Ecuador’s attempt to increase the VAT to 15 per cent 
in 2001, for example, was clearly influenced by multilateral agencies, as the IMF and 
World Bank had repeatedly demanded this increase and made it a condition of an IMF 
stand-by agreement. The reform, however, was not introduced in the end as Ecuador’s 
Constitutional Tribunal declared it unconstitutional. While external influence thus 
clearly played a role in putting this tax reform on the agenda this factor is unable to 
account for the outcome as the reform failed due to a domestic actor. Similarly in 
Bolivia in February 2003: while the multilateral organisations had advocated the 
introduction of a tax on personal income for several years, it was a domestic decision to 
propose this tax in that moment. Some pressure had certainly been put on the 
government as the IMF demanded a reduction of the fiscal deficit in exchange for 
granting a new credit line to Bolivia. While this provided a broader framework which 
made fiscal measures necessary, the particular policy chosen cannot be explained solely 
by referring to external actors. Additionally, since this reform ultimately failed due to 
popular protest, external influence could have gone no further than setting the agenda. 
In other cases, the multilateral organisations disagreed with the reforms proposed and 
tried to prevent them as happened in 1998 when IMF representatives tried to stop the 
FTT -  which was nevertheless was introduced by the Mahuad government. These cases 
show that external influence by the multilateral organisations sometimes -  though not 
always -  played a role in agenda-setting since the mid-1990s but generally had little 
influence on policy choices as domestic variables were decisive at this stage.
Considering external influence it needs to be pointed out, however, that US influence 
has certainly played an important role in Bolivia and that this country is much more
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exposed to US pressure than Ecuador. The US has been able to impose its policies 
regarding coca eradication for the last two decades and has therefore had an important 
presence in the country. Some other examples illustrate how the US government has 
interfered into domestic politics: in 2002 an attempt was made to influence the elections 
as US ambassador Rocha stated that the USA would withdraw all economic help and 
would close their markets in case Evo Morales would win the elections {La Razon, 
27.6.2002:B4). This attempt to interfere into Bolivia’s internal affairs did, however, 
backfire: it seems this statement of the ambassador gave an extra boost to the campaign 
of Morales who ended up in the second place though he had featured in the third or 
fourth place only in the polls taken prior to the elections {Fundacion Milenio, 2002:65- 
66). However, it can be said that the US government’s intention to prevent Evo Morales 
from coming to power has ultimately worked out. In the run up to the second round 
elections in Congress the US helped facilitate coalition partners for Gonzalo Sanchez de 
Lozada so that he would be elected as president. The MIR, which had previously 
resisted entering the Sanchez de Lozada government, ended up being a coalition partner 
after an intervention of the US (see Chapter 5.2).
In this and many other ways, therefore, the US government can be said to be an 
important actor within Bolivian politics (especially in the field of the politics of coca, 
see Chapter 3.9) and is certainly more present than is the case in Ecuador. However, in 
important decisions about economic reforms external influence of the US did play a 
limited role. For example, in the case of the shock programme introduced via Decree 
21060 in 1985 this was introduced during a time when the US took little notice of 
Bolivia (Lynch, 1994a: 116). Similarly, in the cases of tax reforms considered in this 
thesis there is little evidence that the US has been an important actor. Consequently, 
domestic variables are taken to have played the decisive role in tax politics.
Apart from the two approaches focusing on external actors and interest groups, the role 
of social movements and the impact of presidents’ policy positions on the reform 
process were also considered in the thesis and shall be analysed here.
Social Movements. No evidence was found that popular protest organised by social 
movements, trade unions or other groups played a major role in determining Ecuador’s 
and Bolivia’s patterns of tax policy-making. In a large number of cases hardly any 
protests occurred, partly because their opposition was focused on other issues
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(elimination of subsidies, salary increases) or because they did not consider themselves 
hugely affected (e.g. corporate income tax bill in 1994 in Bolivia; FTT in 1998 in 
Ecuador, 2004 in Bolivia). There are, however, significant exceptions: in 2003 the 
income tax in Bolivia could not be introduced due to popular protest by social 
movements and other groups; and in 2001 in Ecuador social movements’ protest and 
appeal to the Constitutional Court played a crucial role in reversing the VAT increase. 
In the course of the 1990s, indigenous and peasant movements appeared on the scene in 
both countries as important political actors and their influence has increased over time. 
They have also broadened their policy agenda (e.g. originally focusing mainly on land 
rights or other issues affecting them) and started challenging the government on various 
policy levels. The fact that the cases where social movements played an important role 
in making tax measures fail occurred in recent years, confirms this trend.
The Role of Presidents’ Policy Positions. To what extent have the policy positions of 
the incumbents played a role in presidents’ abilities to introduce tax policies? Or, in 
other words, is there an ideological explanation as to why presidents in Ecuador 
generally had more difficulties in getting their policies through? In Chapters 4 to 7 a 
short outline of each president’s electoral platform has been given and compared to the 
policies introduced subsequently. Especially in Ecuador, but also in Bolivia for example 
in the case of Paz Zamora in 1993, there was often a wide gap between candidates’ 
election campaign pledges and the policies they introduced once in power. As Stokes 
(2001:111) commented: “In Ecuador, presidents seem always to do just what they 
promise in campaigns not to. ” In her work Stokes (2001) analysed cases of mandate 
switching and referred to prominent cases as Peru’s Fujimori who announced in his 
electoral campaign he would not increase prices and once in power raised them 
massively; or, Venezuela’s Andres Perez who promised wage increases and then 
breached this promise. Stokes provided a useful explanation as to why these policy 
switches occur. Presidents may be convinced that unpopular policies may be more 
beneficial economically (and ultimately thus for themselves politically). Yet lobbying 
on a platform of unpopular policies would rule out any chances of being elected. 
Consequently, as Stokes argued, many presidents adopted the strategy to lobby on a 
“security-oriented platform” and once in power switched to an “efficiency-oriented” 
agenda and implemented market-oriented policies. Febres Cordero’s (1984-88) and 
Duran Ballen’s governments (1992-96) provide good examples for this approach as 
both of them toned down their neoliberal discourse during the campaign to increase
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their chances of being elected. Yet while in these cases politicians from the right 
undertook a mandate switch, in Bolivia a left-wing politician changed his course as 
happened in 1989 with Paz Zamora. Stokes’ approach argued that policy switches were 
more likely when presidents are in minority or coalition situations as they would need to 
make concessions to other parties. The special situation of Paz Zamora who was elected 
president despite being only the third most-voted candidate who then entered in a 
coalition with a party that held a lot more seats can largely explain the mandate switch.
While Stokes’ work is helpful when trying to explain why policy switches occur, it 
provides little evidence for explaining how they influenced presidents’ policy-making 
records. Do mandate switches make the subsequent introduction of market-oriented 
policies more difficult? The most prominent case of a policy switch in Ecuador was the 
u-tum Bucaram undertook when elected in 1996: after promising all sorts of social 
improvements in his campaign he quickly went on to announce one of the most 
orthodox agendas ever proposed in Ecuador when entering office. Though his party 
programme was committed to lowering the tax burden of the popular sectors, the first 
reform he undertook would have increased taxation significantly. Bucaram failed, 
however, to get this tax bill through Congress (see Chapter 6.4). Sanchez de Lozada’s 
attempt to introduce an income tax in 2003 also supports the claim that mandate 
switches make introducing policies more difficult. Though he had promised to lower tax 
rates in his election campaign (a promise he had already made in previous campaigns), 
he now tried to introduce a new tax instead of lowering one. Like Bucaram, Sanchez de 
Lozada also failed (see Chapter 5.2). Still, the evidence for the detrimental effects of 
policy-switching on policy-making is inconclusive. Firstly, in the examples referred to, 
there are a number of factors that caused the failure of the tax reform. In Sanchez de 
Lozada’s case, for example, while the policy switch may have contributed to the failure, 
other aspects (e.g. failure in communication, lack of legitimacy, fragile coalition) all 
need to be taken into account to explain this unsuccessful attempt. Secondly, there are 
several cases where presidents changed their policy agenda and still were successful in 
introducing reforms. Paz Zamora, representing the clearest case of a mandate switch as 
regards Bolivia, for example, managed to carry out two major tax increases in 1990 and 
1992. Ecuador’s Febres Cordero also significantly departed from his electoral platform 
and still managed to raise VAT by four points in 1986. In short, though mandate 
switches may have made introducing reforms more difficult in some cases, the evidence
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is inconclusive and other aspects provide a more coherent explanation of the pattern of 
tax policy-making in Ecuador and Bolivia.
It appears that neither interest groups, external influence or presidents’ policy positions 
but the institutional analysis applied is the best explanation for the different tax policy­
making processes that occurred in Ecuador and Bolivia during the 1980s and 1990s. 
Political structures led to coalition governments in Bolivia which were able to introduce 
wide-ranging economic reforms, while the lack of institutional incentives for coalition- 
building led to frequent failure of reforms in Ecuador. Though an institutional 
explanation accounts for a large number of cases, it does not hold invariably. The 
complex realities of Latin American politics cannot be adequately accounted for by 
single-variable explanations, as indicated in the introduction. Other aspects have also 
contributed to Ecuador’s and Bolivia’s pattern of policy-making.
8.3 H y p e r in f l a t io n  a n d  T a x  R e f o r m
A second finding of this research holds that hyperinflation was an important political 
variable that facilitated a radical restructuring of Bolivia’s tax system. In the literature 
on economic reform the economic crisis hypothesis has been taken up by various 
scholars. To name a few, Drazen and Grilli (1993) formulated the paradox that 
economic crisis can be welfare enhancing as they argued that introducing radical 
economic reforms is only possible if preceded by an economic crisis so that the 
measures would be acceptable given the losses citizens experience. Anne O. Krueger 
(1993:109) argued that policy reform would take place when "economic conditions 
deteriorated sufficiently so that there emerged a political imperative for better 
economic performance''. Applying prospect theory Kurt Weyland (2002a) showed how 
economic crises influenced the choices of political leaders and made them introduce 
risky policies. As regards the analysis of tax reforms in particular, the crisis explanation 
was used by Bird and Perry (1994:177) who argued that ‘for the most part major 
changes in tax structure and administration are possible only when times are bad, that 
is, in a crisis o f some sort
Critics of the economic crisis hypothesis have questioned the usefulness of the
117approach. They have pointed out that the concept of “crisis” is analytically difficult: 
what constitutes an economic crisis? When do countries reach the bottom with the
137 For critical points of view, see for example: Corrales, 1997-8; 2002; Williamson and Haggard, 
1994:565.
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subsequent effect of triggering drastic reforms? Dani Rodrik, pointing out that crisis is 
necessarily the outcome of policy failure, considered that the sequence of crisis 
followed by reform “is no more surprising than smoke following fir e ” (1996:27). Other 
authors, however, have narrowed this approach down and have referred to inflation or 
hyperinflation as being a crucial trigger for economic reforms. Mancur Olson argued in 
1982 that a major crisis, such as a war or hyperinflation, would provide a window of 
opportunity for introducing drastic economic policies (Olson, 1982) and the 
aforementioned Weyland argued that it is economic crises in the form of hyperinflation 
in particular that trigger bold reforms as a large number of people finds itself in the 
domain of losses in such a situation (Weyland, 2002a). Albert Hirschman argued in a 
similar way and considered that inflation had led to facilitating tax reforms in 
developing countries:
“When expenditures consistently outrun revenue the resulting inflation may have the 
effect o f convincing the public and government that taxes must be raised to finance 
public investment. In the advanced industrial countries income taxation and big spurts 
in taxation generally, have become possible only under the impact o f major emergency 
and crisis, mostly in wartime. In a number o f developing countries inflation has acted 
as an equivalent o f war in setting the stage for more forceful taxation. ” (Hirschman, 
1985:76)138
The Bolivian case seems to confirm this argument. As we have seen in the previous 
chapters, Bolivia managed to introduce some sort of “tax revolution” in 1986 when it 
completely overhauled its tax system. Within the Latin American context it introduced 
one of the most wide-ranging reforms. The experience of hyperinflation had made the 
introduction of drastic reforms acceptable to Bolivians. Given that this period had such 
an existential character for the majority of the people, hyperinflation remained as a 
potential threat in their minds. Thus even after the situation stabilised people were 
willing to accept economic reforms that would prevent the country of falling back into 
hyperinflation. Even years later politicians used this threat to defend the introduction of 
tax reforms; and, as Cariaga argued, the tax reform of 1992, for example, was possible 
partly due to the memory of hyperinflation (Cariaga, interview, 21.5.2004). The tax 
reforms and other economic policies introduced in Bolivia from 1985 onwards cannot 
be understood without taking into account the experience of hyperinflation as it 
represented a turning point both in economic and in political terms for Bolivia. As 
maintained by Doria Medina (Interview, 25.5.2004) hyperinflation represented a
138 For other authors referring particularly to the link between inflation and tax reforms see, for example, 
Mahon, 2004.
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window of opportunity for introducing changes and in this sense the argument of 
George Philip (1998:86) that "inflation is a key political variable " can be applied to the 
Bolivian case.
While Ecuador never experienced inflation on a similar scale it certainly went through 
times of serious economic crisis. In 1999, Ecuador’s economy all but collapsed: GDP 
declined by around 7.5 per cent, the real effective exchange rate depreciated by almost 
50 per cent between 1998 and 1999; and inflation climbed from 30.7 per cent in 1997 to 
52.0 per cent in 1999 (IMF, 2000b:7; INEC, 2005). This period is widely considered to 
be Ecuador’s worst economic crisis in decades. Yet even in this situation introducing 
economic reforms was difficult. President Mahuad tried to introduce tax legislation 
three times and three times he failed to have his proposals approved. Only on his third 
attempt did the Congress make some concessions and agree to raise the VAT from 10 to 
12 per cent (Mahuad’s proposal was 15 per cent). This can hardly be classified as a 
drastic reform measure. In the case when he did introduce a radical change by 
dollarising Ecuador’s economy -  for which Mahuad did not need the approval of the 
Congress -  political instability was the result as people protested against the measure 
and a few weeks later he was overthrown. This example shows the limits of the 
economic crisis hypothesis as economic crises do not necessarily pave the way for bold 
reforms. Bolivia in more recent times provides another example: since 2000 the fiscal 
deficit in Bolivia rose sharply from 3.8 per cent in 2000, to 6.5 in 2001, 8.7 in 2002 and 
7.9 per cent in 2003 (EIU, Bolivia, 2004:39). Using fiscal deficits as an indicator 
Bolivia had certainly reached crisis level and the situation had become unsustainable. 
Yet this did not facilitate the introduction of economic reforms as the failure of 
President Sanchez de Lozada to introduce an income tax showed.
To summarise, the examples above show that hyperinflation was an important variable 
in facilitating the radical changes introduced to the tax system in Bolivia in 1986 and its 
aftermath. The mere existence of economic crises, however, did not trigger wide- 
ranging economic reforms in either Bolivia or Ecuador. Other variables, such as the 
political capacity of governments to introduce policies, were decisive. While this was 
not the major focus of this work and more research would need to be done, the evidence 
of these countries seems to question the economic crisis approach in its broad form but 
confirms its narrowed down version of using hyperinflation as a crucial variable in 
bringing about major economic policy changes.
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8.4 How C o a l it io n  P o l it ic s  C o l l a p se d  in  B o l iv ia
With the resignation of Sanchez de Lozada, forced by a popular uprising in October 
2003, the period of political stability Bolivia experienced since 1985 came to an end. 
While Sanchez de Lozada had set up a ruling coalition, apart from failing to introduce 
the tax reform, this coalition was unable (and also unwilling) to shield him from his 
eventual downfall. His successor, Carlos Mesa, did not make any attempt to form a 
coalition and decided to govern without the support of the political parties. The decline 
in the pattern of coalition politics did not occur overnight but was a gradual process: as 
mentioned in Chapter 5.1 already the “mega-coalition” of Banzer (1997-2002) was 
experiencing difficulties and since 2000 popular protest gained more and more 
momentum. The government had to change its course on a couple of policy measures 
(e.g. when trying to privatise Cochabamba’s water supply in 2000). From this 
government onwards it also became increasingly difficult to introduce tax measures and 
the pattern of successfully introducing reforms in this area terminated.
Table 8.4: Tax Reforms in Bolivia since 2000
President Proposal of Government Outcome
2000 B anzer Increase in Excise Tax
C o n g ress  approves, later 
withdrawn (p ressure  of private 
sector)
2003 S an ch ez  de  Lozada
P ersonal Income Tax of 
12.5%
P opular protest forces 
P residen t to withdraw proposal
2004 M esa
a) 0.3% Financial 
T ransactions Tax (FTT)
b) 1.5% Net Property Tax
c) Property and Vehicle Tax
Only a) approved
Source: Own elaboration.
While in 2000 Banzer still managed to make use of the ruling coalition in that it 
approved the excise tax increase in Congress, his weakened government was vulnerable 
to pressure from the private sector and he withdrew the measure a few months after 
having introduced it. In February 2003 the attempt of Sanchez de Lozada to introduce a 
Personal Income Tax failed due to massive popular protest against the bill. Finally, in 
2004 Mesa managed to have only a small part of his tax policy proposal approved given 
that he lacked partisan support in Congress. These cases thus display a rather different 
pattern from the tax reforms introduced in the late 1980s and in the 1990s and give way
for a comparative analysis of the processes within Bolivia.
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Patronage logic. As previously mentioned, with the beginning of coalition politics in 
1985 Bolivia managed to overcome the difficulties of govemability in a fragmented 
Congress. The political pacts allowed presidents to introduce wide-ranging economic 
policies in a coherent way and Bolivia experienced a period of political stability. At the 
same time, however, these political pacts were based on the logic of patronage and 
required side payments to the political partners. As noted by Domingo (2001) the 
distribution of patronage is a normal procedure for any political system, yet Bolivia 
stands out for the degree of prevalence and for the number of challenges to democratic 
structures that patronage presents: “Democratic legitimacy is undermined where 
patronage and clientelism dwarf other motors o f political activity. ” (Domingo, 
2001:148). The salience of patronage politics has also been caused by the structure of 
the Bolivian economy, which has been largely unable to produce job opportunities for 
the urban middle class (Malloy, 1991:45). Napoleon Pacheco of the think tank 
Fundacion Milenio analysed the effects of patronage-based coalition politics as follows:
“It is a political system that allows generating alliances in the second round which are 
then giving governability to the new government. I think it is a very useful system which 
produced interesting results, though with the time it deteriorated precisely because the 
formation o f alliances in the Parliament resulted in the “cuoteo ”, in the distribution o f  
quotas, o f power to the members o f the governing alliance. So I think based on this 
element, this mechanism o f Bolivia’s system was deteriorating and was loosing 
legitimacy to a great extent, the legitimacy it had in the population. ” (Pacheco, 
interview, 5.5.2004)
This patronage logic on which coalition politics was based also found expression in the 
way Bolivia failed to reduce or reform its public sector.
Public sector employment. Considering the patronage logic of coalition politics, 
Bolivia thus presents a good example for Philip’s (2003) argument that the continuation 
of pre-democratic practices has undermined the process of democratic consolidation. 
While Bolivia was a radical reformer in almost all Washington Consensus reforms 
during the 1980s and 1990s, it was far less radical in reducing the size of the state. 
Though public sector employment was reduced during the last two decades, the number 
of employees almost exclusively fell in state industry; in other areas of the public sector 
employment increased from 1987 onwards. Between 1987 and 1997 central government 
employment rose from 129,300 to 180,470 and in recent years the trend has continued 
(see Chapter 3.1). While numbers increased gradually, a significant jump occurred from 
160,782 people employed at central government level in 1996 to 180,470 in 1997. This 
increase can be explained by the fact that in 1997 Banzer came to power and formed a
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mega-coalition of rather heterogeneous parties to support his government and patronage 
logic became increasingly the driving force for keeping coalitions going.
Other data confirm the pattern of a continual failure of Bolivian governments to reduce 
spending on the public sector. Within Bolivia the weight of public sector salaries on the 
government budget has increased during the last years as it represented 38.8 per cent of 
current expenditure in 1998, rising to 48.5 per cent by 2003 (World Bank, 2004b:74). 
An upper rank public employee receives 22 times the amount of an average salary in the 
national economy, a ratio that within Latin America is higher only in Mexico (CLAD,
2004). Considering these indicators -  the number of employees and the amount spent on 
public sector salaries -  it becomes clear that the neoliberal reforms carried out in 
Bolivia from the government of Paz Estenssoro onwards, have not included a reduction 
of public sector expenditure. As a report of the World Bank Bolivia: From Patronage to 
a Professional State (2000a+b) described, Bolivia has failed to modernise its public 
sector which remains highly politicised. A survey published in this report shows that -  
according to public officials -  government ministries are perceived to have a ratio of 
persons hired for political reasons of 38-68 per cent (depending on the ministry), while 
prefectures are perceived to have an average of 78 per cent of political hiring (World 
Bank, 2000a:58).139 In a recent IADB study Bolivia -  together with Paraguay, the 
Dominican Republic and the Central American countries (except Costa Rica) -  is 
categorised as having a “clientelistic bureaucracy”. Such a “clientelistic bureaucracy” is 
defined as a bureaucracy:
“characterized by low autonomy and low capacity. It is made up o f public officials who 
temporarily enter government because o f loyalty or party affiliation. ... The roles 
performed by clientistic bureaucracies are related to their nature primarily as a 
political resource o f the governing party to exchange jobs for votes or political support. 
This type o f bureaucracy is an extension o f the political party. ” (Stein et al., 2005:72).
Bolivia’s failure to reform the public sector had two significant effects: the quality of 
public services provided is generally poor and the country continues to have high rates 
of poverty, which the government has been unable to bring down (World Bank, 
2000a: 8).
Trade-off Public Sector and Tax Reform. A link between the successful introduction 
of tax policies and failed public sector reform can be established. While coalition
139 On reforms undertaken to modernise the public sector see also Sanchez de Lozada (2001:195-215); 
World Bank (2000a+b).
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politics facilitated the introduction of significant changes to the tax system, which 
resulted in a substantial increase in tax collection, it prevented any success as regards 
the other side of fiscal policy as Bolivia failed to reduce its spending on the public 
sector. While this contradicts the logic of market-oriented reforms this development can 
be explained by political aspects: the coalitions that were formed to enhance 
govemability were dependent on the distribution of patronage. To keep the coalitions 
together, therefore, presidents had to hand out public sector positions which in turn 
prevented the country from reducing spending and reforming its public sector. Facing 
this trade-off between public sector and tax reform, presidents in Bolivia repeatedly 
opted for increasing tax revenues to achieve fiscal balance. Paradoxically, therefore, the 
patronage-based coalitions that facilitated the introduction of tax reforms and other 
market-oriented reforms prevented the reduction and reform of the public sector. That 
there is a link between the use of patronage and a lack of public sector reform can be 
confirmed by comparing Bolivia to other countries of the region. In Venezuela, for 
example, the “Punto Fijo” system was highly dependent on patronage, which not only 
led to a decline in the quality of public sector services but also triggered huge discontent 
with the political class among the population.
While patronage-driven coalition politics generated stability and govemability in 
Bolivia for some time, it proved disastrous in the long run. On the one hand Bolivia 
became more and more successful in collecting taxes and the burden on taxpayers 
increased. On the other hand, however, the increased payments were not matched by 
improvement in the services provided by the public sector. The frustration of the 
Bolivian population at this imbalance increased with the perception of wide-spread 
corruption among the political class. The media in Bolivia frequently reports on 
corruption scandals and the public takes a huge interest in them.
As the use of patronage within coalitions increased, so publicity of the issue rose and 
the traditional parties became more and more discredited. The three main parties ADN, 
MNR and MIR that dominated the political scene and had been at the forefront of all 
existing coalitions between 1985 and 2003 received fewer and fewer votes during this 
period (see Chapter 2.5). The parties represented in Congress gradually lost their 
legitimacy and the connections between parties and society all but disappeared. As 
parties were no longer considered capable of expressing societal interests, street politics 
became again an important factor in Bolivia, as had been the case in the years prior to 
1985. Popular protest started to have an influence on political decisions mainly from the
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year 2000 and peaked in the overthrow of President Sanchez de Lozada in October 
2003.
Combining the above conclusion concerning the way that Bolivia’s political structures 
facilitated coalition-building and allowed presidents to introduce tax reform and other 
wide-ranging economic reforms, with the finding that the same pattern of coalition 
politics was based on patronage and prevented the downsizing of the public sector -  one 
is confronted with a dualistic process that was summarised by the aforementioned 
World Bank Report (2000a:vii):
“This practice, called cuoteo politico (political quota), has been the basis for formation 
and sustenance o f governing coalitions, and thus o f democratic stability. Relatively 
stable coalition arrangements have also facilitated legislative passage o f certain key 
reform measures, including the macroeconomic stabilization in the mid 1980s. In that 
sense, patronage politics exercised through the practice o f  cuoteo politico has 
contributed to improved governance at the macro level. The problem is that this macro 
level governance has been achieved at the cost o f deteriorating public services at the 
micro level because o f the excessive politicization o f the government bureaucracy... ”
Table 8.S: The Dual Effect of Coalitions
Coalitions
1985- Facilitated governance / Required side paym ents ■=> P revented  Public
-2003 Allowed introduction of '0- S ecto r Reform
tax and other econom ic Political parties discredited
reforms / 
Political stability
2000 Popular protest
Introducing econom ic policies 
m ore difficult / Political instability
Source: Own elaboration.
The result of this process represented a paradox: the wide-ranging economic reforms 
introduced in Bolivia from 1985 were only possible due to the existence of coalitions 
which in turn were dependent on patronage. Patronage and its resulting effects on the 
public sector, however, contradicted the logic of the other neoliberal economic reforms 
introduced. While this pattern provided Bolivia with political stability for almost two 
decades, in the long run the pattern of coalition politics was undermining itself and was 
set to gradually decline and possibly lead to an eventual downfall.
The coalitions had another effect, the consequences of which became visible mainly in 
the long run. The process can be summarised as such: the political pacts required
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patronage payments to hold them together and over the years did so increasingly. This 
led to the political parties being more and more discredited and a gap between the 
formal political level and society evolved. Disillusioned with their leaders people took 
to the streets and the extra-institutional level became an important factor in Bolivian 
politics. Introducing economic policies became more difficult for presidents (for 
example, failed tax reform of February 2003) and the country lapsed back into political 
instability. It thus seems that the same institutions which facilitated the formation of 
coalitions and therefore governance for a certain period, led to extra-institutional 
political patterns in the long run.
This summary of the process is surely simplified and certainly many other aspects 
influenced the changes Bolivia experienced in the last few years. To name just one, the 
frustration of Bolivians with the lack of improvement in their living conditions after 
almost twenty years of austerity measures hugely influenced society’s willingness to 
mobilise against their leaders. Yet without doubt, the patronage logic has undermined 
the pattern of coalition politics and has contributed to the situation of political instability 
Bolivia currently experiences. Political analyst Carlos Toranzo argued in a similar way 
as he considered this dual nature of coalition politics as one of the explanations for the 
situation of October 2003:
“Thus political stability is generated, I  think it is an element o f modernity o f Bolivian 
politics but while we were creating modernity in parallel pre-modernity was created as 
the logic o f the pact gave way to a clientelistic use o f the state, to an excess o f state 
patrimonialism and a prebendalistic use o f the state. So we had a mixed result: political 
stability, political modernity, possibility for an understanding between the parties yet 
high levels o f clientelism, patrimonialism and a prebendal use o f the state which is one 
o f the explanations for the crisis that happened in October last year." (Toranzo, 
interview, 5.5.2004)
This thesis has analysed the political dynamics of tax policy-making in Ecuador and 
Bolivia during the last two decades. Tax policies have been the main case study, but as 
shown in Chapter 3 these have been representative for other economic reform areas. The 
patterns established here therefore also indicate something about the dynamics of 
economic policy-making more generally. The analysis has made clear that to explain the 
politics of economic reforms it is important to look at institutional details and consider 
their influence on policies. The cases studied have shown that particular institutional 
elements -  such as the congressional election of presidents or provisions regarding the 
legislative process -  have frequently determined the success or failure of economic 
reforms. It was shown that it is of particular importance to include a political system’s
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ability to produce coalitions as a variable, as this crucially impacted on presidential 
policy-making capacities. It has been demonstrated that external actors played only a 
limited role in the economic reform processes of Ecuador and Bolivia. This is an 
important aspect because both countries are comparatively small and due to their 
situation often dependent on financial support. This aspect makes a case for analysing 
predominantly domestic politics when studying economic reform processes. Though 
business groups have managed to gain some concessions in a few cases, they have 
equally not proven decisive in the majority of tax reforms undertaken. Given these 
findings it can be concluded that the influence of business groups or external actors is 
often overstated in research on Latin America. While the importance of institutional 
variables has thereby been established, other aspects -  such as hyperinflation -  have 
complemented the explanation under which conditions presidents are able to introduce 
economic reforms.
8.5 F u r t h e r  R e se a r c h
Since the aim of this work was to investigate the influence of institutional aspects on 
policy-making the issue of conditions for coalition formation raised in Chapter 2.7 
could not be fully explored here. However, coalition-building in presidential regimes 
would make an exciting research topic involving, for example, a case study comparing 
two presidential systems that have produced coalitions. Furthermore, this thesis has 
considered the relationship between coalition politics, public sector reform and tax 
reform. This relationship still requires further analysis, however. To what extent has 
there been a trade-off between successful introduction of market-oriented policies and 
failure to reform the public sector due to persistent patronage logic in the political 
system? The fact that the two processes of political reform and economic liberalisation 
have largely happened simultaneously has led to the common assumption that the two 
are linked and reinforcing. Yet probably these two processes are often rather in conflict 
than in convergence with each other. Case studies analysing how pre-democratic forms 
of politics (e.g. patronage and corruption) have facilitated the introduction of market- 
oriented reforms, could further develop this assumption.
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Bolivia
Laws and Decrees
Ley 843,20.5.1986 
Ley 1141,23.2.1990
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Ley 1314, Modificaciones de alicuota en el IVA, RCIVA y  otros, 27.2.1992
Ley 1551, Ley de Participation Popular, 20.4.1994
Ley 1606, 22.12.1994
Ley 1544, Ley de Capitalization, 21.3.1994
Ley 1704, Ley Electoral, 2.8.1996
Ley 2047, Modifica anexo de tasas del articulo 79, 28.1.2000 
Ley 2152, Modifica las tasas del ICE, 23.11.2000 
Ley 2166, Ley de Servicio de Impuestos Nacionales, 22.12.2000 
Ley 2427, Ley del BONOSOL, 28.11.2002
Ley 2426, Ley de Seguro Universal Materno Infantil (SUMI), 21.11.2002
Ley 2446, Ley de Organization del Poder Ejecutivo, 19.3.2003
Ley 2492, Codigo Tributario Boliviano, 2.8.2003
Ley 2646, Impuesto a las transacciones financieras, 1.4.2004
Ley 2769, Ley del Referendum, 6.7.2004
Decreto Supremo 21521, 13.2.1987
Decreto Supremo 22555, 25.7.1990
Decreto Supremo 23027, Sistema Tributario Integrado (STI), 10.1.1991 
Decreto Supremo 24463, Regimen Agropecuario Unificado, 27.12.1996 
Decreto Supremo 24484, 29.1.1997 
Decreto Supremo 29494, 14.5.2004
Newspapers140
Bolpress (Internet-based Newspaper, www.bolpress.com)
El Deber 
El Diario 
El Nuevo Dia 
El Potosi 
La Prensa 
La Razon 
Opinion
Ecuador
Official Sources and Laws
Congreso Nacional del Ecuador, Acta No. 21-C, 14.12.1989. Sesion Plenario de 
Comisiones, “Continuation del Segundo Debate del Proyecto de Ley de Regimen 
Tributario Intemo”.
140 Throughout the text page numbers were given when the paper version of the newspapers (both 
Ecuadorian and Bolivian) was consulted; if no page number is given the articles were taken from the 
internet.
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Congreso Nacional del Ecuador. Acta No. 14, 3.12.1996. Vespertina del Plenario de las 
Comisiones Legislativas Permanentes, “Primer debate de Proyecto de ley Reformatoria 
al Codigo Tributario, a la Ley de Regimen Tributario Intemo, a la Ley de Presupuesto y 
del Sector Publico y creacion de los Impuestos Especiales al Patrimonio neto de las 
sociedades de los vehiculos motorizados.”
Congreso Nacional del Ecuador, Acta No. 2, 20.12.1996. Vespertina de Congreso
Extraordinario, “Continuation del segundo debate del Proyecto de Ley Reformatoria a la
ley de Regimen Tributario Intemo”
Congreso Nacional del Ecuador, Acta No. 43, 25.11.1998. Matutina Ordinaria del 
Congreso Nacional, “Segundo debate del proyecto de Ley de Reforma Tributaria y 
Financiera. No. 20-089, auspiciado por el Ejecutivo, con caracter de economico 
urgente”
Constitucion Polltica de la Republica de Ecuador, 1984 
Constitucion Polltica de la Republica de Ecuador, 1996 
Constitucion Polltica de la Republica de Ecuador, 1998 
Ley Organica de la Funcion Legislativa
Ley 56, Ley de Regimen Tributario Intemo, Registro Oficial (RO) No. 341, 22.12.1989 
Ley 51, Ley reformatoria a la Ley de Regimen Tributario Intemo, RO 349, 31.12.1993
Ley 110, Ley reformatoria de la Ley de Regimen Tributario Interno, RO-2S 852,
29.12.1995
Ley 06, Ley reformatoria de la Ley de Regimen Tributario Interno, RO-S 1998,
30.12.1996
Ley s/n (without number), reformatoria a la Ley de Regimen Tributario Interno, RO-S 
120,31.7.1997
Ley 41, Ley de Creacion del Servicio de Rentas Intemas, RO 206, 2.12.1997
Ley 46, Ley de Promocion y  Garantia de las Inversiones, RO 219, 19.12.1997
Ley 98-17, Ley de Reordenamiento en materia Economica en el Area tributario- 
financiera, RO-S 78, 1.12.1998
Ley 99-24, Ley de Reordenamiento de las Finanzas Publicas, RO 181 -S, 30.4.99
Ley 99-41, Ley de Racionalizacion Tributaria, RO-S 321, 18.11.1999
Ley 2000-4, Ley para la transformacion economica del Ecuador, RO 33, 13.3.2000
Decreto Ley 2000-1, Ley para la promocion e inversion y  participacion ciudadana.
RO-S 144, 18.8.2000
Ley 2001-41, Ley de Reforma Tributaria, RO-S 325, 14.5.2001
Newspapers
El Comercio 
Hoy
El Telegrafo
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A ppendices
Appendix A 
Primary Sources and Methodology
The primary material used and gathered for this thesis comes from various sources. 
Interviews conducted in Ecuador and Bolivia represented an important source. How 
they were prepared, conducted and used is outlined in the following.
How the Interviews were Chosen. Before starting the actual interviews, extensive 
background research on the different tax reforms carried out in Ecuador and Bolivia was 
undertaken. By reading about the reforms mainly in newspaper articles and secondary 
literature, several names connected to these reforms were repeatedly mentioned which I 
then included in my list of potential interviewees. Given that the research analyses the 
processes and political dynamics of how tax reforms were introduced, the interviewees 
of most interest to me were those closely involved in the reform efforts. Since the 
research question focuses on the extent to which presidents are able to introduce the 
reforms they propose it naturally followed that the interviewees would be mainly those 
with close proximity to decision-making structures. The sampling frame was therefore 
largely elite focused. A preliminary list of people to be interviewed was devised before 
the field trip and mainly included those who participated directly in the decision-making 
process of a tax reform or had got involved in its discussion. In the course of events the 
list was constantly revised and the so-called “snowball strategy” was employed: at the 
end of each interview the respondents were asked which other persons they would 
advise me to talk to. This proved a very helpful procedure as these suggestions helped 
me to find out about the crucial people involved in the process and in several cases 
interviewees even helped to arrange my next interviews. Even when this was not the 
case it happened a few times that when phoning other people they had already heard 
from a previous interviewee about my research. While finding the snowball system a 
useful strategy the previously devised list helped to make sure that not only 
representatives of a certain social network were interviewed. However, though most 
people certainly recommended colleagues and friends, a number of people also 
recommended interviewees who would give a different perspective and opinion from 
theirs. The selection of interview partners depended largely also on their availability.
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For example, several former presidents or finance ministers whom I would have liked to 
interview live in exile and were thus unavailable.
To be able to see the introduction of these policies from different perspectives the 
sampling frame consisted of people from a variety of sectors, including:
- Presidents, finance ministers and other cabinet members
- Members of Parliament and Chairpersons of the Legislative Commissions 
responsible for tax matters
- Central Bank presidents
- Directors and other staff of internal revenue services
- Representatives of private sector groups
(- Representatives of trade unions and social movements)
- Tax lawyers, representatives of think tanks, academics141
Presidents, finance ministers and other cabinet members were interviewed to find out 
how they went about developing the reform and convincing others to back it. To learn 
about the legislative level, interviews with Members of Parliament and chairpersons of 
the legislative commissions responsible for tax matters were conducted. Central Bank 
presidents as well as Directors and other staff of Bolivia’s and Ecuador’s internal 
revenue services provided information on technical aspects of the tax policies. To 
analyse the extent of opposition and influence of private sector groups, several 
representatives of this sector were interviewed. To get a similar perspective from trade 
unions and social movements several attempts were made to meet with leaders of this 
sector. Unfortunately, however, the attempts were largely unsuccessful as my meetings 
with a number of representatives kept on being postponed (until I had left) or the 
interviewees simply did not turn up (some of them failed to appear a number of times). 
To round up the perspective gathered interviews with a number of tax lawyers, 
representatives of prominent think tanks and academics were carried out. In addition 
some members of the National Electoral Courts were interviewed to gather knowledge 
about electoral procedures in Bolivia and Ecuador.
141 For a full list of interviewees see Appendix B.
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In sum, the sampling frame included a wide variety of actors so that different 
perspectives of the tax reforms could be gathered. Particular attention was paid to policy 
actors who were part of decision-making structures, their role in tax reform and their 
interpretation of events.142
How the Interviews were Conducted. Before starting the interviews a list of questions 
was prepared which had two sections: a first section contained general questions (e.g. 
which important tax reforms happened, what was their content, how was the process, 
who were the main actors involved etc.) which were put to all respondents. A second set 
of questions was designed to the specific knowledge of an interviewee (e.g. when 
interviewing someone who was involved in Ecuador’s tax reform of 1989 specific 
questions concerning that case of reform were asked). This list of questions, or 
conversation guide, evolved over time as new insights were won in the early interviews. 
As pointed out by Rubin and Rubin (1995:43) "Qualitative interviewing design is 
flexible, iterative and continuous, rather than prepared in advance and locked in 
stone. ” These principles were followed and the prepared questions were used to conduct 
“semi-structured interviews”: the wording and order of the questions was altered as 
appropriate in every situation. The aim was to make the interviews appear more like a 
conversation rather than a strict agenda of questions and answers. The interview 
structure was also flexible as probing was used to make the interviewees go more into 
detail when they had given a rather general answer only or when their answers went into 
an unsolicited direction which proved interesting.
At the beginning of each interview the interviewee was given some information about 
the researcher’s background and the research undertaken. This often helped to show the 
interviewee that the researcher had some knowledge about the issue so that their 
answers were more detailed than they might otherwise have been. However, several 
respondents started off by giving rather general answers. They usually changed 
direction and went more into depth after I had included some technical terms or 
keywords into the next question asked.
The length of the interview was usually one to one-and-a-half hours and generally took 
place in the interviewees’ office (in a few cases in a cafe or the interviewees’ home).
142 For approaches to interviewing see: Arksey and Knight (1999); Bauer and Gaskell (eds.) (2000); 
Brenner et.al. (1985). For literature dealing particularly with elite interviewing see: Ball (1994); Berry 
(2002); Davies (2001); Dexter (1970); Goldstein (2002); Lilleker (2003); Richards (1996); Rubin & 
Rubin (1995).
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Interviews were carried out in Quito, Guayaquil, La Paz and London. The interviews 
arranged in Cochabamba had to be cancelled due to road blockages occurring in Bolivia 
during my stay. All interviews but one were tape recorded to which all respondents had 
agreed. In two cases I was asked to switch off the tape recorder for a certain time during 
the interview when sensitive information was given.
The process of interviewing was a learning process. My interview techniques of probing, 
including key words, making interviewees go back to the actual topic without showing 
that what they had previously said was not that relevant or generally to shape the 
interview into an easily flowing conversation, yet at the same time managing to ask all 
questions on my list developed over time and from interview to interview. I also 
experienced the interviews as a highly enjoyable activity -  it gave colour to the issues 
researched and gave motivation for the work ahead.
How the Data was Used. In total 67 interviews were carried out. Since in qualitative 
interviewing there is no clear definition as to how many people should be interviewed 
the number came together for two reasons. At a practical level I simply tried to do as 
many interviews as possible while in Ecuador and Bolivia as it was clear that another 
field trip -  at least not to both countries -  would be very difficult if not impossible. At 
the level of gathering data there was a stage in the interview process when stories and 
interpretations repeated themselves and it seemed that I had heard a sufficient variety of 
voices on the theme. Glaser and Strauss (1967) have called this process “theoretical 
saturation
All tape recorded interviews were subsequently transcribed so that the analysis could 
rely on the full text. Subsequently the texts were read and re-read in different stages in a 
coding process. Certain passages and quotes were marked and grouped into categories 
so that what different people said on a certain theme could be compared. The interviews 
were coded according to the year of the tax reform and in the sub-categories of the 
background of this tax reform, its contents, the process, opposition to the reform, the 
actors involved, and why the interviewee thought the reform was possible or obstructed. 
The collected interview passages were then grouped into the different categories and 
sub-categories. When analysing this data an interviewee’s statement or point of view 
was included in the analysis if it was backed up by another respondent or other material 
used.
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Other Sources. The information gathered via the interviews was then contrasted with 
evidence found in other sources.
Newspapers. To complement this material, newspapers proved to be an important 
source and around 1400 articles were consulted. They provided results of voting on tax 
reforms in the Congress, behind-the-scenes information, speeches, and evidence of 
dynamics of the coalitions. They also gave evidence of the reaction of private sector 
groups to the reforms and their attempts to influence them (e.g. by carrying out media 
campaigns) as well as popular protest against the tax policies. Evidence from the 
newspapers was of particular importance for the tax reforms that lie further back as the 
interview partners remembered more details of those reforms that were introduced more 
recently.
The Bolivian newspaper El Diario and the Ecuadorian El Comercio of the last two 
decades were consulted systematically at Colindale, the newspaper branch of the British 
Library. For articles of the last two to three years (useful mainly for the case studies of 
2003 and 2004 in Bolivia) a wider range of newspapers was consulted via the internet.
Documents. The minutes of the legislature’s discussion on some of the tax reforms 
were researched in the Ecuadorian and Bolivian Libraries of Congress. This was done to 
get a better understanding of the procedures and discussions within the legislature. Both 
libraries proved useful for researching the members of the legislative committees 
responsible for tax reform during the last twenty years. Former and current Members of 
Parliament were contacted after this research had been made as it was assumed that MPs 
who participated in these commissions would remember the discussions of the tax 
reforms most. The access to the documents in these libraries was limited, however. In 
Ecuador the Congress building had burned down a few months before my field trip. 
Though the Congress library was unharmed it was now based in a different building. 
This temporary arrangement meant that a lot of documents were not kept in the right 
order and some documents that would have been important for my research could not be 
found. While in Bolivia limitations of time prevented me from doing more extensive 
research in the library of Congress.
Several internal documents were provided by the Ministries of Finance and the Internal 
Revenue Services, which mainly provided technical information on the changes to the 
tax system.
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Statistical data. For statistical data on economic aspects, the databases of the two 
Central Banks, the Internal Revenue Services as well as the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) and World Bank were consulted. Some statistical data was rather hard to 
come by or was sometimes found to be contradicting. In those cases where no reliable 
data was found, it was left out. This explains why in Chapter 3 some economic data is 
only given for a certain time period rather than for the whole two decades considered.
The Tribunal Supremo Electoral (TSE) in Ecuador provided access to their databases 
with the election results of the last twenty years. Similar information was obtained from 
the Bolivian Corte Nacional Electoral (CNE) for recent elections; other electoral data 
was used from www.observatorioelectoral.org.
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Appendix B
List o f Interviews
Note: When no dates are given, position is held currently.
Ecuador
1) Alberto ACOSTA -  Economist at ILDIS (Instituto Latinoamericano de 
Investigaciones Sociales) -  23.3. 2004 -  Quito
2) Dr. Alfredo ARIZAGA -  Minister of Finance (August 1999 -  March 2000) -
31.3.2004 -  Quito
3) Dr. Gustavo ARTETA -  Economist at CORDES (Corporation de Estudios para el 
Desarrollo) -  7.4.2004 -  Quito
4) Dr. Pablo BETTER -  Minister of Finance (January 1991- August 1992); President 
of the Central Bank (June 1999 -  10th of January 2000) -  30.3.2004 -  Quito
5) Dr. Rodrigo BORJA CEVALLOS -  President of Ecuador (1988-92) -  24.3.2004 -  
Quito
6) Sim6n BUSTAMANTE VERA -  Deputy of Partido Social Cristiano (PSC) 1990-96 
and since 1998; Legislative Comission for Tax, Fiscal and Banking Matters (President 
1998-2000; Member 1990-91, 1992-1995); President of the Legislative Commision for 
Economic, Agrarian, Industrial and Commercial Matters (since 2003) -  20.4.2004 — 
Quito
7) Eduardo CABEZAS -  Minister of Finance (January 1988 -  August 1988);
Ecuador’s Ambassador in London since 2003 -  10.3.2004 -  London
8) Jaime CARRERA -  Economist at Observatorio de la Politica Fiscal; Sub-secretary 
of Budget Matters (during government of Mahuad) -  29.3.2004 -  Quito
9) Dr. Fabian CORRAL -  Tax lawyer at Corral-Sanchez Abogados, Law Firm - 
Director Camara de Comercio de Quito (1994-96, 1999-2001) -  6.4.2004 -  Quito
10) Modesto CORREA -  Minister of Finance (September 1994 -  April 1995) -  
President of the Central Bank 1/2000 - 5/2000 -  15.4.2004 -  Guayaquil
11) Alegria DONOSO -  Historian, Author -  17.3.2004 -  Quito
12) Carolyn ESPINOSA -  Economist at Ministry of Finance, Subsecretary of Political 
Economy -  18.3.2004 -  Quito
13) Fander FALCONI -  Economist at FLACSO (Facultad Latinoamericana de 
Ciencias Sociales) Ecuador -  17.3.2004 -  Quito (handwritten notes only, interview was 
not recorded)
313
14) Dr. Gustavo GUERRA -  Research Coordinator at Servicio de Rentas Intemas 
(SRI), Tax Lawyer -  23.3.2004 -  Quito
15) Dr. Raul HURTADO LARREA -  President of Legislative Commission on Tax, 
Fiscal and Banking Matters 2000-02; Member of Parliament for Democracia Popular 
(DP) -  13.4.2004 -  Quito
16) Elsa de MENA -  Director of Servicio de Rentas Intemas (SRI) (September 1998- 
September 2004, again since April 2005) -  20.4.2004 -  Quito
17) Dr. Marcelo MERLO -  Camara de Comercio de Quito 1974-2001; General 
Comptroller of the State 1984-88; Minister of Government under Noboa 2000 -  2003 -
19.4.2004 -  Quito
18) Teresa MINUCHE DE MERA -  President of Legislative Commission on Tax and 
Budget Matters 1992-93; Deputy for Partido Conservador (PC) 1992-94; 
Superintendent of Companies 1979-87 -  25.3.2004 -  Quito
19) Jaime MORILLO BATTLE -  Minister of Finance (1975-76 and November 1981 
-  September 1982) -  Ex-President of Monetary Junta -  7.4.2004 -  Quito
20) Dr. Xavier NEIRA MENENDEZ -  Party leader Partido Socialcristiano (PSC), 
Deputy PSC -  16.4.2004 -  Guayaquil
21) Jorge ORTIZ -  Journalist - 30.3.2004 -  Quito
22) Simon PACHANO -  Political Scientist FLACSO (Facultad Latinoamericana de 
Ciencias Sociales) Ecuador -  18.3.2004 -  Quito
23) Dr. Pablo Lucio PAREDES -  Professor and Director of Research at Escuela de 
Direction de Empresas (IDE); Economist -  7.4.2004 -  Quito
24) Alonso PEREZ-KAKABADSE -  Vice-minister of the Economy (October 1999 -  
August 2000 + July 2002 -  September 2002); Economic Advisor to President Noboa 
(September 2000 -  June 2002) -  3.12.2004 -  London.
25) Mario RIBADENEIRA -  Minister of Finance (August 1992 -  July 1993);
President of Camara de Comercio de Quito (March 2002 -  March 2004) -  (currently) 
Empresa Morisaenz (cars) and President of Consejo Empresario de America Latina -
20.4.2004 -  Quito
26) Cesar ROBALINO -  Minister of Finance (1976; May 1981 -  November 1981;
July 1993 -  September 1994) -  (currently) Vice-president Regional Banco de 
Guayaquil -  5. 4.2004 -  Quito
27) Wilson RUALES -  Tax Expert, Adviser to Director at Servicio de Rentas Intemas 
(SRI) -  23.3.2004 -  Quito
28) Carlos SANDOVAL -  President of Tax Commission elaborating tax reform of 
1989; Consultant at GTZ (Gesellschaft fur Technische Zusammenarbeit) -  26.3.2004 — 
Quito
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29) Dr. Victor Hugo SICOURET -  Minister of Housing (August 1996 -  February 
1997); Deputy and leader of PRE -  16.4.2004 -  Guayaquil
30) Francisco SWETT -  Minister of Finance (August 1984 -  June 1986) -  President of 
Central Bank 1998 -  15.4.2004 -  Guayaquil
31) Eduardo VALENCIA -  Professor Universidad Catolica del Ecuador, Instituto de 
Investigaciones Economicas -  2.4.2004 -  Quito
32) Dr. Patricio VIVANCO -  Deputy of Democracia Popular (DP) 1988-1990; 
Member of Legislative Commission on Tax, Banking, Fiscal and Budget Matters; 
President of Tribunal Supremo Electoral 1997-98 -  1.4.2004 -  Quito
Bolivia
1) Dr. Eduardo ANTELO Callisperis -  Vice-minister of the Treasury (March 2001 -  
August 2002); Vice-minister of the Budget (May 2000 -  February 2001) -  24.5.2004 -  
LaPaz
2) David BLANCO -  Minister of Finance (August 1989 -  February 1992) -  30.4.2004 
-  La Paz
3) Ramiro CABEZAS -  Superintendente Tributario; Minister of Tax Collection 1986- 
87; Minister of Finance 1988-89 -  29.4.2004 -  La Paz
4) Fernando CANDIA -  Minister of Finance (August 1995 -  August 1997); Vice- 
minister of Political Economy 1986-89 -  6.5. 2004 -  La Paz
5) Juan CARIAGA -  one of the authors of Decree 21060; Minister of Planning 
(January 1986 -  August 1988); Executive Director at World Bank 1996-99; Executive 
Director IDB 1988-91; Director Central Bank of Bolivia 1974-75- 21.5.2004 -  La Paz
6) Fernando COSSIO -  Vice-minister of Tax Politics 2002 -  December 2003 -
10.5.2004-L a  Paz
7) Samuel DORIA MEDINA -  Entrepreneur (Sociedad Boliviana del Cemento -  
SOBOCE); Minister of Planning and Co-ordination 1991-93; Party leader of Unidad 
Nacional (UN, founded in 2003), previously member of the MIR -  25.5.2004 -  La Paz
8) Maria FELIX -  Tax Analyst Unidad de Analisis de Politicas Sociales y Economicas 
(UDAPE) -  30.4.2004 -  La Paz
9) Dr. George GRAY-MOLINA -  Ex-Director UDAPE (until March 2004); UNDP 
Bolivia -  7.5.2004 -  La Paz
10) Fernando ILLANES -  President of Confederation de Empresarios Privados de 
Bolivia (CEPB) 1982-85, 1992-93; Minister of Finance (August 1993 -  March 1994) -
4.5.2004- L a  Paz
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11) Bernard INCH CALVIMONTE -  Economic Commission of the Legislature 
(1997-2001, 1998-2000 its President; currently its adviser); Member of Parliament for 
the NFR (1997-2002) -  13.5.2004 -  La Paz
12) Alberto MACHICADO -  Vice-minister of Tax Politics (August 1997 -  August 
2002) -  25.5.2004 -  La Paz
13) Dr. H. C. Felipe MANSILLA -  Political scientist and author -  1.5.2004 -  La Paz
14) Armando MENDEZ -  President of the Central Bank 1992-93; Vice-president 
Central Bank 2000-03 - 7.5.2004 -  La Paz
15) Edgar MILLARES -  Minister of Finance (August 1997 -  August 1998) -
29.4.2004-L a  Paz
16) Dr. Juan Antonio MORALES -  President of the Central Bank since 1996 -
24.5.2004-L a  Paz
17) Herbert MULLER -  Minister of Finance (August 1998 -  April 2000) -  10.5.2004 
-  La Paz
18) Francisco MUNOZ -  (previously) Tax Analyst at PriceWaterhouseCoopers -
11.5.2004-L a  Paz
19) Carlos OTALORA -  Regional Tax Superintendent for La Paz since 2004; General 
Director of Internal Revenue Service (General de la Direction General de Impuestos 
Intemos) 1983, 1996-7 -  12.5.2004 -  La Paz
20) Napoleon PACHECO -  Director Fundacion Milenio -  5.5.2004 -  La Paz
21) Eduardo PAZ RADA -  Legislative Comission on Planning, Political Economy and 
Finances 1993-95; Deputy for CONDEPA 1990-2002 -  26.5.2004 -  La Paz
22) Jaime PAZ ZAMORA -  President of Bolivia 1989-93 -  19.5.2004 -  La Paz
23) Juan Carlos PEREIRA -  Director of Internal Revenue Service 1989-93; 
intemacional tax consultant; (currently) one of the directors of Servicio de Impuestos 
Nacionales (SIN) -  28.5.2004 -  La Paz
24) Fernando ROMERO -  President Confederation de Empresarios Privados de 
Bolivia (CEPB) 1985; Member of team developing Decree 21060; Minister of Planning 
1988-89; Minister of Human Development 1993-97 -  25.5.2004 -  La Paz
25) Dr. Sandra ROMERO -  Chamber of Industry, Vice-manager of Legal and Tax 
Matters -  28.5.2004 -  La Paz
26) Dr. Salvador ROMERO BALLIVIAN -  “Vocal” of Corte Nacional Electoral 
(CNE) -  28.4.2004 -  La Paz
27) Dr. Santos RAMIREZ Valverde -  Head of the economic team of the MAS;
Deputy MAS -  31.5.2004 -  La Paz
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28) Waldo SERRUTO -  Manager for the Hydrocarbons Sector (interim), Servicio de 
Impuestos Intemos -  31.5.2004 -  La Paz
29) Rosa TALA VERA -  Tax Analyst, Price WaterhouseCoopers -  20.5.2004 -  La Paz
30) Carlos TORANZO -  Director of ILDIS (Instituto Latinoamericano de 
Investigaciones Sociales) -  5.5.2004 -  La Paz
31) Jaques TRIGO LOUBIERE -  Minister of Finance (August 2001 -  August 2002); 
Banking Superintendent 1995-2001; President of the Central Bank 1988-89 -  20.5.2004 
-  La Paz
32) Dr. Juan Cristobal URIOSTE -  Superintendent (interim) Pensions, Securities, and 
Insurance; Constitutional expert -  11.5.2004 -  La Paz
33) Gerardo VELASCO -  Manager Chamber of Industry (CNI) -  27.5.2004 -  La Paz
34) Gonzalo M. VIDAURRE ANDRADE -  Chamber of Industry (CNI), Vice­
manager for Economic Research -  28.5.2004 -  La Paz
35) Alvaro VILLEGAS -  Tax Lawyer; consultant for February 2003 income tax 
proposal -  28.5.2004 -  La Paz
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Appendix C
Duration of Finance Ministers in Office (in Months)  - Ecuador
Fernando Aspiazu (1979-80)
Rodrigo Paz Delgado (1980-81)
Cesar Robalino G. (1981)
Jaime Morillo Battle (1981-82)
Pedro Pinto (1982-84)
Francisco Swett (1984-86)
Alberto Dahik (1986)
Domingo Cordovez (1986-87)
Rodrigo Espinosa Bermeo (1987-88)
Eduardo Cabezas (1988)
Jorge Gallardo (1988-91)
Pablo Better G. (1991-92)
Mario Ribadeneira (1992-93)
Cesar Robalino Gonzaga (1993-94)
Modesto Correa (1994-95)
Mauricio Pinto M. (1995)
Ivan Andrade (1995-96)
Pablo Concha L. (1996-97)
Carlos Davalos (1997)
Marco Flores (1997-98)
Fidel Jaramillo (1998-99)
Ana Lucia Armijos (1999)
Alfredo Arizaga (1999-2000)
Alonso Perez-Kakabadse (2000)
Jorge Guzman (2000)
Mauricio Davalos (2000)
Luis Yturralde (2000)
Jorge Gallardo (2001)
Carlos Julio Emanuel (2001-02)
Francisco Arosemana (2002-03)
Mauricio Pozo (2003-04)
Mauricio Yepez (2004-05)
Rafael Correa (2005 -)
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35
Average Duration of Finance Ministers in Office (1979 -  April 2005):
9.6 months
Source: Own elaboration.
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Appendix D
Table -  Trend of Consumer Prices (% change on previous year), Bolivia
Bolivia Ecuador
1980 47.2 11.9
1981 32.1 14.0
1982 123.5 16.2
1983 275.6 47.8
1984 1281.4 32.8
1985 11749.6 28.1
1986 276.4 23.0
1987 14.6 29.4
1988 16.0 57.0
1989 15.2 78.1
1990 17.1 48.5
1991 21.4 48.8
1992 12.1 54.0
1993 8.5 46.4
1994 7.9 27.5
1995 10.2 23.0
1996 12.4 24.4
1997 4.7 30.7
1998 7.7 35.8
1999 2.2 52.0
2000 4.6 95.5
2001 1.6 40.3
2002 0.9 12.6
2003 3.3 8.0
2004 4.4 2.8
Source: Own elaboration. Data Bolivia: INE, 2005; INEC, 2005.
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Appendix E
Elements of Bolivia’s 1986 Tax Reform
Value-added Tax (VAT). At the heart of the new structure was a Value-added Tax 
(VAT): the previously existing over 400 sales taxes were combined into a unified 10 
percent Value-added Tax. An unusually wide range of exemptions was abolished by this 
reform and VAT was now applied to all goods except exports, the sale of real estate and 
of shares, and interest on loans (the last three are exempt, however, as they are subject 
to other taxes). While in many other countries in Latin America basic goods are exempt 
from VAT, Bolivia eliminated also these exemptions thus establishing a very broad base. 
VAT soon turned into the principal tax of the tax system and by 1988 generated over 
half of the total internal tax revenues (excluding customs duties and hydrocarbons 
taxes) (Mann, 1990:33). Bolivia’s VAT rate of 10% is tax inclusive. The VAT is 
incorporated in the price of the product, so the effective VAT rate is 11% of the price 
excluding the tax itself. When the rate was increased to 13% in 1992, the effective rate 
rose to 14.92%.
“Complementary Tax”. One of the most striking features of the Bolivian tax reform 
was that both personal and corporate income taxes were abolished; few tax systems in 
the world do not have an income tax. In their place other taxes were introduced, thus the 
so-called “Complementary Tax” became the successor of the personal income tax. The 
Regimen Complementario al lmpuesto al Valor Agregado (RC-IVA, Complementary 
Regime to the Value-added Tax) implied a 10 percent withholding tax on all income - 
such as salaries, wages, rentals, interest, royalties etc. -  paid to individuals. Ramiro 
Cabezas, considered as the inventor of this tax, explained it as follows:
”We implemented the complementary regime to the value-added tax as a personal 
income tax; however the name already tells that it is not a personal income tax but a 
complementary tax to the VAT. The objective o f this tax was that every citizen and 
taxpayer would turn into a kind o f inspector and would demand an invoice because 
every invoice has a value as the invoice o f all their purchases allows them to deduct the 
VAT they had paid for their purchases from their personal income tax. " (Cabezas, 
interview, 29.4.2004)
As Cabezas made clear the “Complementary Tax” thus not only had the aim to gain 
revenues but was also introduced as an enforcement mechanism of the VAT: it provided 
people with an incentive to demand invoices -  which shops otherwise might not have 
given voluntarily in order to avoid declaring that sale -  as they could use them to offset 
them against the 10 percent tax on their incomes. In consequence, if they managed to 
present invoices for 10 percent or more of their income they would not have to pay this 
tax at all. The “Complementary Tax” was not levied on total income, but two minimum 
salaries could be deducted from the monthly income, thus aiming to benefit people of 
low income (later on this was increased to four minimum salaries). Another reason for 
abolishing the personal income tax was that after the process of hyperinflation it was 
very difficult to determine how much people earned, there was no record or anything, so 
that the government decided to go for a tax that was much easier to administer, as was 
pointed out by Juan Cariaga, one of the core members of the economic team that had 
developed this tax reform (Cariaga, interview, 21.5.2004).
2 percent Tax on Presumed Profits of Companies. Just as the Personal Income Tax 
was eliminated by the 1986 reform, so was the Corporate Income Tax and in its place a 
2 percent tax on the Presumed Profits of Companies was introduced (in 1988 the rate
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was increased to 2.5%). Not only was this tax easier to administer it was also considered 
that tax evasion was much more difficult with the taxation of presumed profits rather 
than income. Samuel Doria Medina, one of Bolivia’s principal entrepreneurs, accounted 
for the choice of this tax:
“In 1986 a tax on the presumptive income was introduced as the companies were 
working wonders with their balances, everyone lost, no one showed any gains. In 
consequence it was said it would be a tax on assets, on the net worth. Thus the concept 
was simple so that they would not cheat the tax on presumptive income, and it was 
efficient but very regressive. " (Doria Medina, interview, 25.5.2004)
As was also the case with the other taxes introduced, the 2 percent tax on the presumed 
profits equally had the objective of reducing possibilities for tax evasion and to 
contribute to the overall simplification of the tax system. Non-profitmaking associations 
and institutions and housing cooperatives were exempted from this tax, as were 
enterprises of the mining, hydrocarbon and electricity sector which were exempt given 
that they were subject to other taxes. As pointed out by Fernando Candia, Vice-minister 
for Political Economy at that time (1986-89), this tax was always planned as a transitory 
measure until a higher degree of institutionality was reached and a corporate income tax 
could be introduced (Candia, interview, 6.5.2004).
Property and Vehicle Tax. This tax was levied on real estate and vehicles. All owners 
-  be it a corporation or a natural person -  were to be charged this progressive tax on the 
rural or urban real property and on their automobiles, boats and airplanes. Rates ranged 
from 0.15 to 2.65 percent for real property and 0.5 to 4 percent for vehicles with rates 
varying according to value. Exempt from the tax were certain types of property such as 
state lands, school areas, and small rural landholdings. The property tax had existed in 
the previous tax regime and had been charged by the municipalities. The new property 
tax provided for much higher rates; municipal governments were to maintain receiving 
the revenue collected equalling the rates valid during the previous tax regime. For 
example, the rate levied by municipalities on real estate used to be 0.35%. 
Municipalities will continue to receive this 0.35% from the rate that is now higher, 
while the difference goes to the central government.
Transactions Tax. A 1 percent transactions tax on sales and other transfers of property 
was introduced, covering sales of goods and services: rents, professional fees, sales of 
shares, real estate properties, motor vehicles, aircraft, also transfers of property at death 
or by gift (the death and gift taxes were only introduced in March 1987 when the 
Congress decided to add these to the original law of 1986). To be exempt from paying 
this tax were salaries in the private and public sectors, interest payments and 
transactions carried out by governmental agencies, exporters, publishing houses and 
book importers, private educational institutions and diplomatic personnel.
“The tax on transactions, which originally was 1 percent, had a cascade effect: every 
time one produced a shirt, sold it to the trader one paid 1 percent, the trader sold it to 
the distributor, paid 1 percent, and the distributor -  all paid this 1 percent so that i f  one 
adds this up it becomes quite a heavy charge because it is cascading. ” (Munoz, 
interview, 11.5.2004)
Bolivia’s prominent economic analyst of PriceWaterhouseCoopers, Francisco Munoz, 
thus pointed to the negative effects of this tax as it was analysed by many people in the 
private sector which saw itself most affected by it. Tax analyst Richard M. Bird 
described this transactions tax as introduced in Bolivia as an “archaic form of sales tax” 
that was introduced to gain a bit more revenue (Bird, 1992:12).
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Special Consumption Tax (also excise tax). In addition to the VAT and the 1 percent 
Transactions Tax another indirect tax was added in the form of the excise tax, which 
was imposed on several luxury items. Alcoholic beverages, tobacco products, perfumes, 
cosmetics and jewellery were taxed at rates between 30 and 50 percent. In 1988 some 
modifications were made as goods such as soft drinks, electrical goods, pottery and 
china, and automobiles were included in the regime, and several rates of existing 
products were changed (Bird, 1992:12).
Changes to the Administration. The reform as such represented a great change to the 
Bolivian tax administration as a large number of taxes had been abolished and as the 
remaining few taxes were geared towards an easy administration of them. Taxes like the 
VAT featured few exemptions, which also made them much easier to administer 
properly. However, apart from the wide-ranging changes to the actual tax system, the 
reform of 1986 also brought with it a number of changes to the tax administration, 
which were believed necessary to be able to benefit from the new tax system at all. A 
crucial change was that the payment of taxes was now processed via the banking system. 
Thus, rather than having to go to the Internal Revenue Office (which often involved a 
long time of waiting as, for example, in La Paz there had been only one office), 
taxpayers could now pay at almost any bank. While this not only made the whole 
process of paying taxes more convenient for taxpayers and speeded up the process 
considerably, this change also limited the interactions between tax officials and 
taxpayers thus significantly limiting opportunities for corruption. In addition, a process 
of reorganising and modernising the Internal Revenue Service was started. New staff 
was employed, manuals were elaborated and all employees underwent training courses 
in the tax laws and the new procedures that were introduced (Cabezas, 1990:538). Other 
administrative changes included considerably shortened tax forms and a huge increase 
in their distribution; tightening of penalties for non-compliers, for example some 
businesses were closed after failing to issue VAT receipts; and at governmental level a 
Ministry of Tax Collections was in place between January 1987 and late 1988 which 
during that period was the home of the Internal Revenue Service (before and after that 
time it was part of the Ministry of Finance) and was in charge of working out the 
regulations that were necessary in the aftermath of the tax reform approved in May 1986. 
Analysing the changes introduced to the Bolivian tax administration, Richard M. Bird 
said:
“The idea that the tax administration now has some idea o f what is going on, at least in 
a major part o f the economy, and can penalise non-compliers is something totally new 
in Bolivia. This realisation appears to have had a healthy effect in stimulating 
compliance." (Bird, 1992:16)
“Co-participation”. The tax reform entailed provisions that not all tax collections 
would remain with the central government but that a so-called system of 
“coparticipacion” (co-participation) would be established. Under this system: the central 
government would receive 75 percent of all tax income, the departments 10 percent, the 
municipalities 10 percent, and the universities 5 percent.
Tax Amnesty. The new tax legislation also entailed a tax amnesty, allowing taxpayers 
to pay a one-off tax for having their tax obligations until December 31st, 1985 forgiven. 
This one-off tax was a 3 percent tax on the presumed profits of enterprises and a 50 
percent surcharge on property (real estate and vehicles). The tax amnesty allowed 
taxpayers a new beginning and more generally can be considered as complementing the 
new start the 1986 tax reform aimed to achieve after several years of complete chaos of 
the tax system and almost non-existent tax collection.
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Appendix F 
Political Parties
Please note that the following list only contains presidential parties or those that have 
played a significant role in ruling coalitions.
Ecuador 
Democracia Popular (DP)
Centre-Left
The DP, previously called Democracia Cristiana, was founded in 1964. It was originally 
set up as a left-wing force basing its ideology in between capitalism and Marxism and 
combining it with the Catholic Church’s social doctrine. It subsequently went through a 
significant transformation and by the 1980s had adopted a liberal economic doctrine. It 
had undergone a switch from the centre-left to the centre or centre-right. The party’s 
main electoral support comes from the sierra, especially from the rural middle class. 
Currently this Christian Democratic party is considered a reformist party with a clearly- 
defined ideology and a technocratic image. In the 1979 elections DP candidate Osvaldo 
Hurtado won the vice-presidency and became President in 1981 after Roldos died in an 
air crash. In 1998 Jamil Mahuad of the DP was elected President and stayed in power 
until 2000.
Frente Radical Alfarista (FRA)
Secular Centre-Right
The FRA was set up in 1972 by Abdon Calderon who had left the liberal party. 
Calderon was assassinated in the late 1970s and replaced by his daughter. During the 
1990s the FRA’s leader was Fabian Alarcon. With the exceptions of the 1984 and 1986 
elections (where it won six and four seats respectively) it has never won more than three 
seats in Congress. Its leader Fabian Alarcon was appointed as interim President after 
Bucaram (PRE) had left in 1997 and stayed in this position until 1998.
Izquierda Democratica (ID)
Centre-Left
The ID was founded in the early 1970s (officially registered in 1978) by Rodrigo Boija 
and others who split up from the Liberals. Similarly to the DP it was set up as an 
alternative to the traditional political parties and considered itself particularly to be an 
opposition to the governments of Velasco Ibarra. Probably more than any other 
Ecuadorian party the ID has a firm ideological programme based on social democratic 
thinking. It belongs to the international federation of social democratic parties. In the 
preamble of its party programme it states: “within the ideological framework o f  
democratic socialism ”, the ID promotes “a state that would be an agent o f economic 
and social development o f the Ecuadorian people, the re-distribution o f income, the 
rational and fu ll exploitation o f the natural resources, and the breaking-off from  
external dependence”. The ID advocates a mixed economic model in which the state 
directs the economy while at the same time foster the development of the private sector. 
While largely abiding by its social-democratic ideology, the ID changed some of its 
views after it had been in power from 1988 to 1992. While previously stressing the role 
of the state, their economic programme changed to acknowledge that the use of market 
mechanism in certain areas would be more efficient. The ID has its electoral base in the 
sierra and is supported mainly by Quito’s middle class, the peasantry, and trade 
unionists. In 1988 its candidate Rodrigo Borja was elected president and stayed in 
power until 1992.
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Partido Roldosista Ecuatoriano (PRE)
Personalist
The PRE was founded in 1983 by Abdala Bucaram in Guayaquil. It was set up in 
competition to the PCD {Pueblo, Cambio y Democracia) led by Leon Roldos, brother of 
the late president Jaime Roldos and Bucaram’s brother-in-law, which was in itself a 
split-up from Jaime Roldos’ CFP (Concentracion de Fuerzas Populares). The PRE 
understood itself as being more truthful to the political tradition of Jaime Roldos than 
the PCD. The party has a highly personalist character, with Bucaram acting as “a 
personalist leader who converted the group in an extension o f him self.. he created an 
organisation to have a platform for projecting his own leadership" Freidenberg 
(2001:344). The PRE’s party platform states that it will carry out a great social change 
which will divest the oligarchy of its power and would introduce socially and 
economically just conditions. When elected to power in 1996, however, the policies 
chosen were of an orthodox nature. It is therefore difficult to classify the PRE 
ideologically. In a survey carried out by Freidenberg (2001:350) members of the PRE 
located the party on the left side of the scale, while members of other parties considered 
it to be clearly on the right. The party receives most of its support in the coastal regions, 
mainly among marginalised groups, and also the business sector from the coast that had 
emerged outside the traditional oligarchic circles. Abdala Bucaram was elected 
president in 1996 and stayed in power until 1997.
Partido Social Cristiano (PSC)
Right
This party was founded in the 1951 as a group split up from the Conservatives and is 
therefore one of the oldest parties still competing today. It is the main party on the Right 
and has its electoral base mainly in the coastal provinces. Though the PSC only won the 
presidency once (in 1984), since Ecuador’s return to democracy it is the party that has, 
on average, won most votes. Economically, the PSC aims to modernise the business 
sector and follows market-oriented ideas backing policies to limit the intervention of the 
state. The PSC is often considered to be closely allied with the business sectors of 
Guayaquil. Leon Febres Cordero was President in 1984-88; in 1992 former member 
Sixto Duran Ballen was elected President only a few months after he had left the PSC 
and set up his own party, the Partido Unidad Republicana (PUR).
Sources: Corkill and Cubitt, 1988; Alban G. et al., 1994; Sanderson, 2000; Freidenberg, 
2001; Coppedge, 1998a+b.
Bolivia 
Accion Democratica Nacionalista (ADN)
Right
The ADN was founded in 1979 around the former dictator Hugo Banzer Suarez (1971- 
78). Its economic programme considers the free-market system as the most efficient 
way of distributing resources and the ADN has consequently supported market-oriented 
reforms during the last two decades. The party has close connections to the business 
sector and represents its interests as well as that of the middle class. It represented the 
second biggest party after the MNR as regards votes received in elections between 1985 
and 2002 (though in the 2002 elections it all but disappeared). Banzer was elected 
president in 1997 but could not fulfil his term as he stepped down in 2001 and handed 
over to Vice-president Jorge Quiroga after he was diagnosed lung cancer.
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Conciencia de Patria (CONDEPA)
Personalist
CONDEPA was set up in 1988 by Bolivia’s media mogul Carlos Palenque. The party 
lobbied against neoliberal economic policies, and received most electoral support from 
the aymara speaking population of La Paz and El Alto. Its economic programme is 
largely defined by a critique of neoliberal policies. A few months before the 1997 
elections Palenque died and Remedios Loza took over as leader of the party. Internal 
conflicts ensued and by the 2002 elections the party had been dissolved. CONDEPA 
participated as coalition partner in the government of Banzer in 1997 but had already 
left it by 1998. Condepa won 9% of the votes in 1989, 10% in 1993, and 13% in 1997.
Movimiento de la Izquierda Revolucionaria (MIR)
Centre-Left
The MIR was founded in 1971 by Jaime Paz Zamora, Oscar Eid and other young 
militants who had split up from the Partido Democratico Cristiano. During the period 
of Banzer’s dictatorship several leaders of the MIR were persecuted and went into exile 
or were killed. While originally having its programmatic base in revolutionary Marxism, 
the MIR has gradually assumed more moderate and reformist positions in line with 
social democratic thought. Particularly by indirectly supporting Paz Estenssoro’s New 
Economic Policy and by co-goveming with Banzer’s ADN in 1989-93, the MIR’s 
position had moved to accepting a market-oriented approach and structural reforms. 
Interestingly, members of the MIR consider their party as centre-left, while members of 
other parties consider it as centre-right (survey was undertaken in 1996-99; Garcia, 
2001:98-99). During the 1990s leaders of the MIR were repeatedly accused of having 
links to narco-traffickers, which lastingly damaged the party’s reputation and negatively 
impacted on its election results. The MIR represented the third-biggest party -  as 
regards votes received -  during the elections between 1985 and 2002. Paz Zamora held 
the presidency in 1989-93.
Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario (MNR)
Centre-Right
The MNR was founded in 1941 by Victor Paz Estenssoro, Heman Siles Zuazo (who 
later split from the party) and others and is thus the oldest party still forming part of 
Bolivia’s political arena. Since the mid-1980s its programme has been committed to 
economic liberalisation, political modernisation, and a rational and technocratic 
approach. In the elections between 1985 and 2002 it has, on average, received the 
largest number of votes. Since 1985 the MNR held the presidency three times: 1985-89 
under Paz Estenssoro, 1993-97 and 2003-03 under Sanchez de Lozada.
Nueva Fuerza Republicana (NFR)
Personalist
In the 1997 elections NFR participated as part of an electoral alliance with the ADN but 
left the coalition in 2000. In 2002 the NFR first participated individually on the national 
level and received 27% of the votes. The leader of the party is Manfred Reyes Villa, the 
Mayor of Cochabamba. He was leading the polls for a long time but in the end came 
only third. The party positions itself as an alternative to the traditional parties and 
promises to put the state back in charge of the economy. The NFR also announced that 
the capitalisation process would be revised.
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Union Civica Solidaridad (UCS)
Personalist
The UCS was founded in 1989 by Max Fernandez, owner of Bolivia’s largest beer 
brewery. It has its support base mainly among the urban poor but also among the 
business sector in Santa Cruz. Its identity is largely based on distancing itself from the 
traditional parties and its economic policy programme is generally rather void of 
specific proposals. Categorising the UCS is therefore difficult. As Morales stated: 
“neither the ideology nor economic program o f the UCS are known, and it is not clear 
i f  the populist label often ascribed to it is even appropriate ” (Morales, 1994:133). 
When party members were asked to locate their party within a left-right spectrum, most 
of them assigned it to a centre position (Garcia, 2001:123). The party’s past election 
campaigns were accompanied by activities such as building schools, hospitals, or 
distributing food and consumer goods in rural areas, which made a commentator 
describe Fernandez as “a combination o f Donald Trump and Santa Claus ” (quoted in 
Gamarra, 1994:119). After Max Fernandez died in a plane crash in 1995, the party 
leadership was passed on to his son Johnny Fernandez. The party participated in the 
coalition governments of Sanchez de Lozada (1993-97 and 2002-03) and Banzer and 
Quiroga (1997-2002). While the party received strong support in its first elections and 
won 15% in 1993 and 16% in 1997, it gained only 5% in 2002.
Sources: Gamarra and Malloy, 1995; Garcia, 2001; Fundacion Milenio 2002+2003; 
Domingo, 2001; Coppedge, 1998a+b; Election data from CNE.
326
Appendix G
Bolivia: Overview of Tax System, 1986 -  2004
Note that the dates in the tables below indicate when the decision on the tax was taken, not when it started to be charged.
1986 1990 1992 1994
2000
(January)
2 0 0 0
(November) 2 0 0 4
VAT
(Impuesto al Valor Agregado - IVA) 10% 13%
“Complementary Tax”
(Regimen Complementary al IVA -  RC-IVA) 10% 13%
Tax on the Presumed Profits of Companies
(Impuesto a la Renta Presunta de las Empresas -  IRPE) 2% Abolished
Corporate Income Tax
(Impuesto sobre las Utilidades de las Empresas - IUE)
— 25%
Transactions Tax
(Impuesto a las Transacciones - IT) 1% 2% 3%
Special Consumption Tax (or Excise Tax)
(Impuesto as los Consumos Especlficos - ICE) 30% + 50%143
18% + 
50%144
21%-33% + 
56%145 18% + 50 %2
Property and Vehicle Tax Property: 0.15%-2.65% Vehicles: 0.5% - 4%146
Property: 0.35% -1.5% 
Vehicles: 1.5% - 5%147
Financial Transactions Tax
(Impuesto a las Transacciones Financieras - ITF)
— 0.3%
Source: Own elaboration. Data from Laws 843, 1141, 1314, 1606, 2047, 2152, 2646.
143 50% on cigarettes, tobacco and jewellery; 30% on beer, wine, spirits, perfume and cosmetics.
144 50% on cigarettes and tobacco; 18% on sale of cars; fixed rates for beer, wine and spirits (adjusted annually according to exchange rate).
145 56% on cigarettes and tobacco; 21-33% on sale of cars (depending on fuel and price); fixed charge on alcohol and soft drinks also increased.
146 Impuesto a la Renta Presunta de los Propietarios de Bienes -  IRPPB.
147 Impuesto a la Propiedad de Bienes Inmuebles y  Vehiculos Automotores -  IPBIVA.
Ecuador: Overview of Tax System, 1984 -  2001
1984 1989 1993 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999(April)
1999
(November) 2000 2001
VAT
(Impuesto al Valor Agregado)
10% 
(Sales Tax) 10% (VAT) 12%
Personal Income Tax
(Impuesto a la Renta de 
Personas Naturales)
1 0 % -2 5 % Abolished 5% -15 % 5% - 25%
Corporate Income Tax
(Impuesto a la Renta para 
Sociedades)
25% 20% (10%) Abolished 15% 25%
Special Consumption Tax 
(or Excise Tax) (Impuesto a 
los Consumos Especiales)
5% - 
260%'
5% - 
100% n
5% - 
67%“
8% - 
103%iv 8% - 75% v
Tax on (Sale of) Vehicles
(Impuesto a la Propiedad de 
los Vehlculos)
— 2% vi — 4%vii . . . 0.5% -4%viii
Tax on Net Capital of 
Companies (Impuesto al 
Capital Neto de las 
Sociedades)
. . . 1% —
Financial Transactions Tax
(Impuesto a la Circulacion de 
Capitales)
. . . 1% 0.8% Abolished
Tax on Corporate Assets
(Impuesto al Patrimonio de 
las Sociedades)
. . . 1 % (one- 
off)
. . .
Tax on Public Events
(Impuesto a los Espectaculos 
Publicos)
— 10%
Source: Own elaboration. Data from Laws 56, 51, 110, 06, s/n 31.7.97, 98-17, 99-24, 99-41, 2000-1, 2001-41.
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I Cigarettes (Virginia tobacco) 200-260%; Cigarettes (black tobacco) 10-70%; Beer 85%; Soft Drinks 20%; Mineral and purified water 5%; Alcohol (other than beer) 100%.
II Cigarettes (Virginia tobacco) 100%; Cigarettes (black tobacco) 25%; Beer 30%; Soft Drinks 12%; Mineral and purified water 5%; Alcohol (other than beer) 20%.
1,1 Cigarettes (Virginia tobacco) 67%; Cigarettes (black tobacco) 15%; Beer 30%; Soft Drinks 12%; Mineral and purified water 5%; Alcohol (other than beer) 20%.
 ^Cigarettes (Virginia tobacco) 103%; Cigarettes (black tobacco) 48%; Beer 43%; Soft Drinks 15%; Mineral and purified water 8%; Alcohol (other than beer) 63%. 
v Cigarettes (Virginia tobacco) 75%; Cigarettes (black tobacco) 18%; Beer 30%; Soft Drinks 10%; Mineral and purified water 8%; Alcohol (other than beer) 26%. 
w Impuesto Especial 2% Vehiculos Defensa Nacional. One-off, on sale.
v" Impuesto a la Propiedad de los Vehiculos de Lujo. One-off on luxury vehicles worth over ECS200m (-US$22,000); 5% on planes, helicopters, and yachts. 
vl" Impuesto a la Propiedad de los Vehiculos.
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